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In challenging the orthodox interpretation of 
Israel's decision-making on issues of deter­
rence and defense during the turbulent days 
of 1967, the authors of this penetrating 
analysis are able to demonstrate conclusively 
that questionable logic informed both the 
process and the substance of choice during 
that perilous time. And the brilliant defensive 
success of the Israelis that ensued has, they 
find, tended to obscure what were quite 
major defects in the logical treatment ac­
corded basic issues, many of which are of 
current as well as of historic interest in that 
they are again prominent on the international 
agenda of architects of new security ar­
rangements in the troubled Middle East. 
Because it provides an explanation of the 
decisions taken that involves an innovative 
treatment of the limits of rationality, this 
pioneering work will prove of intense inter­
est, not only to analysts of Middle Eastern 
politics, but also to students of decision-
making and strategic problems in general. By 
undertaking a systematic evaluation of deci­
sions — a task that is often neglected — the 
authors expand the traditional concept of ra­
tional choice to encompass the logic of argu­
ment and the revision of opinion that occurs 
in °a climate of uncertainty; and, through 
examinat ion of the limits of rat ional 
decision-making, they reach the conclusion 
that if the conflict in the Middle East is to be, 
not simply managed, but effectively reduced, 
the constraining logic of deterrence that in­
forms both policy and practice must be fully 
appreciated. 
Raises both the analysis of foreign 
policy decisionmaking and its critical eval­
uation to a new level of theoretical and 
methodological sophistication. The authors 
first provide the reader with an excellent syn­
thesis and explication of available decision-
making theories and then apply them to 
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Preface 
This study challenges the orthodox interpretation of Israel's decision-
making on issues of deterrence and defense in 1967 Generally regarded as a 
success, performance in 1967 was dramatized further by the allegedly 
defective processes of choice that preceded the October War in 1973. The 
defensive success in 1967, however, has obscured both the failure of 
deterrence and decision-making. A careful explanation and evaluation of 
decision-making in the weeks that preceded the preemptive attack in June 
of 1967 highlights the questionable logic which informed both the 
substance and the process of choice. On critical issues of deterrence and 
defense, the logic of argument was seriously flawed. 
The issues of security that dominated discussion in 1967 are of interest 
not only to historians. Since the beginning of the painful but promising 
peace-making process in 1973, these same issues define the boundaries of 
an often passionate debate. Within Israel, where the cost of defense has 
been widely dispersed and personally felt, a citizen army encourages 
widespread participation in a heated discussion of the requirements of 
security. Not only do "armchair generals" argue about the merits of 
alternative strategies, but "armchair prime ministers" monitor the 
effectiveness of decision-making procedures. More than a decade later, 
many of the issues that confronted Israel's cabinet in 1967 are again 
prominent on the national and, indeed, international agenda. This 
dissection of the substance and process of decision-making is relevant not 
only to the archaeologists but also to the architects of new security 
arrangements in the Middle East. The consequences of choice are so 
important that the quality of the processes and the logic of the arguments 
are of significance. 
A concern with process and argument stimulated this investigation of 
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Israel's decision-making in 1967 It is sometimes difficult to trace the 
intellectual history of a project but, in this case, the stimulus is painfully 
obvious. We were both visitors in the Department of International 
Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in the days immediately 
following the October War in 1973 and were party to the extensive 
examination of the causes and consequences of faulty argument and poor 
decision-making processes. In many long hours of discussion, our interest 
in the quality of choice as well as in the rationality of arguments and 
estimates acquired new meaning. In our intense debate, evaluation of 
decisions was rarely separated from their explanation. No evaluation of 
critical decisions could be made without an explanation of the processes 
which produced them, but an explanation which provided no basis for 
evaluating the quality of these choices, while theoretically interesting, was 
"academic" in all senses of the word. As in many other areas in the study of 
human conduct, too little attention has been paid to quality as a focus of 
explanation and as a criterion for evaluation. This link between 
explanation and evaluation is the principal theoretical and normative 
concern of this study 
This emphasis on the explanation and evaluation of the substance and 
process of decision-making makes unavoidable a somewhat lengthy 
introduction to the issues that challenged Israel's policymakers in 1967 In 
Part One, Chapter 1 examines concepts of rationality that are used to 
evaluate choice and estimation and expands traditional concepts to include 
the logic of argument. Chapter 2 reviews contemporary explanations of 
decision-making while Chapter 3 transcends the theoretical debate by 
synthesizing complementary explanations to specify multiple paths to 
choice. Part One establishes the theoretical framework for the explanation 
and evaluation of Israel's decision-making which follows. It emphasizes the 
rationality of argument and process and synthesizes theoretical strands in 
the explanation of choice. 
Part Two explains and evaluates argument, process, and choice in Israel 
during 1967 In Chapter 4, the logic of strategic argument which informed 
the choices of decisionmakers is reconstructed and evaluated. Since many 
of these same concepts of deterrence and defense are once again the subject 
of considerable controversy, discussion of their assumptions and 
implications should be of interest both to those who anxiously watch and 
to those who participate in the search for peace and security that have 
eluded the Middle East for more than a quarter of a century. Chapters 5 to 
7 explain the critical decisions of May and June 1967 and evaluate the 
rationality of the arguments and processes leaders used. Surprising 
strength in the performance of important decisional tasks is marred by 
confusion and illogic in the application of basic concepts of national 
security. Chapters 8 and 9 draw on decision theory, sensitivity analysis, and 
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Bayesian inference to evaluate the rationality of opinion revision and 
choice. A distinctive feature of Part Two is the systematic evaluation of the 
logic of argument and the rationality of estimates and choice. 
Part Three returns to the central theme of the rationality of choice, 
process, and argument and considers the implications of the research 
results for theory and policy. After collaboration in the development of 
concepts and methods, a collaboration frequently punctuated by lively 
exchanges, Janice Gross Stein wrote Chapters 1 through 7 and 10, and 
Raymond Tanter is the author of Chapters 8 and 9. 
In both the explanation and evaluation of choice, we rely heavily on 
empirical evidence of decision-making processes in 1967 Our colleagues 
and students provided invaluable assistance in collecting and interpreting 
the data we needed. Particularly we wish to thank those in the Department 
of International Relations at the Hebrew University who read and 
criticized portions of the manuscript. Michael Brecher of McGill 
University, a frequent visitor to the department, suggested a collaborative 
enterprise and generously made available his invaluable collection of 
primary data on the decision process in 1967 He read and commented 
upon several early drafts of the manuscript, and his detailed knowledge of 
Israel's foreign policy-making was offered freely and exploited frequently. 
When he was visiting professor in the department, Thomas Schelling 
provided helpful suggestions for revisions of Chapter 8. Robert Jervis, who 
visited in the spring semester of 1977, read the first seven chapters carefully 
and offered detailed and helpful criticism. Alan Dowty, now at Notre 
Dame, Yair Evron of Tel Aviv University, and Dan Horowitz of Jerusalem 
spent many hours in discussion of Israel's strategic doctrine and practice. 
Benjamin Geist freely made available his extensive primary data on the 
1967 decision process. 
Graduate students in the department were an unending source of 
stimulation and information. We are especially grateful to Yaacov 
Wertzberger, Motti Raz, Marcy Agmon, Inez Pollack, and Varda Sheffer 
for their interest and constructive criticism. Lisa Kaufman, Judith 
Shribman, Sarah Vertzberger, and Hemda Ben Yehuda contributed 
valuable research assistance in scaling dimensions of value in Chapter 9. 
Offra Vineberg and Zahava and Ze'ev Maoz carefully checked references 
and bibliography for the whole manuscript. More generally, the on-going 
interest of students and colleagues deeply concerned with these problems 
was a source of encouragement to us. 
We are also indebted to many of our colleagues in North America. A 
special note of thanks to Alexander George of Stanford University, who 
was so constructive in his criticism that he stimulated large-scale revision of 
the final manuscript. Blema Steinberg of McGill University and Gilbert 
Winham of Dalhousie University read early drafts of the first seven 
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chapters and provided extensive comments. Michael Stein of McMaster 
University read several drafts of Chapters 1 to 7 and 10 and corrected errors 
of substance and style. Susan Gross Solomon of the University of Toronto 
was extraordinarily helpful in the discussion of the philosophy of science 
and the logic of argument. She read Chapters 1 and 4 with painstaking care 
and demanded clarity in content and expression. Her insistence on rigor 
was always accompanied by constructive suggestion and warm encourage­
ment and support. 
Graduate students, both at McGill and at the University of Michigan, 
joined in the transnational and transcontinental debate and discussion. 
John De Marco, Grace Aldrovandi, and Ted Moss of McGill read the 
manuscript in its entirety and offered useful suggestions for revision, Ellis 
and Valerie Morris were exacting in their proofreading, and Edith Klein 
constructed the index with imagination and dispatch. Robert Olender of 
Michigan participated in the Bayesian revision of opinion in Chapter 9 
David Wiechert provided valuable assistance in ranking dimensions of 
value and contributed significantly to the analysis of the impact of in­
formation, and Jeffrey Colman painstakingly checked all calculations. 
Collaboration in this examination of Israel's decision-making was made 
possible not only through the help of individual scholars and students, but 
also through the generous support extended by those who sponsor 
research. We are particularly grateful to the Mershon Center at The Ohio 
State University who awarded the manuscript the Edgar S. Furniss Jr. 
Award and sponsored its publication. A special word of thanks to Richard 
Snyder and Charles Hermann of Mershon for their encouragement and to 
Anne Trupp of Mershon and Robert Demorest of the Ohio State 
University Press for their patience and perseverance in the editing and 
preparation of the manuscript for publication. They discovered and 
corrected inconsistencies in style and substance, and their high standards of 
professional competence contributed immeasurably to the readability of 
the volume. 
In Israel, the Director of the Leonard Davis Institute for International 
Relations, Nissan Oren, generously made available research assistance 
which facilitated the collection of data. A special word of thanks to Sophie 
Amir of the Leonard Davis Institute for her warm personal support and 
unending resourcefulness. The Municipality of Jerusalem housed 
Raymond Tanter at Mishkenot Sha ananim, the official guest house of the 
municipality, in the winter of 1977 when the collection of data for the 
decision analysis was completed. 
In North America, Robert Young, formerly of the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, provided partial support for earlier decision analyses. 
Support from the Canada Council, through its Sabbatical Leave 
Fellowship Program, permitted Janice Gross Stein to begin the primary 
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research on Israel's decision-making processes. Harold Jacobson, 
chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Michigan, and Frank Kunz, chairman at McGill, helped to make long-
distance collaboration easier. We owe a special debt to Catherine Duggan 
and Susan Milburn of McGill University who typed and retyped drafts of 
this manuscript. Catherine Duggan not only responded to innumerable 
changes with unfailing good cheer but also supplied the typewriter on 
which the early drafts of the manuscript were written, and Susan Milburn 
typed the final draft in record time despite the pressure from an author with 
an overdue manuscript. 
A special word of thanks is due Michael Stein and Judith Tanter who 
adjusted to extended field trips at inconvenient times, adapted with 
flexibility and good humor to changing schedules, and never objected to 
long and sometimes outrageous working hours. As colleagues, they 
understood with no explanation. 
If this explanation and this evaluation of Israel's decision-making in 
1967 contribute even in a small way to more responsible and rational 
national security choices, then our debt to those who have given so 
generously of their time and expertise will be partially repaid. We remain 
permanently indebted, however, to those who continue to hope that 
decisionmakers can be rational and who persist in holding them 
responsible. 
Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, 
Jerusalem, Montreal, and Ann Arbor, 
June, 1979 

part one 
A Theoretical Framework 

chapter A 
The Evaluation of Decisions 
A Foreword 
Do Decisionmakers Matter, and 
Does It Matter If They Are "Rational"? 
People rarely question the rationality of their leaders. Particularly on 
issues of national security, when so much is at stake, leaders are expected to 
be rational—to argue logically, to judge carefully, and to choose efficiently 
among alternative options. These popular expectations fly in the face of a 
large body of evidence, however, which documents important limits to 
rationality. The limits are neither simple nor uniform, but vary in scope, 
intensity, and in their consequences for policy. Rationality and its 
constraints, the subject of this book, have many faces. 
This study examines and assesses rationality and its limits when leaders 
confront difficult decisions about the use of force. While it systematically 
explores these limits, it also affirms the importance of rationality in 
decision-making. The book has two central purposes: to explain the 
processes leaders use to make choices on matters of national security and to 
evaluate the quality of their decisions. The explanation of decisions 
delineates multiple paths to choice, and all but one of these paths constitute 
different kinds of constrained rationality The evaluation of decisions 
provides criteria to assess rationality and its limits. These criteria are then 
used to evaluate the quality of arguments, estimates, and choices leaders 
made in one particular case: Israel in 1967 The explanation and evaluation 
of this sequence of decisions challenge the conventional interpretation of 
rational decision-making which produced a strategic success. Examination 
and assessment of argument, process, and choice in 1967 highlight 
important and unexpected flaws in rationality. 
Why this concern with the quality of choice? An evaluation of national 
security decisions assumes first that individual leaders do make a 
difference, that their choices about the use of force can have far-reaching 
consequences for domestic and international society, and, consequently, 
that their rationality must be of central concern. The premise that decisions 
4 I Part One: A Theoretical Framework 
about deterrence and defense are not trivial is basic to an assessment of the 
quality of choice. Before the detailed discussion of criteria to evaluate 
decisions is begun, it is useful to take a moment to consider whether 
decisionmakers do matter and whether it matters if they are rational. 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, individuals will no longer 
shape history but become its pawns. So argue many acute observers who 
emphasize the extraordinary impact of burgeoning technology and 
anonymous market forces on the scope for autonomous action by this 
generation of leaders. In the international arena particularly, complex 
interdependencies among states have constrained the capacity of leaders to 
control their environment. At home, a maze of organizational processes 
and bureaucratic politics further limits the latitude of policymakers.1 
Leaders, even the ablest among them, will operate more and more at the 
margin, or so the forecast goes. 
Despite this increasing complexity in the international environment, 
however, individual decisionmakers continue to loom large in contem­
porary politics. In an interdependent world, the actions of one must matter 
more rather than less to all the others. Interdependence, even though it 
complicates the decisional environment, increases the consequences of 
policymakers' choices for other members of the international system. 
Individual choice becomes more rather than less important. 
The scope for individual decision is also increased by the ambiguity of 
information in an uncertain and complex world. Because information is 
frequently ambiguous or inconsistent, multiple interpretations are possible 
and plausible. Choices among these plausible interpretations and selection 
among possible options, no matter how few, remain the province of central 
decisionmakers. If choices are to be made, rather than avoided, they must 
be made by those leaders formally authorized to do so. The obvious 
alternative to neglect or non-decision-making is the intrusion of 
individuals into the processes of history 3 
If an interdependent environment imposes constraints, it also provides 
new opportunities. Contemporary leaders have far more sophisticated 
instruments at their disposal than did their predecessors. Much of the new 
technology which has challenged their efficacy has simultaneously 
expanded their sphere of competency. A vastly improved communications 
network, for example, has transformed many of the rules of international 
1. Considerable emphasis has recently been placed on the external and internal 
constraints operating on foreign policy decisionmakers. Katzenstein( 1976) and Keohaneand 
Nyc (1977) examine the impact of interdependence, and Allison and Halperin( 1972) explore 
the constraining consequences of bureaucratic politics on the latitude of policymakers. 
2. Holsti (1976:18-54) and Jervis (1976:13-31) develop these arguments. 
3. Bachrach and Baratz (1963) argue that even non-decision-making requires the active 
intervention of decisionmakers who often must mobilize opinion to exclude an issue from the 
agenda for decision. 
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political life. The slow, somewhat tortuous diplomacy of earlier 
historical periods has been superseded, for better or worse, by almost 
instantaneous transmission of messages from one leader to another. 
Presidents and prime ministers conduct important negotiations live 
through satellite technology and, as television stars, they have unparalleled 
access to public and private audiences. Skilled in the use of transnational 
technology, contemporary leaders use the international system as their 
stage. Far from being anonymous, they frequently stand out in sharp relief 
from the gray, frustrating, difficult environment in which they work. 
The consequences of external interdependencies and internal 
bureaucracies, moreover, are not felt evenly in all areas of policy and in all 
kinds of decisional situations. When problems are not routine, they cannot 
be dealt with easily through standard operating procedures and established 
bureaucratic norms. When the extraordinary occurs, decisionmakers 
frequently cut through ordinary procedures and expand their latitude for 
decision. This is particuarly so on issues of national security when the use of 
force is possible. For no state is the use of force routine; and generally, 
whenever and wherever the use of force is considered, choices are made at 
the pinnacle of government. Leaders rarely delegate decisions about 
defense and deterrence to their subordinates but reserve the right and the 
responsibility to make those choices that jeopardize the security or survival 
of their communities. 
Preoccupation with defense and deterrence is not now, nor is it likely to 
become, an esoteric concern of the few. On the contrary, even after a 
decade of detente, leaders of the industrialized world continue to devote 
considerable attention and resources to stabilizing their security 
relationships. The leadership in newly independent states, working within 
more recently established borders and with fewer binding and well-
developed ties, grapples even more actively with many of the security 
dilemmas that preoccupy their counterparts in the industrialized world. 
Most leaders acknowledge that national security must include not only the 
absence of threat but also the presence of growth and development, but 
they consider a modicum of military security an elusive but essential 
precondition of prosperity. This is especially so in an unstable Middle East 
where historically decisionmakers have paid less attention to 
development- in part because of the absence of security. And, particularly 
in the Middle East, the choices of individual leaders are of consequence not 
only for those within the region but throughout an interdependent world 
community Interdependence increases the importance of the choices of 
these high-level policymakers who face important security dilemmas. 
If leaders do make some difference, then their rationality must be of 
central concern to those who explain and evaluate their choices. To be held 
responsible, decisionmakers must be capable of being rational. 
6 I Part One: A Theoretical Framework 
Criminologists, for example, recognize temporary insanity as an 
extenuating circumstance even for an act of homicide. This emphasis on 
rationality as a prerequisite to responsibility can be traced back as far as the 
onset of serious philosophical discussion. Particularly within the more 
recent tradition of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, rationality was 
both assumed and valued as the defining characteristic of human nature. 
Not only philosophers but also statesmen and diplomats were considered 
capable of reasoned thought and rational decision. Responsible leaders, it 
was argued, carefully consider their basic assumptions and are sensitive to 
flawed inference or contradictory argument; not only do rational leaders 
search for truth and understanding through reason, they are also capable of 
choosing the best option to achieve their objective. 
Confident of human capacity to reason and calculate, Enlightenment 
philosophers considered that only improved information and better 
argumentation were needed to improve the quality of choice. Faulty 
decisions were the result of ignorance, and progress was possible through 
education. Because scholars who assumed that leaders could be rational 
held them responsible, they did not treat kindly those who made poor 
decisions or committed irrational acts. 
Some philosophers have challenged the assumption of objectivity which 
underlay the premise of human rationality. Those who emphasize 
phenomenological rather than logical processes begin by arguing that 
decisionmakers define the boundaries of their problems through their 
perceptual networks. Phenomenology emphasizes human interpretation 
and evaluation of observable events; what exists is what decisionmakers 
consider to exist.4 Since an objective environment is ultimately un­
knowable and therefore irrelevant, argues the subjectivist interpretation of 
human history, an understanding of choice must rest on the explanations 
that leaders themselves offer. These explanations, not necessarily the 
product of strict reason, establish the context of a decisional problem and 
shape the subsequent process of choice. If individuals do matter in history, 
then history is shaped by their perceptions of the historical process. History 
is not objective matter but subjective spirit. 
The argument of phenomenologists does not threaten the concept of 
human rationality since rationality is not dependent on objectivity. Put 
another way, the assumption of a subjective context of decision is not 
inconsistent with that of human rationality. Leaders may consider 
carefully the quality and power of competing arguments, examine 
4. The phenomenological tradition within philosophy draws heavily on the work of 
Edmund Husserl who argued that the development of human self-awareness could be 
understood only through non-objective means. Although there are several schools within the 
phenomenological tradition, the core of that tradition is the emphasis on self-explication by 
subjects in their own right. 
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sequences of cause and consequence, and choose those options which they 
consider most likely to achieve their purposes. Although objective 
rationality is precluded, subjective rationality is not. Psychologists have 
posed a much more difficult challenge, however, to those who consider 
human rationality the defining characteristic of the species. 
Cognitive psychologists argue empirically that rationality, however 
desirable, is not the generally dominant mechanism of choice. Evidence 
drawn from a considerable body of research disputes the likelihood of 
rationality; human capacity for complex calculation and reasoned 
argument is constrained by basic cognitive structures. Decisionmakers 
diagnose problems, draw inferences, examine alternatives, and make 
choices through mechanisms which bear little resemblance to the ideal of 
homo sapiens. Leaders are constrained not only by complex in­
terdependencies in their environment, but also by unconscious mental 
processes and mental equipment. It is biology and psychology which limit 
logic. 
While the argument of phenomenologists has been accepted implicitly 
by many who study the making of national security decisions, new issues 
are joined when analysts grapple with the evidence of cognitive 
psychologists and debate the scope and limits of constrained rationality. 
There is little agreement either on its boundaries or on its essential 
components. Consequently, when they evaluate decisions, analysts often 
use the concept of rationality quite differently. Some concentrate on the 
quality of the selection and consider rationality as the choice of the most 
appropriate means to achieve given ends. Rationality then becomes a 
capacity for efficient choice. Others emphasize the quality of the 
procedures decisionmakers use to make their choice and pay particular 
attention to information-processing and estimation. The third and most 
inclusive concept of rationality emphasizes the logical quality of argument 
which shapes both the process of choice and its outcome. To be fully 
rational, a decisionmaker must be an efficient chooser, an optimal 
estimator, and a logical thinker. 
Application of these standards to particular choices is no easy matter. 
The analyst confronts problems of thresholds, feasibility, interrelatedness, 
and challenges to the validity of the standards. First, the precise threshold 
between rationality and irrationality is not obvious. The boundary, for 
example, between open-minded revision of estimates and exaggerated 
response to questionable information is not clear. Second, these standards 
are demanding and difficult to meet; if they are to be valid as criteria, 
they must be feasible and capable of being met. And third, meeting any 
one standard may make performance of related tasks more difficult. Pur­
suit of logical coherence in argument, for example, may complicate 
critical examination of evidence and options. Finally, these criteria are 
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not acceptable to all those who evaluate the performance of decision-
makers; some are not fully consistent with a concept of subjective 
rationality. Despite these difficulties and because the difference between 
rationality and irrationality is important—and fraught with consequences 
for policy—the evaluation of choice, process, and argument must be of 
central concern. 
Evaluation of Efficient Choice 
The criterion for evaluating the rationality of choice is the least 
ambiguous. Decisionmakers are judged rational only if they choose the 
most efficient option, or that alternative which promises them the highest 
expected value. The standard of performance is fairly straightforward: 
after they have identified their options, estimated the likely consequences 
of these options, and considered their cost and benefit, decisionmakers 
"trade off" expected cost and benefit to establish expected value. To make 
their choice, decisionmakers select that option which promises them the 
greatest gain or the smallest loss. Clearly, it would be irrational to choose 
the more costly alternative. Expected-value maximization, then, serves as 
the criterion to evaluate the rationality of choice. 
Efficiency as a criterion is fully consistent with a concept of subjective 
rationality. Decisionmakers need not choose the most promising of all 
possible alternatives, but only the most efficient among the alternatives 
they have considered. Nor do they need to estimate all the likely 
consequences or calculate all the costs and benefits. Within the context of 
whatever estimates of likelihood, cost, and benefit they make, they need 
only choose that option which promises them their highest expected-value. 
A criterion of subjective efficiency imposes no unique solution to a 
problem. Indeed, one would expect that decisionmakers who differ in their 
estimates of probability or cost and benefit would differ in their choices 
unless they are irrational. But, to be rational, decisionmakers must work 
with some estimates of likelihood and value to determine the most efficient 
option. If they do not calculate, they cannot be efficient. 
Although such a decisional process would not meet fully the criteria of 
reason established by Enlightenment philosophers, such a process is likely 
to produce a technically rational or efficient choice. Other things being 
equal, "good" procedures are more likely to produce "good" outcomes, and 
an efficient choice indicates a "good" decision-making procedure. Those 
who recommend systematic procedures recognize, of course, that they 
cannot assure good outcomes in each case (Brown, Kahr, and Peterson, 
1974:4). The story is told of a scorpion who, wishing to cross from one bank 
of the Jordan River to the other, spied a frog nearby and asked for a ride. 
The frog was somewhat reluctant to ferry the scorpion across the river. 
After considering the likely cost of some of the consequences, the frog 
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replied: "If I give you a ride, you may sting me and we'll both drown." The 
scorpion assured the frog that such an action was unlikely since their joint 
objective was to reach the opposite bank of the river safely. Reassured by 
the additional information, the frog reconsidered and agreed to the 
scorpion's request. Halfway across the river, the scorpion stung the frog; 
the obvious outcome of the scorpion's choice was the death of both. With 
final breath, the frog expressed bewilderment to the scorpion who 
explained: "You don't understand—this is the Middle East." 
If the quality of the frog's decision were evaluated by its consequence— 
death—the choice would obviously be a poor selection. The unsatisfactory 
outcome, however, did not result from a poor process of individual 
decision-making. The frog, after all, did consider the likelihood and cost of 
the consequences of ferrying the scorpion across the river and may even 
have made the efficient choice. The frog's death was the result of the action 
of the scorpion who did not consider net cost or benefit but alluded to other 
premises to explain the decision. The choice of one brought disaster to 
both, a not uncommon experience in international relations. Even if 
policymakers do manage to select the "expected-value maximizing" 
option, the immediate outcome in a sometimes capricious and often 
uncertain environment may not be anticipated or desired. Moreover, 
interdependence can produce jointly irrational results although each party 
individually is efficient. Over time, however—if the initial consequences are 
not ruinous and leaders have time—it is more likely that such systematic 
procedures will produce "good" results. 
Given this caveat, those who insist that efficiency of choice is a central 
component of a rational decision, who focus on repeated decisions rather 
than on a single instance, use only the expectations and values of 
decisionmakers and renounce the unfair advantages of hindsight. They 
exclude additional data introduced, ex post facto, but unavailable to a 
leader at the time, and insist that the evaluation of the rationality of 
decisions includes only the limited knowledge and complex preferences of 
leaders when they made their choices (cf., Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky, 
1970). An evaluation of a decision, for example, that incorporates 
information about the irrationality of an adversary—information that a 
decisionmaker could not possibly have had—is grossly unfair to the leader 
who very likely suffered the consequences. To go beyond the estimates 
decisionmakers themselves make, the argument goes, would be to violate 
the premises of subjective rationality. 
Not all those who make judgments about the quality of choice are happy 
with this reliance on the stated purposes, values, and estimates of leaders as 
the basis for evaluation. Criticism is launched on several levels. First and 
most important, critics insist that it is inappropriate to accept the purposes 
of policymakers as given and to consider only the efficiency of their means. 
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No matter how efficiently a group of decisionmakers were to pursue such 
objectives as genocide or massive annihilation of an adversary's civilian 
population, few would judge such leaders rational. Intuitively, most of 
those who study decisionmakers will not begin to evaluate their efficiency if 
they consider their purposes morally outrageous. 
When analysts question the purposes of leaders, however, they no longer 
assume subjective rationality but draw upon standards external to the 
decisionmaker. Although the criteria they invoke may be flexible and may 
allow considerable variation in the range of permissible purposes, these 
standards reflect a larger social or broader cultural ethos. Even though they 
rarely acknowledge it, most of those who evaluate efficiency generally do so 
only if the objectives of leaders are broadly acceptable. Before they begin 
their assessment of the rationality of choice, they engage in some prior 
assessment with other ethical criteria to eliminate the unacceptable as an 
object of evaluation. Although the introduction of other criteria challenges 
the central assumption of subjective rationality, those who evaluate 
decisions apparently tolerate some inconsistency. 
Even when purposes are not in dispute, critics are reluctant to rely 
exclusively on the stated values of leaders (Holsti and George, 1975:269).5 
One group of decisionmakers, for example, may place overwhelming 
emphasis on cost and consistently seek to avoid loss. Other leaders, 
working with the same problem, could focus most of their attention on 
possible gain (cf., Slovicand Lichtenstein, 1968). Using comprehensive and 
systematic procedures, the former would choose the risk-averse while the 
latter would choose the risk-acceptant option. But both decisions could be 
rational, and an evaluation of their efficiency could say nothing about their 
relative merits. When subjective efficiency is the only criterion, there are no 
unique solutions which are independent of the estimates leaders themselves 
make. A choice between efficient decisions cannot be made exclusively 
through rational decision procedures. While those who evaluate the 
rationality of choice can indicate whether leaders indeed were efficient in 
their selection of means, they cannot judge the rationality of values which 
inform the choice. 
Finally, critics argue, if rationality is restricted to the efficiency of choice, 
it becomes partial and static since it builds in no evaluation of the quality of 
information-processing. Technically, should policymakers make no 
adjustments whatsoever in their consideration of the likelihood of different 
5. George (1972:768-769) proposes that, even when the values of policymakers are not in 
dispute, evaluation of efficiency must include such criteria as the accuracy of estimates and the 
timeliness of response as well as the suitability of means. He suggests, however, that a broader 
normative framework is necessary. Central to any evaluation of decisions are the values which 
inform choices. Assessment of rationality must include a critical examination of values and 
value hierarchies, value conflicts, explicit doctrinal beliefs, and implicit decisional premises. 
They are considered here under the rubric of rationality of estimates and argument. 
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consequences, even in the face of substantial environmental change, their 
choices could be considered rational. Intuitively, an assessment of 
rationality in light of such rigidity seems unwarranted. Yet, to question the 
quality of leaders' estimates, analysts must go outside the boundaries of 
subjective rationality. 
This tension between internal and external criteria of evaluation cannot 
be resolved without doing some violence to one or the other. Certainly, an 
evaluation of rationality must begin with an assessment of the efficiency of 
decisionmakers. In the course of this assessment, moreover, analysts 
simultaneously can explore the impact of different values on the choices 
leaders would make if they were efficient. When analysts do so, they deal at 
least indirectly with the impact of alternative values on choice. 
If leaders cannot choose the best available means given their ends, if they 
are not subjectively efficient, then constraints to rationality are indeed 
severe. An evaluation of subjective rationality, therefore, is a minimal 
obligation for those who explain choice through subjective processes. But 
efficiency is a necessary but insufficient condition of a more dynamic 
concept of rationality. While proficiency is important, it is not enough. 
When analysts go beyond the internal logic of decisionmakers, when they 
evaluate more than efficiency, they address the rationality of information-
processing and the formulation of estimates. 
Evaluation of the Rationality of Estimates 
Before decisionmakers can choose among available alternatives, they 
must somehow process information to make judgments or estimates about 
the likelihood of different consequences. These estimates of probability are 
a central component in a dynamic process of choice. When evaluation is 
extended beyond the rationality of static choice to include the dynamic 
process of choosing, appropriate criteria are much less clear-cut. Generally 
speaking, leaders who are rational carefully monitor change in their 
environment, are open and receptive to new evidence, examine several 
rather than only one explanation of unexpected information, and revise 
their estimates in response to changes they consider important. Beyond 
these generalities, however, there is debate about both the processes and 
the scope of rational judgment. 
In the search for appropriate standards, a comparison is frequently 
drawn with the scientist as a rational decisionmaker. A rational process of 
estimation then becomes one which conforms to the norms established by 
scientific practices for the management of evidence. Such gross deviations 
from accepted norms as the retention of central organizing assumptions 
which are weakly supported by prevailing theory and evidence, or the 
discounting of overwhelming amounts of discrepant information, or a 
failure to search for evidence that the observer considers clearly available 
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and important are treated as evidence of irrational estimation and revision 
(Jervis, 1976:156-172). Imposing an even more demanding criterion of 
judgment, Popper (1959) argues that the distinguishing characteristic of 
the scientist as a rational decisionmaker is an attempt to falsify those 
assumptions which organize the interpretation of evidence and the making 
of inference. Since ad hoc hypotheses can be added or concepts modified to 
accommodate evidence which challenges central assumptions, a rational 
decisionmaker deliberately searches for information to invalidate 
organizing concepts.6 In an amplification of the argument, Lakatos (1970) 
emphasizes that, since assumptions are often competitive, a rational 
decisionmaker engages in comparative evaluation of more than one, if not 
multiple hypotheses. Only through comparative evaluation can estimates 
be appropriately sensitive to new information and evidence. 
The use of the scientist as a model does not really solve the problem of 
appropriate standards for processes of rational judgment, First, the 
procedures scientists use are by no means clear-cut. Critics of the neo-
Popperian view of science suggest that even those scientists who engage in 
experimentation under controlled conditions do not normally make their 
decisions using such rigorous criteria. Kuhn (1962, 1970a, 1970b) argues, 
for example, that "normal" science proceeds through a shared set of 
assumptions which dictates the problems to be investigated, a range of 
plausible hypotheses, and criteria of the adequacy of evidence to confirm 
these hypotheses. It is only in a "revolutionary" stage of paradigm change 
that decisionmakers in the scientific community consider falsification of 
one paradigm and its replacement by another. Otherwise, a community of 
scientists generally amend and modify available theory to accommodate 
moderately discrepant information. Indeed, the scientist anticipates that 
investigation will produce some inconsistent evidence or anomaly purely 
by chance. Falsification or rejection of a hypothesis in the presence of some 
competing evidence would be inefficient and costly in a process of scientific 
decision-making.7 And it would not be a rational response to a diverse and 
random environment. 
Even these criteria of normal scientific investigation are not fully 
appropriate if they are to be used to evaluate information-processing and 
6. The neo-Popperian criterion of rationality consists of at least two separate 
components: attitudes or policies toward central assumptions and rules for their evaluation. 
Only the procedures for the rejection of a hypothesis relate to the management of evidence to 
draw inferences. Of much greater importance is the emphasis on policies, or cognitive 
predispositions, toward the validity of central concepts. Rational assessment of concepts 
depends on prior cognitive attitudes toward the activity of assessment. See Mortimore and 
Maund (1976:11-33) for a more extended discussion. 
7. When analysts intrude the cost of extended search or premature rejection of a 
hypothesis in their evaluation of the quality of inference, they shift their criterion of 
rationality from process back to outcome. They are no longer evaluating the quality of the 
process but the efficiency of the decision to accept or reject. 
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estimation by policymakers. In the early stages of a decisional problem, 
when leaders are most open and receptive, they usually are not as self-
conscious as scientists in their interpretation of evidence. They generally do 
not engage in formal consideration of competing hypotheses or use 
established criteria of admissible evidence as a basis of confirmation.8 Since 
policymakers generally are not amateur scientists and rarely work under 
controlled conditions, standards extrapolated directly from routine 
scientific procedures may be too rigorous. 
If the criteria of rational procedures are in dispute, the constraints to 
even a rough approximation to these processes are well-documented by 
cognitive psychologists.9 Yet, there are cases where leaders have 
demonstrated careful management of information and scrupulous 
attention to procedures. During the Cuban Missile crisis, for example, 
advisers self-consciously searched for additional information and 
examined competing interpretations (Janis, 1972). A comparative 
investigation of decision-making and bargaining during international 
crises also finds that attention to discrepant information, though not 
common, nevertheless does occur (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:333). 
Even if decisionmakers do scrupulously observe these rules of evidence, 
the direction and scope of the changes they must make in their estimates 
may be unclear. There are no unambiguous criteria of optimality in 
opinion revision; it is not clear precisely how much change is appropriate. 
This is due in part to the ambiguity of evidence and the plausibility of 
competing hypotheses and in part to divergent evidence on cognitive biases 
in information-processing. Analysts acknowledge that, in an uncertain 
world of ambiguous information, contradictory inferences may be equally 
rational. When multiple interpretations are possible and plausible, the 
"right" direction is not obvious and no criterion of rationality can dictate a 
single conclusion.10 Because more than one interpretation frequently is 
possible, a restrictive standard of rationality would not be rational. 
Analysts must assess the reformulated estimates leaders offer given their 
available, often contradictory, evidence. In evaluating the direction of 
8. Scientific decisionmakers have access to a body of statistical literature which they use to 
ease some of the problems of inference. To reduce the likelihood of error in inference, 
statisticians have developed explicit guidelines for rejection of a hypothesis based on the 
probable occurrence of evidence. They acknowledge, however, that it is impossible to reduce 
simultaneously the likelihood of making two types of inferential errors. The decisionmaker 
who concentrates on avoiding the acceptance of an incorrect hypothesis is more likely to reject 
a correct assumption and vice-versa. It is interesting to note, moreover, that, in its emphasis 
on rejecting a null hypothesis, contemporary statistics uses a criterion of "falsiriability" to 
guide inference. 
9. Chapter 2 reviews in detail the evidence presented by cognitive psychologists on the
constraints to rational judgment. 
10. Jcrvis (1976:119) develops this argument at considerable length. 
14 I Part One: A Theoretical Framework 
change, moreover, they must acknowledge that frequently more than one 
formulation may be rational. 
Analysts must assess not only the direction of revision but also the scope 
of change. Were estimates changed too much or too little? Psychologists 
have marshaled somewhat inconsistent evidence on biases reflected in the 
scope of revision. Some experimental evidence suggests that decision-
makers are too radical in their processes of inference. They pay too much 
attention to the most recent information and give it too much weight in 
revising their earlier judgments; recent evidence looms too large in the 
modification of more general beliefs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Bar-
Hillel, 1977; and Heuer, 1978). A larger body of evidence, however, 
suggests that decisionmakers are far too conservative in their judgments. 
They pay too little rather than too much attention to new information and 
resist rather than exaggerate. 
When competing hypotheses are plausible and evidence is open to 
multiple interpretations, analysts can get some help from available 
techniques in assessing the optimal scope of revision. Bayesian analysis, for 
example, reflects a concern with conservative bias in information-
processing.11 Beginning with the initial estimates decisionmakers provide 
and consistent with a concept of subjective rationality, Bayesian analysis 
does not consider the quality of this first set of judgments but provides 
normative criteria for revision of these initial estimates in the light of new 
evidence. It does so by reconsidering the likely validity of competing 
hypotheses as new information is received. Although leaders are unlikely to 
use the elaborate procedures required by Bayesian analysis, the results can 
serve as a criterion to evaluate the scope of revision in the estimates 
decisionmakers offer. Bayesian techniques do not require the falsification 
urged by Popper but do emphasize the comparative evaluation of 
assumptions which Lakatos defines as rational. Because Bayesian analysis 
considers a rational decisionmaker as one who considers truth relative,12 
because it explicitly considers the ambiguity of evidence and competing 
11. Named after an English minister, Thomas Bayes, who lived in the eighteenth century, 
Bayesian analysis is an approach to probability revision which is consistent with the 
subjectivist orientation of this study. 
12. Although a full discussion of the "falsificationist" or neo-Popperian concept of 
rationality and verification are beyond the scope of the present inquiry, it differs 
fundamentally from Bayesian analysis in its concept of truth. The neo-Popperians are legatees 
of Humean skepticism and assume that truth cannot be validated through inductive inference 
to existing concepts. Closely related is the tradition of causal modeling developed by Blalock 
where the investigator rejects concepts as inadequate and chooses that model which generates 
the least inadequate explanation. Bayesian analysis adopts a still different concept of truth 
and reason. It rejects a concept of absolute validity and explicitly uses one of relative truth. 
The validity of assumptions is reconsidered through time by sensitivity to new evidence and 
across time by simultaneous consideration of competing assumptions. The emphasis on 
probable validity, recalculated in an ongoing iterative process, rather than rejection or 
acceptance of a hypothesis, is consistent with a concept of relative truth. By implication, a 
rational decisionmaker is one who considers truth relative. 
The Evaluation of Decisions / 15 
interpretations, it provides one yardstick for an assessment of the 
rationality of information-processing in an ambiguous and complicated 
world. 
The frustration of the analyst should be clear to the reader. No precise 
threshold between rational and irrational information-processing and 
judgment has been established. Nor can analysts infer a rational process 
from changes in the direction or scope of estimates. Optimal criteria of 
revision are not at all obvious when known or "true" probability 
distributions are neither available nor appropriate. While some leaders 
may defend an assumption in the face of a volume of discrepant evidence, 
others will revise their estimates in response to a dynamic environment. 
Grosso modo, most analysts would concur that the latter process of 
judgment is rational while the former is not. Even then, however, revision 
may not be warranted despite the large amount of discrepant information. 
Current evidence may be transient or deliberately designed to deceive; if it 
is, it should be ignored or heavily discounted. In an uncertain, unstable, 
and sometimes treacherous environment, there are no general rules for 
revision that can be applied before the fact. As a first step in an assessment 
of the appropriate scope of change, the consequences of revision can be 
compared with those of conservatism in judgment. If, for example, the cost 
of revising estimates too quickly is greater than the cost of failure to 
change, conservative revision may be preferable. But because the 
appropriate direction and scope of revision cannot be ascertained a priori, 
change in estimates must be highly context-dependent. The analyst and the 
decisionmaker must examine the empirical context to judge whether to 
revise estimates rapidly or slowly. 
Although optimal standards of estimation and revision cannot be 
established before the fact, the policy analyst is not totally helpless. Within 
very general guidelines, procedures of information-management can be 
evaluated independent of the direction and scope of change. Leaders' 
handling of the evidence can be scrutinized. Were they aware of ambiguity 
or contradiction in the information they examined? Did they seek 
additional information to clarify ambiguity? Did they consider more than 
one interpretation of the evidence? Did they consider the possibility that 
they were being systematically deceived? Did they consider the validity of 
the indicators they used? Did they use probabilistic and qualified or 
categorical language? In an ambiguous and complicated world, were they 
skeptical or certain? 
Once the qualky of information-processing has been assessed, analysts 
can then examine the direction and scope of change in prevailing estimates. 
They can survey the competing evidence that was available to decision-
makers at the time and, without the benefit of hindsight, consider the 
appropriateness of change. With careful attention to the biases they are 
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designed to correct, normative information-processing models like Bayes's 
can be helpful in evaluation. Although no precise threshold of rational 
revision can be established across cases and across time, there are broadly 
defined boundaries. Within these broadly defined limits and drawing on a 
multiplicity of methods, analysts can assess the rationality of estimates and 
the processes used to make them. 
Evaluation of the Logic of Argument 
The ability of policymakers to relate means to ends and to change their 
opinions does not say anything about whether those same decisionmakers 
profess logical arguments. Indeed, philosophers distinguish between 
efficiency or "practical rationality" and the logical quality of arguments or 
"epistemic rationality" (Benn and Mortimore: 1976:4). 
The logical quality of an argument inheres in the relationship among the 
components of an argument and in the procedures for deriving conclusions 
from premises. The formal study of these procedures has preoccupied 
philosophers for centuries and, in the main, discussion has revolved around 
the appropriate standards of logical argument; some equate logic with 
consistency, while others base logic on contradiction. Philosophers and 
historians have examined the structure of dialectical logic where 
contradiction animates the relationship among component parts of an 
argument. Alternatively, logical thinking is equated with some form of 
syllogism or two-premise argument; once certain propositions are posited, 
others follow necessarily. The logical quality of an argument, then, 
depends on its consistency. In a logical argument, higher-order inferences 
are compatible with lower-order assumptions, and two contradictory 
conclusions cannot be derived from the same set of premises. 
Unlike their counterparts in philosophy, cognitive psychologists 
traditionally have been concerned not with the logical quality of argument 
but rather with the structure and content of beliefs which organize 
thinking. Beliefs generally refer to assumptions about the environment. 
They may be first-order, or fundamental assumptions, or they may be 
higher-order and have other beliefs as their premises; higher-order beliefs 
are connected to first-order assumptions. Generally, psychologists use the 
term "belief" somewhat differently than do philosophers: philosophical 
discussion tends to emphasize the way beliefs or convictions are held and 
concentrates on the logic of the calculation based on these beliefs; 
psychologists, on the other hand, focus directly on the formation, content, 
and structure of the beliefs themselves.13 
This study draws on compatible elements from philosophy and 
13. The distinction is by no means hard and fast. Some philosophers examine "causal 
beliefs" or "epistemic rationality," and psychologists consider consistency in the content of 
beliefs (Adelman, 1974 and Benn and Mortimore, 1976). 
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psychology to develop and apply standards of logic. It uses criteria of logic 
derived from philosophy and applies these criteria to beliefs connected in a 
system. Higher-order beliefs which are connected to first-order assump­
tions can be considered as arguments. A belief system is a configuration of 
assumptions and arguments bound together by some form of constraint or 
functional interdependence (cf., Converse, 1964:207). That is, in a belief 
system the content of one assumption or belief sets limits for others related 
to it. The logical quality of the content and structure of leaders' belief 
systems becomes critical to any evaluation of their rationality. 
In the study of national security decision-making, it is assumptions, 
beliefs, and concepts—the terms are used here in an interchangeable way— 
about the international and national environment that are relevant. More 
precisely, it is the logical quality of strategic arguments which is of central 
concern to an evaluation of national security decisions. These arguments 
are built as a set of causally related propositions which claim consistency; 
therefore, evaluation of strategic logic on its own terms with some criterion 
of consistency is not a priori inappropriate. Selection and application of a 
standard, however, is far from obvious. 
First, there are different forms of logical consistency based on different 
kinds of syllogistic reasoning, and not all are relevant to the arguments and 
belief systems of political leaders. Second, strict observance of axiomatic 
reasoning may be inappropriate to the problems leaders confront and to 
the limited knowledge they have. Third, consistency must be a matter of 
degree. While the self-conscious search for consistency improves the logic 
of argument, the unconscious search for consistency may severely 
constrain processes of estimation and revision. If an argument is to be 
reconsidered and revised, its proponent must be receptive to the challenge 
of discrepant evidence. An intolerance of inconsistency at any level would 
produce pathology rather than logic. The boundary between the 
psychological dynamic of consistency-seeking and logical consistency is far 
from clear. Again, there is no precise threshold, and it is not obvious how 
much consistency is appropriate or, for that matter, how much is too much. 
All that can be said with any confidence is that a rational decisionmaker 
reinforces logical consistency with psychological tolerance of at least some 
inconsistency.14 
A second widely accepted standard of the logic of an argument is its 
14. The definition of consistency as well as its relationship to rationality is a matter of 
some controversy. Consistency can refer not only to the absence of contradiction but also to 
the stability of beliefs across cases and over time. Statistical definitions of consistency also 
emphasize stability which is measured through low variance. Consistent beliefs, consequently, 
are beliefs which are highly resistant to revision, and this resistance to revision may be an 
important component of irrationality. The interaction of processes of judgment with the 
substance of argument is examined in Chapter 2 where the psychological dynamic of 
consistency-seeking is discussed. 
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exhaustiveness. An argument is considered logically exhaustive when it 
considers all possible contingencies but, again, this may be too rigid a 
criterion. Exhaustiveness may be an appropriate standard when a universe 
is well-defined and its boundaries explicit. It is not applicable, however, 
when arguments organize an unstructured and ill-defined environment. 
This is precisely the kind of environment in which those who make 
decisions on national security operate. 
To evaluate the logic of the arguments that leaders develop, com­
pleteness and coherence as standards may be less rigorous than 
exhaustiveness and consistency but more appropriate. A complete 
argument is one which omits no essential causal factor in the relationships 
it specifies (Brodbeck, 1958:12). Omission of any one of these factors would 
invalidate the relationships that are posited.15 An argument is coherent if 
these factors are related as a set of propositions which are not 
contradictory. These two criteria of completeness in content and coherence 
in structure can be used to evaluate the logical quality of organizing 
arguments and their impact on subsequent processes of choice. 
First, the completeness of an argument can be examined to assess its 
usefulness as a guide to estimation and judgment. If, for example, strategic 
concepts include a list of indicators essential to monitor change in an 
unstable and unstructured world, leaders who draw on these concepts may 
be better equipped to make the kind of estimates necessary for a high-
quality choice. Alternatively, concepts may be so simplified that they 
permit a self-confirming interpretation for any conceivable message and 
promote irrational resistance to revision. The completeness of concepts 
decisionmakers accept can contribute directly to a rational process of 
estimation and revision. 
Second, and even more important, the coherence of an argument can 
significantly affect the diagnosis and definition of a problem for decision. 
Those responsible for national security frequently struggle with a 
particularly acute kind of uncertainty; in a poorly defined environment, the 
pertinent options and their relevant consequences often are not identified. 
If the arguments leaders know and use explicitly relate option to 
consequence and cause to effect, then they can be of considerable assistance 
in the diagnosis of a problem as well as in the identification and evaluation 
of options. Coherent arguments can help to break down the structure of 
uncertainty and to organize complexity. When leaders begin with 
incoherent assumptions and pay little attention to the flaws in the logic, 
they are severely handicapped in their processes of choice: the constraints 
to rationality will be severe. On the other hand, the powerful impediments 
15. Brodbeck argues that even completeness is too rigorous a standard when knowledge is 
imperfect and, at best, probabilistic. Given lack of closure and imprecise identifiable referents, 
completeness can only be approximated but not achieved. 
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to rational choice can be reduced somewhat if leaders can draw on well-
formulated and inclusive arguments. The logical quality of organizing 
arguments is of considerable importance to those responsible for national 
security. 
Finally, not only the logical quality of organizing arguments but also 
their use by those who make the decisions can be evaluated. Were 
decisionmakers sensitive to subtle or nuanced issues? Were they aware of 
any logical weaknesses in the concepts they accepted and applied? Or, if the 
arguments were flawed, did leaders replicate these errors during their 
process of choice? If the arguments they drew upon were complete and 
coherent, did policymakers understand and correctly apply them, or did 
they misuse and abuse available concepts when they diagnosed their 
problem and organized their decisional activity? Both pure and applied 
logic are a part of a comprehensive evaluation of rationality. 
While evaluation of the logic of arguments and belief systems is a central 
component in a broader assessment of rationality, standards of logic 
cannot be general and absolute but must be particular and context-specific. 
The criterion of completeness, for example, cannot be applied uniformly to 
all kinds of arguments; on the contrary, the scope of an argument is likely 
to vary with the context and scope of the problem it addresses. Particularly 
relevant will be prior examination of the problem and development of 
earlier arguments. Even more troublesome, standards of coherence also are 
relative: what is coherent to an analyst may not necessarily be coherent to a 
leader, and an analyst may miss hidden areas of coherence within a belief 
system. Psychologists as well as philosophers have been vigorous in 
challenging an objective concept of consistency as a criterion of 
evaluation.16 Finally, completeness may make coherence more difficult: the 
more inclusive an argument, the more difficult to specify fully coherent 
relationships among all the component parts. Despite these difficulties in 
evaluation, however, the importance of organizing assumptions to the 
subsequent processing of choice makes their quality impossible to ignore. 
The belief systems of leaders are the starting point of any process of 
decision: they influence diagnosis of the problem, processes of estimation 
and revision, and evaluation of particular consequences. The logic of the 
initial arguments leaders use to organize their problem for decision is 
among the most important determinants of the choices they make. 
The crucial dilemma analysts face in evaluating the quality of logic is the 
16. A group of psychologists who study the impact of personality on behavior treat 
consistency as a property of a belief system rather than as an externally-imposed criterion of 
evaluation. See the debate between Mischel, 1973 and Bern and Allen, 1974. Anthropologists 
also debate the bases of coherence in different thought systems and question the uniformity of 
standards across cultures. They pay particular attention to hidden bases of consistency which 
may elude an outside observer. For a brief review of the anthropological and philosophical 
debate, see Lukes, 1974. 
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substitution of their standards for those of the decisionmaker. For those 
who begin from phenomenological premises, it is especially difficult to go 
beyond the framework established by those who frame the argument. 
Fortunately, because assessment of the substance and use of strategic logic 
is so important, this dilemma may be more apparent than real in the 
evaluation of national security decisions. Contradiction between the 
assumptions of the analyst and those of leaders responsible for national 
security does not appear to be serious; insofar as leaders work with 
strategic logic, they accept a comprehensive concept of rationality. They 
too assume logical argument, rational processes, and efficient choice. More 
so than many of their academic colleagues, policymakers assume 
interdependent bargaining through logical argument and rational 
processes. Those who study and those responsible for national security 
decisions share a common criterion: both work with some standard of 
rationality. Although leaders frequently acknowledge human frailty, the 
possibility of error or miscalculation, and attempt to guard against its 
consequences, they nevertheless generally assume rationality in order to 
plan and choose. The alternative, they suggest, is paralysis in the face of 
history. 
It appears that those who study national security decision-making can 
escape neither the empirical nor the normative exploration of its 
rationality. If for no other reason than that those charged with 
responsibility for security see little alternative to rationality as the 
standard, evaluation of its dynamics must be a central concern. At the same 
time, contemporary scholarship continues a long and honorable 
philosophical tradition when it emphasizes rationality as a criterion of 
evaluation. Drawing on compatible elements within the 
phenomenological, psychological, and logical traditions, rationality is 
broadly conceived. A comprehensive concept of rationality encompasses 
the efficiency of choice, the quality of learning and judgment, and the logic 
of argument. With full awareness that decisionmakers rarely meet the 
exacting requirements of rationality in choice, estimation, and argument 
and with the expectation that rationality is constrained, the analyst 
nevertheless can proceed with a yardstick that is acceptable to all the 
dramatis personae. Humility replaces resignation when analysts focus on 
the extent to which decisionmakers can and do approximate rationality. 
Just as criteria for an evaluation of the quality of choice are drawn from 
phenomenology, psychology, and logic, so an explanation of choice must 
include multiple parameters if it is to address the complex processes and 
different forms of limited rationality. The next chapter explores different 
explanations of rationality and its constraints. A brief overview of the rest 
of this book, however, may be of some help in guiding the reader through 
the detours and by-ways on the rather lengthy road to explanation and 
evaluation of decisions. 
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An O\>erview 
This study examines the scope and consequence of constrained 
rationality among Israel's leaders in May and June of 1967 It explains and 
evaluates the choices they made when they considered options of force in a 
national security crisis. Decisions are treated not as discrete acts but as part 
of a process over time which permits an analysis of a sequence of decisions 
and an assessment of the cumulative impact of choice. 
Chapter 2 reviews the principal explanations of choice and examines the 
impact of collective decision-making in situations of crisis. It compares 
explanations of the five principal decision-making tasks—diagnosis, 
search, estimation and revision, evaluation, and choice—and pays 
particular attention to different forms of constrained rationality. Chapter 3 
develops the central theoretical argument. In an effort to transcend some of 
the ongoing debate in the literature, available explanations of choice are 
synthesized insofar as they are complementary. Multiple paths to choice 
which represent different forms of constrained rationality are developed, 
and the sensitivity of these paths to the logical quality of argument and 
group decision-making procedures as well as to leaders' perceptions of 
threat and time is considered. The chapter concludes by establishing 
appropriate levels of analysis and criteria of admissible evidence and 
inference for a valid explanation of decisions made by Israel's leaders in 
1967 As Chapter 1 establishes criteria of evaluation, so Chapter 3 sets the 
scene for explanation. 
Since strategic arguments are considered an important component of the 
belief systems of leaders responsible for national security, Chapter 4 
examines the concepts of deterrence and defense developed by Israel's 
policymakers before 1967 Insufficient attention has been paid to the use of 
strategic logic by decisionmakers when they make national security 
choices. The chapter evaluates the logic of strategic arguments and their 
likely impact on the subsequent rationality of process and choice. 
The next three chapters go to the heart of the matter and examine the 
performance of the five decision-making tasks in May-June 1967 when 
leaders considered the use of military force. Drawing on the paths to choice 
developed in Chapter 3, Chapter 5 explains the decisions to mobilize, 
Chapter 6 the decisions to delay, and Chapter 7 the decision to preempt. 
Each chapter assesses the impact of group procedures, situational 
perceptions, and the logic of the argument on the rationality of the process. 
Chapter 8 explores decision theory, sensitivity analysis, and Bayesian 
inference as tools for the evaluation of the rationality of opinion revision 
and choice. In Chapter 9 these methods are used to assess the rationality of 
the estimates Israel's leaders offered and the decisions they made to 
mobilize, to delay the use of military force, and to preempt. 
The final chapter considers the implications of the research findings for 
the explanation and evaluation of decisions. It returns to the issues of 
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efficient choice, optimal estimates, and logical argument and concludes 
with a reexamination of the concept of constrained rationality and its 
implications for policy. The study attempts to use multiple methods to 
untangle critical strands in the web of decisions and to assess the impact of 
the quality of argument and inference on the rationality of choice. 
chapter JL 
The Explanation of Decisions 
Choice in an Uncertain and Complex World 
Foreign policy decisionmakers do not have an easy time of it. They 
frequently make their choices in an uncertain and complicated world. 
Although those who watch decisionmakers struggle offer a variety of 
explanations of their processes of choice, they do agree that the two 
principal elements of a decisional problem are information uncertainty and 
value complexity. If decisionmakers could be sure of the consequences of 
the alternatives they consider, their task would be much simpler. If an 
increase in one benefit frequently did not require some sacrifice of another, 
decision-making would be much less painful. Decision-making, however, 
is neither simple nor painless. 
Those who observe policymakers' responses to the uncertainties and 
complexities of their environment debate the appropriate explanation of 
processes for choice. This chapter begins with a brief survey of the three 
principal explanations—analytic, cybernetic, and cognitive—to compare 
systematically their analyses of five main decision-making tasks. It then 
examines the conduct of the individual in a group context and concludes 
with a discussion of the impact of crisis-induced stress on decisional tasks. 
Drawing on these explanations, the next chapter specifies a variety of paths 
to choice and the conditions under which each is likely. By developing 
multiple paths which combine complementary assumptions from all three 
explanations, some of the ongoing debate in the literature may be 
transcended.1 Before examining these paths to choice, however, a brief 
discussion of the central problems of all decisionmakers—complexity and 
uncertainty—and a review of each of the explanations is in order. 
Uncertainty is pervasive in the environment of those responsible for 
national security choices.2 Decisionmakers allude to at least one 
1. Although others (Allison, 1971; Steinbruner, 1974) have contrasted the three 
explanations of choice, none has specified conditions under which combinations of each 
explanation are more or less relevant. The emphasis here is on complementarity of elements 
from each of the explanations. The focus of the prior literature, however, is on difference 
rather than on the possibilities for creating a synthesis as developed in Chapter 3. 
2. McClelland, in particularly apt phraseology, suggests that international relations can 
be considered a continuous contest between information and uncertainty (1966:134). 
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component of this uncertainty when they acknowledge that they are 
frequently unsure of the likely consequences of the options under 
discussion. If they knew the consequences of available alternatives, then 
policymakers could choose with certainty. They do not usually claim, 
however, to be in such an advantageous position. Nor do they generally 
profess complete ignorance about the likelihood of different consequences. 
Only infrequently do policymakers complain that they are proceeding 
blindly with no relevant information whatsoever. Generally, decision-
makers work with less than perfect information and often confront 
contingencies which affect the outcome of their choices but which they do 
not control. 
Since neither ignorance nor certainty prevail, policymakers must 
somehow estimate the probable consequences of the alternatives they 
identify. Virtually all national security decisions, then, can be considered as 
choices whose consequences are uncertain; only the level of confidence with 
which decisionmakers estimate likely outcomes varies. These subjective 
estimates of probability become a crucial component of the subsequent 
decision-making process. 
Some analysts suggest that this usual meaning of uncertainty may be 
inadequate when issues of national security are on the agenda for decision. 
Commonly used concepts of uncertainty assume that an environment is 
structured sufficiently so that the range of possible outcomes is known even 
if the probability of their occurrence is not. In most national security 
problems, however, even the listing of outcomes is a matter of uncertainty 
in an environment which frequently lacks sufficient structure. This special 
form of "structual uncertainty" becomes an important component of the 
policy environment (Steinbruner, 1974:18). 
Decisionmakers must contend not only with uncertainty but also with 
complexity in their environment. Those who study decision-making 
processes work with several different concepts of complexity. Some 
consider complexity a function of information from the environment; as 
the quantity of information grows, so does complexity. Decisionmakers 
may be forced to process large amounts of data or large numbers of policy 
alternatives relative to the time available for decision (Winham, 1977 and 
Alkerand Hermann, 1971:33). Not only size or volume but also variety can 
increase complexity in a policy environment.3 When decisionmakers must 
handle a wide variety of issues or types of information, complexity can 
become acute. 
3. From an international system rather than a decision-making perspective, McClelland 
considers variety an essential component of uncertainty. His measure of relative uncertainty is 
a proportional measure of the variety of acts an actor might use. McClelland suggests that an 
increase in relative uncertainty or variety of event/interaction patterns identifies the onset of 
crisis (1972:97). Here uncertainty is a function of complexity. 
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Complexity includes more, however, than the structure of information 
coming from the environment. Conflict between values, a crucial element 
of a complex decisional problem, is particularly relevant to this study. The 
defining characteristic of value conflict is the necessity to trade offone value 
for another; an increase in one requires some reduction in a second. When 
resources are scarce, value conflict is likely. If limited resources are used to 
achieve one intended outcome, they are then unavailable for a second. 
Even when resources are not transferable, when values do not conflict 
directly, purposes themselves may be in a trade-off relationship. In 1973, 
for example, Israel's decisionmakers chose to permit the resupply of 
Egypt's Third Army, trading military advantage for American diplomatic 
support in the immediate postwar period. They could not simultaneously 
encircle the Third Army and maintain American support. If decision-
makers think that they can achieve two purposes at the same time with a 
single option, then their problem is much simpler and their choice less 
painful than if they face value conflict. Unpleasant trade-offs, then, are a 
principal component of a complex decisional problem. 
It is useful to consider complexity and uncertainty separately although 
they are closely related. Even though a decision problem involves no value 
conflict, leaders are likely to be uncertain of the consequences of 
alternatives. It is very unlikely, on the other hand, that decisionmakers will 
confront complex decision problems where all consequences are known. 
To distinguish the two concepts and avoid overlap in this study, complexity 
refers only to value conflict. Uncertainty and complexity may interact, 
however, to increase the intensity of both. Evidence drawn from labor 
negotiations, for example, suggests that value complexity in a decision 
situation increases the ambiguity of information available to decision-
makers and makes the information subject to a variety of interpretations 
(Walton and McKersie, 1965:295; cf., Simon, 1969:86). 
To make their choices, decisionmakers must somehow reduce uncertain­
ty and simplify complexity. To do so, they must first diagnose their 
problem and determine what is at issue. They must somehow define the 
boundaries of their problem to set the scene for subsequent activity. After 
diagnosis, decision-making activity then generally includes four principal 
tasks: search, revision, evaluation, and choice. Search refers to the process 
of obtaining and sharing relevant information as well as to identifying 
options (Holsti and George, 1975:271). Often, alternatives are not simply 
available for identification and retrieval, but must be constructed to fit the 
diagnosis of the problem. Search is active rather than passive and, like 
revision, is directed principally at reducing structural and informational 
uncertainty. Revision refers to the updating of estimates in response to new 
information, thus indexing the sensitivity of decisionmakers to a dynamic 
environment. Evaluation refers to the processes of examining relationships 
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within the available information and assessing the appropriateness of 
alternative options. In their evaluation of options, decisionmakers try to 
simplify complexity. Through search, revision, and evaluation, 
policymakers structure and stabilize the decisional environment as a 
prelude to choice. 
Even after decisionmakers have searched, revised, and evaluated, they 
need strategies or guidelines to structure the process of choosing. Such 
strategies are often called decision rules. In British legal practice, for 
example, a well-known decision rule for jurors is "A person is innocent 
until proven guilty" or "When in doubt, acquit." This decision rule tells the 
juror not to be equally wary of erroneously convicting or acquitting; the 
error that is important to avoid is erroneous conviction. In medical 
practice, different norms have developed to reduce uncertainty; doctors 
follow a rule of "When in doubt, diagnose illness." The consequences of 
failing to treat the sick are considered more serious than treating the 
healthy unnecessarily. In both the legal and the medical professions, 
practitioners have developed decision rules that anticipate the conse­
quences of error (Scheff, 1963:98-99). Although no equivalent decision rule 
is available to those who are responsible for national security choices, 
policymakers often use "worst-case" logic to make their decisions. Risk­
aversity predisposes decisionmakers in doubt to diagnose the worst 
possible contingency and to choose appropriate precautionary measures.4 
Each of the three principal explanations—analytic, cybernetic, and 
cognitive5—suggests somewhat different yet sometimes complementary 
responses to these two central problems of uncertainty and complexity; 
consequently, the explanations posit different processes of diagnosis, 
search, revision, and evaluation. Performance of these tasks in turn 
produces varying decision strategies or procedures for choice. The next 
section reviews and reorders the literature to extract and highlight 
explanations of these five essential tasks. 
4. One of the most explicit statements of worst-case logic as a decision rule is that of 
former Secretary of Defense McNamara: "In 1961 when I became Secretary of Defense, the 
Soviet Union had a very small operational arsenal of intercontinental missiles. However, it 
did possess the technological and industrial capability to enlarge that arsenal very 
substantially over the succeeding several years. We had no evidence that the Soviets did plan, 
in fact, to fully use that capability. But . a strategic planner must be conservative in his 
calculations; that is, he must prepare for the worst plausible case and not be content to hope 
and prepare for the most probable" (1968:57-58). 
5. The use of the term "cognitive" to describe the third process of choice is both 
unsatisfactory and misleading. All processes of choice are cognitive in that all decisions are 
made through mental processes. Decisionmakers use cognitive processes to estimate, 
evaluate, and choose. This third process of choice is distinguished by the importance of belief 
systems throughout the decisional process. A search for a less misleading term, however, 
produced no better alternative. "Psychological" processes similarly could refer to analytic or 
cybernetic procedures within a subjective context. By default, current use of the term 
"cognitive" is continued with the understanding that all three processes refer to subjective 
decision processes. For similar nomenclature, see Steinbruner, 1974. 
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The Analytic Explanation 
Analytic concepts of decision-making present the familiar picture of the 
"rational" or efficient decisionmaker. Developed first as standards for 
performance, these concepts are used with some difficulty to explain rather 
than evaluate choice. Those who are subjectively rational are expected to 
reduce complexity and uncertainty first by dividing the decision problem 
into its major components and then by using a specified and defined 
procedure to aggregate these components to produce a decision. Analytic 
concepts pay less attention to problem diagnosis and search than to 
revision, evaluation, and choice. Once policymakers recognize a problem, 
they are expected to search for relevant information and to identify 
alternative courses of action. To evaluate the options they identify, 
decisionmakers estimate the likelihood of the consequences of each of these 
several courses of action and order these outcomes in relation to their 
preferences or values. They then choose that alternative which promises the 
greatest gain. 
Assumptions of comprehensive search, optimal revision, complete 
evaluation, and value maximization must be somewhat relaxed when 
processes of choice are explained rather than evaluated. Decisionmakers 
are not likely to meet these standards fully and consistently, but they may 
approximate some of these procedures some of the time, and it is precisely 
this approximation which is of interest in an explanation of decision-
making. The boundaries of an explanation of analytic processing, 
however, are not easily established. 
Analytic concepts of decision-making do not specify procedures for 
problem recognition or identification. Once decisionmakers diagnose a 
problem, however, they are expected to structure its solution through 
decomposition of its component options and their consequences. Even 
then, problem-solving procedures through decomposition remain some­
what vague. While leaders are expected to engage in more than cursory 
search, both for policy options and for information about their conse­
quences, the limits of efficient search are not easily drawn. 
Those who reflexively define their problem with little attempt to consider 
the issues at stake, identify only one alternative, and examine only that 
information relevant to one set of consequences clearly cannot be 
considered analytic. On the other hand, should leaders search at great 
length for additional information and options, they may delay the 
evaluation of alternatives already at hand. Formal models of efficient 
choice are of no help in establishing appropriate criteria of closure; there is 
as yet no normative theory of search.6 
6. One possible rule of limiting search for alternatives and their consequences has been 
suggested: search until the marginal cost of search equals the marginal improvement in the 
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Even though analytic concepts do not specify criteria of search, some 
tentative boundaries can be inferred if assumptions are somewhat relaxed. 
Inevitably, decisionmakers concentrate on the identification of what they 
consider to be the principal alternatives; indeed, a search for all possible 
options would be inefficient. Analytic decisionmakers, however, do iden­
tify discrete, if not continuous, options and then search for information 
relevant to their most important consequences. In particular, they look for 
varying kinds of information in different places. They use several sources to 
generate multiple streams of evidence. A distinguishing characteristic of 
analytic decisionmakers is their recognition of the uncertainty and 
complexity of their environment and their deliberate attempt to extend 
search beyond their immediate evidentiary base. 
In comparison to search, analytic concepts are only a little more precise 
in specifying procedures of estimation and revision. Policymakers must 
first extract and then assess a range of information to obtain diagnostic 
evidence. Criteria to distinguish "signals" from "noise," the first step, are 
not obvious before the fact, and formal models establish no such a priori 
standards. Yet, leaders must choose from a mass of data before they can 
generate and revise estimates of the likelihood of important consequences 
of the options they are considering. Analytic concepts are silent about this 
important first phase of information-processing. 
Once relevant information has been extracted, very general guidelines to 
estimation and revision can be inferred from analytic concepts. These 
procedures do not assume known or "true" probability distributions; 
objective probabilities are not a necessary assumption within a subjective 
context of choice. Policymakers frequently generate subjective estimates to 
consider the likelihood of different outcomes. Their estimates are not 
categorical but phrased in probabilistic language that mirrors the 
uncertainty in the policy environment. Generally, people tend to be 
overconfident in their judgments; they suffer from the "illusion of control" 
(Langer, 1975).7 An important characteristic of analytic estimators is the 
qualified and probabilistic judgments they make. 
Decisionmakers must deal not only with an uncertain environment but 
also with a dynamic one. In such a policy environment, new information 
may suggest new options to decisionmakers who are struggling with a 
problem. Incoming information may also encourage policymakers to 
alternatives found. Such a rule is neither practical nor optimal. It cannot be used since the 
value of alternatives is discovered only after search has taken place. It also constrains the 
identification of new options whose values have never been considered. There are no obvious 
rules for limiting what is potentially an infinite process. For a discussion of models of the 
search process—or their absence—see March and Simon, 1958:174, Skjei, 1973:9-46, and 
Kirkpatrick et al., 1976. 
7. Overconfidence in judgment is a principal generalizable finding of judgment research. 
SeeSlovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 1977. Fischoffs evidence of pervasive hindsight biases 
is consistent with overconfidence in judgment. See Fischoff and Beyth, 1975. 
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update probability estimates and incorporate those revised estimates in the 
evaluation of alternatives. Sensitivity to new information and revision of 
estimates is an important indicator of the analytic processing of choice. 
Again, it is difficult to specify the appropriate direction and scope of 
revision before the fact. The optimal rate of revision is dependent in part on 
the nature of the information and in part on the kind of problem 
decisionmakers confront; standards of revision are highly context-
dependent. 
If analytic explanations cannot establish the appropriate rate of revision 
before the fact, they do specify appropriate procedures of information-
management. Analytic decisionmakers consider the impact of newly 
received information on the validity of competing, rather than single, 
assumptions and on the probability of a variety of consequences. They are 
sensitive to ambiguity or contradiction in the evidence and consider more 
than one interpretation of the ambiguities they do identify. Analytic 
procedures generally encompass the use of more than one indicator to 
revise estimates, and they pay explicit attention to probabilities in an 
uncertain world. The probability estimates generated by these procedures 
are a critical component of an analytic process of evaluation and choice. 
In an analytic process, decisionmakers evaluate alternatives by ordering 
their preferences across dimensions of value. Policymakers who have not 
yet chosen to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, for example, may 
confront the choice between improving their international reputation and 
increasing their deterrent capability. They consider it possible to achieve 
one only at the expense of the other. If they are analytic, policymakers 
estimate the cost and benefit of the consequences of the two available 
options and then use some measure to calculate net cost or benefit. When 
they prescribe choice, models of rationality assume that decisionmakers 
comprehensively calculate cost and benefit, rank order their preferences, 
and produce estimates of net gain or loss for each option. Again, these 
assumptions must be relaxed if analytic concepts of decisionmaking are to 
be used as explanation. 
Just as decisionmakers do not search for all options, neither do they 
consider all possible costs and benefits. Indeed, if comprehensive costing 
refers to examination of all possible factors, evaluation of options could 
extend indefinitely. Enumeration of large numbers of negligible factors is 
empirically unlikely and probably unwise. Decisionmakers can be 
considered approximately analytic if they identify what they consider to be 
the important costs and benefits of major alternatives. More important, 
analytic decisionmakers recognize value complexity when it exists in the 
environment. They do not assume that they can achieve all values 
simultaneously, but they acknowledge that some trade-off may be 
necessary. Some value may have to be sacrificed if another one is to be 
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achieved. Analytic decisionmakers do not insist that their preferred policy 
option is "best" on all dimensions of value. In their discussion and 
evaluation, they are likely to argue that a policy option is "the best possible 
under the circumstances" of complexity and uncertainty. 
The calculation of net cost or benefit is neither simple nor obvious. If 
decisionmakers are to produce some net estimate, they must be able to 
order their preferences. This integrated set of values provides the yardstick 
to measure the loss or gain of alternative outcomes. Obstacles to the 
construction of such a yardstick are well known and widely discussed. If 
values are expressed in common units, as they are in many business 
problems, comparison is easier though not without difficulty.8 When there 
is no common unit of measurement, however, decisionmakers must 
translate units of value to produce a cardinal scale. They must compare one 
value with another to produce an estimate of net worth. 
Although decision analysis provides procedures for comparison across 
dimensions of value, these procedures are useful as norms in the evaluation 
of the quality of choice.9 Policymakers themselves are not likely to perform 
these complicated and precise calculations. Decisionmakers can be 
considered analytic even if they engage in a crude process of measurement 
where they generate non-quantitative estimates of cost and benefit. They 
may refer to the military advantages of an option which are offset, however, 
by its more important and unfavorable diplomatic consequences. They 
may discuss a loss of international prestige which is more than 
compensated for by strategic gain. When they use such concepts as 
compensation or "sacrifice" of one value to achieve another, decision-
makers are acknowledging rather than avoiding value complexity. 
Without making explicit the yardstick they are using, decisionmakers 
somehow do make comparisons across values to permit crude estimates of 
net cost or benefit. Some direct comparison of alternatives is at the core of 
an analytic process. In a complex world, if decisionmakers consider 
obvious costs and benefits of principal alternatives, acknowledge the value 
complexity their estimates may produce, and approximate some process of 
trade-off, their process of evaluation can be considered analytic. 
In an analytic process, a decision rule follows directly from prior 
processes of search and revision as well as from the calculation of net cost 
or benefit. Formally, to make their choice, decisionmakers are expected to 
discount the value of each option by the likelihood of its consequences and 
select that option which promises the highest expected value. The 
requirements of such an expected-value calculus are not simple; at the least, 
8. Even when units are expressed in dollar values, calculations for each decisionmaker 
will differ according to the value attached to money itself. 
9. Procedures for construction of a "yardstick" and for comparison across dimensions of 
value are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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decisionmakers have to perform some complicated multiplication. There is 
growing skepticism of leaders' capacity to understand, much less perform, 
these complicated calculations (Snyder, 1978 and Jervis, 1979). 
While formal calculation is unlikely, a body of empirical evidence does 
suggest that decisionmakers have considerable capacity as "intuitive 
statisticians." Psychologists who have examined processes of explanation 
or attribution find that their subjects work intuitively with statistical 
principles like covariance and discounting (Kelley, 1973 and Ross, 1977). 
While far from unbiased in their application, these intuitive statisticians 
would not be confounded by consideration of probability and value. 
Although decisionmakers are unlikely to make their choice through 
explicit calculation, it is possible that they will use much cruder processes 
to consider probability and value together. Analytic decisionmakers will 
attempt to choose what they consider to be the best among a set of 
alternatives through direct comparison of their likely advantages and 
disadvantages. 
When concepts of analytic decision-making are modified to explain 
rather than to prescribe processes of choice, some empirical evidence 
suggests that decisionmakers have the capacity to approximate such 
processes. A defining characteristic of analytic decisionmakers is a search 
for causal explanation of the relevant outcomes (Steinbruner, 1974:34). 
Analytic thinkers examine the causal connections between option and 
consequences and consider the impact of an option on different outcomes. 
They try to understand the consequences of an action they may choose. 
Attribution research in psychology, in particular, finds strong evidence 
that decisionmakers intuitively perceive causality and attribute reasons for 
the occurrence of events.10 Concentrating on the capacity of people to 
explain events, attribution research suggests that individuals do construct 
complicated cause and effect sequences. In their processes of attribution, 
individuals are considered intuitive scientists (Kelley, 1973). 
The attribution of cause to effect may serve important psychological 
needs. Decisionmakers may impose order on their environment by 
constructing cause-effect sequences (Kirkpatrick, 1975:70). They may try 
to predict and control their environment by anticipating the effects of their 
actions. They can do so only by considering the consequences of the 
options they examine. Indeed, the lack of structure in the environment 
which creates uncertainty leads decisionmakers to structure and order a 
chaotic world through causal inference. 
Because people intuitively make causal inferences, however, they are not 
10. The psychological literature on processes of attribution is considerable, but there is as 
yet little consensus on the processes or the mechanisms used by decisionmakers to construct 
explanations. Pioneering work was done by Heider, 1958, and continued by Jones and Davis, 
1965; Kelley, 1967, 1972a, 1972b, and 1973; Bern, 1972; and Ross, 1977. Fora useful review of 
the literature, see Fischoff, 1976. 
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necessarily analytic. First, the evidence suggests that processes of 
attribution are not free of error; there appear to be systematic biases in the 
construction of explanations.11 Second, although people work with a 
variety of causal schemata, they tend to prefer the simpler to the more 
complex.12 They may use only one or two simple causal sequences to reduce 
the uncertainty in their environment and ignore interaction and feedback 
(Kelley, 1973 and Axelrod, 1976). They may concentrate on those cause-
effect sequences where the effect is desired and pay particular attention to 
explaining the behavior of others while ignoring the consequences of their 
own actions. Under these circumstances, analytic concepts would not 
provide the most powerful explanation of their processes of choice. 
A predisposition to think causally, however, may make it easier for 
decisionmakers to process choice analytically. The connection between 
option and consequence may be intuitive rather than artificial. After 
examining the decision-making processes of several policymakers in 
different contexts, Axelrod concludes that, regardless of the philosophical 
difficulties inherent in the concept of causation, "people do evaluate 
complex policy alternatives in terms of the consequences a particular 
choice would cause, and ultimately of what the sum of all these effects 
would be" (1976:5). Some psychological evidence suggests, at least, that a 
capacity for analytic processing is present. At the right time, under the right 
circumstances, some decisionmakers may be analytic. 
The Cybernetic Explanation 
Although an analytic process of choice may be optimal, decisionmakers 
may be unable to make their choices through analytic procedures. They 
may be incapable of extensive search when uncertainty and complexity are 
high. Many do not have the time or the interest to engage in far-reaching 
search. Not only may interest in search be limited, but analytic processing 
of information may be constrained by cognitive processes. The psy­
chological limits on logic have been widely discussed. In processing new 
data, decisionmakers are likely to use a series of cognitive shortcuts which 
distort their revision of estimates. Psychologists who study processes of 
11. One fundamental error is the overestimation of the impact of personal or dispositional 
factors relative to environmental influences. The "intuitive psychologist" is all too frequently a 
proponent of individual differences (Ross, 1977). Related to egocentric attribution are 
systematic tendencies to overestimate the purposive behavior of others and to assume that all 
consequences of action are intended. Decisionmakers also tend to view their own actions as 
responsible for desired outcomes (Cook, 1971 and Jervis, 1976:346). This evidence is 
consistent with the more general finding that people apparently have a poor conception of 
randomness. They do not recognize it when they see it, but find causal explanations for almost 
any discrepancy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971 and Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). 
12. Kelley (1973) suggests that there is a preference for schemata that emphasize "main 
effects" rather than those that include "interaction effects" within an analysis-of-variance 
explanation. Axelrod's (1976) evidence of systematic exclusion of feedback from causal 
sequences would be consistent with simpler schemata. 
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inference find that, in their processing of information, decisionmakers 
violate fundamental analytic procedures. Decisionmakers, unlike com­
puters, lack adequate programs for probabilistic thinking: "We have not 
had the opportunity to evolve an intellect capable of dealing conceptually 
with uncertainty. We are essentially trial-and-error learners, who ignore 
uncertainty and rely predominantly on habit or simple deterministic rules" 
(Slovic et al., 1975:12).13 
Decisionmakers are not much better equipped to evaluate and choose 
with analytic procedures. In an analytic process, decisionmakers integrate 
across dimensions of value in order to produce a set of consistent and 
transitive preferences. Decisionmakers may find it difficult, however, to 
compare multiple outcomes and infer a consistent utility function. They are 
incapable of performing complicated outcome calculations based on a 
single utility function. Their rationality is "bounded"; they have "neither 
the sense nor the wits to discover an optimal path" among multiple goals in 
a complex environment (Simon, 1956:136). Neither a general utility 
function nor elaborate procedures for calculating marginal rates of 
substitution among competing values are likely. Decisionmakers use much 
simpler procedures to cope with uncertainty and complexity. 
The cybernetic explanation suggests that decisionmakers rely on 
selective feedback and programmed operations to make their choices.14 In 
an analytic process, decisionmakers approach their problem with a 
blueprint or a causal model of the environment; they concentrate on 
understanding and explanation. A cybernetic decisionmaker follows 
routine procedures without necessarily understanding the effects of 
individual ingredients or their interaction together to produce the final 
product. If the stew is too thick, the cook adds water, if it is too thin, a little 
more flour. The chef substitutes trial-and-error experimentation and 
learning for causal knowledge. Cybernetic decisionmakers follow 
programmed procedures without understanding the reasons for them. 
13. Those who study processes of inference or judgment have developed a very different 
concept of human capacity to make rational inferences than those psychologists who study 
processes of attribution. Attribution theorists consider people to be effective information 
processors with relatively few biases; the fault lies not within themselves but in the quality of 
the information they are handed. Those who examine processes of judgment under 
uncertainty pessimistically conclude that individuals lack not only the "programs" to process 
information but the mental equivalent of the computer facilities. See Fischoff, 1976. 
14. Cybernetic concepts assume that control or "steering" is based not on complex 
outcome calculations but on selective information of past performance. Wiener defines 
feedback as the control of a machine based on its actual rather than its expected performance 
(1950:12). In his application of cybernetic assumptions to the analysis of a political system, 
Deutsch argues that its future behavior can best be explained by information on its past 
performance and present position in relation to some external goal or target (1966:182). 
Simon (1956) applies cybernetic concepts to decision-making when the values of the system 
are unknown. In so doing, he focuses attention not on the processes of communication and 
control among the units in a larger system, but on the decision-making mechanism itself. This 
perspective is particularly useful for the explanation of decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty and complexity. 
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Moreover, they do not care that they do not fully understand; it is not the 
reasons but the result that counts. They concentrate on the immediate 
effect rather than the precedent cause. Even then, cybernetic decision-
makers generally emphasize one consequence rather than the range of 
outcomes which their actions may produce.15 
Procedures of problem diagnosis are well-articulated by cybernetic 
explanations. Analysis usually has been done long before the fact, and 
decisionmakers are expected to monitor only a limited number of 
preselected variables. Only when change occurs in one of these indicators, 
when some failure is registered, do they diagnose a problem. Problem 
identification is structured and simplified. 
Cybernetic processes of search differ markedly from those expected by 
analytic explanations. Search is not extensive or comprehensive but 
limited to a preselected number of responses embedded in routines. When a 
prevailing policy is no longer satisfactory, decisionmakers search for 
marginal changes they can make to adjust for its inadequacy. At most, they 
search to identify the next item in the response repertoire (Cyert and 
March, 1963:120-121 and Steinbruner, 1974:74-75). This simplified search 
procedure is consistent with constrained learning; just as human beings 
learn through trial and error, they also search through trial and error. 
Similarly, cybernetic information-processing is focused and selective. To 
manage uncertainty, policymakers focus on only a few variables which 
have been preselected as links to existing programs. Existing programs 
screen out information which is not directly relevant and reduce the 
amount of information which is processed. Standard operating procedures 
then permit the revision of estimates in response to these preselected 
variables; no complicated calculations are required. This highly focused 
and constrained information-processing is appropriate for decisionmakers 
whose ability to integrate new information with prior data is limited. 
Considerable empirical evidence suggests that decisionmakers do 
experience difficulty combining indicators and tend to rely heavily on a few 
major variables to revise their estimates (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
The revision of estimates in cybernetic processing is conservative; marginal 
adjustments are made through a process of trial and error. Cybernetic pro­
cesses of uncertainty control are consistent with constrained human ability 
to process information. 
15. When cybernetic concepts are applied to the decision-making process, rather than to 
the system as a whole, the assumption of movement towards targets or goals is no longer 
necessary. In his systems analysis, Deutsch considers simple and complex feedback 
mechanisms as goal-seeking, goal-maintaining, and goal-modifying activities. An analysis of 
processes within the decision-making unit, however, need not assume either fixed goals or 
intended outcomes. Decisionmakers may even attempt to reduce uncertainty by avoiding 
consideration of direct outcomes. They perform procedures rather than pursue preferred 
outcomes (Horelick, Johnson, and Steinbruner, 1975:15). 
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Paradoxically, evaluation and choice are both more demanding and 
simpler in cybernetic than in analytic processing. They are simpler since no 
complex calculations across dimensions of value are assumed or required. 
Decisionmakers cannot and do not employ elaborate procedures to 
evaluate options. They avoid calculation of trade-offs through fragmenta­
tion and rely on standard operating procedures which have precosted and 
preanalyzed options. Evaluation is limited to the consideration of the next 
option in the response set. The criterion of choice is not much more 
complicated. Decisionmakers use a decision rule of "satisficing" rather 
than optimizing; they select the first option which satisfies their minimum 
needs. Elaborate decision rules are neither used nor usable, and a simpler 
decision strategy of satisficing is consistent with "bounded rationality" 
(Simon, 1956:136). 
This simplicity in principle may not be the case in practice; decision-
makers must specify their minimum needs before they can select the first 
option that satisfies these constraints. Cybernetic decisionmaking is 
possible only when policymakers have a clear set of purposes they wish to 
accomplish or disasters they wish to avoid. Unlike their analytic 
counterparts who can value the outcomes that flow from the options they 
identify, cybernetic decisionmakers must establish at least a simple 
sequence of goals. Analytic decision-making is less demanding: goals may 
remain implicit throughout the process or emerge from the direct 
comparison of principal alternatives. The first question maximizers ask is 
not "What do I want to achieve or avoid?" but rather "What are the 
consequences of this option?" Analytic policymakers have the luxury of 
responding to their environment while cybernetic decisionmakers must 
impose their purposes on the problem they confront. While calculation of 
values is more complicated in analytic processes, cybernetic decision-
makers must at some point establish a set of purposes. Teleology may be 
considerably more difficult than mathematics. 
Just as the most rigorous assumptions of analytic decision-making must 
be somewhat relaxed, so the role of purpose in cybernetic decision-making 
may be less central than formal concepts suggest. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that some decisionmakers use cybernetic strategies to avoid 
considering either purpose or outcome; they proceed from one option to 
the next deliberately ignoring the larger issues at stake (Horelick, Johnson, 
and Steinbruner, 1975:15). They do not so much satisfice as move serially 
through a sequence of available options already designed to cover such 
contingencies. In this looser version, decisionmakers do have an easier 
time. They select the first or the next option in a series without explicitly 
considering whether their choice meets their minimum needs. They can do 
so, however, only when other policymakers have already prepared 
programs and packaged options. If, somewhere in a series, someone 
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considers and orders either values or purposes, then selecting the next 
option is equivalent to satisficing. 
The outcome of a satisficing strategy is likely to be incremental. This 
choice, which is the next step in the sequence of options available to the 
decisionmakers, is not likely to differ significantly from previous selections. 
Incremental choices are a necessary and not unwelcome product of a 
cybernetic process. In a political context especially, decisionmakers reduce 
the stress of uncertainty and complexity by proceeding through small or 
marginal changes rather than through consideration of abstract values 
(Lindblom, 1959). These small changes will remain in place as long as they 
are effective; only when they no longer "satisfice" will further incremental 
steps be chosen.16 
Cybernetic concepts may be less than fully satisfactory in the 
explanation of national security decision-making, the principal focus of 
this study. They have been used most successfully to explain bureaucratic 
decision-making which is serial and continuous.17 Operating within a 
hierarchical structure, officials return again and again to make adjustments 
to problems that are not solved but reduced. Decisionmakers choose, 
knowing that their choices are neither final nor momentous. After a decent 
interval, if the problem persists, further adjustments can be made which 
may ameliorate troublesome conditions. 
National security problems, however, are often acute and do not permit 
repeated attempts at problem-solving. Decisions frequently must be made 
within an unstructured environment, and organizational fragmentation, 
which usually compensates for lack of structure, may be impossible or 
inappropriate on an important issue of national security.18 The core of the 
cybernetic paradigm, however, is the emphasis on programs for choice and 
specified responses which permit decisionmakers to process information 
selectively and avoid calculation of alternative outcomes. These sets of 
responses may be found not only within bureaucratic organizations, but 
16. An incremental choice, of course, may also be the product of an analytic process, if 
such a choice were the efficient solution of a decisional problem. The likelihood of an 
incremental response in an analytic process is a function of the particular problem and the 
expected probabilities and values or utilities. Although not exclusive to cybernetic processing, 
incrementalism is much more likely within a strategy of satisficing. 
17. Complex problems are broken into a series of separate problems, and each is 
addressed to a separate decisionmaker through pre-established channels. Each has a set of 
repertoires to manage the specific problem, and the choices of thefirst become the problem of 
the decisionmaker one level above in the hierarchy. Problem partitioning, therefore, 
substitutes for a structured decisional environment. See Simon, 1969 and Steinbruner, 1974 
for a detailed application of cybernetic concepts to bureaucratic decision-making. 
18. Allison (1971) did apply a model of "organizational process" to American decision-
making in the Cuban missile crisis. Although major decisions were made by the central 
players, the specific details of the options considered and actions taken were determined in 
large part by the standard operating procedures and programs of the major participating 
organizations. A complete explanation of the decision process incorporates both analytic and 
cybernetic components. 
The Explanation of Decisions / 37 
also within rigorously elaborated strategic doctrine. Doctrine may 
integrate prior experience in its consideration of cause and consequence 
and analysis of cost and benefit. In lengthy discussion and debate on 
strategic issues, analysts have calculated value before prescribing choice. 
Doctrine may then structure the decision problem for participating 
policymakers.19 
Concepts of deterrence, for example, require communication to an 
opponent of the likely cost if the adversary does perform an undesired 
action. In issuing a conditional threat, the deterring power may program 
subsequent choice and establish the equivalent of a standard operating 
procedure. As Snyder argues: 
In making a threat the deterrer places in hostage certain aspects of 
his future deterrent power. The credibility of an irrational response may 
be increased if the deterrer can appear to commit himself to this response by 
some device which removes or reduces his freedom of choice. Such 
"automation" is itself rational. Automation inhibits the choice of 
all responses except the one which is being relied on for deterrence (1961:24). 
Schelling concurs: 
The commitment process on which all American overseas deterrence 
depends is a process of surrendering and destroying options that we might 
have expected to find too attractive in an emergency. We give them 
[options] up on our own account to make our intentions clear to potential 
enemies (1966:44). 
Deterring power A threatens that, if State B does X, then the deterrer will 
respond with Y The choice of Y would require no additional calculation of 
cost and benefit, no further assessment of value trade-offs; such 
calculations have already been performed before A issued the conditional 
threat. Decisionmakers now need monitor only selected indicators and 
process limited information to ascertain that the unacceptable action is 
probable or that it has occurred. These procedures conform to the 
theoretical expectations of the cybernetic paradigm. 
A rigidly automated process of choice where decisionmakers proceed 
reflexively from threat to implementation is not likely. A cybernetic 
process, however, does not require such simplification of the decision-
making problem. Rather, programs structure the environment and specify 
both the indicators to be monitored and a series of responses available to 
decisionmakers. Often, these programs are the result of extensive 
19. The capacity of strategic doctrine to reduce complexity and uncertainty may explain 
its attractiveness to policymakers who have adopted many of its basic concepts. Other 
concepts developed by specialists in international politics have not been as widely accepted by 
decisionmakers. Those who question the rationality of strategic logic emphasize the danger of 
its easy acceptance by policymakers. Sec Morgan, 1977 The logic of strategic argument is 
considered in Chapters 4 and 10. 
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examination and preanalysis. Strategic doctrine can substitute for 
institutional programs if it is well articulated, consistent, and specifies 
responses to varying challenges or provides a decision rule. Prespecified 
response can be nested in doctrine as well as in organizational routine and 
can affect the process of choice in either case. 
The Cognitive Explanation 
Analytic strategies of maximizing and cybernetic processes of satisficing 
are the two principal explanations of decision-making. Each includes a 
coherent set of predecisional procedures and establishes a distinct decision 
rule. While each provides a powerful interpretation of decision-making, 
they may not be fully adequate as explanations of choice. Each may claim 
too much and include too little. There may be situations where neither 
applies. And both may pay insufficient attention to psychological evidence 
which underlines the complex impact of cognitive processes on the 
performance of decisional tasks. 
Critics of the rigorous requirements of analytic decision-making suggest 
fragmentation and satisficing as an alternative explanation. Decision-
makers who must make difficult choices on national security, however, 
may not always be able to structure their environment by parceling out 
their problem to smaller organizational units or by referring to doctrine. 
Generally, major choices affecting security tend to be concentrated in the 
hands of high-level policymakers who have considerable discretion and are 
less likely to consider themselves the representatives of bureaucratic 
organizations (Bonham, 1975 and Holsti, 1976). Issues of national security 
also are more likely to create dilemmas that are not anticipated by standard 
operating procedures. 
Policymakers also may confront additional problems of information 
when they consider national security questions. Information may be 
scarce, and the data that do exist may be of questionable validity and 
quality. If information is plentiful, on the other hand, decisionmakers may 
be swamped with pertinent data, and information overload may preclude 
orderly processing through established channels (Holsti, 1976:29-30). 
Under such conditions, cybernetic processing, especially through 
organizational fragmentation, is not likely. Neither problem partitioning 
nor routinized procedures are likely to prevail. 
Not only situational factors constrain the general applicability of 
analytic and cybernetic explanations. Each explanation achieves 
coherence by limiting the impact of cognitive factors on decisional activity. 
Cybernetic explanations do emphasize constrained cognitive capacity to 
calculate but, like analytic arguments, they do not incorporate evidence of 
systematic bias in inference. Only part of the evidence from cognitive 
psychology can be incorporated directly within each of these two 
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explanations by further relaxing some of their central assumptions. The 
modifications would become so substantial, however, that the consistency 
of each would be violated. Cognitive explanations posit fundamentally 
different processes of diagnosis, search, estimation, evaluation, and choice. 
Although it has less-developed and less-articulated rules, this third 
explanation better captures the full weight of the evidence. 
Cognitive psychologists concentrate their attention on the organization 
of belief systems and the subsequent processes of inference and choice. 
Despite considerable controversy about the impact of cognition on 
behavior, there is growing emphasis on human capacity to construct and 
synthesize rather than to photocopy. Far from being passive in the face of 
history, individuals intervene actively through their cognitive processes to 
structure their environment. Decisionmakers are not trial-and-error 
learners, as the behaviorists would have it, but active participants in 
problem-construction and problem-solving.20 Insofar as cognitive psy­
chology rejects trial-and-error learning, it differs in an important way from 
cybernetic explanations of problem diagnosis and choice. Cognitive 
psychologists address both the logic of argument and the rationality of 
estimation and underline their boundaries. These boundaries are not 
synonymous with those that limit the satisficer. 
Investigation begins with the systems of belief that decisionmakers use to 
organize and define their environment. Individuals who think, reason, and 
learn impose structure on a complex world by the concepts they develop of 
themselves and others. These belief systems or schemata serve essential 
purposes; such configurations of interrelated concepts are basic to both 
argument and inference.21 Without some set of beliefs, no decisionmaker 
would be able to organize or interpret the enormous amount of 
information which is potentially relevant to any problem. There is debate, 
however, about how well individuals construct and use these central 
concepts. Some psychologists describe an "intuitive scientist" when they 
examine processes of causal argument, while others emphasize distortion 
in logic and flawed causal reasoning. 
The most optimistic assessment of cognitive capacity comes from those 
20. Mischel(1973, 1977) argues strongly that cognitive psychology provides a better basis 
for understanding personality's relationship to behavior than do the more traditional drive-
reduction or automatic stimulus-response models. He suggests that the impact of personality 
is mediated through an individual's "grammar" of cognition and rejects broad generalization 
from personality traits. The effect of a given stimulus depends not on the cognitions 
individuals have but rather on the operations they perform on the information they receive. 
Bandura (1974) concurs that control through information, which is rooted in cognitive 
processes, is more pervasive and powerful than conditioning through contiguous events. 
21. Converse (1964:207) defines a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes 
in which elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional 
interdependence." The terms "belief," "concept," "argument," and "belief system" are defined 
in Chapter I. 
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interested principally in processes of explanation. Attribution researchers, 
who focus on epistemological questions of how individuals know what they 
know, are the principal proponents of a model of an intuitive scientist. 
Working intuitively, this naive scientist approximates almost quasi-
scientific procedures to construct causal explanations (Kelley, 1967 and 
1973). Initial research emphasizes the quality of causal judgment and 
suggests unexpected capacity for logical construction. Subsequent 
evidence, however, demonstrates considerable distortion in attribution 
processes which create rather biased diagnoses of decision problems (Ross, 
1977). The cognitive dynamics of causal argument remain a matter of some 
controversy. While attribution research has contributed an important 
corrective to prevalent psychological models by demonstrating impressive 
problem-solving capacity in the subjects studied, it also has uncovered 
significant errors in explanatory processes. The intuitive scientist is 
flawed.22 
Disagreement among psychologists is not limited to processes of 
argumentation and problem-construction. While there is considerable 
consensus that processes of search, revision, and estimation are poorly 
performed, there is some debate about the sources and direction of these 
errors in judgment. Evidence on the scope and direction of important 
biases is inconsistent, and psychologists trace these errors to different 
cognitive processes. 
Psychologists suggest that policymakers are most free from cognitive 
constraints at the beginning of a decisional process. When they identify a 
problem, they search actively until they establish an initial diagnosis. As 
soon as one of several possible concepts provides an adequate interpreta­
tion of incoming information, however, decisionmakers are likely to 
discontinue their search both for additional alternatives and for further 
information. To shorten the process of search for organizing concepts and 
relevant options, political leaders often resort to historical analogy (Jervis, 
1968, 1976, and May, 1973). Nor do they generally search through a variety 
of precedent experience to select that analogy which provides the best fit 
with the current decisional problem. On the contrary, historical analogies 
frequently are the source of basic misinterpretation (Snyder and Diesing, 
1977:321). 
The early selection of an organizing assumption establishes a cognitive 
22. Ross (1977) finds, for example, persistent overestimation of personal factors relative 
to environmental influences in the construction of explanation. In a related error of "false 
consensus," individuals also tend to see their own judgments as relatively common and view 
alternative responses as deviant. Like many analysts of processes of judgment, Rossfinds that 
initial explanatory errors persist in the face of disconfirming evidence through mechanisms of 
distortion and autonomy. Jervis (1976:217-283), in his examination of how decisionmakers 
construct organizing images, emphasizes related distortions in how leaders learn from history. 
Insofar as cognitive psychology emphasizes impaired processes and flawed judgments, it 
differs fundamentally from analytic explanations of choice. 
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framework that is more difficult to alter at a later stage of the decisional 
process. The cost of examining the fit of new data with alternative 
assumptions increases as the commitment to one concept increases (Jervis, 
1976:192).23 Search not only for further information but also tor additional 
options is likely to be constrained. Premature termination of search is 
explained by the well-known hypothesis that individuals are consistency-
seekers. They find it particularly difficult to tolerate contradiction or 
inconsistency within their belief system (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958:5). 
To reduce the stress of contradiction, individuals first construct belief 
systems that are internally consistent and then struggle to maintain this 
consistency. Decisionmakers, therefore, are likely to identify only those 
options which are consistent with strongly-held beliefs.24 
The validity of consistency-seeking as an explanation of cognitive 
processes is open to some question. Evidence suggests that cognitive 
structures may not be consistent over time. Below a certain threshold, 
moreover, inconsistency may be characteristic.25 The debate arises in part 
from difficulties inherent in the concept of consistency. As in so many other 
cases, criteria of consistency may be better derived from the standards of 
the participating decisionmaker rather than from those of the investigating 
psychologist. What is consistent to the former is not necessarily consistent 
to the latter.26 Even if subjective rather than objective criteria are used, 
however, the centrality of the search for consistency remains in doubt.27 
A similar debate is now developing among those who study processes of 
estimation and revision. Psychologists disagree on the biases they find and 
23. Jervis suggests that a policymaker who avoids formation of an initial hypothesis until 
large amounts of data are available is more likely to continue searching for additional 
information and alternatives. If incoming information is expected, if it is compatible with a 
well-known and well-established image, the search process is not likely to continue. The more 
strongly established the belief structure, the less the search for additional information. 
24. Cognitive mapping, a technique which graphically represents the causal arguments of 
decisionmakers to predict their choices, uses the two concepts of consistency and centrality to 
select the strongest causal path. See Axelrod, 1976 and Shapiro and Bonham, 1973. 
25. Gergen (1968) argues that individuals do not have a consistent unitary self-concept 
and that inconsistency rather than consistency is the natural state. 
26. Bern and Allen (1974) suggest, for example, that some of the difficulty in finding 
consistency between personality traits and behavior derives from the nomothetic as­
sumptions of the research. Idiographic assumptions, on the other hand, would not assume 
shared definitions by investigators and subjects. If the subject establishes the criteria of 
consistency, then a concept of cross-situational consistency becomes relevant. This argument 
is fully compatible, of course, with a phenomenological interpretation. 
27 McGuire (1966) suggests that at best the search for consistency is one motive among 
others, similar to the desire for affiliation or achievement. Others suspect that the drive to 
reduce inconsistency is of a second order and is activated only when inconsistency frustrates 
another motive force. Cognitive psychologists also are unsure of the dynamics of consistency-
maintenance. Some assume a multiplicative process of balance the enemy of an enemy is a 
friend while others suggest that the process may be additive the enemy of an enemy is the 
object of even greater disaffection than the enemy. Freedman and Sears (1965), in related 
research on attitude change, find that such factors as the utility of a message, its topical 
interest and novelty, and its persuasiveness can offset a bias toward selectivity. 
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offer different explanations of the cognitive processes that produce these 
errors in judgment. While most insist that decisionmakers are too 
conservative in revising their estimates (Edwards, 1968 and Peterson and 
Beach, 1967), other evidence suggests that decisionmakers may pay too 
little attention to baseline information and that they revise their judgments 
too radically (Ross, 1977 and Bar-Hillel, 1977).28 Analysts do not agree on 
whether decisionmakers give too much or too little weight to central beliefs 
when interpreting new information.29 
If psychologists cannot agree on the direction of errors, it is not 
surprising that they debate their causes. Some explain faulty judgments on 
largely technical grounds, others refer to a variety of more fundamental 
cognitive processes, and still others investigate the nature of the task or the 
content of organizing concepts. Faulty estimates, for example, may result 
from an inability to handle several indicators simultaneously (Schroder, 
Driver, and Streufert, 1967:127). If individuals are limited in their intuitive 
statistical methodology, if they are poorly equipped to think in 
probabilistic terms, then both extreme and conservative judgments are 
understandable (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). 
The use of different kinds of cognitive processes also may explain 
different kinds of errors in estimation and revision. A large body of 
evidence suggests, for example, that people tend to estimate the probability 
of an event by the number of such instances they can retrieve from memory; 
the more "available" the relevant analogy, the more likely the event 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Individuals also tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of an event when they consider it to be representative of an 
underlying process (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; Nisbitt and 
Borgida, 1975; and Bar-Hillel, 1974). Reliance on such "heuristics" as 
availability and representativeness may explain inadequate or exaggerated 
estimates of the probability of events. 
Overly conservative judgments may come from commitment to a central 
organizing assumption and a related search for consistency. Once 
decisionmakers become strongly committed to a central concept, revision 
becomes much less likely (Whaley, 1975:8; Alker and Hermann, 1971; 
Chapman and Chapman, 1967, 1969; cf., Ross, 1977). Consequently, 
decisionmakers are more receptive to information which arrives early in 
the decision-making process. Information which is processed before initial 
28. Nisbitt and Borgida (1975) suggest that evidence of the weak effect of base rate 
information on category prediction is analogous to the weak effect of consensus information 
on attributional judgments. See also McArthur, 1972. 
29. Part of the difficulty in establishing whether decisionmakers are overly or 
insufficiently conservative lies in the criterion of judgment. Optimal estimates are usually 
established by reference to "objective" probability theory, and individual performance is then 
compared. When "true" probabilities are unknown, however, assessment is much more 
difficult. Political decisionmakers, moreover, may be quite willing to increase their average 
error if it helps them to predict the few really deviant cases. 
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estimates have been formalized is more likely to produce revision than 
information which arrives after estimates have been made.30 Once an 
assumption is accepted, inertia predominates, and the bias is in favor of 
standing estimates (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).31 The stronger the 
commitment, the more information needed to revise the estimate in 
comparison with the data that were required to adopt the opinion initially. 
As in search, earlier units of information are more important than 
subsequent units in the revision of estimates. 
Conservative revision also may result from the attempt to preserve the 
consistency of belief structures once they have been established. When new 
information is consistent with prevailing beliefs, no revision is required. 
Ambiguity in information, a characteristic of the data most political 
leaders receive, appears to have less impact than does commitment to a 
central assumption. When information is discrepant, however, individuals 
frequently struggle to reduce the impact of the information through a 
variety of well-known techniques of inconsistency-management.32 If the 
data are only mildly discrepant, decisionmakers usually resist revision of 
assumptions. If the information is so challenging that this is impossible, 
then policymakers will first discredit or dismiss the source or deny the 
validity of the information, then alter their least important beliefs through 
such techniques as differentiation or transcendence, and, only as a last 
resort, substantially modify basic beliefs. 
The rate at which inconsistent information is received also affects the 
updating of estimates. When data come in gradually, coping mechanisms 
are more likely to be effective in permitting only incremental adjustments. 
Indeed, leaders anticipate some discrepant information, and its arrival 
reinforces prevailing assumptions (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971:705 and 
30. Alkerand Hermann (1971) suggest that the assumption that subsequent estimates are 
independent of earlier estimates is not supported by experimental evidence. Information 
appears to impact on prior estimates at a decreasing rate. 
31. Jervis (1976:143, 154) suggests that, in the earlier phases of information-processing, 
decisionmakers are more likely to experiment with different interpretations of incoming data. 
Once an assumption is accepted, however, they tend to integrate new information into their 
prevailing estimates. This does not necessarily constitute an irrational process of revision, 
Jervis argues, and is indeed characteristic of most scientific investigators. If all states of the 
world were equally probable or the data completely unambiguous, such a process would be 
distorting. The data generally do permit multiple interpretations, however, and can only be 
interpreted through theory developed from previous cases. The influence of expectations on 
estimates, certainly at early stages in a decisional process, is "rational" and essential to the 
logic of scientific inquiry. The critical issue is, of course, the boundary between rational and 
irrational commitment to organizing concepts. 
32. Cognitive techniques of inconsistency-management are treated extensively in the 
literature. For a discussion of these techniques as they are applied to international decision-
making, see particularly Bonham, Trumble, and Shapiro, 1976; Coelho, Hamburg, and 
Adams, 1974; de Rivera, 1968; George, 1975; Holsti and George, 1975; Jervis, 1968, 1970, 
1976; Lazarus, 1966; McGuire, 1966; Snyderand Diesing, 1977; and Stcinbruncr, 1974. Those 
who emphasize inconsistency-management give considerable weight to cognitive processes of 
consistency-seeking and consequently to conservatism as a central bias. 
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Jervis, 1976:125). Most policymakers are too sophisticated to expect only 
supportive information. Information which challenges firmly held 
expectations must adhere to higher standards of evidence, therefore, than 
data which support prevailing assumptions. Decisionmakers frequently 
use a double standard to assess consistent and discrepant information. If 
discrepant information arrives in large amounts rather than marginal 
increments, is of high quality, and is difficult to ignore, discount, or 
transcend, then, force majeure, significant revision of central assumptions 
is likely. 
Processes of revision also may be affected by the cognitive content of 
central concepts. Beliefs vary in the amount and kind of information 
necessary for disconfirmation, and some may not be subject to 
disconfirmation except after the fact. Decisionmakers who assume that 
deterrence is succeeding, for example, can be convinced of its failure only 
after it has failed. The conclusion that the other side is bluffing can be 
rejected only when the challenger attacks (George and Smoke, 1974). 
Revision occurs too late to be of any use to decisionmakers. Because the 
content of concepts differs in sensitivity to discrepant information, 
regardless of the processes people use, some concepts are more easily 
revised than others. 
Those who document conservative bias in judgment expect revision to 
oscillate much more sharply than do cybernetic explanations of the 
updating of estimates.33 Impaired cognitive processes depress revision in 
the earlier stages but permit far-reaching changes in the later stages. 
Responding to highly discrepant data, people update dramatically to 
anticipate exact outcomes. As expectations are invalidated, they resort to 
categorical rather than probabilistic judgments. Evidence of conservative 
and radical judgments also may be explained by the nature of the problems 
people confront. Cognitive psychologists suspect that individuals use 
different processes for different tasks. Indeed, it is difficult to know which 
one will be applied in any specific instance. There is as yet no general 
explanation of judgment (Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 1977:6-7). 
There is somewhat less controversy about the evaluative phases of the 
decision-making process. Consideration of options is subject to systematic 
bias as people attempt to avoid painful and complicated value trade-offs. 
Through cognitive mechanisms, they evaluate options by separating rather 
33. Sharp upward revision of estimates does not necessarily indicate cognitive processing. 
Such shifts can indicate an analytic response to highly diagnostic data and cannot be used, 
therefore, as evidence to infer either process of choice. The cognitive explanation does 
suggest, however, that revision is unlikely to be gradual throughout the processing of 
discrepant information. At a certain threshold, sharp oscillation is predicted. The cybernetic 
explanation excludes sharp revision and predicts incremental adjustment. An analytic 
process, which responds to the diagnositicity of new information, may be gradual or rapid. 
The rate of revision does not discriminate, therefore, between analytic procedures and either 
of the other two processes. 
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than integrating incommensurate values. They do so by considering values 
in sequence rather than simultaneously as the analytic explanation 
suggests. In the most extreme process of simplification, leaders set up 
single-value decisional problems to avoid painful value conflict (Jervis, 
1968; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Steinbruner, 1974:105; and J. Snyder, 
1978). 
Once they have evaluated options along the most salient dimensions of 
value, leaders may "bolster" support for their preferred policy option 
(Jervis, 1976:142). Bolstering is a process of magnifying the gains of a 
preferred alternative and minimizing its costs; similarly, the expected gains 
of a less preferred alternative are downgraded and their expected costs 
magnified.34 When policymakers consider that an option contributes to 
one important value, they are likely to hold that it simultaneously 
contributes to several other values. They may also use inferences of 
transformation or impossibility to increase support for their preferred 
alternative (Steinbruner, 1974:116-117). By arguing that an option is 
impossible, leaders categorically exclude that alternative from considera­
tion. Such a process of evaluation simplifies choice; the preferred option 
appears to entail few costs.35 
Unlike analytic concepts, cognitive explanations do not assume that 
processes of evaluation and revision are independent. There is competing 
evidence, however, on the consequences of the interaction of expectations 
and preferences. One body of evidence suggests that decisionmakers 
underestimate the likelihood of undesirable consequences and 
overestimate the likelihood of valued outcomes. This process of 
overestimation of desired outcomes is one of "wishful thinking." On the 
other hand, individuals avoid extreme probability estimates and 
consequently tend to underestimate the likelihood of highly desirable 
consequences which are very probable.36 Even though the evidence does 
34. The counterpart to bolstering in the predecisional stage is dissonance reduction in the 
postdecisional stage. After an alternative has been chosen, decisionmakers rearrange their 
beliefs to increase support for their chosen option and reduce support for the rejected 
alternatives. Dissonance theorists term this process one of "spreading the alternatives." See 
Festinger, 1957, 1964; Deutsch, Krauss, and Rosenau, 1962:83. For an application to 
international decision-making, see Shlaim and Tanter, 1978; Steinbruner, 1974:315; and 
Snyder, 1978. 
35. The separation of values and the bolstering of alternatives are most likely when values 
are vague or ill-defined; when they are difficult to measure in monetary equivalents; when the 
consequences of action are difficult to predict and uncertainty is high; when values are deeply 
held; and when all options are costly (Jervis, 1976:130, 146). Value integration is least likely 
when value complexity is easy to avoid or painful to contemplate. When decisionmakers 
evaluate options under stress, the likelihood of value integration is further reduced (Holsti 
and George, 1975; .lanis and Mann, 1977). 
36. Pruitt and Hoge(l965) find that incentives decreased but did not remove the tendency 
among subjects to overgucss the occurrence of desired outcomes. Jervis (1976:356-381) 
reviews a considerable body of evidence which questions the pervasiveness of wishful thinking 
as a cognitive process. He notes, however, that decisionmakers rarely differ about the value of 
an objective without simultaneously disagreeing about the probability that it can be achieved. 
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not support the pervasiveness of wishful thinking, it does affirm the 
interaction of probability and value dimensions in the evaluation of the 
consequences of alternatives. 
Finally, while the analytic explanation establishes a decision rule of 
optimizing and the cybernetic paradigm posits a decision strategy of 
satisficing, cognitive explanations establish no single decision mechanism. 
They provide no unique solutions to decisional problems; on the contrary, 
a wide range of decision rules is possible. Policymakers may eliminate 
unfavorable possibilities along the most salient dimensions of value 
(Tversky, 1972 and Wissel, 1971). If more than one alternative remains, 
leaders may follow a lexicographic decision strategy in which they choose 
the option which best discriminates among rank-ordered dimensions of 
value (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973).37 Or, decisionmakers may choose by 
analogy and select that option which has the strongest support within their 
structure of beliefs.38 Finally, they may simply avoid or postpone decisions 
if choice is too difficult to make. The cognitive paradigm, therefore, 
suggests a number of admissible strategies rather than a unique mechanism 
of choice. 
This absence of specified decision strategies weakens the power of 
cognitive explanations. Psychologists suspect that the inability to specify 
unique processes is a function of the variety of cognitive processes that 
operate at different times under different circumstances. Attribution 
research suggests, for example, that the use of different causal schemata at 
different times for different problems may explain many of the obvious 
departures from the predictions of single models such as balance or 
consistency (Kelley, 1973). Or, the context of the decision problem may 
evoke one of a series of possible cognitive techniques (Janis and Mann, 
1977). Cognitive capacities are so complex and repertoires so multidimen­
sional that they cannot be explained adequately by a single dynamic. 
Different cognitive processes, moreover, are not linked explicitly to 
different decision rules. It is difficult to know why and when, or under what 
37. The general use of the term "bounded rationality" to characterize all non-analytic 
decision rules obscures important differences among them. Decision by elimination, 
lexicographic calculus, and satisficing all fall under the rubric of bounded rationality, but 
imply significantly different procedures and consequences. Leaders who satisfice choose the 
first satisfactory alternative which meets minimum aspiration levels along one or more 
dimensions of value. In lexicographic calculation, individuals choose the alternative which 
best discriminates among rank-ordered values. Satisficers choose by considering more than 
one value but only one alternative at a time, while lexicographers choose by considering only 
one value but all remaining alternatives. The difference frequently is of considerable 
importance in international politics. 
38. Decision rules by analogy are specific to time and place. HolstiandGeorge(1975:299, 
n. 41) suggest that some American officials used the following decision rule in developing 
policy for Latin America in the 1960s: "Influid situations of uncertainty in which there is some 
risk of the emergence of another Castro in the Caribbean, take whatever actions are necessary 
to prevent it." 
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circumstances, decisionmakers use a particular strategy.39 Cognitive 
explanations suggest only the very general rule that decisionmakers who 
are impaired choose the option which is generated by limited search, 
reinforced by categorical estimation, and bolstered by the reduction of 
value complexity. Within these parameters, decisionmakers have con­
siderable latitude in their mechanisms of choice. 
This review of the three principal explanations of choice suggests that the 
outcome of a decision-making process is affected by the performance of 
earlier tasks in the process. The quality of the outcome depends in part on 
the procedures decisionmakers use to diagnose, search, estimate, and 
evaluate. The likelihood of analytic, cybernetic, or cognitive processes, 
however, is determined in part by small group dynamics and the stress that 
flows from situational factors. The context of choice affects the process and 
through it its outcome. 
Small Group Dynamics 
National security choices are not made by single decisionmakers only. 
Frequently they are the outcome of a collective rather than an individual 
process, and choices which are the product of a group may be quite 
different from what an aggregation of the preferences of individual 
members would suggest (Holsti and George, 1975:285). Although group 
dynamics can affect all phases of decision-making activity, their impact on 
the last of thefive tasks—choice—has been the main focus of investigation. 
The effect of group factors on choice is a matter of some controversy, and 
this chapter reviews the two approaches of social psychology and 
bureaucratic politics or coalition-building. It examines these two 
explanations of choice and then turns to the discussion of the four earlier 
decision-making tasks. 
Social psychologists debate the effect of group membership on the final 
choice the group makes and assess its divergence from the average 
preference of its individual members. The most frequently cited 
consequence of collective decision-making is the "risky shift" or the 
systematic revision in choice which results from group discussion or group 
decision-making (Vinokur and Burnstein, 1974). Early research found that 
group members shifted their individual choices to a riskier alternative after 
participating in group discussion (Stoner, 1961). This evidence challenged 
a standing hypothesis that group decisions tended to be more cautious than 
individual choice (Whyte, 1956). A series of follow-up studies designed to 
replicate the "risky shift" under controlled conditions concluded that 
39. .lanis and Mann (1977:132) suggest that anticipation that an action would be costly, 
accompanied by an expectation that a better solution is possible but that the time is 
inadequate to search, promotes defensive-avoidance. Decision-making under stress is 
discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
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group interaction produced a consensus on matters of risk and a willing­
ness to make decisions which are riskier than would be made by individual 
decisionmakers (Wallach et al., 1962, 1965, 1967). Other investigators, 
using the standard instrument of risk-taking developed for this experimen­
tal research, found that different kinds of decision-making groups shifted 
toward risk (Rim, 1963; Jamieson, 1968; Kogan and Doise, 1969: Lamm 
and Kogan, 1970).40 
A reexamination of some of the evidence suggested that choice may shift 
toward caution as well as toward risk after group discussion.41 The risky 
shift appears to be part of a more general phenomenon of a group shift 
(Rabow and Pincus, 1971 and Pruitt, 1971a). Subsequent research 
documented a shift in both directions under different conditions. When 
potential losses were small, group risk-taking did exceed that of 
individuals. When potential losses and gains were high, groups were more 
cautious than their members (Zaleska, 1974). Discussion-induced shifts 
also occurred on several dimensions: on attitudinal issues (Doise, 1969; 
Gouge and Fraser, 1972); and on issues of fact or logic (Thomas and Fink, 
1961, Hall, Mouton, and Blake, 1963; and Kelley and Thibault, 1969). 
Shifts in choice appear to respond to multiple dimensions (Stoner, 1968). 
Group processes produce a more general shift in choice rather than a shift 
only on the caution-risk dimension.42 
Social psychologists have developed two kinds of explanation of the 
shift in choice.43 Information-processing explanations emphasize relevant 
40. The instrument developed by Wallach and his colleagues is the Choice Dilemma 
Questionaire (CDQ). Each dilemma contains two alternative courses of action, one of which 
is riskier insofar as it is less probable but more desirable, while the other alternative is more 
cautious in that it is less desirable but more probable. The subject is asked to specify the 
minimum probability of success on the risky alternative which would justify its choices, and 
this designated probability is considered to be the score. In most studies, subjects respond to 
the CDQ first as individuals, then as a group after discussion, and then again individually after 
the group meeting. Mean scores are used to calculate shifts. 
41. Two items on the CDQ repeatedly produced a shift toward the more cautious 
alternative in experimental settings. Those who described the decisional outcome as a risky 
shift either used only total scores on the multi-item CDQ or eliminated these two items to 
improve the validity of the CDQ as a measure of risk-taking. 
42. Some evidence suggested that the group shift may be epiphenomenal. One reanalysis 
of some of the experimental data found that most groups were not riskier, a substantial 
minority was more cautious, and the most frequent outcome was no shift at all (Belovicz and 
Finch, 1971). Using a different measure of risk and subjects with some political sophistication 
or experience, Semmel and Minix(1977) find that 26 groups in their experiment shifted to risk 
54% of the time, to caution 44% of the time, and failed to shift only 2% of the time. In an 
attempt to discover whether the research instrument was biasing the results, the effects of 
group discussion were explored in a variety of experimental and nonexperimental situations 
(Myers and Lamm, 1976). The comparative investigation found considerable evidence of a 
shift toward risk and toward caution by different kinds of groups in different kinds of 
situations. 
43. Earlier explanations have been rejected in subsequent research. The "familiarization" 
hypothesis suggested that familiarity with an issue involving risk will produce riskier choice 
(Bateson, 1966; Flanders and Thistlewaite, 1967); Miller and Dion (1970) largely 
discontinued the hypothesis. A second explanation suggested that those who are most 
The Explanation of Decisions / 49 
information and persuasive arguments. Affective explanations, the second 
type, include both diffusion of responsibility and the value of risk. The 
"diffusion of responsibility" hypothesis is well known: members of a group 
feel less responsible for the higher likelihood of failure because 
responsibility is shared among the group (Kogan and Wallach, 1967). 
Evidence drawn from risk-taking in international crises suggests that 
concurrence-seeking produces shared notions of invulnerability which lead 
to excessive risk-taking (Janis, 1972:197-204). This explanation is 
intuitively appealing because of its consistency with explanations of crowd 
behavior. However, the evidence does not support the contention that 
cohesive groups will produce a greater shift toward risk (Dion, Miller, and 
Magnan, 1971). 
A related but stronger explanation is the "risk as value" hypothesis. If 
risk is highly valued within society, members of a group whose initial 
choices are less risky than the average will reformulate their views to 
maintain their perception of themselves as risky. The essential element in 
the group process is the exchange of information on members' risk 
preferences. It is not the content of group discussion which is important, 
but the opportunity to compare initial preferences (Brown, 1965:702; 
Wallach and Wing, 1968; and Willems, 1969). Such a hypothesis could 
explain cautious as well as risky shifts; if caution were highly valued, the 
same mechanism would operate to produce a shift toward a less risky 
choice. Although there is considerable support for this explanation, it 
appears that information about the choices of other group members is not 
sufficient to produce a shift (Wallach and Kogan, 1965; Pruitt and Teger, 
1969). Other factors are necessary in an explanation of group shifts in 
choice. 
Information-processing explanations emphasize the situation or task 
rather than the conditions under which problems are discussed. The 
"relevant information" hypothesis suggests that information relevant to 
the task must be exchanged during discussion. Contrary to earlier 
arguments, the content of the discussion and the arguments pro and con do 
constitute an essential factor if the change in choice is to occur (Madaras 
and Bern, 1968; Pruitt and Teger, 1969; and Silverthorne, 1971). Relevant 
inclined to choose a risky course of action also tend to be leaders within the group (Marquis, 
l°62). These interactive explanations focus on the social or leader-follower processes within 
the group. Further research did not support any relationship between initial risk-taking and 
perceived influence within the group (Kogan and Wallach, 1967; Wallach, Kogan, and Burt, 
1967). A variant of this explanation, the "extremity" hypothesis, suggests that those members 
ol the group who take the most extreme positions are also most confident and committed and 
arc better able, therefore, to influence other members of the group (Burns, 1967, cited in 
Vinokur, 1971:239). This last hypothesis had better predictive capacity than the earlier 
explanations. Finally, some researchers suspect that the choice shifts are artifacts of the 
experimental design (Cartwright, 1971). The robustness of the shift indifferent experimental 
and non-experimental situations does not support this interpretation. 
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information may explain any additional shift that occurs after information 
about initial preferences has been exchanged (Pruitt, 1971b:504, 506). 
A related explanation has drawn on analytic concepts to suggest that 
relevant arguments made in the context of group discussion produce 
changes in utility which, in turn, produce shifts in choice. Through 
exposure to new information and argumentation, decisionmakers 
reconsider their values and shift their choices in response to their revised 
calculations. Experimental evidence provides considerable support for 
explanations derived from premises of the analytic paradigm. Shifts in 
utility accompany shifts in risk preference, and exchange of information 
produces shifts by exposing group members to arguments they have not 
considered previously (Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein et al , 1971; and 
Burnstein, Vinokur, and Trope, 1973). Shifts toward risk or caution are the 
product of systematic revision in utility resulting from analytic decision-
making processes (Vinokur and Burnstein, 1974:305). 
If changes in group choice result from systematic revision in utility 
following group discussion, then shifts can occur when persuasive 
arguments are known only to some members of the group (Vinokur and 
Burnstein, 1974). If the relevant persuasive arguments are widely known, 
then group members are likely to have considered these arguments in 
making their initial choice. Subsequently, if arguments are repeated in 
discussion, they are not likely to induce members to alter their earlier 
preferences. However, when members hear new arguments which are 
persuasive, they are likely to revise their calculations and shift their 
preferences. 
Further studies reinforce the importance of learning in producing group 
polarization. The nature of the expressed argument appears to be the most 
important factor in mediating the relationship between individual and 
group shifts. The direction and magnitude of the shift can be determined by 
the direction of the argument, or the alternative it favors, the per­
suasiveness of the argument, and the originality of the argument (Vinokur, 
Trope, and Burnstein, 1975; Myers and Lamm, 1976). Moreover, the 
magnitude of the shift is increased by active participation in group 
discussion rather than by passive listening. 
These analyses of group processes are of interest to those who examine 
national security decision-making; such choices frequently are made within 
a group context. Inferences must be made with some care, however, 
because of the limited validity of some of the research results. The evidence 
is drawn almost exclusively from the examination of processes of problem-
solving. Problem-solving experiments often present subjects with 
problems for which alternatives are given, probabilities are specified, and 
an optimal solution is possible. In most national security dilemmas, 
decisionmakers neither know all the relevant alternatives nor their 
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probable consequences. On the contrary, current concepts of decision-
making emphasize the search for information, the construction of 
alternatives, and the generation and revision of probability estimates. 
Explanations drawn from problem-solving may not be transferable to a 
decisional environment of "structural uncertainty." 
Second, the groups which were the object of the research bear little 
relationship to any decision-making group outside the laboratory; almost 
all have no history, no future, no established structure, and no significant 
enduring relationships with a surrounding social system (Cartwright, 
1971.373).44 Even more important, they bear little responsibility for the 
consequences of their collective choices. Differences in the decisional 
environment and the structure of groups limit the external validity of these 
research results. 
Within these constraints, evidence from social psychology does appear 
to converge with that of cognitive psychology and studies of personality; all 
stress the importance of new information and persuasive argumentation in 
changing preferences and explaining choice. The emphasis on new 
information is fully consistent with concepts of dynamic learning that are 
increasingly important in each of these three fields. Group membership 
may increase the dynamism of these processes. As a member of a group 
rather than as an individual, a decisionmaker may be exposed more quickly 
and thoroughly to relevant new information and interpretation. Members 
may be exposed to arguments they otherwise might not hear. And learning 
within a group may be better than learning as an individual. By 
participating in rather than merely listening to discussion and debate, 
members become less passive and, through "cognitive rehearsal," increase 
the causal role of learning (Myers and Lamm, 1976). 
Although social psychologists cannot predict with any precision the 
direction or magnitude of a change in choice, their research is relevant to 
the analyst of national security decision-making. They expect a group to do 
what most of its members would do, only more so, after discussion and 
debate of the issues. Examination of group problem-solving highlights not 
only group dynamics but also the problem the group confronts. The 
substance of the issues and the content of the debate are important in an 
explanation both of the individual decisionmaker who operates within a 
group and of any decision the group may make. 
A second major interpretation of group choice is provided by coalition 
44. The impact of the experimental milieu on the response of individuals is a matter of 
controversy among psychologists who study decision-making. Edwards (1975) argues that 
experimental designs deny subjects the necessary tools and therefore exaggerate intellectual 
limitations. Winkler and Murphy (1973) criticize the oversimplified and elaborate structure of 
experimental problems in comparison to real-life dilemmas. Social scientists who draw on 
psychological evidence can search for convergence in different decisional environments. 
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explanations and the weaker but related arguments of bureaucratic 
politics. Bureaucratic explanations suggest that preferences can best be 
explained by official positions and vested interests of organizational units: 
"where you stand depends on where you sit."45 The preferences of members 
within a decision-making group are those strategies that would advance the 
interests of the organizations they represent. The explanatory power of 
bureaucratic politics is limited, however, both by empirical evidence and 
logical difficulty. 
An examination of crisis decision-making in a variety of contexts finds 
bureaucratic politics a weak explantion of group decisions. First, official 
position was not a sufficient explanation of the preferences of individual 
decisionmakers within the group; beliefs and personal predispositions or 
bias were more important. Second, proponents of different alternatives, 
who inevitably represented different organizational units, developed their 
arguments from among available options. Their preferences reflected the 
constraints imposed by the international environment in which they 
worked as well as their individual biases. Bargaining positions cannot be 
explained solely as a function of agency interests; they were a response also 
to the dilemmas decisionmakers faced (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:359, 
513). The inability of bureaucratic politics to explain adequately even 
initial preferences of participating decisionmakers may be a function of the 
crisis atmosphere in which policymakers worked. Organizational loyalties 
are likely to be much reduced when issues are important and unusual 
(Jervis, 1976:26). 
Even more important, bureaucratic politics offers no explanation of how 
individual preferences determine a group's decision. While "where you sit" 
provides a partial explanation of the initial positions of decisionmakers, 
the analyst of decision-making cannot predict the outcome from 
knowledge of these initial preferences. Bureaucratic politics does not 
specify the relationship among the bargaining resources of principal 
participants, their strategies for producing a collective choice, and the 
decision the group ultimately makes. It leaves implicit the impact of 
members' skills and resources in determining a group decision. 
Finally, in its attempt to explain a government decision, bureaucratic 
politics does not pay explicit attention to the political resources any 
individual member may bring to bear. Working largely within presidential 
systems, analysts concentrate on the weight of institutional position in 
determining the collective choice. In cabinet systems of collective 
responsibility, members frequently hold their portfolios because of their 
45. See especially Allison, 1971 and Halperin, 1974 for an application of an argument of 
bureaucratic politics to foreign policy decision-making. For an earlier examination of pulling 
and hauling in domestic politics, see Neustadt, 1960 and Truman, 1962. 
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political weight in party forums. Particularly when cabinets are coalitions 
which operate within multi-party systems, the impact of the independent 
political constituencies of members of the government is likely to be as 
important as their institutional base. Both political and positional strength 
must be included in an explanation of the collective choice. 
Coalition-building, a related yet distinct explanation, specifies the 
relationship between individual strength and group decision with greater 
rigor.46 Decision-making becomes a process of building a majority 
coalition to support one alternative. A collective decision is the result of 
persuading at least a majority of participating decisionmakers to support 
one option. Persuasion is not limited to argumentation, as social psy­
chologists would suggest, but includes appropriate payments to con­
vince a large enough number of members to join the coalition. Different 
problems require different strategies by coalition builders. When initial 
preferences converge, for example, some group members are natural allies. 
Payments by a powerful coalition builder may include sacrifice of 
inessential but objectionable components of a policy option or acceptance 
of innocuous components from a prospective coalition member. When the 
central coalition builder is weaker, payments may extend to the sacrifice of 
important components of a strategy or its expansion to accommodate the 
arguments of a prospective coalition member. The coalition builder may, 
of course, also offer side-payments on related issues while trying to preserve 
the integrity of the policy option.47 
In the most rigorous formulation, coalition explanations specify pre­
cisely the number of members that are necessary to produce a "minimum 
winning coalition." Such a coalition includes enough members to control 
the final voting but few enough so that the coalition builders and their 
close allies can dominate the coalition (Riker, 1962). A rational coalition 
builder knows just when to stop. Generally, the largest payments go to 
those last hold-outs whose participation assures such a minimum coalition. 
If decisionmakers are rational, coalition theory both predicts the size of the 
winning coalition and explains the changes in individual preferences that 
are necessary to produce the group's decision. 
While a "minimum winning coalition" may be an appropriate normative 
standard- and even this is open to some debate48—it is not likely to explain 
46. Snyder argues that it is coalition-formation rather than bureaucratic politics which
explains crisis decisions. Sec Snyder and Diesing, 1977:407-408, note 33. 
47 Snyder and Diesing (1977:349) list the following as examples of side-payments: 
strategy revision to incorporate the problem definition of a prospective member; inclusion of a 
member's favored tactic as a preliminary move or fallback position to induce joining; and 
according a potential member an important role in implementing the group's decision. 
48. Building a larger consensus for a major decision may, under certain circumstances, be 
considerably more important than preserving control of a winning coalition. Downs (1957) 
suggests, for example, that coalition leaders exceed the minimum in situations of uncertainty. 
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the processes decisionmakers use to build support for their preferred policy 
option. Just as analytic assumptions must be relaxed somewhat if they are 
to provide an explanation of individual decision-making, so a concept of 
rationality within a group must be made moreflexible. Decisionmakers are 
more likely to construct a majority rather than a minimum winning 
coalition. A majority coalition is that part of the decision-making group 
which can carry out a decision without the help of remaining members and, 
if necessary, against their active opposition. Regardless of numbers, it must 
include those members whose support is essential to the implementation of 
any decision the group may make. In national security decision-making, 
for example, a coalition which excludes a president or prime minister, or a 
defense minister, is not likely to be effective, regardless of other support it 
can marshal. Very often, a head of government, with only one vote and 
often formally primus inter pares, single-handedly constitutes a blocking 
coalition. No decision is possible without prime ministerial or presidential 
support. The concept of a majority coalition which includes essential 
members reflects the unequal political weight of different members of a 
decision-making group; it is attuned to political realities. 
The two principal explanations of group choice focus on the content of 
debate and the construction of coalitions. Those who pay attention to 
debate emphasize intellectual processes while those who examine coalition 
stress interaction and bargaining; the first focuses on cognition and 
information-processing and the second on consideration of interest. Both 
assume considerable receptivity to new information and recalculation of 
consequences. Both are incompatible with cybernetic explanations and 
would have difficulty accommodating some of the evidence of impaired 
procedures generated by studies of individual cognitive processes. Neither 
explanation emphasizes pathologies in the decision-making process. From 
very different perspectives, social psychologists and bargaining theorists 
both expect a high level of performance by decisionmakers in a group. 
Social psychologists and observers of bureaucratic politics are less 
comfortable with this rather optimistic portrait of decisionmakers when 
they discuss performance of the earlier decisional tasks—diagnosis, search, 
revision, and evaluation. The impact of the cohesion of a group on these 
four tasks has received considerable attention. Analysts consider group 
cohesion among the most important determinants of the quality of a 
collective process of decision. Group cohesion may promote effective 
problem-solving by reducing the influence of parochial and vested 
interests. Members of a cohesive group with properly defined roles, 
traditions, and standard operating procedures may search, revise, and 
evaluate more thoroughly than an individual working on a problem alone. 
Working within a group, members also may be better able to perform some 
of the complex tasks of information-processing which require division of 
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labor(Janis, 1972: 13 and George, 1975:285). Recall of previously acquired 
information, for example, is facilitated by the presence of others (Zajonc, 
1965; Collins and Guetzkow, 1964). In a cohesive group, individuals may 
intensify their search for information (Kirk, 1975) and generate a greater 
number of alternatives than they would working alone (Maier, 1970). 
Group cohesion may have negative as well as positive consequences, 
however, for decision-making processes. A cohesive group may promote 
"groupthink" which severely constrains processes of search for informa­
tion and policy options. Concurrence-seeking supersedes the search for 
additional information; members may make little or no effort to obtain 
information from experts and frequently restrict their search to only one or 
two alternatives (Janis, 1972:9; Feldman and Kanter, 1965:622). When 
disagreements threaten to reduce group cohesion, the breadth and quality 
of search is more likely to be limited (Holsti and George, 1975:290). An 
argument of bureaucratic politics puts the case even more strongly: 
organizational interests structure and limit the search for options and 
information (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Only those alternatives that are 
in the interest of one or the other participating bureaucracies will be 
brought to the attention of the group or the central decisionmaker. 
Selectivity rather than search is routine bureaucratic practice. Both social 
psychologists and proponents of bureaucratic politics expect the same 
consequence—constrained search—from the opposite causes of group 
consensus and bureaucratic rivalry 
The evidence of the impact of group cohesion on revision of estimates is 
less contradictory than its impact on search. Concurrence-seeking or 
"groupthink" produces a selective bias in receptivity to new information; 
members ignore or discount information that does not support the 
preferred option. Receptivity to discrepant information may be viewed by 
members as a breach of group solidarity (Janis, 1972:9, 12). The decline in 
receptivity to discrepant information is accompanied by pressures for rapid 
closure (Maier, 1970:433-435). Bureaucratic interest similarly would 
depress the impact of discrepant information. If members of a cohesive 
group are committed to open-ended scrutiny of new evidence, however, 
they may revise estimates more efficiently than an individual decision-
maker (Janis, 1972:118). Only a commitment to methodical procedures 
overrides biases in search and revision.49 
Most analysts consider that group cohesion is likely to reduce the 
effectiveness of the evaluation of alternatives. Once a preferred option is 
identified or proposed by a strong group leader, other alternatives are likely 
to receive diminished attention and scrutiny (Janis, 1971:44, 75). Those 
49. An argument that a commitment to methodical search and appraisal is a good 
explanation of methodical search and appraisal is not entirely convincing. See Janis and 
Mann, 1977:131-133, for a discussion of the antecedent conditions of "groupthink." 
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alternatives which are unacceptable to the majority of the group are 
unlikely to receive serious consideration, and members may make little or 
no effort to obtain expert estimates of losses and gains of the consequences 
of alternative courses of action. Experimental evidence suggests that a 
reduction of intergroup conflict reduces the effective evaluation of 
alternatives and the number of options that are considered (Bower, 
1965:275,277 and Kirk, 1975:9). Here the arguments of social psychologists 
and observers of bureaucratic politics converge. Even though each 
representative may bolster a preferred option, the clash of interests 
promotes some comparative consideration of alternatives. The right thing 
is done for the wrong reasons. Once consensus is achieved, however, other 
options stand little chance of gaining acceptance (Maier, 1970:433-435). 
Groupthink increases the likelihood of bolstering; members are more likely 
to discount the costs of the preferred option. The more actively the leader 
of the group promotes a preferred alternative, the more likely bolstering 
will constrain the process of evaluation (Janis, 1972:197). Some evidence 
does suggest, however, that members of a group perform better than 
individuals working alone. Cohesive groups with appropriate norms and 
and Guetzkow, 1964:54). 
Research on the performance by members of small groups of the tasks of 
diagnosis, search, revision, and evaluation is inconclusive.50 Group 
members may be better able to perform these complex tasks than 
individuals working alone. Cohesive groups with appropriate norms and 
practices may improve dramatically the quality of the decision-making 
process. If group cohesion leads to concurrence-seeking, however, the 
constrained search, revision, and evaluation which are characteristic of the 
cognitive processing of choice are likely to result. Groupthink is defensive-
avoidance and bolstering writ large (Janis and Mann, 1977:133). The 
absence of cohesion, however, may constrain decison-making by 
reinforcing bureaucratic politics and parochial analysis. Members of a 
group with low cohesion also may seek concurrence because they fear the 
cost of failure (Janis, 1972:192). The explanatory power of the concept of 
group cohesion remains unclear: groups with low or high cohesion may 
promote concurrence-seeking; high cohesion may promote effective or 
defective decision-making among its members; and the same group may or 
may not seek concurrence at different times under different circumstances. 
Underlying contradictory argument and evidence are competing 
concepts of decisionmakers and their capacities at different stages in the 
decision-making process. Explanations of group choice emphasize 
50. Research on small group performance is extensive and well beyond the scope of this 
study. Particular attention is paid here to evidence related to decisional tasks. For useful 
reviews of research findings, see Hare, 1962,1972; Hoffman, 1965; and Hackmanand Morris, 
1975. 
The Explanation of Decisions / 57 
learning and rational bargaining. One important explanation within social 
psychology draws explicitly on analytic assumptions to explain shifts 
induced by group membership, while others expect, at a minimum, 
considerable learning and recalculation by members of a group in response 
to new information and persuasive argumentation. Social psychologists 
place greater emphasis on pathology, however, when they turn their 
attention to the four earlier decisional tasks. It is not obvious why social 
psychology expects decisionmakers to be less analytic when they search 
and revise than when they choose. The premises of bureaucratic politics are 
more consistent than those of social psychology: the rational pursuit of 
organizational interest by bureaucratic players distorts search and 
evaluative activity. The same competence and analytic capacity which 
permits decisionmakers to construct winning coalitions also explains 
selective search and biased evaluation. 
Confronted by competing models, contradictory argument, and 
inconsistent evidence, the reader may be forgiven some confusion. In an 
attempt to explain some of these contradictions, analysts suggest that 
variations in performance may be explained by the structure of a group and 
by situational factors. Groups where members are relatively independent 
both of their leader and of any organization they may head are most likely 
to use analytic processes and make innovative decisions, whereas groups 
whose members are representatives of or responsible to constituent 
organizations will suffer the vicissitudes of bureaucratic politics and 
incremental conservatism (Hermann, 1978). Structural factors cannot 
explain, however, why the same group uses effective and defective decision-
making processes at different times. A more powerful explanation may lie 
in the impact of situational factors. External threat, for example, when 
experienced as common fate, increases group cohesion. Group cohesion 
may have a higher explanatory value, then, for crisis than for non-crisis 
situations (Holsti and George, 1975:289 and Kirk, 1975:21). 
Crisis 
Analysts of foreign policy decision-making have paid particular 
attention to the situation of crisis.5' The core element in a crisis situation is 
a perception by decisionmakers of a threat to basic values. In national 
51. Because the impact of international crises on decision-making has been examined 
extensively, it receives less attention here than other factors which may affect choice. Research 
is of high quality and is frequently cumulative. Of particular note are studies by Brady, 1975; 
Brecher, 1977, 1978, 1979; George, Hall, and Simons, 1971; Hermann, 1969, 1972; Holsti, 
1972a, 1972b; Janis, 1959, 1972; Milburn, 1972; North et al., 1963; Paige, 1972; Robinson, 
1969, 1972; Robinson, Hermann, and Hermann, 1969;Snyder, 1972; Snyder and Paige, 1961; 
Young, 1968; Zinnes, 1968; and Zinnes, Zinnes, and McClure, 1972. McClelland (1968,1972) 
has examined the impact of crisis from the perspective of the system as a whole rather than 
that of the decisionmaker. For a review of the use of the concept of crisis across the social 
sciences and an examination of the recent literature, see Tanter, 1975 and 1978. 
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security crises, a threat to basic values generally implies an increase in the 
probability of violence (Brecher, 1977; Morgan, 1977:168; and Snyder and 
Diesing, 1977:492). A sense of threat and a perception of probable violence 
create considerable stress for decisionmakers. There is some debate about 
time as a component of crisis and as stress-creating. Some consider time 
pressure to respond a critical component (Janis and Mann, 1977:78); 
others argue that limited or finite rather than short time is a necessary 
component of crisis (Brecher, 1977); and still others insist that time 
pressure is neither necessary to crisis nor necessarily stress-creating 
(Snyder and Diesing, 1977:492).52 Common to almost all definitions of 
crisis, however, is an emphasis on the stress created by the necessity to 
make important and often difficult choices in a threatening environment. 
Although analysts agree that crisis-induced stress is likely to affect 
decision-making processes, they disagree on the direction of this effect. 
While some suggest that stress precludes analytic processing, others argue 
that, in a crisis, decisionmakers are freed from routine constraints and are 
better able to use analytic procedures. Indeed, in an acute crisis, 
decisionmakers may "shift toward rationality" (cf., Holsti and George, 
1975:262 and Morgan, 1977:179). There is little consensus on the impact of 
heightened perceptions of threat and limited time on the performance of 
each of the five decisional tasks. 
Those who study the impact of crisis-induced stress on decision-making 
generally are little concerned with the task of problem diagnosis. Once 
leaders perceive a serious threat and finite time to respond, they have 
identified a problem for decision.53 Acknowledgment of crisis constitutes 
problem diagnosis, and most studies of crisis begin by examining the 
impact of stress on search. The evidence suggests both a decrease and an 
increase in search activity when leaders are under stress. In high 
threat-short time situations, decisionmakers may reduce their search for 
policy options, and they also are less resistant to premature closure 
(Hermann, 1972:207; Holsti, 1972a: 14-17, 119-142; Janis and Mann, 
52. Morgan (1977) and Snyder and Diesing (1977) suggest that a threat to basic values 
alone may be sufficient. Morgan distinguishes those crises that arise and culminate suddenly 
from those that build gradually over a long period of time. Only the former, the "acute" crises, 
include a perception of limited time for response. Snyder and Diesing, drawing on evidence 
from their comparative examination of crisis decision-making, reject short decision time as a 
defining characteristic of crisis. The pathological patterns of decision-making, predicted by 
time pressure, were found even when decision time extended over weeks and months. In one of 
the two cases where decision time was shortest, moreover, the expected consequences did not 
appear. Snyder and Diesing conclude that time pressure does not appear to be a major source 
of stress in international crisis decision-making. Their argument and evidence run directly 
counter to that of Janis and Mann (1977), who consider decisionmakers' perception of 
insufficient time a principal source of stress and pathological behavior. 
53. Janis and Mann (1977:107-115) suggest that acute stress may encourage decision-
makers to avoid recognition of a problem through defensive-avoidance. In certain 
circumstances, they imply, stress may decrease leaders' capacity for problem diagnosis. 
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1977:78). Organizational theorists suggest, however, that search for 
information under crisis conditions may be more extensive, even if less 
efficient and productive (March and Simon, 1958:116). Decisionmakers 
are also more likely to search past the first "satisficing" alternative 
(Gawthrop, 1969:85, 87, 94, 125, and Wilensky, 1967:78). The impact of 
crisis on search activity remains a matter of some dispute. 
There is consensus that crisis may increase the conservative revision of 
estimates. The effect of cognitive constraints on the processing of 
information may increase when decisionmakers must consider new 
information under stress. They are likely to pay attention to fewer cues and 
to be less discriminating (Holsti and George, 1975:284, 279). Decision-
makers are also more likely to accept a single hypothesis to organize and 
interpret information and increase resistance to discrepant information. 
For decisionmakers handling information before the outbreak of World 
War I, for example, the pressure of time became an increasingly salient 
factor (Holsti, 1972a:200). Perceptions of threat and limited time appear to 
depress revision of estimates and increase cognitive constraints on the 
processing of information. 
The evidence is not consistent, however, on the impact of crisis on the 
evaluation of alternatives. Some studies suggest that the intensity of the 
crisis is inversely related to the number of alternatives considered 
(Robinson, 1972:23, 273, 274; Paige, 1972:52; Milburn, 1972). In a 
simulation of crisis, however, decisionmakers considered a larger number 
of alternatives than they did in low threat-extended time situations 
(Hermann, 1969:168). They may do so in part because the situation is better 
defined in time and space; their perceptions of threat and finite time 
structure the policy environment. In a crisis situation, moreover, 
decisionmakers may have a stronger incentive to consider a broad range of 
options (Morgan, 1977:178 and Hermann, 1972:298, n. 6). 
Crisis may affect not only the number of alternatives considered but the 
quality of the evaluative process. A great deal of evidence suggests that 
crisis-induced stress decreases ability to identify a range of consequences, 
especially for those options that are preferred. As stress increases, attention 
focuses increasingly on immediate rather than long-range consequences 
(Holsti, 1972a:200). Decisionmakers also tend to overestimate the benefit 
of preferred alternatives and underestimate the cost of those they favor 
(Milburn, 1972:273). Under stress, decisionmakers may fail to recognize 
value conflict at all. Should they recognize the conflict, moreover, this 
acknowledgment would further increase the level of stress and consequent­
ly reduce resistance to premature termination of the evaluative process 
(Janis and Mann, 1977:47-50). Decisionmakers then may substitute 
bolstering for other processes of evaluation and persuade themselves that 
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one alternative will satisfy, if not maximize, all the relevant values (Holsti 
and George, 1975:282). 
Those who study the behavior of decisionmakers within organizations, 
however, suggest that decisionmakers under stress may use improved 
analytic skills to evaluate policy options. The quality of evaluation also 
may be improved by the access of the decision-making unit to expert advice 
and opinion. The scope of the values at stake may lead decisionmakers to 
demand refined estimates; they may be more sensitive to error and more 
careful in their costing. The evidence, therefore, is not all in one direction. 
Analysts of crisis decision-making are unable to specify precisely the 
decision rules which policymakers are likely to use to choose among policy 
options. Policymakers may use the best-known or most accessible decision 
strategy; they may choose by analogy to earlier situations of crisis 
(Kilpatrick, 1969 and Milburn, 1972:274). In so doing, decisionmakers 
would be using cognitive procedures for choice. Within an organization, 
however, decisionmakers are less likely to resort to routine procedures of 
satisficing and more likely to consider general values and apply 
superordinate decision rules (Janis, 1972; Holsti and George, 1975:299, n. 
41). Broad-gauge decision strategies may replace narrower procedures 
when decisionmakers perceive increased threat to important values. 
Research on the impact of crisis on decision-making suggests 
considerable variation in the performance of decisional tasks. There is no 
clear pattern: crisis-induced stress may promote or reduce the likelihood of 
analytic processing. A number of plausible explanations of the contradic­
tory evidence are possible. First, crisis may have no systematic impact on 
decisional performance; any relationship may be spurious. Such a 
hypothesis is inconsistent with a large body of evidence drawn from 
biological and psychological studies of human behavior under stress 
(Appley and Trumball, 1967; Broadbent, 1971; Suedfeld and Tetlock, 
1977; Janis and Mann, 1977). 
Second, the level of threat perception and time pressure may explain 
differences in the processing of choice. The relationship between 
perceptions of threat, time pressure, and decision-making may be 
curvilinear rather than linear. Moderate time pressure, for example, 
promotes analytic performance while intense pressure constrains careful 
search and complex evaluation (Ray, 1965:234 and Pepinsky, Pepinsky, 
and Paulik, 1960:38). Since decision time is not synonymous with clock 
time but varies with task complexity, the performance of decision tasks 
may decrease after a certain threshold in time pressure because of the 
disproportionately lower levels of information used in short decision-time 
situations (Tanter, 1975:86). Consistent with these findings, psychological 
evidence suggests that moderate levels of anxiety promote effective 
performance, while high or low levels decrease the efficiency of task 
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completion. If decisionmakers perceive moderate threat and time pressure, 
they may have both the incentive and the capacity to use analytic processes. 
This hypothesis would be consistent with studies of organizational 
decision-making which suggest that crisis may break through routine 
inertia and promote more effective decision-making procedures. 
Third, the impact of crisis on decision-making may vary if it is accom­
panied by a changed perception of other situational factors. Although 
surprise is not an essential component of crisis, it often accompanies per­
ceptions of threat and time pressure. In a national security crisis, surprise 
refers to the perception by decisionmakers that they have miscalculated 
or misperceived the intent of their adversary.54 If decisionmakers are 
surprised when their perception of threat and time pressure is low, they 
may be provoked to initiate analytic processes of search, evaluation, and 
choice. If they acknowledge miscalculation when threat and time pressure 
are high, however, an analytic process is less likely. Covariance of sur­
prise with crisis-induced stress may explain some of the variation in 
decision-making procedures.55 
Finally, crisis-induced stress may interact with the group context of 
54. When policymakers miscalculate rather than misperceive, surprise is less intense. 
They may miscalculate the importance of particular information, for example, and 
marginally revise their estimate of the likelihood of an event. When the event occurs, 
decisionmakers will be surprised. They may never have considered the possibility that the 
event may occur, however, and consequently develop no base estimate of probability. Should 
the event occur, their misperception rather than miscalculation of adversary intent would 
produce a more intense level of surprise. Linguists and mathematicians are only now 
beginning to formalize the distinction between probability and possibility theory. SeeZadeh, 
1978 and Gaines and Kohout, 1977. This distinction corresponds to that between 
miscalculation and misperception. 
55. The relationship of surprise to the two dimensions of crisis is a matter of controversy. 
Brady (1974:3, 258), in a study of crisis behavior through event interaction data, finds no 
significant interaction effects between threat, time, and surprise. Hermann (1969:202-203), in 
a simulation of crisis decision-making, finds that decision-making varies with perceived 
changes in the amount of threat in combination with the amount of time or the amount of 
surprise. The inconsistency in results may be a function in part of the different measures of 
both the independent and dependent variables. Janis and Mann (1977:76-80), in their 
examination of the impact of stress on decision-making behavior, suggest indirectly that 
surprise which accompanies high threat and short time would constrain choice. They argue 
that, if a decisionmaker perceives serious risk and sufficient time to search for a solution that is 
better than currently available alternatives, a high quality decision-making process is likely. If 
they perceive insufficient time and serious risk, panic and confusion are the likely result. 
Even if surprise does interact with the other two kinds of perceptions, McCormick (1975:14, 
16) questions whether surprise can be operationalized. He argues that surprise does not 
increase or decrease during a crisis but normally occurs only once. Here McCormick is 
treating surprise as a dichotomous variable; it is present or absent. When surprise is coded 
dichotomously, its capacity to explain variation over time in decision-making processes is 
limited. Surprise can be considered, however, as an interval variable. For heuristic purposes, 
intensity of surprise can be considered as the size of the gap between the estimated probability 
of an event and unity, or its occurrence. If decisionmakers estimate a moderate probability of 
attack, for example, and the attack occurs, the intensity of surprise can be considered as the 
difference between estimates of sixty percent and unity. Here policymakers miscalculated. If, 
however, they never considered the contingency of an attack, then the intensity of their 
surprise, should the attack occur, is much greater. Because they misperceived rather than 
miscalculated, the intensity of their surprise can be considered as the difference between 
impossibility and unity. 
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decision-making to produce variation in procedures. Stress may increase a 
tendency to seek concurrence. If decisionmakers feel threatened and see no 
obvious way out, the tendency to engage in collective defensive-avoidance 
may increase sharply (Janis and Mann, 1977:132). Separately and together, 
situational and group factors may affect the processing of choice. Indeed, 
variation in these two factors may help to explain some of the differences in 
the processes of choice highlighted by each of the three principal 
explanations. 
This review of explanations of decision-making documents both 
controversy and consensus. There is agreement on the centrality of 
uncertainty and complexity as components of the decision-making 
environment. The lack of information about the likely consequences of 
choice and the value conflict implicit in most situations makes decision-
making difficult. Second, three explanations of choice—analytic, 
cybernetic, and cognitive—suggest that people respond differently to 
uncertainty and complexity in their performance of the five decisional 
tasks. While the latter two explanations emphasize the constraints to 
rationality, each delineates different kinds of limits. Finally, diagnosis, 
search, revision, evaluation, and choice are affected by membership in a 
group and the stress of crisis. 
The disagreement and dissensus among these explanations of choice 
may be somewhat less than is apparent onfirst reading. A body of evidence 
suggests that people use different procedures for different kinds of tasks. 
Decisionmakers may combine those elements of analytic, cybernetic, and 
cognitive strategies that are compatible to develop procedures more suited 
to particular circumstances. These hybrid paths to choice may provide a 
more powerful explanation of decision-making than current concepts. 
Drawing on the three principal explanations, the next chapter begins by 
specifying multiple paths to static and dynamic choice and relates these 
different forms of constrained rationality to differences in group 
procedures and crisis-induced stress. It concludes with a discussion of the 
level of analysis and criteria of admissible evidence and inference for a valid 
explanation of decisions made by Israel's leaders in 1967 
chaptei 
Multiple Paths to Choice 
Introduction 
Although students of decision-making have documented critically 
important constraints to rational choice, they are not fully agreed on the 
scope of these boundaries to rationality. This disagreement may reflect 
considerable variation in the performance of decisionmakers, especially in 
such a crucial area of public policy as national security. This chapter first 
establishes multiple forms of constrained rationality by delineating 
different paths to any single choice, and then it examines processes of 
choice over time. Prior to the detailed examination of different forms of 
constrained rationality, a brief outline of the factors that may explain these 
differences is in order. 
Leaders can and do use a variety of processes to handle the complexities 
and uncertainties of their strategic environment. The particular processes 
they use can be explained in part by the norms and procedures their group 
accepts, by their perceptions of immediate threat and pressure of time, and 
by the set of strategic concepts or collective beliefs they have developed and 
accepted over time. The relationship of group procedures, crisis 
perceptions, and strategic beliefs to decision process and outcome is 
displayed in Figure 3.1. Each of these factors, separately and sometimes 
together, affects the likelihood that one rather than another process will be 
used. The content and structure of strategic beliefs, for example, may 
contribute to perceptions of threat which may in turn affect the dynamics of 
a decision-making group responsible for national security. Or, group 
processes may create a heightened sense of common threat and pressure of 
time. All these factors may operate directly as well as indirectly on 
processes of choice. In more formal language, leaders' beliefs about their 
strategic environment, their perceptions of threat, and the procedures used 
in their group explain decisional processes and therefore the quality of 
choice. Figure 3.1 provides a formal statement of the central theoretical 
argument of this study. 
I. Philosophers of science who have examined decision-making studies suggest that there 
may be tension between the goal of theory-construction and the phenomenological 
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Figure 3.1 
National Security Decision Making 
Beliefs 
Crisis Decisional Process Choice 
I t / 
Group Norms 
Before an examination of the relationships displayed in Figure 3:1, the 
different paths to choice must be established. Each of the three 
explanations of choice reviewed in the last chapter specified the basic 
decision-making tasks—diagnosis, search, revision, evaluation, and 
choice—somewhat differently. These three explanations are summarized 
in Table 3.1. Each assumes an internally consistent and coherent process of 
choice. Some of the psychological evidence suggests that this may not be 
the case. 
Decisionmakers may combine elements from several processes to make 
their choices. Evidence drawn from research on attribution, information-
processing, and social judgment suggests that people use many rules or 
strategies to make a single decision. Early in a process of evaluation, people 
may compare a number of alternatives on the same attribute. After they 
have eliminated those options that are unsatisfactory, they may then 
proceed to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the remaining 
alternatives before choosing (Berl, Lewis, and Morrison, 1976; Payne, 
1976). Some social judgment theorists find that people synthesize analytic 
and cognitive elements in a single process of choice (Hammond, Stewart, 
Brehmer, and Steinman, 1975; Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 1977). 
Decisionmakers may adapt their processes of choice to suit their 
environment and the task at hand. 
assumption of the reconstructed world of the decisionmaker as the explanation of choice 
(Gorman, 1970 and Yanarella, 1976). The tension, however, is a result in part of the kind of 
factors which analysts include in their approach to formal explanation. The contradiction 
occurs when decision-making is explained by variation in objective environmental 
characteristics—the external or domestic setting—which are beyond the purview of 
decisionmakers. When the principal explanatory factors of decision-making are themselves 
subjective—such as related sets of beliefs, perceptions, and norms of decisionmakers—this 
contradiction is largely removed. Indeed, the central theoretical thrust of this study is 
consistent with a hermeneutic explanation of decision-making which interprets decisions 
within a broader and more inclusive context of the subjective environment of decisionmakers. 
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TABLE 3.1 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE PROCESS OF Choice 
7i7.vA.V Cybernetic Cognitive Analytic 
Diagnosis	 preselected and indicators derived unspecified 
validated indicators	 from belief systems 
Search	 programmed consideration within the parameters across all relevant 
of a preselected number of belief systems options 
of variables 
Revision	 incremental and deductive and optimal* 
conservative	 categorical inference;

sharp oscillation from

low probability to

certainty

Evaluation	 limited; reliance on limited; sequential comparative calculation 
preanalyzed SOPs or along one or two of cost, benefit, and 
programs dimensions likelihood of principal 
consequences of 
alternatives 
Choice satisficing	 single-value criterion, optimizing 
analogizing, lexico­
graphic calculus 
* Analytic revision may be gradual or sharp; it responds to the diagnosticity of the data. 
Cybernetic revision is more likely to be incremental while cognitive revision is more likely 
to move sharply to and from estimates of low probability to certainty. 
Decisionmakers may be more flexible and creative than current 
explanations of their processes suggest. An adequate reconstruction of 
their processes of choice may require the combination of different elements 
on the path to choice. Drawn from the principal explanations of choice, the 
multiple paths to choice diagrammed in Figure 3.2 are likely combinations 
by policymakers of decisional tasks. 
Figure 3.2 
Multiple Paths to Choice 
PATH 
NO. SEARCH REVISION EVALUATION CHOICE 
. 1 Program Program — - Program «• Satisficing 
1/2. Belief/Program—Program/Beli€ f —Program Satisfying 
—-Belief— •Analogizing 
BELIEFS 
' /	 Single Value STIMULUS 
- I — - 4 -Program • Program / Belief — Belief Calculus PROBLEM 
DIAGNOSIS V*5 -Analytic — • Belief Belief — Lexicographic 
Calculus 
\ ^6 -Analytic — - Analytic • Analytic Optimizing 
Constrained V -Belief Optimizing 
Multiple Paths to Static Choice 
Decision-making begins with a diagnosis that a problem exists. 
Policymakers must recognize an issue for decison before they can begin to 
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perform those tasks designed to ameliorate or solve their problem. 
Perception of a stimulus for decision is filtered through belief systems. 
Decisionmakers begin their process of choice by referring to prevailing 
beliefs; they have no other basis. 
When the problem is diagnosed as one of national security, strategic 
doctrine provides a rich source of relevant beliefs and concepts. 
Frequently, strategic concepts have been considered in depth over time and 
serve as standing estimates for decisionmakers at a given moment in time. 
Indeed, strategic doctrine often defines the boundaries of a problem and 
interprets the stimulus for policymakers. Leaders may identify the act of an 
adversary as the onset of a decisional problem, for example, only by 
referring to a standing concept of deterrence. 
Particularly when decisionmakers have been involved in protracted 
conflict with an adversary, strategic concepts are likely to be well-
developed and articulated. These concepts summarize the intersubjective 
consensus of successive sets of policymakers developed over time. 
Generally, doctrine includes beliefs about the nature of the environment, 
current strategic dilemmas, and principal adversaries.2 Leaders generally 
do not begin consideration of each new stimulus de novo, but refer to these 
standing beliefs developed over time. Although leaders may define their 
strategic environment differently, doctrine may provide the most available 
and coherent framework for commonly accepted beliefs over time. 
If all decisionmakers begin their process of choice by referring to 
prevailing concepts, they differ significantly in the way they manage these 
beliefs in the subsequent processing of information and evaluation of 
options. Indeed, the relative importance of initial beliefs, once the process 
of choosing gets under way, can be used as a major criterion to distinguish 
one kind of decisional process from another. In Path 1, officials spend little 
time on interpretation of the stimulus through their belief system. They 
proceed directly from prevailing concepts to consideration of a preselected 
number of variables, incremental revision, limited evaluation, and 
satisficing choice. They consider only a limited number of variables and 
rely on codified routines to search, revise, evaluate, and choose. Such 
routines may be found in the organizational memories available to high-
level decisionmakers or in well-articulated strategic doctrine. This first 
path is the reconstruction suggested by the cybernetic explanation. To infer 
such a process of choice, there must be evidence of explicit references by 
decisionmakers to organizational routines or strategic doctrine in the 
discussion preceding choice. They must indicate that they chose the first 
satisfactory option without undue reflection. 
2. Snyder and Diesing (1977:494) define the belief system of a foreign policy decision-
maker as concepts of the nature of international politics and a set of images of each of the 
bargainers including oneself. Strategic doctrine generally includes both these components: 
a concept of international politics and a set of assumptions about the principal participants 
and their options. 
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Decisionmakers need not rely exclusively on cybernetic procedures to 
make satisficing choices. In Path 2, for example, policymakers search more 
extensively than is usual in a cybernetic process. In the early stages of 
decision, beliefs continue to dominate.3 After members of a government 
have identified the onset of a problem for decision through reference to 
their belief systems, they continue to search these beliefs for policy options. 
If the first one or two options identified are part of an established sequence, 
then subsequent evaluation is likely to be limited and choice will be 
satisficing. This path differs from the usual cybernetic reconstruction in its 
emphasis on somewhat more extended search for information and options 
and is especially likely if search highlights an alternative which is prescribed 
as the obvious next step on the basis of past experience. 
Alternatively, belief systems may dominate the formation and revision 
of estimates rather than the search process. Even though leaders identify 
only the next option in a sequence, they may include more than the 
preselected variables in their revision of estimates of likelihood. In 
considering or reconsidering probable contingencies, for example, they 
may draw upon additional factors highlighted by prevailing concepts. 
Along this second path, then, decisionmakers use different combinations of 
cognitive and cybernetic search and revision but, nevertheless, restrict their 
evaluation and choice of options as the cybernetic explanation suggests. 
Policymakers need not be restrictive or "automated" in their performance 
of the earlier decisional tasks to produce a satisficing choice; rather, a 
satisficing decision can flow from a process which is considerably more 
complicated than the cybernetic reconstruction suggests. 
In the third path to choice, policymakers' beliefs remain predominant 
throughout the process of choice and constrain the performance of all the 
decision tasks. In national security decision-making, for example, repeated 
reference by leaders to strategic concepts and assumptions in their early 
discussion and debate would be preliminary evidence of a cognitive process 
of choice. Leaders may also restrict their search to options which are 
consistent with prevailing strategic concepts. Even if members of a 
decision-making group make no explicit reference to strategic arguments 
when they consider alternatives but reject out of hand any option which 
contradicts prevailing concepts, then the inference can be made, although 
with less confidence, that strategic concepts serve as a belief system which 
constrains search and evaluation.4 
3. Stembruncr (1974:139) suggests that cybernetic processes must be supplemented by 
cognitive processes when complexity and uncertainty are not reduced in a decomposed 
environment. He focuses attention principally on the path from programs to beliefs rather 
than from beliefs to programs. 
4. In the absence of direct empirical evidence, the analyst can only make explicit behavior 
anticipated by an explanation. If decisionmakers consider only those options which are 
consistent with beliefs, then the inference can be made that decisionmakers are behaving as if 
their process of choice is structured by their belief system. Criteria of inference are discussed in 
greater detail at the end of this chapter when standards of explanation are examined. 
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When they consider the consequences of options, leaders who rely 
principally on their belief structure are likely to use categorical language. 
Use of such terms as "impossible" or "certainty," for example, generally 
indicate constrained information-processing. Leaders' estimates of the 
likely actions of others change little during the course of the discussion; 
they "know" rather than question, and their knowledge is deduced from 
their prevailing assumptions (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:333). These 
decisionmakers are very confident in their inferences and estimates. 
In evaluating alternatives, leaders emphasize one or two overriding 
values which take precedence over all others and whose importance they 
consider obvious. They may make reference to analogous situations which 
they recall in discussion, and they speak with assurance of the lessons of 
history. Decisionmakers do not allude to the complexity of their choice, 
but defend their preferred option as the "best" choice. Reference to 
analogous situations, emphasis on the simplicity of the problem and the 
obvious choice, and the use of such language as "best" rather than "better" 
all indicate a cognitive process of choice. This path emphasizes cognitive 
constraints to information-processing and evaluation. It includes a 
deductive pattern of search and revision, a limited evaluation of 
alternatives, and a choice which, at the extreme, is the product of 
categorical inference and analogizing or single-value calculation. 
This generally accepted reconstruction of a cognitive process is neither 
the only nor the major variant of constrained choice. Decisionmakers may 
use cybernetic or analytic procedures to search and revise, but evaluate and 
choose by referring principally to their beliefs. As they proceed from one 
decisional task to another, their reliance on basic components of their 
belief system increases rather than decreases. Path 4 suggests, for example, 
that decisionmakers combine cybernetic search with cognitive revision and 
evaluation. After they diagnose a problem, they move to standard 
procedures to consider only the next option. In their discussion, they 
explicitly refer to an alternative as the obvious next step in a sequence. As 
the process continues, however, they shift the terms of the debate to 
emphasize the dominance of the proposed option along one or two 
principal values and its consistency with prevailing concepts. What 
cybernetic processes split, cognitive processes keep apart. 
Decisionmakers may begin by limited search for an option which 
improves things marginally, and they may even monitor only a limited 
number of variables to generate revised estimates of probability. As they 
work, however, they shift from a criterion of marginal improvement to one 
of best along some relevant dimension. They no longer speak of "some" 
improvement but refer to the "best" option or a choice which is good on its 
merits. The result is a much less modest choice made with less humility. 
When leaders combine analytic and cognitive procedures to arrive at 
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their decision, the tone and spirit of discussion are considerably different. 
Path 5 diagrams such a process of choice. Decisionmakers consciously 
extend their search for alternatives and may express their frustration with 
available options which are presented in sequence. They may even 
deliberately extend their search for additional information and generate 
some alternatives which are not fully consistent with their belief systems. 
If the information they receive, however, challenges important 
components of their belief systems, leaders may revert to a constrained 
process of opinion revision where discrepant information is ignored or 
discounted. If they depress the impact of inconsistent evidence on the 
validity of central beliefs, policymakers are likely to continue to emphasize 
the relevance of these beliefs to evaluation and choice. They may 
acknowledge openly the need to simplify and state explicitly that they are 
choosing on the basis of one or two important values which discriminate 
between options. Even as they do so, however, they make reference to the 
complexities in their environment which make such simplification 
unavoidable. Unlike their colleagues who combine cybernetic search with 
cognitive processing, those who follow an analytic-cognitive path speak 
with less assurance; their language is less categorical. 
To make their choice, decisionmakers may use some variant of a 
lexicographic decision rule or "eliminate by aspects" (Tversky, 1972). 
Lexicographic decision strategies require decisionmakers to impose some 
order on their values but not to trade off or integrate across these 
dimensions of value. Policymakers simply use their most important value 
to see if alternatives affect it differently. If this first value does not 
discriminate between options, they then move through the remaining 
values until they reach one which does distinguish an alternative as better 
than the others. Such a procedure is much less demanding than comparison 
of all the relevant alternatives and values but more comprehensive than 
consideration of only one value or choice by analogy. Although these three 
last paths to choice are all examples of constrained information-processing 
and evaluation, there are important differences among them. And these 
differences may have considerable policy consequences. 
The next path charts the familiar analytic process of decision. After 
leaders perceive and identify a stimulus to decision, beliefs gradually recede 
and become less important as a point of reference for subsequent search, 
evaluation, and revision. Analytic search is indicated by an explicit effort to 
discover additional alternatives and gather further information. Leaders 
anticipate difficult choices and ambiguous information and acknowledge 
dissatisfaction with the obvious policy options. Even under considerable 
stress in a national security crisis, leaders have engaged in analytic search. 
Those who advised President Kennedy after the discovery of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba deliberately expanded search beyond one or two obvious 
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policy options (Schlesinger, 1965:803-805). Although they did not 
identify all possible alternatives, they identified six rather than the 
obvious one or two. 
Decisionmakers are also skeptical of prevailing estimates and expect 
both discrepant and confirming evidence. Although they may make an 
initial attempt to defend the validity of important beliefs, they do make 
adjustments in the face of a continuous flow of data which do not conform 
to expectations. During the discussion which precedes choice, leaders 
generally do not express their estimates of probability in quantitative 
terms. An examination of the Japanese choice to attack Pearl Harbor, for 
example, finds that, although decisionmakers did not express probability 
estimates in numerical values, they did consider the likelihood of the 
consequences of various alternatives and weigh their cost and benefit 
(Russett, 1967:92). Use by officials of such terms as "probably," "doubtful," 
"likely," "unlikely," or "possibly" is a first indication of an analytic process 
of estimation. Decisionmakers who are analytic express only moderate 
confidence in their estimates and avoid the categorical language of 
certainty.5 
Even policymakers who are analytic do not generally present precise 
estimates of cost and benefit. They do, however, acknowledge value 
complexity and compare the alternatives they consider. When they speak 
of the choice that confronts them, they use terms like "sacrifice," 
"compensation," "relative advantage," or "give up in order to gain." They 
may express their calculation of the cost and benefit of the consequences of 
alternatives by referring to their "advantages," "gain," and "desirability," 
or describe them as "undesirable," "costly," "risky," or "dangerous." 
Essential is some direct comparison accompanied by a recognition of the 
complexity of the choice. 
After decisionmakers have engaged in even an ad hoc or approximate 
process of costing, they choose that option which promises them the 
highest expected gain. Although they do not follow exact procedures of 
probability-value multiplication, leaders do make crude estimates of 
likelihood and relative gain and loss. They consider their choice the best 
possible or the least dangerous in a complex and uncertain world. Aware of 
these complexities and uncertainties when they make their choice, they do 
not claim to have removed the often painful conflict between options. More 
so than their colleagues who rely principally on their established beliefs, 
they are modest in the face of history. 
Leaders may not be consistently analytic, however, in their process of 
5. In a reassessment of Kennedy's decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis, 
Snyder (1978:361) uses evidence of categorical certainty to argue that Kennedy was not 
analytic. While his treatment of problem formulation and evaluation of options is somewhat 
flawed, certainty in inference and estimates does distinguish non-analytic from analytic 
choice. 
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choice; performance of some of the important decisional tasks may be 
constrained. The final path to decision traces such mixtures of cognitive 
and analytic components. In Path 7, beliefs do not diminish in importance 
once policymakers have identified a problem. They may stop searching, for 
example, after they have identified a few obvious alternatives which are 
consistent with prevailing beliefs. They reject out of hand any option which 
is inconsistent and limit their search for additional alternatives. From the 
beginning, their process of choice is constrained. 
A though search is limited, leaders may be thorough in their search for 
information and open to discrepant data. If confronted with a steady flow 
of challenging information, they may be able to modify strongly-held 
opinions. Although the alternatives they identify are the outputs of 
cognitive processes where beliefs predominate, revision of opinion need 
not necessarily be so. It is entirely possible, of course, that both search and 
revision are constrained. 
Even so, decisionmakers may carefully consider the cost and benefit of 
the consequences of the principal options they have identified. Having 
done so, they choose that option which promises the greatest gain.6 There is 
considerable evidence of the use of such a mixed path to choice. Axelrod 
examines a range of decision-making processes and concludes that, within 
the limits of simplified images, policymakers are analytic both in their 
processes of inference and in their selection of options. They can make 
inferences consistent with their assertions and choose the best alternative in 
terms of these simplified images (1976:243-244). Decisionmakers also may 
use more than one evaluative procedure. They may begin by eliminating 
those options that are unsatisfactory and then weigh the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the remaining options (Bed, Lewis, and 
Morrison, 1976). Snyder and Diesing, in their study of crisis decision-
making, also suggest that leaders may supplement a decision strategy of 
maximization with elements of lexicographic calculation (1977:346-348).7 
In all these cases, constraints dominate the performance of earlier 
decisional tasks but recede as policymakers move into the final stages of 
evaluation. Decisionmakers use both cognitive and analytic procedures 
but in sequence. Choice is constrained though analytic, and analytic 
though constrained. The longer cognitive processes persist through the 
sequence of decisional tasks, the more constrained the final choice. Within 
6. Steinbruner suggests that analytic and cognitive processes are non-substitutable. 
However, once alternatives have been identified—and rejected—through search of prevailing 
beliefs, the consequences of remaining options can be comparatively evaluated. 
7. Snyder and Diesing suggest that policymakers may begin by rejecting alternatives with 
obviously "bad" consequences along one or two important dimensions and then proceed to 
comparative evaluation. It is more difficult to see how maximization could supplement a 
satisficing strategy, an alternative which Diesing suggests. For Snyder's challenge to the 
validity of such an interpretation, see p. 348. 
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this last path to choice, several combinations of cognitive and analytic 
procedures are possible, but all end with some comparative evaluation of 
major alternatives and an optimizing choice among them. 
Other possible paths to choice have been eliminated if they did not meet 
either of two necessary conditions: logical coherence and some empirical 
evidence of their use. The seven paths that remain can each be understood 
as an "ideal type" whose empirical interpretation may reflect varying 
combinations of component tasks. Of the seven, three replicate the tight 
consistency of the cybernetic, cognitive, and analytic explanations. The 
remaining four differ from the usual reconstruction of decision-making 
processes and attempt to mirror the mixture of procedures policymakers 
use to respond to their environment and to the task at hand. It is very 
unlikely that decisionmakers will use one strategy all the time for all kinds 
of decisions. On the contrary, some evidence suggests that the same person 
will use a variety of procedures to make even a single choice. A 
comprehensive explanation of decision-making must include multiple 
components in its reconstruction of a single process of choice. 
Discussion of these multiple paths to choice also highlights a second 
issue of some importance. Six of the seven paths can be considered 
examples of constrained or bounded rationality. Only the sixth path 
reconstructs what is generally considered to be a rational decision-making 
process; all the others emphasize the limits to human rationality. Yet, the 
differences among these six processes are considerable. Although all are 
constrained, some produce choices which are incremental adjustments to 
long-established programs, others yield highly over-simplified single-value 
decisions, still others produce more complicated choices based on some 
rank-ordering of priorities, and the last permits a choice which is 
optimizing even if it is constrained. While the concept of bounded 
rationality is valuable in its emphasis on constraints, it obscures when it 
ignores the important differences among these processes of choice. 
Those whose focus is the quality of choice are interested in these 
differences among constrained processes. They are interested particularly 
in the conditions which promote any variant of analytic decision-making, 
even those that are constrained. A cognitive-analytic sequence is not the 
path expected by observers of major national security decisions. On the 
contrary, those paths which emphasize the pervasive importance of 
beliefs—Paths 3, 4, and 5—are the generally anticipated processes of 
choice. Other things being equal, when leaders operate with the 
uncertainties and complexities that surround national security decisions, 
they are likely to draw heavily on prevailing concepts to make their 
inferences and to use cognitive short-cuts to make their choices. Even if a 
particular event triggers a more extensive search or highlights an option 
tied to an available program, a resort to some simplifying mechanism, as 
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leaders evaluate and choose, is not at all surprising. Some variant of a 
cognitive process is considered the empirically dominant mechanism of 
choice. 
More surprising is evidence of a path to decision which includes any 
significant analytic component. Even a cognitive-analytic sequence, one 
form of constrained rationality, is not considered usual. When it does 
occur, those who study decision-making are challenged to explain why and 
when leaders are able to use any variant of an analytic procedure. Although 
rationality is bounded in both cases, the difference between a cybernetic-
cognitive sequence which produces a highly simplified decision and a 
cognitive-analytic process which permits some degree of comparison and 
optimization is not at all trivial. This is especially so when the issue on the 
agenda is one of national security. Careful distinction among the varieties 
of constrained processes is essential if differences in the quality of choice 
are to be explained. 
Multiple Paths to Dynamic Choice 
Once policymakers have made one decision, they do not necessarily 
continue to use the same processes if the problem persists. If they use 
hybrid procedures to reach a single decision, they are as likely to use 
different procedures at different points in time. If their first choice does not 
meet their minimal objectives, leaders may shift to a different process. In 
explaining choice, this study is interested not only in the path to a single 
decision but also in the explanation of a sequence of decisions over time in 
the face of a persistent problem. 
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that variation in decisional 
processes can be explained by the content and structure of strategic beliefs, 
by leaders' perceptions of their immediate environment, and by the 
dynamics that operate when a group decides (Figure 3.1). It is difficult to 
determine precisely the relative weight of each of these factors in explaining 
why policymakers use one rather than another process. Special problems 
arise when all three operate indirectly as well as directly to affect the 
procedures leaders use. Since group discussion and procedures and a sense 
of threat and time pressure are of well-documented importance, this study 
pays special attention to the linkage between doctrine, process, and choice. 
It is also interested particularly in the combination of conditions which 
may promote any kind of analytic process at any time in the sequence of 
decisions. 
The structure and substance of strategic doctrine may affect the kind of 
processes policymakers use. Decisionmakers may use combinations of 
cognitive and cybernetic processes when a stimulus is directly anticipated 
by available doctrine or highlights a concept tied to an accessible program. 
Under these circumstances, leaders can be expected to use some variant of 
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cybernetic choice (Paths 1 and 2). Strategic doctrine serves as a substitute 
for programs if it is well-articulated and specifies appropriate responses to 
plausible contingencies. This specification provides the equivalent of a 
decision rule and obviates the necessity for extended search or evaluation 
before choice. Insofar as strategic concepts are explicitly prescriptive and 
comprehensive, decisionmakers who share these beliefs are likely to use 
some variant of cybernetic processes when they make their first attempt to 
solve a security problem. 
Policymakers also are likely to begin with cognitive-cybernetic 
procedures if they identify a problem for decision but perceive little threat 
and adequate time for decision. Leaders who are surprised by unexpected 
behavior by an adversary, for example, may acknowledge their mispercep­
tion or miscalculation and recognize the need for decision, but perceive 
little threat or pressure for immediate action. The low level of urgency will 
permit inertia and routine group procedures to persist. Operating within a 
unit, decisionmakers are then likely to make use of those available 
programs that cover such contingencies. Low levels of threat perception 
and time pressure reinforce routine group procedures to promote some 
version of cybernetic choice. 
Policymakers may not be able to use one of the low-cost cybernetic 
strategies to begin their decisional sequence. If, for example, the stimulus 
to decision is so unexpected that it has not been seriously considered, then 
decisionmakers must use other processes of choice. Secondly, a decisional 
process may not begin when threat and time pressure are low. 
Policymakers may simultaneously identify a problem and perceive 
moderate threat and limited time for response. An unexpected action by an 
adversary, for example, is likely to increase the level of perceived threat and 
time pressure. Leaders then operate under crisis conditions which generate 
some stress. Thirdly, moderate stress may occur if earlier efforts to manage 
a problem have proven to be ineffective and the problem persists. If, for 
example, decisionmakers have experimented with available programs as a 
first response to an unacceptable challenge and their first choice fails to 
restore the status quo ante, the level of stress is likely to increase. Moderate 
levels of threat perception and time pressure are most conducive to some 
form of an analytic process (Paths 6 and 7). 
When crisis-induced stress is moderate, decisionmakers are freed from 
routine constraints and stimulated to break through the normal pattern of 
inertia. In a group, members are provoked to seek additional information, 
to coordinate policy more carefully, and to depart from routine or satis­
ficing responses to the standard problems they normally confront. Op­
erating under only moderate stress, leaders in a group are less constrained 
by routine procedures but are still not prone to extremes of "group­
think." Research on individual performance at a similar level of stress 
converges with the findings on group performance. The biological and 
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psychological evidence generally suggests that the relationship between 
stress and task performance is curvilinear. If decisionmakers perceive 
moderate threat and finite decision time, they may have both a stronger 
incentive and an increased capacity to search for and evaluate alternatives 
through analytic processes. Group dynamics may interact with perceptions 
of some threat and limited—but adequate—time to promote a "shift 
toward rationality" by policymakers who become willing to suspend 
normal politics (Morgan, 1977:177). 
If, in addition, decisionmakers can refer to closely-reasoned and 
carefully-structured strategic argument, their performance of difficult tasks 
may be facilitated. Strategic concepts may help officials to identify and 
diagnose a problem for decision before threat perception and time pressure 
become intense. If they provide a set of indicators to be monitored, 
policymakers will find it easier to revise their estimates. Unpleasant 
information is more likely to receive attention if it is connected to a well-
established and accepted indicator. And if prevailing strategic concepts 
highlight the value conflict inherent in strategic dilemmas, decisionmakers 
may be less prone to skirt the comparison of values and to deny the 
necessity to make some sacrifice. The logic of starting assumptions is not 
unrelated to the logic policymakers subsequently use. The structure and 
content of strategic argument can contribute directly and indirectly to 
analytic processing, even if it is constrained. 
As many observers of national security decision-making have noted, 
analytic processing, even when it is severely limited, is not common. It 
appears that conditions must be almost ideal if policymakers are to begin 
their decision-making with analytic procedures, or if they are to shift to 
them after other processes have failed to limit the level of threat perception 
and time pressure. The quality of strategic logic is itself an important 
factor. If it can be used to identify a problem before the problem becomes 
too threatening or too pressing to manage, it can create the psychological 
conditions which promote at least modified analytic choice. Moreover, if 
decisionmakers use concepts which emphasize value conflict, under only 
moderate stress and within altered group dynamics, the likelihood of some 
variant of analytic processing increases. It is impossible to separate with 
any precision the contribution of each of these factors to analytic decision-
making. When they occur together, however, they reinforce each other and 
strengthen the probability that decision-making will be unusual rather than 
usual. Under these circumstances, policymakers may be most willing to use 
demanding and time-consuming procedures even in their first approach to 
their problem. Moreover, if earlier and easier methods have produced no 
improvement under these circumstances, decisionmakers are more likely to 
switch to more difficult analytic processes in a renewed attack on their 
problem. 
If it is difficult to begin with even modified analytic processes, however, it 
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may be somewhat easier to continue. Once decisionmakers begin to travel 
this route, they are likely to continue to do so unless they perceive a drastic 
change in their environment. Should they be forced to make sharp and 
unexpected upward revision in their estimates of a probable adversary 
attack, for example, and should these revisions be accompanied by high-
intensity threat and short time for decision, leaders very likely would 
exclude any analytic component in their process of choice. If their revision 
of estimates of adversary intent is gradual, however, and accompanied by 
increases in felt threat and urgency spread over time, decisionmakers may 
continue to process choice analytically even when they perceive intense 
threat and time pressure. After they have made one decision with analytic 
procedures, policymakers may find it easier to make the next one through a 
similar process. Initial estimates of value and probability may make 
subsequent calculations less onerous. Decisionmakers may not onlyfind it 
easier to continue, but they may also find it more difficult to "switch from 
rationality." Alternative processes may be less psychologically satisfying 
than the procedures they have performed. Having learned through 
experience to appreciate the complexities and uncertainties they face, they 
may find it more difficult to simplify through shortcuts. Decisionmakers 
themselves want to be rational. 
Leaders may never begin, however, to use analytic procedures. They may 
experience a sudden and sharp increase in the level of threat and, 
dissatisfied with available programs, move directly to some variant of 
cognitive choice. Even if they have made no prior attempt to solve the 
problem, their decisional environment may not be conducive to any 
version of an analytic process. Policymakers may first become aware of a 
threat when they perceive it at a high level of intensity; under these 
circumstances they are less likely to be the challengers and more likely to be 
responding to an external trigger. If, in addition, decisionmakers feel an 
urgent need for action, they perceive what is generally considered an acute 
crisis. The high level of stress generally associated with an acute crisis 
precludes almost any kind of analytic processing. Stress also operates 
indirectly on members of a group to increase the likelihood of 
"groupthink" and cognitive processing. Under these circumstances, 
policymakers are less likely to consider the nuanced logic of strategic 
argument. Indeed, faulty strategic assumptions may have contributed to 
the failure to perceive a challenge when it was less threatening. If this is the 
case, strategic concepts will be of no further use to decisionmakers who 
have acknowledged misperception or miscalculation. Operating with 
shaken expectations and under stress, decisionmakers, individually or 
collectively, will simplify complexity and reduce uncertainty through 
cognitive shortcuts. Once they start to do so, they are not likely to stop. 
The use of a particular decision strategy is neither ahistorical nor 
random, but depends among other things on timing. Those who begin their 
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processing of choice in a non-crisis environment may take advantage of 
available programs as a first cut, but if the problem persists and programs 
run out, they are forced to switch. Whether they switch to or from 
rationality depends in part on their own and their colleagues' perception of 
time and threat and upon the quality of the logic they use. Similarly, those 
fortunate enough to begin their process of decision-making when 
perceptions of threat and time pressure are only moderate are more likely 
to use procedures with some analytic component. On the other hand, those 
who confront an acute crisis are more likely to approach their problem 
shorn of the logic and the time they need to use even modified analytic 
processes. The capacity for modified rationality is related, at least in part, 
to the timing and circumstances of action in history; those who begin 
earlier under favorable conditions have greater freedom to quarrel with 
history on its own terms. 
In 1967, in both the pre-crisis and acute crisis stages, Israel's leaders 
made a number of crucial decisions about the use of force—choices which 
acquire interest for the analyst not only individually but as a sequence. The 
challenge is to explain these decisions, to uncover the constraints in the 
process, and to explore the underlying logic. Before doing so, however, the 
criteria of a valid explanation need brief discussion. For the explanation of 
choice to be valid, the appropriate levels and units of analysis must be 
selected, the sources and standards of evidence made explicit, and the basis 
of inference established. 
Evidence and Inference in a Single Case 
When analysts of national security decision-making turn to questions of 
evidence and inference, they themselves face a multiplicity of difficult 
decisions. First they must determine the appropriate level of analysis—the 
individual or the group—and examine the fit of explanations developed at 
one level of analysis to another. Then, they must uncover evidence 
appropriate to the explanation they wish to make and, finally, they must 
establish criteria of evidence which can validate their inferences. Problems 
of inference are particularly troublesome when a study investigates one 
rather than several cases. 
Level of Analysis 
Any explanation of decision-making must begin by establishing the level 
at which decisions were made. National security choices can be made either 
by single individuals, acting with or without the advice of civilian and 
military advisers, or by an officially authorized group formally charged 
with responsibility. Both levels are quite common;8 in different cir­
8. Snyder and Diesing (1977:357) find that of 37 crisis decisions where the use of force was 
probable, 24 were made by one or two decisionmakers, acting alone or in consultation with 
their advisers. Only 13 were made by groups or committees. Individual-level decisions 
appeared to be twice as frequent as group choices. 
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cumstances, at different times, on different issues, sometimes an individual 
and sometimes a group makes the critical choices. In the last decade in 
Israel, the focus of this study, national security decisions have been made 
by the head of government or by a single minister, acting alone or in 
consultation with one or two advisers, and by the cabinet as a whole.9 The 
first two choices in the sequence of this case in 1967, the decisions to 
mobilize, were made by Prime Minister Eshkol in close consultation with 
Chief of Staff Rabin. The three remaining decisions, however, were made 
by the officially authorized body, the cabinet. The weight of all its 
members, moreover, was not equal. Prime Minister Eshkol, Foreign 
Minister Eban, Minister of Labor Allon—after 24 May—and Minister of 
Defense Dayan—after 1 June—were the "essential" members. 
When an individual choice is the focus of explanation, the analyst can 
draw explanatory variables from both the individual and the group level of 
analysis. Individual beliefs, perceptions of the environment, and decisional 
tasks are the relevant individual-level variables for the first two decisions. 
Group-level variables include the impact of collective beliefs and 
arguments presented by colleagues and advisers as well as their political 
and institutional position. In this case, variables drawn from the group 
level of analysis become inputs to individual processes of decision-making; 
there is no problem of cross-level inference as long as the impact of these 
variables on processes of individual choice is specified. The first two 
decisions, the choices to mobilize, are explained by the impact of both 
kinds of variables on individual decision-making processes. 
Whereas the first two decisions were made by an individual in 
consultation with his advisers, the next three choices were made by a 
group—the cabinet. The level of analysis problem becomes somewhat 
complicated when a group's decision is to be explained. Two approaches to 
cross-level inference are possible. The analyst may draw on individual as 
well as group-level variables, but must specify how these variables are 
aggregated to produce a collective decision. Alternatively, an examination 
of collective decision-making may treat the group as a whole and apply 
concepts developed to explain individual processes to those of the group. 
Both these approaches create some difficulty.10 
9. In the early years after independence, Prime Minister Ben Gurion dominated decision-
making in the area of national security. Although he consulted his ministerial colleagues, as 
prime minister he was more than "primus inter pares." In the period which followed his 
retirement, responsibility was more widely shared. For an analysis of decision-making under 
Ben Gurion, see Brecher, 1975:225-317 and Avi-Hai, 1974:175-250. 
10. Brodbeck (1958) distinguishes between "methodological individualism" and 
"metaphysical holism" at the definitional and explanatory level. Methodological in­
dividualists, grounded in the empiricist philosophical tradition, deny that there are group 
properties and explain group behavior in terms of the aggregate of individual behaviors. 
Metaphysical holists maintain that the group has properties distinct from those of individuals 
within the group, and they explain collective behavior by group properties. Methodological 
individualists must specify the composition laws or rules of aggregation which combine 
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The first approach considers that group choice can be explained by the 
decisions of individual members. Explanations of group decisions, 
however, provide 10 agreed-upon procedure for deriving the collective 
choice from those of its individual members. Analysts recognize that the 
whole does not necessarily equal the sum of its parts and that all parts are 
not necessarily equal; some members of a group are more essential than 
others. Unequal importance among members is only one difficulty in 
integrating preferences to explain a group decision. Analysts disagree 
about when and how individual preferences should be aggregated. These 
differences in approach to procedures and timing of aggregation flow, at 
least in part, from differences in the explanation of decision-making tasks. 
Those who explain individual processes through some variant of an 
analytic process attempt to compare the utilities of members of a group. 
Since the unit of value of one does not necessarily equal that of another, 
such comparisons are likely to be invalid.11 The timing of aggregation also 
may be important. Members may compromise their initial differences and 
then work with a group estimate, or they may use new evidence to change 
their individual preferences and compromise only after revision. The 
collective outcome would be quite different in the two cases. 
M ost variants of cognitive explanations confront similar difficulties. It is 
not obvious how individual choices, which may be the product of 
inconsistency-management or stability-seeking, are combined to produce a 
group decision. Social psychologists address this problem most directly 
when they suggest that individual preferences can be aggregated through 
concurrence-seeking as group members try to reduce their differences.12 
individual elements to explain the collective behavior. Metaphysical holists cannot attribute 
individual properties to group entities in their explanation of group behavior. Both these 
concerns are particularly relevant to explanations of decision-making as collective behavior. 
11. Arrow's pioneering work demonstrates the inconsistencies among several necessary 
conditions if group preferences are to be mapped from individual values. The condition which 
is most difficult to meet is the necessity to compare interpersonal preferences. Others have 
suggested that assumptions derived from models of individual rationality can be revised when 
interpreted in a group context. They suggest, for example, that a criterion of Pareto 
optimality may provide a better basis for aggregating preferences. A group choice is Pareto 
optimal if no other choice can better reflect the preferences of some members without 
simultaneously increasing the distortion of the preferences of others. The use of a criterion of 
Pareto optimality would avoid direct comparison of interpersonal utilities. Steiner (1970) 
argues, however, that it is too restrictive to be applied to a major policy issue. Bower (1965) 
cites an unpublished manuscript by Zechhauser in which he proves an impossibility theorem 
that demonstrates the incompatibility of amalgamating subjective distributions and 
subjective utilities separately and satisfying the criterion of Pareto optimality. For an 
extended discussion of the impact of different procedures of aggregation on collective 
outcomes, see Arrow, 1951; Bower, 1965; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Cotter, 1974; 
Horelick, Johnson, and Steinbruner, 1975:14-15; and Shepsle, 1974. Those who use analytic 
concepts as normative theory emphasize that any procedure of aggregation introduces 
considerable distortion of individual preferences. Even the use of simple voting rules, where 
winners and losers are decided by totaling the preferences of all the participating members, 
produces distortion. This distortion, while of central importance to normative argument, 
becomes the focus of explanation in the examination of collective choice. 
12. Janis (1972) and Janis and Mann (1977:129-134) arc somewhat ambiguous on the 
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Finally, all versions of the cybernetic explanation ignore the problem of the 
aggregation of individual preferences; satisficing strategies deliberately 
avoid complex issues of value integration. Consequently, they provide no 
explanation of how individual preferences are combined to produce a 
satisficing choice. 
A second approach contends that groups have attributes distinct from 
those of their component parts. When the properties of the group as a 
whole are the principal components of the explanation, the problem of 
aggregating individual preferences is avoided. Students of collective 
decision-making, however, tend to extend attributes of the individual to 
the group. Analysts have suggested that the group as a whole may use new 
evidence to revise a collective probability distribution.13 Others have 
attempted to construct a collective cognitive map by drawing on the known 
beliefs of members or the documents and publications issued by the group 
(Roberts, 1976 and Hart, 1976). In addition, scholars have attempted to 
examine the association of individual members with ideas in the collective 
decision process; they substitute the "idea" for the individual as the unit of 
analysis (Bonham, Heradstveit, and Shapiro, 1977). These studies suggest 
that the group produces a decision which is distinct from the parallel 
processes of its constituent members. They run the risk, however, of the 
inappropriate application of concepts and assumptions developed at the 
individual level to the group level of analysis.14 While it is easy to 
understand a group attribute of cohesion or stratification, it is more 
difficult to specify how a group thinks. 
There is as yet no fully satisfactory solution to the problem of cross-level 
inference from individual variables to the explanation of group decisions.15 
This study, therefore, uses both strategies in an effort to derive the benefits 
of each. The evaluation of choice uses the group as the unit of analysis to 
level of analysis problem in their explanation of group decisions. Group cohesion and 
"groupthink" are group properties which explain collective decisions. At times, however, they 
emphasize the tendency for individual members to seek concurrence and use individual 
concurrence-seeking as the principal explanation of defective group decisions. 
13. In his discussion of "group Bayesians," Raiffa (1968) formulates the problem 
somewhat differently. He suggests that groups may agree on the cost, benefit, and likelihood 
of consequences, given an underlying state. His discussion of an underlying state is compatible 
with Steinbruner's concept of "structural uncertainty" (1974:18). 
14. The problem of cross-level inference from independent to dependent variable is quite 
distinct from that of an unjustified inference from an individual to a group-level independent 
variable which may lead to an "individualistic fallacy" in reasoning (Alker, 1969). The 
"individualistic fallacy" is the obverse of the better-known "ecological fallacy" or unjustified 
inference from a higher to a lower level of analysis (Robinson, 1970). For an extended 
discussion of the relationship between individual and collective properties, see Lazarsfeld and 
Menzel, 1961; Ray and Singer, 1973. 
15. As long as a valid set of composition rules which specify the combination of 
component parts is unavailable, a problem of aggregation remains. Since composition rules 
are empirically-based generalizations, moreover, they may prove invalid under as yet untested 
conditions. Brodbeck (1958) suggests, therefore, that a solution to the problem can at best be 
imperfect and temporary. 
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assess the rationality of the collective decision. In Chapter 9, cabinet 
members are considered equally important, and probability and value 
statements are aggregated across individuals to the group level. Individual 
differences are less significant when the group decision is being evaluated 
rather than explained. 
The detailed explanation of decision-making in Chapters 5,6, and 7 uses 
the individual as the unit of analysis and aggregates preferences. Although 
there is no agreement on when and how to aggregate preferences, the 
disagreement may be less extensive than it appears. Different modes of 
aggregation may reflect differences in group procedures, dissimilar 
circumstances, and varying kinds of problems. Analysts have 
demonstrated that, on some occasions, members of a group avoid any 
formal procedures and aggregate their preferences through tacit con­
currence. Under other circumstances, the same individuals have engaged in 
interpersonal bargaining or "averaging" amongst themselves to produce a 
joint decision.16 Explanations of coalition-building do not assume 
complicated interpersonal comparison of utilities but, rather, individual 
calculations of interest which culminate in changing preferences. 
Aggregation occurs through joining; as individuals change their 
preferences and join a coalition, they create a majority decision. Finally, 
members of a group may ignore problems of distortion and rely on simple 
procedures of majority voting. This is the standard practice of Israel's 
cabinet, where the preferences of individual members are tabulated 
formally to produce a collective decision. To explain the three group 
decisions of 23 May, 28 May, and 4 June, this study aggregates the 
processes and preferences of individual members within the group. No 
particular pattern of aggregation is assumed; in each of the three decisions, 
empirical investigation must establish the procedure and timing of 
aggregation which produced the collective choice. 
Although individual processes and preferences are the focus of 
explanation, the analysis includes both individual and group-level 
variables. Because individuals may behave differently in a group than they 
would alone, the study draws on group-level variables which may affect the 
final choice through the critical intervening variable of individual 
performance of decision tasks. Thus, the beliefs of individual members and 
their perceptions of their immediate environment are supplemented by the 
16. Janis (1972:127) reports the rather bizarre use of such a procedure by officials 
responsible for national security. Every request by military commanders to bomb targets in 
Vietnam was submitted to President Johnson's "Tuesday Lunch Club." Members of this 
advisory group processed the request with a checklist which required them to evaluate the 
military advantage of striking the proposed target, the risk to American aircraft and pilots, the 
risk of military escalation, and the cost of civilian casualties from the proposed sortie. Each 
participant graded the proposed targets in the four categories, and the final choice was made 
on the basis of averaged grades. 
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group-level variables of strategic argument as relevant collective beliefs 
and coalition-building or bureaucratic politics. Individuals within a group 
may listen to discussion, hear new evidence, debate different estimates, 
exchange information about each other's preferences, or avoid controver­
sial issues and subject each other to considerable pressure to conform. 
Group as well as individual variables become important components of the 
explanation of the decisional activity of central members within a group 
who must produce a collective choice. 
Because the evidence that decisionmakers provide is so important in 
determining the processes they used and in establishing the pattern and 
timing of aggregation, special attention must be paid to the quality of that 
evidence if threats to the validity of explanation are to be reduced. 
Criteria of Evidence 
The record of debate and discussion among policymakers provides the 
analyst with invaluable evidence to reconstruct the process of choice. 
Unfortunately, official records frequently are not declassified for thirty 
years, and scholars who wish to examine more recent processes of choice 
must turn to sources that may be less valid. In this study the number of 
decisionmakers ranges from two to twenty-one across all decisions, and the 
unofficial record of their discussions is of varying quality. A major source 
of evidence is the public statements issued by decisionmakers during the 
process of choice and their private statements which have been 
subsequently published. Evidence collected for this study includes all 
official transcripts of the speeches by participating decisionmakers in the 
period preceding each decision and additional verbatim accounts 
published subsequently in the local press. These primary historical sources 
may not provide a sufficient basis for valid inference. Decisionmakers who 
are in the process of evaluating options are often circumspect in discussing 
these alternatives and their likely consequences in public; this is especially 
likely to be the case in a national security crisis. Frequently, there is a 
tendency to rely too heavily on formal documents in reconstructing a 
decisional process because of the difficulty of access to official records of 
group discussion (Holsti, 1976). 
A second source of evidence is ex post facto reconstruction of the 
decisional process by policymakers themselves. One obvious source is 
private and public interviews. All the principal decisionmakers in 1967 
have granted extensive public and private interviews, both in English and 
in Hebrew.17 Five years after the war, several members of the cabinet 
17 The transcripts of all public and privately available interviews are used to reconstruct 
this decision-making process. An additional study which had unique access to generally 
unavailable primary sources is also a valuable source of evidence. Brecher (1975) interviewed 
the principal participants and saw many relevant documents of the Foreign Ministry. This 
Multiple Paths to Choice / 83 
granted commemorative interviews which are important sources in the 
reconstruction of the process. Also of interest was an anniversary 
symposium held by members of the General Staff where they discussed 
issues of principal concern to military decisionmakers in the weeks 
preceding the outbreak of war. The director of Military Intelligence, 
General Yariv, participated as did others who were senior commanders 
during 1967 
Decisionmakers also provide valuable reconstructions of the decision-
making process in the autobiographies and memoirs which they publish 
after retirement from office. Minister of Defense Dayan (1976), Foreign 
Minister Eban (1977), General Rabin (1979), then chief of staff, and 
General Weizman (1976), then chief of operations in the army, have all 
written their autobiographies. Prime Minister Eshkol kept a diary and 
extensive records of meetings and discussions.18 Minister of Labor Allon 
(1970) has written in considerable detail of the debates during these days in 
his history of Israel's army. 
There is a potential threat to valid inference in reliance on such after-the­
fact recollection. With an eye on history, leaders may distort their 
opposition to or support of particular positions that are subsequently 
accepted. The postdecision rationalization that may be built in to 
autobiographical evidence may, paradoxically, exaggerate the extent of 
bolstering and inconsistency-management in a process of choice. The 
researcher cannot escape the contradiction that data collected after choices 
are made are used to reconstruct predecision activity. This study treats this 
type of evidence, therefore, with circumspection. When several of the 
participants agree, however, on the reconstruction and order of group 
discussion and when evidence from multiple primary sources converge, the 
evidence can provide a valid basis for inference. Fortunately in this case, 
arguments among the participating decisionmakers focus on interpretation 
rather than on reconstruction of important decisions. Even though official 
transcripts of executive sessions are not yet available under a thirty-year 
rule, available evidence shows considerable agreement among decision-
makers about who said what to whom and when it was said. This 
reconstruction of the decision-making process in 1967, therefore, relies 
almost exclusively on primary sources. 
Criteria of Explanation 
When the appropriate levels and units of analysis have been established, 
study relies on the citation of these documents and uses the transcripts of the interviews which
Brecher graciously made available. 
18. The diary and appointment book of the prime minister was updated each day and not 
subject, therefore, to ex post facto bias. While not publicly available, it was seen and cited 
extensively by Geist (1974) in an unpublished doctoral dissertation. Where the published 
primary record is still incomplete, this study draws on the diary as cited by Geist. 
84 I Part One: A Theoretical Framework 
criteria of admissible evidence specified, and concepts made operational, 
the student of decision-making faces the most difficult task, that of setting 
the standard of a valid explanation, What kinds of causal inferences can be 
drawn from evidence of a single case? Some would argue that no causal 
explanation is possible when evidence is restricted to one case which, 
moreover, is not subject to the control of the investigator. Students of 
national security decision-making are only rarely able to design 
experimental or quasi-experimental research subject to stringent con­
trols.19 To determine the validity of the explanation they offer, however, 
they can examine the fit between what they expect and what they find, and 
they can "trace the process" through which cause creates consequences 
(George, 1979).20 
When analysts examine congruence or fit, they attempt to establish the 
necessary and sufficient conditions in an explanation. To explain the choice 
of a particular option, for example, they may argue that the strategic 
assumptions made by decisionmakers are the antecedent cause. To assess 
the validity of this explanation, analysts can perform "mental experiments" 
to ascertain whether such a choice could have been made if decisionmakers 
had held different assumptions. They must also consider the related 
possibility that other, quite different, variables might explain the choice of 
option equally well if not better. To establish the validity of an explanation, 
analysts must do a mental run-through of competing possibilities. If the 
particular strategic assumptions were indeed necessary, analysts must still 
determine whether this set of beliefs was congruent with other options as 
well. To the extent that a cause is congruent with a consequence and only 
that consequence, it provides a powerful explanation. When a set of 
assumptions or beliefs is congruent both with the option that was chosen 
and with others as well, even though these beliefs may be a necessary 
condition, they provide a far less powerful explanation of the choices 
decisionmakers make.21 Given the complexity of choice, moreover, it is 
unlikely that any single variable will prove both necessary and sufficient. 
A more direct approach to causal inference, and one which is 
particularly suited to single case analysis, is "process-tracing." Analysts 
examine how a series of necessary conditions work together to produce a 
19. The inability to design quasi-experimental research would not be considered a serious 
drawback within the phenornenological tradition. Controlled variation of cause to determine 
effect is consistent with a nomothetic-deductive mode of explanation. A concept of self-
explication as the basis of explanation is inconsistent with such a deductive mode and requires 
explanation based on idiographic assumptions. Without fully entering the complicated 
debate, a strictly deductive explanation is not fully consistent with the subjectivist bias that 
animates this study. 
20. George (1979) provides the best discussion of causal inference in a single case. He 
develops strategies of "congruence" and "process tracing" to validate explanations of 
decision-making and proposes the technique of mental experimentation to introduce 
controlled variance. See also Campbell, 1975; Eckstein, 1975; and Lijphart, 1971. 
21. In formal terms, A is a necessary condition of B when B is always preceded by A. A is 
a necessary and sufficient condition when B is always preceded by A and only A. 
Multiple Paths to Choice / 85 
particular decision. They trace the process through which beliefs, or 
perceptions of time and threat, or group dynamics, or all three together, 
explain the choice of one rather than another option. To do so, the analyst 
establishes the impact of these factors on critical decisional tasks that 
precede choice. The principal drawback to "process-tracing" as a mode of 
explanation is the extensive data it requires; indeed, it is so rigorous in its 
requirements that it all but precludes multiple-case analysis. Its weakness is 
also its strength, however, since process-tracing produces a rich and 
detailed exposition of how a decision was made. 
This study uses both "congruence" and "process-tracing" as complemen­
tary approaches to explanation. Process-tracing is perfectly suited to the 
reconstruction of the decision-making process which is the core of the 
explanation.22 Its extensive data requirements are not additional but 
central in the explanation of the path to choice. Congruence is a valuable 
supplementary technique, however, in establishing the validity of a process 
explanation of choice.23 Before one process can explain a choice, it must 
first be demonstrated that no other process could have produced that 
choice that way.24 Especially where evidence is incomplete, alternative 
processes must be eliminated; a "mental experiment" with competing 
explanations is a particularly useful method of doing so. 
Equally important, reasoning through congruence can establish the 
importance of process as an intervening variable in any explanation of 
choice. If the content of beliefs, or perceptions of threat and pressure of 
time, could have predicted the choice of one option and only that option, 
then the detailed exposition of process is an unjustified expenditure of 
scarce research resources. This study expects that process is a necessary 
intervening variable. While validating a process explanation, moreover, 
the independent role of belief systems, situational perceptions, and group 
dynamics is assessed. Competing and complementary explanations must 
be considered to assess the importance of process as a mediating variable in 
the explanation of choice. 
Summary 
This rather lengthy discussion of multiple paths to choice and the basis of 
inference and evidence was a necessary preliminary to the explanation of 
22. Insofar as the reconstructed decision-making process relies on the evidence of 
participating decisionmakers, process-tracing as a mode of causal explanation is consistent 
with phcnomenological assumptions. This is not so of the nomothetic-deductive mode. 
23. George (1979) suggests that process-tracing be used to validate causal inferences 
established through congruence. This study proposes to validate relationships established 
through process-tracing by eliminating explanations that do not provide either necessary or 
sufficient conditions. 
24. Brchm and Cohen (1962) argue that, even in experimental conditions, it may be 
impossible to determine whether an effect is caused by cognitive dissonance or whether it is the 
result of rational rules of decision which produce the same result as nonrational cognitive 
rules. This is so when an explanation is validated only through congruence and not 
supplemented by process-tracing. 
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Israel's decision-making process in 1967 This process includes a sequence 
of five major decisions over a period of nineteen days in May and June. 
After a short precrisis phase, the decision process unfolded when leaders 
perceived a major threat to national security and limited time for response. 
Egyptian actions, which were the stimulus to decision, challenged basic 
concepts of deterrence worked out in the decade prior to the onset of the 
crisis. Since Israel's leaders defined their problem as one of national 
security, the decision points selected for examination are those in which an 
option to use force is considered: the decision on 16 May to mobilize 
partially; the choice on 19 May to mobilize on a large scale; the two 
decisions on 23 May and 28 May to postpone the use of force; and the 
decision of 4 June to preempt. 
Before beginning the empirical examination of Israel's decision-making 
process in 1967, it is useful to restate briefly the two basic concerns which 
guide the investigation. First, decisionmakers do not follow a single path 
all the time for all kinds of decisions. Rather, they respond to the changes 
they perceive in their environment by changing their decision process. No 
single explanation of decision-making can encompass the variation in 
policymakers' responses to different decisional environments under 
dissimilar circumstances. The question is not "which strategy?" but "which 
strategy when and why?" The student of national security decision-making 
is particularly interested in when and why decisionmakers use any variant 
of an analytic process, either in the first instance or as a response to 
dissatisfaction with earlier decision strategies. 
Second, just as decisionmakers vary their procedures over time in a 
sequence of choices, so they develop flexible and adaptive procedures to 
make a single decision. Current explanations of any individual decision 
may be somewhat limited in the face of evidence which suggests that 
decisionmakers combine elements of cybernetic, cognitive, and analytic 
processes. In particular, four hybrid paths to choice (Paths 2, 4, 5, and 7) 
have been suggested as likely routes to choice. Decisionmakers may reach a 
cybernetic decision with a mixture of cognitive and programmatic 
procedures (Path 2); they may arrive at simple decisions through a com­
bination of cybernetic and cognitive processes (Path 4); they may make 
much more complex decisions if they incorporate analytic search with 
cognitive evaluation (Path 5); and they may optimize even if analytic re­
vision and evaluation are constrained by cognitive search (Path 7). These 
hybrid decisional paths may provide a better reconstruction of the 
processes decisionmakers use. Although these paths are less coherent and 
more complicated than those articulated by cybernetic, cognitive, and 
analytic explanations (Paths 1, 3, and 6), they may be more useful in 
illuminating the procedures policymakers actually use. 
If this is indeed the case, the evaluation of choice must incorporate 
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modifications in the explanation of decision. Various combinations, for 
example, may produce decisions of differential quality. Are choices based 
on simple single-value calculation less desirable than those based on 
programs carefully planned in advance? Are more complex choices which 
result from lexicographic decision rules preferable to those based largely 
on prepared routines? To make one choice, leaders may begin analytically 
but revert to a strong emphasis on central beliefs. The same policymakers 
may make a second choice through an analytic process constrained by 
cognitive search. Although in both cases decision-making would be neither 
cognitive nor analytic but a hybrid, whether a process is analytic-cognitive 
or cognitive-analytic may have important consequences for the quality of 
the choice individuals make. Careful distinction among several versions of 
constrained rationality is essential to both the explanation and the 
evaluation of choice. Rationality may be constrained in very different ways 
with very different policy consequences. 
Answers to these questions go to the heart of the debate on the quality of 
choice and the processes that produce it. Before undertaking the 
explanation and evaluation of the paths to choice taken by Israel's 
decisionmakers in 1967, this study makes one last detour to consider the 
substance of the logic available to policymakers. In Israel, strategic 
concepts have been the object of extensive debate and discussion ever since 
the creation of the state in war. On a matter of national security, leaders are 
likely to draw on these concepts to structure their definition of the problem 
and their processing of choice. The quality of strategic argument is not 
academic for Israel's leadership. To reconstruct the processes of choice 
on issues of national security, analysts must examine the structure and 
content of the strategic arguments decisionmakers use. 

part two 
Decision-making in Israel, 1967


chapter ^¥ 
Deterrence and Defense 
The Logic of Strategic Argument 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the logic of strategic argument and its impact on the 
process of choice. Of particular concern is the relationship between the 
completeness and coherence of strategic concepts and different forms of 
constrained rationality. Two basic components of strategic argument are 
the concepts of deterrence and defense. Concepts of deterrence examine the 
use of the threat of force to prevent the leadership of another state from 
choosing to attack and emphasize the threat of punishment, rather than 
the use of force, to persuade an opponent that the risks of an attack 
would outweigh its possible benefits. Concepts of defense explore ways 
to ensure military security by reducing the cost of an attack should 
deterrence fail. 
Strategic concepts like deterrence and defense are especially relevant to 
leaders who perceive permanent or ongoing hostility in their environment. 
When leaders charged with responsibility for national security perceive 
enmity, they consider an attack by their adversary as possible and, at times, 
as plausible. In response to a rooted perception of permanent conflict, they 
concentrate on deterring, if possible, and defending, if necessary, against 
an anticipated attack. 
At times leaders suspect that their opponent is actually considering 
immediate action and, concentrating on intention rather than capability, 
they threaten the use of force to influence their adversary's calculations. 
Even in acute conflicts, however, such instances of "immediate deterrence" 
are relatively rare; much more frequent is a situation of "general" 
deterrence (Morgan, 1977:28). Leaders emphasize their adversary's general 
desire to attack rather than an imminent plan to do so, and they expect an 
attack only when their opponent considers the balance of capabilities to be 
favorable. Consequently, decisionmakers focus their attention on the 
capabilities of their adversary and try to maintain an effective force 
posture. 
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Frequently, leaders have extended the concept of deterrence beyond the 
single contingency of a direct military attack to try to prevent other kinds of 
actions. Patrons have attempted to deter an attack on clients, or alliance 
members have organized both to forestall an attack on any one of their 
group and to defend each other should deterrence fail. Decisionmakers 
also have tried to protect interests they consider important by threatening 
the use of force if these interests are violated. Open sea lanes, the status of 
nationals abroad, access to resources—all these have been the object of 
deterrent strategies at different times in history. 
Strategic concepts of deterrence and defense can affect the making of 
national security decisions both directly and indirectly. Developed over 
time and frequently the subject of considerable discussion and debate, 
these concepts come to be widely accepted by political leaders. When 
confronting difficult decisions, policymakers may draw directly on 
strategic concepts to make their choices. They may also use strategic 
concepts to process information and to evaluate available options. The 
logic of strategic argument is important to those responsible for national 
security, and increasingly this logic has been the object of considerable 
criticism (George and Smoke, 1974; Jervis, 1978, 1979; Knight, 1973; 
Morgan, 1977; Salmon, 1976; and Steinbruner, 1976). 
Strategic arguments are constructed as a set of causally connected 
propositions. Beginning from an axiom of human rationality, these 
propositions explain the causal antecedents of the choices made by each 
side in a conflict. Causal logic is at the heart of strategic thought and its 
contingent predictions; policy is read as the consequence of specified causes 
and careful calculation by unitary rational actors on both sides. Strategic 
concepts like deterrence imply rational choice as a consequence of causal 
logic. 
Just as the rationality of the choice that leaders make can be evaluated, 
so the logic of causal argument that they use can be assessed.1 Two widely 
used standards of evaluation of the logic of an argument are the 
exhaustiveness of its content and the coherence of its structure, but these 
standards must be adapted to the context of strategic argument. If an 
argument is logically exhaustive, it considers all possible contingencies in 
the specification of cause and effect. While exhaustiveness may be an 
appropriate standard when the universe is well-defined, it is too rigorous 
for arguments which organize a structurally uncertain environment. 
Arguments also are considered complete if the set of interrelated 
propositions omits no important causal factor (Brodbeck, 1958:12).2 Even 
1. See Chapter I for an extended discussion of the evaluation of the logic of argument. 
2. This criterion of completeness draws on Hospers's treatment of "denning" and 
"accompanying" characteristics. Denning characteristics are those "without which the thing 
would not be labelled by a certain word. Those characteristics of a thing without which 
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this criterion may be too demanding, however, given current imperfect and 
partial explanations of strategic dilemmas and decisions. 
For purposes of this study, a complete strategic argument is one which 
omits no recognized and important factor in the consideration of challenge 
and response. There are at least five such essential or defining factors and, if 
any of these factors are excluded, the logic of the argument is seriously 
flawed. Second, strategic arguments can be considered coherent if these 
factors are related as a set of consistent propositions which are not 
contradictory. These two criteria of completeness in content and coherence 
in structure together determine the logical quality of strategic argument. 
Before an exploration of the particular concepts of deterrence and 
defense developed and accepted by Israel's leaders and planners, some 
clarification of terminology is in order.3 In the discussion which follows, 
the terms "strategic beliefs," "strategic concepts," and "strategic assump­
tions" are used interchangeably to refer to the concepts leaders use to 
organize their environment. "Strategic doctrine" or "strategic argument" 
refers to a set of causally-linked concepts; an argument or doctrine orders 
several concepts in a relationship. Finally, a brief review of the five essential 
factors in logically complete and coherent concepts of deterrence and 
defense is a useful prelude to the examination of strategic thought in Israel. 
General criteria developed to consider the logical quality of strategic 
argument can then be applied to an evaluation of Israel's strategic doctrine. 
Deterrence and Defense: The Logic of the Argument 
To be judged complete, strategic concepts of deterrence and defense 
must examine at least five factors.4 They must include some valuation of 
the interests at stake, specification of the challenge to be deterred, 
examination of an adversary's calculations of the suitable conditions and 
available options to challenge, consideration of the credibility of a 
commitment to respond, and discussion of defense or appropriate 
responses to the failure of deterrence. To be considered coherent, strategic 
doctrine must order and interrelate thesefive factors in a set of propositions 
that are consistent in their specification of cause and consequence. 
First, a concept of deterrence must consider the value of the interests at 
the word would still apply to it are its accompanying characteristics" (1953:26). Hospers 
establishes criteria for completeness of definition whereas evaluation of the logic of argument 
concerns the closely related problem of completeness of specification. 
3. These terms are discussed in Chapter I where distinctions among them are considered. 
4. George and Smoke's seminal examination of conventional deterrence pays a great deal 
of attention to attempts by third parties to protect client states. Because the present inquiry 
considers conventional deterrence in a bilateral relationship, the criteria specified by George 
and Smoke are not directly applicable. Consequently, this study develops its own 
requirements for a complete and coherent concept of deterrence. These logical requirements 
should be distinguished from empirical evidence of the conditions necessary and sufficient for 
the success of deterrence. 
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stake as well as the cost of their protection in comparison with the 
anticipated cost of their loss. If the object of deterrence is a conventional 
military attack, the results of the valuation are frequently obvious. When 
the interests at stake are more differentiated and range across a series of 
contingencies, the calculations become somewhat more difficult. Yet, such 
a careful examination is a necessary component of a logical strategic 
argument. Precisely when calculations are difficult, strategists may ignore 
the cost of fulfilling a commitment when they initially formulate their 
intention to deter. 
This requirement suggests criteria that can be used to examine the 
development and application of specific concepts of deterrence to assess the 
logic of argument. First, the valuation of interests that must precede the 
commitment to a given state of affairs can be scrutinized. Did the concept 
distinguish what was important to deter, what was worth trying, and what 
was beyond the scope of deterrence? Was the strategic argument delimited? 
Then, did leaders or strategists define, weigh, and rank the interests they 
considered important or vital? Did they weigh the cost of protecting their 
interests against their value? Did they consider the interconnectedness 
among interests before committing themselves? Before attempting 
deterrence, did they include in their analysis the cost of fulfilling 
commitments should deterrence fail? If deterrence were to fail, is the cost of 
available policy options commensurate with the value of the interests at 
stake? A coherent and complete concept must begin with an analysis of the 
scope and value of intrinsic interests. 
Second, once leaders have decided to try to deter, they must signal intent 
to do so to a potential challenger. Logically, they must communicate a 
commitment to a specific state of affairs if they wish to preserve it.5 If 
adversaries are to be persuaded to refrain from actions that threaten vital 
interests, they must know the broad limits of unacceptable action. While 
communication of credible intent is logically necessary, it is neither easily 
done nor sufficient to ensure the success of deterrence. Some evidence 
suggests, for example, that either narrowly or broadly specified 
commitments may at times provoke challenge. When the scope of 
deterrence is broadly defined, commitments may be less credible, but when 
deterrence is narrowly focused, challenges may be provoked in those areas 
that are omitted. Adversaries are encouraged to "design around" a rigorous 
commitment to maintain a specific set of conditions (George and Smoke, 
1974:65).6 Specification of commitments becomes especially important 
5. Lockhart (1978) distinguishes between commitment to a certain state of affairs and 
commitment to a particular course of action to preserve that state of affairs. Very often, 
several courses of action may show some promise of preserving a particular set of conditions. 
This second requirement addresses only the commitment to a set of conditions. 
6. The advantages of narrowly and broadly denned deterrent strategies and the obstacles 
to clarity and credibility have been the objects of extensive investigation. George and Smoke 
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when deterrence is designed to do more than prevent military attack. And 
even when commitments are clearly formulated, an opponent may still 
misperceive and miscalculate. If commitments are not carefully considered 
and clearly explicated, however, a concept of deterrence is flawed. 
Third, a concept of deterrence assumes an adversary who calculates 
efficiently and is sensitive to changes in probabilities, cost, and benefit. If 
defenders are to achieve their objectives without escalation and the resort 
to force, a challenger must be able to estimate the likelihood and the 
consequences of retaliation. Even if the standard of rationality is relaxed 
somewhat to accommodate psychological evidence, deterrence requires 
that a challenger at least approximate analytic procedures and rational 
choice. At the minimum, each set of leaders is expected to understand the 
other's calculus. Each must understand the intentions of the other and the 
options and resources available to both. Deterrence implies interdependent 
and analytic decision-making.7 
From this requirement of interdependent and analytic decision-making 
flow criteria of a complete and coherent argument. Logically, strategic 
doctrine must include an examination of the intentions of an adversary and 
the options and resources a challenger can use. A concept of deterrence 
must investigate the conditions under which a challenge becomes likely. It 
must include an examination of the incentives that motivate an adversary 
and specify the factors likely to produce a change in the cost-benefit 
(1974:560-567) examine the application of broadly and narrowly specified strategies and 
review the consequences. Obstacles to credibility are analyzed by Schelling (1960, 1966), and 
.Jervis (1976) examines the problem of clarity of signals. 
7. Partly in response to the disturbing psychological evidence of constrained rationality, 
analysts have suggested recently that rationality may be neither logically necessary nor 
sufficient for deterrence to succeed (Morgan, 1977 and Jervis, 1979). Morgan suggests that, if 
leaders were perfectly rational, then no situation of immediate deterrence would arise. The 
defender accurately estimates the cost-benefit calculus of the challenger, threatens 
punishment to influence that calculus, and develops the military capability to make the threat 
credible. The challenger also calculates cost and benefit accurately, estimates correctly that 
the defender is prepared to retaliate, and concludes that an attack is unacceptably expensive. 
A fully rational challenger never considers attack, and a completely rational defender never 
needs to deter. The thrust of Morgan's argument is not that rationality is unnecessary to 
deterrence, but that it makes deterrence unnecessary. 
The argument applies, however, only to immediate and not to general deterrence. On the 
contrary, a threat to punish is credible only when it is reinforced by the requisite military 
capability to implement the threat and withstand the anticipated response of the challenger. 
Immediate deterrence becomes irrelevant only if general deterrence succeeds; yet the success 
of general deterrence requires careful calculation of comparative capabilities and relative cost 
and benefit. Except when capability differences are large and obvious, deterrence cannot 
succeed without some approximation to rationality. 
More relevant is the contention that irrationality may make the success of deterrence more 
likely. Irrationality on the part of a defender becomes an asset in deterring a challenger who 
fears an irrational response. This argument has been applied principally to deterrence of 
nuclear attack: the threat to launch a counter-city strike after an adversary has preempted is 
credible only if the defender is irrational. As analysts have noted, however, issuing an 
irrational threat under these circumstances may be rational. When deterrence is applied below 
the nuclear level, the asymmetry between cost and interest is reduced, and uncertainty rather 
than irrationality reinforces deterrence. 
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calculus. Does the analysis address those actions which may provoke an 
opponent as well as those which may deter a challenge? Critical is the 
investigation of those conditions which may lead to a challenge. If the 
concept of deterrence does not specify conditions for its failure, than it is 
difficult to know when and why deterrence may fail.8 
A concept of deterrence must examine not only the intent of a challenger 
but also the range of options available and the impact of capabilities on the 
likely use of one or another. Especially when force is conventional rather 
than nuclear, a challenger disposes of a wide variety of options ranging 
from limited probes to full-scale military action.9 The variety of options is 
reinforced by the multiple uses of conventional military capabilities. 
A complete concept of deterrence must consider a large number of 
possible and plausible actions that could challenge deterrence. A coherent 
doctrine must examine the relationship between capabilities and intent as 
an indicator of the likelihood and type of challenge. Strategic arguments 
vary in the significance they attach to capabilities in comparison with intent 
in estimating the probability of deterrence failure.10 The relative weight of 
each must be assessed and different thresholds of capabilities related to the 
alternatives available to a challenger. This is difficult to do because 
conventional military capabilities may be used for so many purposes 
unrelated to a direct challenge. Logically, however, a complete and 
coherent doctrine must examine levels, kinds, and deployment of 
capabilities by a potential challenger, relate these to the range of available 
options, and consider the relationship of capabilities to intentions to 
estimate the likelihood of deterrence failure. 
Fourth, if deterrence is to succeed, leaders must make credible their 
intention to retaliate if challenged. An argument of deterrence depends on 
raising an opponent's estimate of the probable cost of a challenge by 
increasing the expected cost of retaliation. While a credible commitment to 
respond is a logical necessity, its formulation and communication are 
difficult. Credibility is a function of both the form and the content of a 
commitment. When a challenger considers the intrinsic interests at stake to 
be vital to the defender, the particular formulation of a commitment is not 
likely to be terribly important in establishing its credibility. The 
formulation and communication of a threat to retaliate if home territory is 
8. See George and Smoke (1974:480-481) for a discussion of "conditional predictions" 
regarding deterrence failure. 
9. George and Smoke (1974:54) develop this argument at greater length. Given the large 
number of options available to a challenger, they question whether a "rational" concept of 
conventional deterrence can be developed. They suggest implicitly that the scope of 
contingent possibilities is so great that a single concept cannot meet the criteria of 
completeness and coherence. 
10. Capabilities refer to the military resources usable for a challenge to deterrence. 
Intention concerns the political plans of leaders to challenge deterrence. Warning of 
deterrence failure includes an analysis of the relationship between capabilities and intent. 
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attacked are unlikely to significantly affect its credibility. When the value of 
the interests at stake is less obvious to either side, designing and signaling a 
credible commitment are more important and more difficult. 
A complete and coherent strategic argument discusses the advantages of 
flexibility and commitment under different circumstances. At times, 
commitment to a particular response may strengthen the credibility of a 
deterrent threat while, under other conditions, deliberate ambiguity and 
flexibility may enhance the likelihood of successful deterrence.11 A flexible 
response may be appropriate when evidence of likely deterrence failure is 
ambiguous but less so as the probability of a challenge grows. A related 
issue is the appropriateness of threatening a response which is dispropor­
tionate to the value of the interest at stake. Analysts of deterrence have 
suggested that, under certain circumstances, it may be rational for leaders 
to threaten a course of action they would otherwise not choose had they not 
committed themselves to do so. In a strategy of the "rationality of 
irrationality," decisionmakers acknowledge the imbalance in the cost-
benefit calculation, but commit themselves to respond if they consider the 
interest important though not vital and see no other way of deterring a 
likely challenge.12 To be judged logical, strategic arguments must specify 
the circumstances under which such a threat is appropriate and examine its 
risks should deterrence fail. More generally, a concept of deterrence must 
establish the form and content of a credible commitment to retaliate if 
deterrence is challenged. 
Finally, strategic concepts must design responses appropriate to 
different kinds of challenges and roughly specify the required capabilities. 
A coherent and complete doctrine must canvass likely challenges and their 
relationship to available policy responses and assess the cost effectiveness 
of different options under varying circumstances. As the number of options 
increases for both the challenger and the defender, systematization 
becomes difficult and important. Closely related is an analysis of the kinds 
of capabilities necessary for the implementation of any given policy option. 
Can policymakers, working with strategic concepts, distinguish relevant 
from irrelevant capabilities in the design of effective deterrent responses? 
How closely are different kinds of capabilities related to the use of different 
options in response to different kinds of challenges? In Berlin during 1961 
and in Cuba in 1962, for example, multiple options and ambiguous 
decision rules explain the largely ad hoc attempts by the United States to 
reinforce deterrence. Strategic concepts did not specify criteria for deciding 
11. Lockhart( 1978) discusses the advantages offlexibility and commitment as do George 
and Smoke (1974:560-567) and Snyder and Diesing (1977:245-254). 
12. Maxwell (1968:2) examines the logic which underlies a strategy of the "rationality of
irrationality" at the nuclear level, but the strategy can be applied at the conventional level as
well. 
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whether, when, where, and how to threaten or use force (George and 
Smoke, 1974:42-43). 
This fifth requirement also would include an analysis of the ap­
propriateness of various responses to different indications that deterrence 
may fail. Warning of a likely challenge must be related systematically to the 
options of a defender over time; different options may be appropriate as 
warning of the likelihood of a challenge grows.13 To be coherent and 
complete, strategic doctrine must identify, scrutinize, cost, and relate the 
range of relevant options to the appropriate challenge under variable 
conditions. Since concepts of deterrence applied at the conventional level 
are highly context-dependent, such an examination is particularly 
important. 
These five criteria can be used to evaluate the logical quality of specific 
strategic concepts and arguments. Strategic concepts must consider what is 
worth protecting before prescribing deterrence, formulate and com­
municate the scope of unacceptable challenge, analyze the calculus and 
options of a challenger, establish a credible intent to respond to challenge, 
and design responses appropriate to different kinds of challenge under 
variable conditions. Skeptics may counter that these standards of 
completeness and coherence are overrigorous and unlikely to be met. In 
reply, those preoccupied with the evaluation as well as the explanation of 
policy can insist that these criteria are implicit in andflow from the general 
concept of deterrence. No more is expected than the concept itself requires. 
Second, even though a particular strategic argument may not fully meet 
these standards, the degree to which it approximates norms of 
completeness and coherence is important in the explanation and 
evaluation of choice. Strategic arguments differ in their specification of the 
conditions under which deterrence is appropriate, in their examination of 
possible and plausible challenges, in their analyses of central relationships 
among important strategic concepts, and in their evaluation of the 
contribution of alternative options to effective deterrence under changing 
conditions. Since leaders frequently draw on these arguments to define the 
substance of strategic dilemmas, their logical quality is an appropriate 
object of evaluation. 
The logic of strategic arguments affects not only the performance of early 
decisional tasks but also the subsequent processing of choice. After leaders 
diagnose a problem for decision, they may continue to draw on strategic 
concepts to search, revise, evaluate, and choose. Strategic assumptions, 
serving as cognitive premises, can organize and constrain decisional 
activity. Because the degree of completeness and coherence may predispose 
leaders to follow either cognitive-cybernetic or cognitive-analytic paths to 
13. George and Smoke (1974:567-587) consider this linkage as "warning-response." 
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choice, the quality of strategic logic can affect the particular form 
constrained rationality takes. 
Completeness and coherence in strategic argument may induce leaders 
to use these arguments as programs for choice. In an attempt to make 
deterrence credible, for example, strategic doctrine may specify the action 
to be prevented and the response to follow if deterrence fails. The response 
to the stimulus is specified before the fact as leaders foreclose their options 
in an attempt to make commitments more credible. Decisional activity is 
circumscribed by available arguments, and processes of choice are short-
circuited. Strategic concepts may, however, specify the action to be 
deterred but leave the level and scope of the response ambiguous. This 
imprecision may be designed deliberately to increase the credibility of 
deterrence by preserving rather than preempting the options of 
policymakers. Leaders may wish to reserve freedom of choice until the 
scope and direction of a challenge is unambiguous. If strategic doctrine 
does not specify a precise response, then decisionmakers cannot process 
their choice through programs. Since strategic arguments are rarely fully 
complete and coherent, policymakers generally use some other path to 
choice. 
Even if strategic arguments are not fully logical, the more closely they 
approximate norms of completeness and coherence, the more likely some 
variant of an analytic process of decision.14 If, for example, strategic 
concepts include a list of relevant capabilities and multiple indicators of an 
opponent's intentions, an analytic process of inference is more likely. If 
concepts provide several rather than single indicators to estimate intent, 
policymakers are less likely to ignore or discount the significance of 
changes in these indicators should they occur. Fuller or more complete 
concepts can guide leaders in the use of indicators to improve the quality of 
inference. 
Similarly, complete and coherent strategic arguments may make an 
approximation of analytic evaluation and choice easier for participating 
policymakers. Concepts which include a number of available alternatives 
and which examine their advantages and disadvantages under different 
circumstances can reduce the difficulty of evaluation of alternatives in a 
complex environment. Insofar as strategic doctrine isolates and highlights 
a trade-off between values, leaders may find it difficult to bolster support 
for a preferred option and defend it as the best on all possible grounds. The 
14. The relationship between the logic of organizing concepts and the processes 
decisionmakers use may be curvilinear. If concepts are fully complete and coherent, some 
variant of cybernetic choice is likely. When concepts are simple, one-dimensional, and partial, 
a severely constrained process of choice is likely. As concepts become more differentiated, 
complete, and coherent, the probability of an analytic component in the process of choice 
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salience of value complexity increases, and analytic evaluation becomes 
more likely. 
Strategic concepts which include consideration of multiple indicators 
and conflicting values increase the likelihood that choices may be analytic 
though constrained. The powerful impediments to analytic processing are 
reduced if decisionmakers can draw on arguments which are more rather 
than less complete and coherent. When the quality of logic is poor, 
however, and concepts provide little guidance for inference and evaluation, 
leaders willfindit more difficult to translate poor logic into good outcomes. 
The constraints to rationality will be severe. The logical quality of strategic 
argument is of considerable importance, therefore, to those responsible for 
national security. 
Israel's leaders, more than many others, have drawn on strategic 
concepts to organize an inhospitable environment. The status of these 
concepts should not be overstated; there was no official or explicit 
consensus on the formal content of Israel's strategic doctrine. On the 
contrary, strategic ideas frequently were a rather untidy amalgam of 
concepts and precepts which were not universally held or officially 
sanctioned. Israel's leaders did refer to these precepts, however, when they 
diagnosed a challenge to national security. Especially when the margin for 
error is small, as it was for Israel's decisionmakers, the quality of strategic 
logic is particularly important. 
The Dilemmas of Israel's Strategic Environment 
Israel's strategic environment imposed greater than usual constraints on 
the choices available to policymakers. Neither the perception nor the 
reality of permanent hostility is unique to Israel's decisionmakers; in 
diplomatic history, interstate conflict is much less the exception than the 
rule. The conflict in the Middle East, however, is extraordinarily 
compressed in space and time. Air distances between Israel's principal 
cities and those of the closest Arab states are extremely short: only 75 
kilometers between Jerusalem and Amman, 160 kilometers between Haifa 
and Damascus, and 435 kilometers between Cairo and Tel Aviv When 
warfare is conventional, short distances increase the consequences of 
attack and the cost of defense. With little depth, a defending army has 
greater difficulty absorbing an attack before unacceptable damage is 
inflicted on major population centers. 
Not only is strategic space limited, but strategic distances and resources 
are asymmetrical in the military geography of the Middle East. Before 
1967, Israel had the lowest ratio of territory to borders in the Middle East.15 
15. The ratio of territory in square miles to borders in miles for pre-1967 Israelis 13:1 and 
86:•:1 after 1967. Comparable figures for Syriaf  iafter 1967 are 57:1, Egypt, 239:1, Jordan, 39:1, 
and Lebanon, 18:1. Cited in Rosen, 1977:12.:1 
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As former Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense Dayan observed, "The 
entire country was a frontier" (1955). At its narrowest point in the center of 
the country, the distance from the Mediterranean to the Jordanian border 
on the West Bank was only 15 kilometers. The capital city, Jerusalem, was 
surrounded on three sides by Jordanian territory and could easily be cut off 
from the rest of the country by an advance of only a few kilometers. In the 
north, Syrian forces overlooked Israel's Hula Valley which is only nine 
kilometers wide at its base. In the south, an advance by the Egyptian army 
of less than 20 kilometers could create a land bridge between Egypt and 
Jordan and isolate Israel's southern port of Eilat. None of the three 
borders, moreover, provided natural or topographical advantages for 
defense. Israel's military geography was a strategist's nightmare. 
The striking asymmetry in the population base of Israel and neighboring 
Arab states has been the object of extensive comment by both sets of 
decisionmakers. In 1948, for example, the ratio of Arab population to 
Israel's citizens was 50:1; the total of the Arab population in Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia was 32.3 million while Israel 
numbered 650,000. When immigration to Israel increased in the first 
decade after independence, the balance shifted somewhat in Israel's favor; 
by 1967, the equivalent ratio of Arab to Israel's population was 20.4:1. The 
asymmetry in the base, however, was still overwhelming: 53 million in the 
Arab states and 2.6 million in Israel.16 This differential in population was 
not reflected in the mobilized strength of the armed forces of the principal 
Arab states and of Israel.17 The quantitative inferiority in manpower base, 
reinforced by long borders and a lack of strategic depth, nevertheless 
created an acute awareness of national security. The dilemmas of military 
geography and demography were so stark that concern with national 
security became pervasive among both civilian and military elites. 
After the war in 1948, analysts began a searching examination of the 
requirements of Israel's security in the post-independence period. With the 
decreasing probability of the renegotiation of the armistice agreements to 
create permanent and recognized boundaries, Israel's strategic planners 
took an ongoing conflict as given. A high probability of a "second round" 
set the framework for the postwar strategic debate. Israel's decisionmakers 
16. The data for the Arab states, except Saudi Arabia, come from the United Nations
Statistical Oflice, Demographic Year Book (New York, 1949). The 1967 data for the Arab 
states are taken from the Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1967-1968 
(London, 1968) 39-42. The statistics on Israel's population are drawn from the Central Bureau 
of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 19 (Jerusalem: 1969), 20, and do not include Arab 
citizens. 
17. In 1967, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria fielded 272,000 regular troops, while Israel, with its 
fully mobilized militia, deployed 275,000. The Arab states maintain strong standing forces 
and make little use of their militia while Israel draws heavily on its reserve forces to support its 
small regular army in time of emergency. The data on troop deployment are drawn from the 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1967-1968 (London, 1968). 
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considered that, even when Arab decisionmakers were not actively 
considering an option to attack, their hostility persisted and they merely 
awaited opportunity. Indeed, Prime Minister Ben Gurion argued that 
Arab governments continued to wage war against Israel by "different 
means" (1955). As time passed, decisionmakers characterized the 
relationship between Israel and the Arab states as one of "dormant war" 
(Rabin, 1967b). The Arab claim that the 1949 armistice agreements did not 
imply a termination of belligerency, decisionmakers argued, forced Israel 
to think in terms of permanent war (Allon, 1959:15). The parameters of 
Israel's strategy were determined by the Arab maintenance of short-of-war 
belligerency (Peres, 1965:19-20). The concept of a permanent state of no 
war-no peace became a core concept in the doctrine of national security. 
The strategic dilemma created by a perception of permanent hostility 
was complicated further by major strategic liabilities and few assets. The 
constraints imposed by the lack of geographic depth, long borders in front 
of shallow space, and a small population were compounded by the absence 
of a permanent alliance or reliable international ally (Dayan, 1955:250-251, 
258). Not surprisingly, defense planners repeatedly emphasized the narrow 
margin of security and the small margin for error (Tal, 1976). In the 
immediate post-independence period, military and civilian decisionmakers 
debated the impact of time on this narrow margin of security. Peres, at one 
time a director-general of the Ministry of Defense, argued that over time 
the quantitative superiority of Israel's Arab antagonists would translate 
itself into operational success (1962; 1965:11-12, 113-117). This estimate 
was challenged by some military officers who maintained that time was 
likely to increase the effectiveness of the qualitative superiority of Israel's 
armed forces as technology became more sophisticated and demanding 
(Nevo, 1968). 
In the years immediately following the armistice agreements, strategic 
thinking focused principally on defense. Israel's leaders had little 
confidence that an anticipated Arab attack could be forestalled, and army 
officers and strategists debated the appropriate defensive response. Some 
advocated a strategy of counterattack following the absorption of an 
adversary's first strike (Sadmi, 1956). Most, however, urged a first-strike 
strategy of a quick, decisive military victory gained on adversary territory 
(Yadin, 1959; Allon, 1959). Dayan, chief of staff from 1953 to 1956, argued 
that Israel could not afford to absorb a military strike; it had no territory to 
lose (1959). Moreover, Israel's small population did not permit a strategy 
of territorial defense which absorption of a first strike assumed. Laskov, 
chief of staff from 1958 to 1960, urged "a defensive strategy, carried out in 
an offensive way" (1968b). The growing attractiveness of a first-strike 
strategy reflected the narrow margin of security perceived by Israel's mili­
tary officers and civilian planners. 
Almost at the same time, military leaders began to develop a strategy of 
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deterrence based on the political use of force. The controlled use of force 
was intended to deter Arab governments from launching limited raids 
across the armistice lines and to compel them to cease their support of 
feda'yeen or guerrilla infiltrators. Especially after 1953, limited military 
reprisals were designed not only to deter infiltration but also to prevent a 
more serious attack by strengthening Israel's reputation for resolve 
(Dayan, 1959). There was considerable disagreement among Israel's 
leaders about this political use of force: Dayan and Ben Gurion were the 
chief architects of a strategy of deterrence through limited use of force 
while Sharett, then the prime minister, opposed both the strategy and the 
tactics.18 
The success of deterrence through limited retaliation was questionable. 
Especially along the border with Egypt, reprisals grew in scope until the 
raid on Gaza in February 1955. Indeed, this limited use of force may have 
contributed to a substantial increase in tension.19 By the middle of the 
decade, Israel's leaders felt a growing sense of threat (Dayan, 1966). Two 
years earlier, Egypt had imposed restrictions on Israel's shipping but, in 
September 1955, President Nasser instituted a complete blockade of 
shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel's southern port of Eilat. 
Concurrently, on 27 September, Egypt concluded an arms agreement with 
Czechoslovakia and began to receive massive shipments of Soviet and 
Czech military equipment; the increased level of arms supply threatened to 
shift the balance of military capabilities heavily in Egypt's favor (Dayan, 
1966). In October of 1956, the Egyptian Third Infantry Division, stationed 
in the Sinai desert between el-Arish and Abu Ageila, shifted from defensive 
to offensive deployment and, on the twenty-third of the month, the chiefs of 
staff of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies established a unified 
command under General Amer of Egypt. Long before these changes in 
Egypt's military posture, however, Israel's leaders began to consider 
seriously a preventive strike. In the autumn of 1956, Israel's prime minister 
and chief of staff met with French officials to finalize plans for an offensive 
and, on 29 October, Israel launched a preventive attack.20 
18. Disagreement on strategy and tactics was considerable in this period preceding the 
Sinai campaign. At the political level, the principal protagonists were David Ben Gurion and 
M oshe Sharett. Sharett discussed the strong disagreement with Ben Gurion in his diary entries 
of February and March 1955. See Sharett, 1955a, 1955b, and 1957. In the General Staff, 
Dayan strongly supported the limited use of military force to create a credible deterrent 
reputation. See Dayan, 1959. For an analysis of the civilian cleavage, see Brecher, 1972:251­
290. For a discussion of the military debate, see Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975:71-137. 
19. Some analysts suggest that the strategy of compellence through reprisal did have 
limited success. For a detailed analysis, see Blechman, 1972. More recent evidence, drawn 
from official Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence records captured in wartime, suggests that 
the Gaza reprisal in particular was escalatory rather than deterrent in its impact. Humiliated 
by the scope of the attack, Egypt's leaders increased their involvement in feda'yeen activity, 
and the growing cycle of violence culminated in full-scale war the following year. For a 
presentation of the original Arab intelligence documents, see Ya'ari, 1975. 
20. A detailed examination of the strategic issues which Israel's leaders considered is 
beyond the scope of this study. The most comprehensive treatment by a principal participant 
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Only after the military victory in the Sinai—and the subsequent 
withdrawal in response to American and Soviet pressure—did Israel's 
concept of national security crystallize (Tal, 1976). Increasingly, military 
decisionmakers accepted the hypothesis that qualitative superiority would 
compensate for quantitative inferiority (Weizman, 1976). The margin 
provided by qualitative superiority permitted the acceptance of the 
territorial status quo and the full development of a strategy of deterrence 
(Dayan, 1959; Laskov, 1960; and Rabin, 1967b). 
Deterrence could only develop as one of the two fundamental concepts 
of national security when the deterring power wished to maintain the status 
quo and felt capable of doing so. Only after the military victory of 1956 did 
both these conditions exist. Israel's decisionmakers accepted the prevailing 
rules of the political game and defined any violation of these rules as a casus 
belli. Indeed, Israel's decisionmakers first specified a casus belli in 1957, 
when the withdrawal of forces from Sinai was under negotiation. In her 
speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Foreign Minister 
Meir warned that a blockade of the Straits of Tiran would be considered an 
act of war and would justify a military response by Israel. In the context of 
military success, decisionmakers shifted from concentration on defense to 
a mixed strategy of deterrence and defense. This shift in emphasis is evident 
in the summary of Israel's national security doctrine by one of its principal 
architects: 
During the decade 1956-66 [Israel's] doctrine rested upon the following 
crucial points: first, that the long-threatened Arab war should if possible be 
averted; second, that if it did nevertheless take place, it must at all costs be won 
by Israel; third, that only an army capable of winning would have the power to 
deter; fourth, that the hope to deter depended not on military strength alone but 
on the credibility of using it at the proper time and in a decisive way; fifth, that 
Israel had to be prepared to face all her enemies on her borders simultaneously; 
and finally, that she had to be ready to do the job herself without any military 
help from outside (Allon, 1970:61-62).21 
As the decade progressed, policymakers increasingly emphasized Israel's 
conventional military superiority as the principal instrument of deterrence. 
At the same time, they added to the list of casus belli in an effort to make 
is provided by the chief of staff. See Dayan, 1966 and 1976:151-207 See also Brecher, 
1975:225-317 and Blechman, 1966. 
21. Allon did not formally become a major policymaker until 1961 when he joined the 
cabinet. Nevertheless he was one of Israel's outstanding commanders during the War of 
Independence and continued to write extensively on Israel's security problems. One of the 
major statements of Israel's strategic doctrine was his Massach Shel Hoi (A Curtain of Sand), 
published in 1959. Allon reproduced the list of factors cited above from an address he 
delivered on 22 February 1967, in a publication in 1970. He then comments: "I have 
deliberately preserved the original sequence and emphasis of my arguments, in order to bring 
out the close correspondence between the military doctrine developed during this period and 
the actual course of the Six Day War, which was soon—less than four months later—to 
supply conclusive proof of the practical validity of the doctrine" (1970:62, n. 1). For 
the text of the address in Hebrew, see 1967a. 
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explicit the limits of acceptable change in the status quo. Most of these 
casus belli relate to "basic security," or those interests which Israel's 
decisionmakers consider vital to Israel's security. Peres (1965:9-15), Ben 
Gurion (1956a), and Allon (1956) distinguished issues of "current security," 
or the protection of civilians from limited attacks by irregular forces from 
neighboring Arab countries, from those issues which endangered Israel's 
existence.22 Among decisionmakers and analysts of Israel's strategic 
doctrine, there is variation in definition and valuation of interests at stake; 
considerable difference in definition and specification of the actions to be 
deterred; and ambiguity in the likely response by Israel should deterrence 
fail. 
Casus Belli: A Strategy of Deterrence 
The most precise enumeration of Arab actions which would "oblige" 
Israel to retaliate was provided by Yigal Allon.23 Israel would be entitled to 
strike "when it was clear that the enemy was preparing a surprise air attack 
on Israel's air bases" (1970:71). Allon then listed the indicators to be 
monitored. 
Air supremacy ensured the maximum chance of victory. The enemy air force 
would not be allowed to hit our air force on the ground. When the imminence of 
an air attack became apparent, either through intelligence sources or on the 
radar screens, it was to be forestalled, and the enemy air force was to be 
destroyed, if possible even before take-off (1970:71). 
Here Israel's decisionmaker specified precisely the nature of the 
unacceptable action, the consequences of such an action, valid indicators, 
and the response. A second related casus belli was an intent to carry out a 
localized air attack against atomic installations and scientific institutions. 
Egypt might attempt such an action, Allon argued, accompanied by a 
declaration that its purpose was to destroy these installations and no more. 
It therefore must be made clear "that such a 'localized attack' would call 
forth an immediate general counter attack" (1970:71, emphasis added). 
Again, the unacceptable action was specified precisely, as was the scope 
and timing of Israel's response. 
An Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran was the most frequently 
22. The distinction between "basic security policy" and "current security policy" is 
discussed in the Israel Government Yearbook (1969:153). Allon does list an unacceptably high 
level of guerrilla activity, an issue of "current security" as a casus belli: "When guerrilla 
warfare the planting of land mines and harassment shellings- reached such a point that 
passive defence and reprisals are unable to cope with it" (1970:71). Handel, in analyzing 
Israel's casus belli, includes an intolerable level of guerrilla activities that persists despite 
reprisals (1973:66), as does Friedlander( 1972:150). Both decisionmakers and analysts suggest 
that a massive response by Israel is to be expected only after a series of guerrilla attacks -- that 
is, in the event of deterrence failure. 
23. Peres (1962), Meir (1957), and Ben Gurion (1971) also specified casus belli. 
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articulated casus belli. Foreign Minister Golda Meir, in her speech to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 1 March 1957, stated that: 
Israel is resolved on behalf of vessels of Israel registry to exercise the rights of 
free and innocent passage and is prepared to join with others to secure universal 
respect of this right. Israel will protect ships of its ownflag exercising the right of 
free and innocent passage on the high seas and in international waters. 
Interference, by armed forces, with ships of Israel flag exercising free and 
innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran, will be 
regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-
defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and to take all such 
measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships in 
the Gulf and in the Straits (1957). 
Prime Minister Ben Gurion, in his address to the Knesset on 5 March 1957, 
repeated the declaration of the foreign minister. To underscore its 
importance, he then stressed the acquiescence of the principal maritime 
states in Israel's definition of such a blockade as a casus belli:24 
These [the principal maritime] states will exercise their right to free passage, and 
send their ships to Eilat. They have in addition taken note of our declaration that 
if our right to free passage is violated by force, Israel will be able to defend itself 
by force under Article 51 of the Charter. Several states also expressly recorded 
their recognition of our rights in this connection (1957). 
While Ben Gurion unambiguously detailed the action to be deterred, the 
timing and scope of Israel's response to deterrence failure was less precise: 
[In 1959] I had explained that the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israel 
shipping was to be regarded as "an act of open warfare," and that from the point 
of view of vital strategy Israel must not undertake to engage in defensive warfare 
"linked" to a given theatre of war (such as the area of the Straits of Tiran) or to 
any given date (such as the actual date of the blockade) chosen by the Egyptian 
ruler. For he would obviously attempt to lay down the time and place most 
convenient to himself and unfavourable to Israel. [A blockade] 
amounted to a declaration of war, which permitted Israel to lay down the place, 
the scale, and the zero hour for her action (Allon, 1970:72). 
A blockade of the Straits of Tiran was defined repeatedly as an 
unacceptable change of the status quo. Israel's decisionmakers, however, 
deliberately refrained from specifying the scope, direction, or timing of the 
response should deterrence fail. This suggests that were a blockade to be 
imposed, choice would not be programmed; search and evaluation of 
possible responses would have to be undertaken. Although an Egyptian 
blockade was a principal object of deterrence, the procedures to manage 
deterrence failure were less developed. 
24. For a further statement by Ben Gurion of a blockade as a casus belli, see his interview 
in Newsweek, 25 March 1957. For his version of the events of this period see Ben Gurion, 
1971:502-507. 
Deterrence and Defense / 107 
A military response by Israel also would be necessary "if Jordan should 
enter into a military pact with another Arab country and permit the 
concentration of alien military forces on her territory, and especially on the 
West Bank of the River Jordan" (Allon, 1970:71).25 Allon explored the 
likely impact of such an action: 
The territories occupied by Jordan on the West Bank of the River Jordan faced 
the "soft underbelly'' of the Israel defense lines. An offensive military force 
worthy of the name would try to cut Israel into two or three parts. If she 
[Jordan] joined a war-like coalition against Israel and permitted other Arab 
armies to enter her territory, Israel would have no alternative but to turn the 
West Bank from a potential wedge against herself into a grand trap for the 
enemy forces (1970:72, emphasis added). 
Here, the decisionmaker, in stating the casus belli, has a priori processed 
choice and selected the preferred option; all other alternatives but military 
action are eliminated. Again, however, he does not specify the scope, level, 
or timing of the military response.26 
An additional casus belli, which was articulated less frequently by 
decisionmakers but is included by analysts of Israel's political-strategic 
doctrine (Handel, 1973:63; Friedlander, 1972:150; and Horowitz, 
1975a:246-248), was a situation in which Israel's qualitative superiority was 
undermined seriously by arms supplied to Arab countries. This casus belli 
is consistent with the argument that time was reinforcing qualitative 
superiority and thereby compensating for a narrow margin of security. 
After 1956, army planners argued that the introduction of modern non­
nuclear technology increased rather than decreased the importance of the 
qualitative human factor in the conduct of war. This analysis was accepted 
by civilian decisionmakers and reinforced their commitment to the 
political status quo. As long as development was unimpaired by embargoes 
on the sale of sophisticated weapons or an unbalanced pattern of supply, 
Israel could deter effectively through its qualitative superiority in 
capabilities. Should external sources of arms supply intervene to distort 
this process, calculations of qualitative superiority would have to be 
25. Ben Gurion warned against such concentrations in his statements to the Knesset on 15 
October 1956. See Ben Gurion, 1956b. The importance of this casus belli is attested to by Sir 
Basil Liddell-Hart: "When visiting Israel in 1960, I had lengthy discussions with 
Generals Laskov, then Chief of Staff, and Rabin, then Vice Chief, about their course of action 
in any future war. From these discussions it was evident that the contingency with which they 
were most concerned was that Hussein might be overthrown by a Nasserite plot—and in that 
case they would advance into Jordan immediately before Egyptian and other Arab forces 
could move in" (1968:19). 
26. Handel (1973) expands the scope of this casus belli to include an attempt by an Arab 
state more powerful than Jordan or Lebanon to take control of either and thereby to change 
the balance of power on Israel's eastern or northern border. Israel's decisionmakers warned 
against a Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970, and against Syrian interference in the internal 
strife in Lebanon in 1973. During the civil war in Lebanon in 1975-1976, Israel's officials 
frequently warned that they would not "tolerate" the presence of Syrian forces across a "red 
line," generally considered to be the Litani River in southern Lebanon. 
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revised. Such calculations are context-dependent, and a precise threshold 
of imbalance cannot be specified in advance.27 Although this casus belli 
does not provide a program for the processing of choice, an unbal­
anced pattern of supply was likely to indicate a decisional problem. 
The final casus belli was defined most ambiguously.28 Not only was the 
probable response by Israel unspecified, but the nature of the unacceptable 
action was left ambiguous. Allon declared that a casus belli would exist 
"when such offensive forces were being constituted as to constitute a danger 
to Israel" (1970:70). His elaboration was not precise: 
The concentration of offensive forces had one aim only: aggression. The 
mustering of forces for an offensive was thefirst phase of the offensive itself and 
was to be treated as such (1970:71). 
Analysts are somewhat more specific: Brecher refers to "the concentration 
of Egyptian military power in the Sinai" (1972:67), while Handel lists "a 
threatening concentration of Arab military forces on one or more of its 
[Israel's] borders" (1973:63). Considerable ambiguity exists in the 
definition of the size, location, and intent of the military force that would be 
concentrated. 
This casus belli was applied most frequently to the deployment of 
Egyptian troops in Sinai,29 and it is here that ambiguity was most 
pronounced.30 Regular Egyptian troops were deployed throughout Sinai 
from 1957 to 1967 Estimates of the scope of the Egyptian deployment vary, 
but all agree that it was considerable.31 Egypt had built an extensive 
infrastructure in Sinai which included airfields, supply depots, and a 
forward system of defensive positions in the strategic areas close to the 
Israel-Egypt border.32 This infrastructure—airfields, fortifications, roads, 
27 Horowitz (1975a:248) distinguishes between "preventive" and "preemptive" war as a 
response to casus belli. A "preventive" war would only be chosen when Israel's 
decisionmakers perceived a serious imbalance in capabilities; after 1956, this was unlikely. 
These distinctions are discussed in greater detail when Israel's defensive strategy is examined. 
28. An additional casus belli, which is not relevant to the strategic choices under analysis 
here, was the unilateral attempt by a neighboring Arab state to divert the waters of the River 
Jordan (Handel, 1973:63 and Brecher, 1972:67). 
29. Deployment of troops on the northern and eastern frontier was covered partially by 
the casus belli which prohibited the stationing of other Arab forces on Jordanian or Lebanese 
soil. A second casus belli which established an upper limit of tolerance of guerrilla activities 
was directed to Syria, as well as to Jordan and Lebanon. 
30. For an excellent analysis of the ambiguities in Israel's deterrent posture toward 
Egyptian deployment of troops in the Sinai, see Evron, 1975. 
31. Estimates in Israel range between one and two divisions, plus approximately 250 
tanks. Two squadrons of fighter-bombers were kept permanently in Sinai, although none 
were MlG-21s (Evron, 1975:6, n. 6). A senior officer in Military Intelligence has disputed the 
accuracy of these estimates and suggests that Egypt stationed only three infantry brigades and 
no armor in Sinai. Such a limited deployment would provide no offensive capability. 
32. Although the actual deployment of aircraft was not extensive, there werefive airfields 
which could be activated quickly. Sixteen radar stations were in place throughout Sinai, and 
the network of roads and the water system— important for troopsfighting in the desert—were 
developed considerably in the decade 1957-1967. 
Deterrence and Defense / 109 
and water systems—made possible large-scale and rapid deployment of 
Egyptian troops in the forward strategic areas close to Israel's border. 
Given this deployment of troops and development of infrastructure, 
Israel's decisionmakers could have been referring only to massive 
reinforcement of this troop deployment; but they did not specify the scope 
of "massive"—or the movement of troops to forward areas. More so than 
in other cases, the scope of unacceptable action to be deterred was 
underspecified. 
On 18 February 1960, after a retaliatory raid by Israel against Tawafik 
in Syria, Egypt moved three infantry brigades and one armored division, 
including 500 tanks, across the Canal into the Sinai where they took up 
positions in Gaza, el-Arish, and Abu Ageila. Israel responded with a par­
tial mobilization of some of its reserve units and the transfer of large tank 
formations to the south (Schiffand Haber, 1976:482-483).33 After a few 
days, Egypt announced that its troop concentrations had deterred Israel 
from attacking Syria, and on 1 March Egyptian troops began to return to 
their bases west of the Canal. The restrained response by Israel to troop 
deployments in the Sinai in 1960 suggests that the movement of troops into 
Sinai cannot of itself be considered a casus belli; nor is movement close to 
the border of Israel sufficient. A change in capabilities is not sufficient to 
indicate an attack. Although troop movements are reliable indicators 
which can be monitored easily, they may not be valid if used independently 
as indicators of a probable attack. Rather, decisionmakers must evaluate 
the intentions of their opponent directly, through the examination of the 
statements of Arab leaders which accompany the change in the deployment 
of forces. In the specification of this casus belli, there was no unambiguous 
identification of the action to be deterred nor of the response to an 
unacceptable change in the status quo. Nor was the relationship between 
capabilities and intent clearly established.34 In the few cases prior to the Six 
Day War, Israel responded with partial mobilization of its reserve forces. 
The criteria to choose an appropriate response to a "major" militarization 
of the Sinai remained unclear. 
All six casus belli would be relevant in the three weeks preceding the 
choice by Israel's decisionmakers to preempt on 4 June 1967. Their analysis 
shows, however, considerable variation in the specification both of the 
action which constitutes an unacceptable change in the status quo and in 
the likely response should deterrence fail (Table 4.1). The validity of the 
indicators used to monitor such unacceptable changes also varies. The first 
two causes of war- preparation or intent to implement a surprise air attack 
33. Israel's response is referred to as "Operation Rotem." 
34. Handel (1973:47-48) suggests that even massive troop concentrations do not by 
themselves constitute a casus belli. To evoke a military response, they must be accompanied 
by explicit statements of intent by Arab decisionmakers. 
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and/ or a limited strike against Israel's scientific installations—clearly spec­
ify the limits of unacceptable action. They unambiguously detail Israel's 
response and establish valid indicators to monitor changes. Radar screens 
monitor changes in adversary capabilities while intent is estimated by 
political intelligence. Decisionmakers can follow established procedures of 
evaluation and use programs to process choice. 
TABLE 4.1 
Casus Belli AS PROGRAMMED CHOICE 
Casus Belli Indicator Israel's Response 
Air Attack Changes in air 
capability monitored 
on radar or tactical 
Immediate, general, 
military attack 
intelligence on intent. 
Limited strike 
against scientific 
installations 
Changes in air 
capability monitored 
on radar or tactical 
Immediate, general, 
military attack 
intelligence on intent 
Blockade of Israel's 
shipping through the 
Straits of Tiran 
Verbal declaration by 
Arab leaders and/or 
monitoring of aerial 
and naval deployments 
Scope, level, and 
timing of military 
response unspecified 
Entry of other Arab 
armies into the West 
Bank of the Jordan 
Monitoring of troop 
deployment 
Scope, level, and 
timing of military 
response unspecified 
Unfavorable change 
in the balance of 
military forces 
Unspecified pattern 
of arms shipments 
Scope, level, and 
timing of military 
response unspecified 
Troop concentrations 
near Israel's 
borders 
Unspecified change 
in the pattern of 
deployment accompanied 
by declaration of 
hostile intent 
Scope, level, and 
timing of military 
response unspecified 
The next two casus belli—a blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the entry 
of other Arab forces into Jordan and Lebanon—also identify the 
undesirable action and the appropriate indicators. However, the response 
to deterrence failure is specified less clearly; in both cases, considerations of 
scope, level, and timing intervene between stimulus and response. 
Additional processes of search for and evaluation of alternatives are 
necessary before a choice can be made.35 
The final two causes of war—an unfavorable change in the balance of 
forces36 and massive troop deployments in preparation for an offensive 
35. Since programs are the product of prior calculation, search is restricted to locating the 
appropriate program, and evaluation is limited to consideration of the prespecified indicators. 
If additional calculation intrudes between stimulus and response, the process is no longer 
purely cybernetic. 
36. Even though external arms supplies which would change fundamentally the balance 
of power were not a factor in 1967 as they were in 1955-1956, they were relevant insofar as 
Israel's chief source of arms supply introduced an embargo in the days immediately preceding 
the decision to strike. 
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attack— fail to specify precisely the quality or quantity of an unacceptable 
change in the status quo, valid indicators to monitor such a change, or the 
probable response by Israel. No clear boundaries are established of either 
the extent of imbalance of arms supplies or the scope of troop deployment. 
Further, when troop deployment did occur, the scope of the deployment 
was not considered a valid indicator of attack, and statements of the 
adversary were factored into the calculation. Finally, neither the scope, the 
level, nor the timing of Israel's response can be anticipated. In both cases, 
the calculation of a wide range of factors intervenes between stimulus and 
response. 
The ambiguity may not have been inadvertent but deliberate. 
Policymakers considered their conflict with Arab states to be of 
considerable interest to powers outside the Middle East. If Israel specified 
too explicitly the boundaries of unacceptable violations, interested great 
powers might intervene to challenge these limits. Such a challenge to 
Israel's definition of unacceptable action would reduce the credibility of 
deterrence among Arab decisionmakers. This line of argument dictated 
imprecision rather than precision.37 
The specifics of the unacceptable action would remain imprecise not only 
for those outside the region, however, but also for the Arab governments 
likely to initiate the challenge.38 Imprecision would then reduce the 
effectiveness of deterrent warnings that would be issued. If Arab 
decisionmakers were not aware of the boundaries of the unacceptable, they 
might initiate action with less than complete understanding of the 
consequences. Deterrence would fail not through design but through 
miscalculation. Only if Israel anticipated that its definition of unacceptable 
action was itself unacceptable to interested outsiders was the imprecision in 
deterrent strategy understandable. This imprecision suggests that Israel's 
leaders gave greater weight to support from the major powers than to 
Israel's independent capacity to deter. They chose to permit a high level of 
uncertainty among Arab decisionmakers in order to preclude an 
unfavorable response from the major powers. Such a strategy made little 
sense. Should an Arab government initiate a challenge, the absence of great 
power support for Israel's definition of acceptable behavior would 
immediately become apparent. Present ambiguity was designed to avoid a 
future contingency, but that ambiguity made the undesirable contingency 
more rather than less likely. It is difficult to prevent adversaries from doing 
something they do not know is unacceptable. 
37. This interpretation of the imprecision in deterrent strategy is offered by Horowitz 
(1975a). 
38. Members of the opposition criticized both the ambiguous specification of the actions 
which arc considered a violation of the status quo as well as the failure to establish an 
unequivocal commitment to respond to such violations. In discussing the deployment of non-
Jordanian forces on the West Bank, they argued that the vague formulation reduced the 
effectiveness of the deterrent warnings that were issued. See, for example, the debate in Divrei 
Ha-Knesset, 6 and 7 May 1963. 
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While the logic of an incomplete specification of an action to be deterred 
is difficult to follow, the logic of ambiguity in the deterrent response is more 
obvious. Imprecision may be designed deliberately to preserve the options 
of decisionmakers. Indeed, if the contingent commitment to retaliate 
appears excessive, deterrence becomes less credible to the challenger. 
Should Israel threaten a full-scale military attack, for example, to deter 
troop movements on its borders, Arab decisionmakers might consider it 
highly unlikely that Israel would indeed undertake action of such scope if 
Arab forces were so deployed. The credibility of deterrence would be 
reduced rather than increased by the precise specification of response. 
Rather, deterrence may become more effective as options become more 
numerous and flexible. As a commitment becomes more explicit, the 
flexibility to calibrate responses to particular conditions decreases. By 
refraining from a precise description of their response, decisionmakers do 
not foreclose their own choice among a variety of alternatives.39 The 
credibility of deterrence then depends not on the specificity of the 
commitment to respond, but on the obvious strategic rationale which 
underlies the warning by the deterring state. In the formulation of these last 
two casus belli, then, both stimulus and response are underspecified. While 
the latter implies only that decisionmakers will not be able to use programs 
to make their choices, the former compromises the logic of the argument 
and the psychology of deterrence. A challenger can consider the 
consequences of action only when the action has been defined as a 
challenge. 
Although strategic doctrine is of only limited precision and provides few 
routines for choice, it does provide a framework for subsequent 
information-processing by decisionmakers. The list of unacceptable 
violations of the status quo, specified by the concept of deterrence, can 
serve as a series of environmental indicators for decisionmakers to 
monitor. In this sense, strategic assumptions guide the use and 
interpretation of indicators. Variation in these indicators may signal to 
decisionmakers the necessity to revise their estimates of the probability of 
attack. 
An examination of the indicators established by strategic concepts for 
each of the casus belli (Table 4.1) suggests different emphases on capability 
and intent. Those indicators which monitor changes in capabilities—such 
as preparation for an air offensive—are considered both reliable and valid 
measures of the probability of an attack. Those indicators which include 
39. While ambiguity may preserve the options of the defender and thereby increase the 
credibility of deterrence, it also complicates calculation by the challenger of the defender's 
intent. This increase in uncertainty increases the cost of information management and 
probability estimation for the adversary. For a discussion of the impact of flexibility on 
deterrent effectiveness, see Snyder, 1961; George and Smoke, 1974:556-557; Horowitz, 1975a; 
and Lockhart, 1978. 
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measures of intent as well as capabilities—the concentration of troops 
accompanied by threatening statements—are more difficult to use to 
estimate and review the probability of attack; both their reliability and 
validity are lower. Even then, however, variation in indicators which have 
been prespecified is more difficult to ignore or discount. The availability of 
a series of indicators established through the specification of casus belli 
reduces the likelihood that decisionmakers will use cognitive shortcuts to 
process information. 
An accessible set of indicators can also lengthen the amount of time 
available for decision by facilitating early identification of a problem for 
decision. A director of long range planning in Israel's Ministry of Defense 
defined the essence of the security problem for a small state in a threatening 
environment as a lack of time, or a risk of insufficient warning for 
mobilization and deployment in the face of a massive conventional assault 
(Amiel, 1975:16). Variation in the indicators which are considered valid 
can serve as early warning of the likelihood of deterrence failure. If 
decisionmakers work under moderate rather than intense time pressure, 
they are more likely to use more complicated and demanding procedures. 
To the extent that strategic doctrine includes consideration of such 
indicators, the likelihood of some variant of analytic processing increases. 
Just as concepts of deterrence may provide guidelines for the processing 
of information and the revision of estimates, so they may simplify 
complexity through the specification of the value trade-offs which must be 
considered if the status quo is violated. Strategic concepts can provide 
structure for the evaluative process and encourage analytic procedures. 
Israel's concept of deterrence varied in its specification of the relevant 
dimensions of value. In thefirst two causes of war, trade-offs were specified 
clearly as the net loss to Israel's military security from a surprise air strike 
was calculated. Despite the possibility of miscalculation and the 
probability of international disapproval, Israel "could not afford" to 
absorb an Arab air attack. In the subsequent two casus belli, the value 
trade-offs were calculated only partially. The loss to military security as a 
result of economic blockade or military invasion from the east was 
considered, but the scope, level, and timing of response were to be 
influenced by additional factors which were not made explicit. Yet 
decisionmakers would have to consider these factors in making their 
choice and these factors may be related to other dimensions of value which 
arc important to decisionmakers. The doctrine of deterrence is only of par­
tial help to decisionmakers in structuring their process of evaluation should 
deterrence failure seem imminent. 
For thefinal two causes of war—troop concentration and an unbalanced 
pattern of arms supply—value trade-offs were marginally calculated. The 
point at which either challenge became so costly that a choice to respond 
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with military force would compensate for the loss on other dimensions was 
not specified. Again, the additional dimensions of value which must be 
considered before choosing to respond were not detailed, nor were 
procedures for their identification. In the six cases of action to be deterred, 
strategic concepts are of decreasing utility in structuring a process of choice 
should deterrence failure appear likely. Some of the relevant factors or 
dimensions of value which are not considered by the concept of deterrence 
are examined when defense is analyzed. Drawing on the concept of 
deterrence, however, decisionmakers will get considerable assistance in 
information-processing but substantially less help in structuring the 
process of evaluation. 
This examination of the doctrine of deterrence developed between 1957 
and 1967 suggests that the quality of its logic may have considerable impact 
on the making of national security choices. Strategic concepts are not 
complete. Only under conditions of anticipated short decision t ime-
minutes—does a casus belli provide a program for choice. At all other 
times, varying degrees of calculation are required between the specific 
stimulus and the appropriate response. Decisionmakers who refer to 
prevailing strategic assumptions are not likely to use any of the cybernetic 
paths to choice. 
Although strategic concepts are not fully complete, they do include 
many of the central components of deterrence. By articulating a series of 
casus belli, leaders formulated commitments to a given set of conditions, 
specified unacceptable action, and signaled to their opponents their intent 
to deter. Once unacceptable action is demarcated, these casus belli can 
serve as valid indicators to estimate the intent of an adversary. Strategic 
concepts paid very little attention directly to reconstructing the calculus of 
Israel's principal opponents. Indirectly, however, uncertainty is reduced: 
because Egypt or Jordan know what is unacceptable, the occurrence of any 
of these actions would indicate intent to challenge. Changes in one or 
another of these indicators should signal the need to reconsider and revise 
estimates of the calculus of an adversary. If Israel's leaders draw on 
prevailing strategic assumptions, they are unlikely to commit egregious 
errors in information-processing. Evidence relevant to actions established 
as casus belli would be difficult to discount or ignore. 
There is one minor flaw in this logic. One of the major causes of war, a 
concentration of troops on Israel's borders, was ambiguously defined: the 
scope and limits of unacceptable action remained unclear. Under such 
circumstances, miscalculation both by a challenger and a defender 
becomes more likely. Each finds it difficult to estimate the significance of 
actions as indicators of the intention of the other. The challenger is un­
certain of what is unacceptable, and the defender is uncertain of the in­
tent of a challenger should undesirable action occur. It is difficult to 
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reconcile this ambiguity with the premise of an interdependent and rational 
decision process which is part and parcel of any concept of deterrence. Op­
portunities for miscalculation multiply when expectations are regressed: 
the challenger knows the defender is uncertain of the challenger's intent, 
and the defender knows that the challenger knows that the defender is 
uncertain. The incomplete specification of what is to be deterred 
compounds the difficulty of information-processing in the management of 
deterrence. 
More serious is the incomplete valuation of intrinsic interests which 
underlies a strategy of deterrence. Careful comparison of the value of the 
interests at stake to the defender with the cost of their protection is a logical 
prerequisite of any complete and coherent doctrine of deterrence. Israel's 
leaders are explicit that failure to respond to an impending aerial attack or 
to the militarization of the West Bank would be a grave error. They have 
anticipated the consequences should deterrence fail and consider their 
threatened response to be rational under the circumstances. The 
enumeration of cost and consequences which flows from the valuation of 
interests makes a variant of analytic evaluation easier should either of these 
contingencies occur. The consequences of alternatives and some of the 
important cost-benefit factors have been made salient. 
Careful valuation of intrinsic interest is much less apparent when troop 
concentrations or a naval blockade are discussed. Although a blockade is 
clearly undesirable, there is little comparison of its cost with the 
consequences of lifting a blockade should deterrence fail. Decisionmakers 
drawing on prevailing strategic arguments would get only limited 
assistance in evaluation: concepts make passing reference to the economic 
and political consequences of a blockade and to unspecified factors which 
must be evaluated should a blockade occur. These factors may intrude to 
make fulfillment of a commitment very costly. The scope of deterrence was 
not delimited carefully to reflect valuation of the interest at stake in 
comparison to the cost of protection. Since the cost of fulfilling a 
commitment was not assessed systematically, leaders may find themselves 
trapped in an irrational commitment to retaliate. If this indeed were the 
case, then incomplete concepts have produced questionable logic. 
Even if the net consequences of retaliation were negative, decision-
makers nevertheless may consider it rational to attempt to deter. In a 
variant of the "rationality of irrationality," by establishing a blockade or 
troop concentrations as a casus belli, they have committed themselves to 
choosing a course of action which they would not choose should the 
provocation occur and they were free to consider alternatives. It might 
nevertheless be rational to make the commitment if leaders considered that 
the undesirable action could not be forestalled in any other way and if they 
anticipated that deterrence would succeed. The specification of these casus 
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belli would be rational as a calculated risk. There is little evidence, 
however, that decisionmakers did calculate the risks carefully; they do not 
appear to have engaged in preliminary evaluation either of the costs of 
deterrence failure or of failing to fulfill their commitment. Only if they had 
done so could they have assessed whether it was rational to make the 
commitment to deter. 
Once an undesirable action has been specified and a commitment to a 
specific state of affairs has been made, leaders become committed to the 
maintenance of a credible deterrent reputation. Failure to protect one 
interest jeopardizes the credibility of commitments to safeguard other 
interests. Because of the interdependence among interests, deterrence is 
transformed from a strategy to a value: reputation for resolve becomes an 
intrinsic interest when leaders are considering appropriate responses to the 
likely failure of deterrence. When reputation for resolve is of some 
importance in an ongoing relationship, careful valuation of interests is 
especially critical before an attempt to deter is made. If the scope of 
deterrence is overextended, failure to fulfill irrational commitments may 
severely increase the cost of protecting interests where commitments are 
cost-effective. It is these kinds of considerations which lead policymakers 
to weigh heavily the cost of the failure to deter when they are considering 
alternatives in the face of a challenge. When strategic arguments do not 
include a careful valuation of intrinsic interest and the cost of maintaining a 
credible deterrent posture, when they are incomplete and incoherent on 
critical components, the logic of the argument is flawed. On two of the 
central issues at stake, Israel's leaders were working withflawed arguments. 
Deterrence Failure and Defense 
The development of concepts of deterrence did not preclude continued 
emphasis on defense. Indeed, although Israel's decisionmakers considered 
that the quick decisive military victory of 1956 provided a basis for a 
credible deterrent posture, they did not argue that it had diminished the 
intensity of Arab hostility or changed the thrust of Arab intent. On the 
contrary, the intensity of Arab hostility increased as the conflict continued 
(Allon, 1970:67). Given constant and unremitting Arab hostility, Israel's 
leaders emphasized that, in determining their strategy of defense, they must 
consider the narrow margin of security which derived from the absence of 
geographic depth and from a small population. This narrow margin was 
reduced further by the absence of a defensive alliance (Dayan, 1955:250­
251, 258). The first basic principle of Israel's defensive strategy, dictated by 
its strategic environment, was that of self-reliance.40 
40. The concept of "self-reliance" is deeply rooted in the development of Zionist ideology. 
It found its earlier expression in the term "self-emancipation," used by Dr. Leon Pinsker in a 
pamphlet in 1882. The concept characterized an important strand of Zionist thinking in the 
nation-building period, and it is not surprising that it would influence both the strategic 
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Self-reliance refers both to the appropriate weighting of external factors 
in making strategic choices, and to the kinds of capabilities necessary to 
ensure Israel's security. Decisionmakers emphasized Israel's military 
isolation and the corresponding necessity to rely entirely on its own 
capabilities in case of emergency (Peres, 1970). Allon, in describing the 
basis of Israel's strategic doctrine, argued that "she [Israel] had to be ready 
to do the job herself [should an attack be considered imminent] without 
any military help from outside" (1970:62). Because Israel depends only on 
its own resources, Israel's decisionmakers must make choices in their 
autonomous self-interest; they must weigh the interests of others only as 
they impinge directly on those of the state. This assumption of isolation 
and the related necessity for self-reliance was widely shared among the 
decision-making elite.41 
Related to the emphasis on self-reliance was a consistent pursuit of the 
broadest possible margin of security (Horowitz, 1975a:253). Because of the 
constraints of geo-strategic factors and the expectation of only limited help 
from other states, strategists emphasized the importance of choosing the 
risk-averse option. Strategic thinkers analyzed problems with worst-case 
assumptions and recommended options which reduced the risk to the 
military security of the state. Risk-aversity and self-reliance established the 
framework for the analysis of the appropriate response to an impending 
military attack. Within this framework, analysts first examined those 
conditions which constrain the choice to respond with force and then 
developed assumptions about the appropriate response to likely deterrence 
failure. These two sets of assumptions are not necessarily consistent. 
Israel's decisionmakers detailed the conditions which were necessary 
before Israel could respond to an imminent failure of deterrence with force. 
Ben Gurion, the former prime minister and minister of defense, argued that 
Israel must never fight the military forces of a major power. Israel's forces 
engaged those of a major power only once;42 on 7 January 1949, air force 
pilots shot down four British Spitfires with no formal authorization from 
central policymakers. General Weizman, a senior air force officer at the 
time, recalled the apprehension about possible consequences: "We 
definitely had had the feeling that we were running a big risk, and I would 
by no means say that the decision to engage the British planes was the 
calculus and the tactical doctrine of the Israel Defense Forces. For a discussion of the Zionist 
roots of the concept, see Horowitz, 1975b:24, and for an analysis of the impact of the concept 
on the fighting practices of the Haganah, see Dinur, 1954. 
41. This assumption is described as "Ben Gurionism"; it is shared by most members of the 
decision-making elite (Brecher, 1972:281). There are competing assumptions those of 
"Buberism" and "Weizmannism" which are held by a minority of decisionmakers. For 
definitions of these terms and an analysis of the nuances within the decision-making elite, see
Brecher, 1972: 280-290. 
42. A second encounter with the forces of a major power occurred during the War of
Attrition when, on 30 July 1970, Israel's pilots shot down four MIG-21.)s flown by Soviet 
pilots. 
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outcome of cold sober reasoning" (1976:83). The prime minister, in 
subsequent years, repeated his determination to avoid such encounters in 
the future. "I will never undertake to send the Israel Defence Forces to fight 
a European, or American, Russian, British, or French army," Ben Gurion 
told his colleagues in the Knesset in the months preceding the Sinai 
Campaign (1956a). 
Extending this principle further, Ben Gurion argued that Israel should 
not attack unless it secured in advance the political support of a major 
power capable of supplying military equipment when the war was over.43 
More important, such political support would also neutralize a potential 
threat from another great power intervening on behalf of Israel's 
opponents. During the War of Independence, Israel's decisionmakers had 
to consider the possibility of British intervention on behalf of their 
adversaries. After 1948, Ben Gurion determined that Israel could not risk 
such intervention through its military action.44 An ally to deter such 
intervention was a necessary condition of a first strike. Chief of Staff Rabin 
incorporated these assumptions when he summarized Israel's political and 
military thinking prior to the Six Day War: "Israel must avoid getting 
involved in a war without the clearest support of a European or other 
power." (1971). Finally, planners emphasized the danger of a multi-front 
war with little strategic space. They urged decisionmakers to avoid a war 
alone against the combined strength of Arab armies while preparing for the 
contingency that Israel would face a coordinated military offensive by all 
Arab states simultaneously (Rabin, 1971). 
These concepts intervene between an unacceptable violation of the status 
quo by an Arab state and the selection of an appropriate response. It is 
entirely possible that, should a violation occur, Israel's leaders would be 
unable to secure the support of interested great powers or to neutralize 
them. Prevailing assumptions about the necessary conditions for defense 
complicate the choice prescribed by deterrence. The two concepts are not 
43. There is some disagreement on the relative importance of external factors in the 
calculus of Israel's decisionmakers. Ben Gurion urged early in the 1950s that no attack be 
considered unless Israel were assured of great power support. This suggests a high valuation of 
support from external powers and a recognition that an Arab-Israel conflict could not be 
isolated from the larger strategic context. Horowitz suggests, however, that only after 1967, 
when the threat of Soviet intervention increased, did Israel's decisionmakers abandon the 
assumption that Israel's security problem was confined to the Arab-Israel contest. Until that 
time, Israel's planning assumed, if not explicitly, a certain degree of autonomy for Arab-Israel 
relations: "The potential, and at times, actual presence of the Great Powers in the region was 
perceived as part of the system of political forces which set limits to the possibility of resorting 
to force during periods of decreased tension, but not as a point of departure for determining 
moves in Israeli strategy" (1975a:258). 
44. I n an intriguing interpretation, one analyst of Israel's foreign policy suggests that the 
principal reasons to ally with France and Britain in the period immediately before the Sinai 
Campaign were the necessity to secure a reliable supply of arms and, equally important, a 
guarantee that neither power would intervene on behalf of Egypt. Israel argued, he suggests, 
that to have England as an ally against Egypt was the surest method not to have England as an 
enemy (Derrienic, 1974:92-93). 
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inherently inconsistent, but the argument is not fully worked out; there 
is no systematic investigation of the consequences of retaliating without 
great power support as against permitting deterrence to fail. While the 
argument is enriched, it is not fully coherent. 
The incoherence in the argument arises in part from its greater 
completeness, or the inclusion of additional factors necessary for defense. 
This listing of additional factors does help, however, to define some of the 
parameters of a complex problem for decision. Leaders who draw on 
prevailing strategic concepts which expand the factors to be evaluated are 
less likely to ignore the obvious and salient value trade-offs. Just as a richer 
concept of deterrence can help in the processing of information, so a more 
complete concept of defense can be useful in listing at least some of the 
complexities leaders may have to consider before choosing a response to 
the likely failure of deterrence. 
In response to an unacceptable violation of the status quo, Israel's 
strategic thinkers developed a two-phase concept of defense: in the first 
phase, a small standing army and a regular air force provide the framework 
for the rapid mobilization of the reserves; in the second phase, the 
mobilized Israel Defense Forces (I.D.F.) seize the strategic initiative. 
After the War of Independence, almost all those serving in the army were 
demobilized rapidly to return to pressing civilian tasks. Chief of Staff 
Yigael Yadin and his colleagues confronted the dilemma that Israel, with a 
small population, could not maintain a standing army of adequate size. 
Egypt was able to deploy a large army of long-term regulars without 
draining its civilian economy. The majority of Israel's manpower had to be 
free to engage in civilian activity if the country were to surmount its 
formidable social and economic problems of absorption and reconstruc­
tion. However, trained combat-ready forces of sufficient size had to be 
ready at all times to defend against an attack across any of the borders. To 
solve this problem, Yadin organized a universal system of reservists—a 
"citizens" army All able-bodied men and women regularly trained each 
year with permanent units,45 and a system of mobilization was established 
to ensure their rapid call-up in the event of an emergency. The mobilization 
system was tested extensively through military exercises in 1950-51 and 
judged to be successful.46 Since that time, Israel's military system has been 
based on a small regular army with its principal strength in reserve units. 
The success of a system of defense based on militia forces depends, to an 
unusual degree, both on accurate intelligence information and on support 
and cover from the standing forces. The concept of defense included the air 
45. For an extensive description of the origins of the reserve system, the procedures of
reserve training, and its impact on the economic and military sectors, see Luttwak and 
Horowitz, 1975:71-103. 
46. For the considerations that led to the adoption of the reserve system, see Allon, 
1959:35-51. 
120 I Part Two: Decision-making in Israel, 1967 
force, the navy, and the intelligence corps as the principal regular forces of 
the Israel Defense Forces. Especially as air power developed in the decade 
after 1948, the air force was responsible for covering the mobilization 
process and for supporting, through itsfire-power, the small standing army 
which must contain an enemy offensive until the militia forces were fully 
deployed (Tal, 1976). Military planners relied even more heavily on ample 
warning from the intelligence corps of an impending attack (Laskov, 
1968a:41-44). Advance warning of enemy intent to attack is important for 
all states; in Israel's case its importance is much greater because of the 
reserve structure and the necessity of early warning to permit mobilization. 
Given a high-risk strategy of a reserve army in a situation of "dormant 
war," the number of large-scale mobilizations should be frequent. 
However, Israel's proportionately small manpower base imposed 
constraints on the frequent use of large-scale mobilization. A full-scale 
mobilization, if it is prolonged, ha]ts economic activity and paralyzes the 
civilian sector. Although neither decisionmakers nor planners discussed 
the issue frequently, they recognized that reservists could not be kept in 
uniform for an extended period (Weizman, 1976:166). Given the basic 
asymmetry in the structure of the Arab and Israel armies, large-scale 
mobilization by Israel, in the event of an Arab violation of the status quo, 
implied a rapid return to the status quo ante or an offensive strike by Israel. 
If intelligence estimates a high likelihood of a general attack or a violation 
of the status quo which is defined as unacceptable, mobilization is a first-
phase response; a second phase follows quickly. 
Partial mobilization provides an alternative to the high cost and 
disruptive effect of large-scale mobilization.47 If the validity of indicators is 
not high, "signals" ambiguous, and Arab intent difficult to estimate, Israel 
could mobilize some reserve units both to defend and to deter. If an Arab 
violation of the status quo is one which has been specified less precisely and 
if this violation is not an immediate prelude to a general attack, partial 
47. Official definitions of partial, full, and total mobilization are classified, as are the 
conditions which guide the selection of these levels of preparedness. Decisionmakers and 
secondary sources have not made the distinctions precise; therefore, the following definitions, 
the product of informal interviews, must be treated with caution. The Israel Defense Forces 
use three levels of alert—A, B and C. At level B, frontline forces are alerted as is the air force, 
and the system of mobilization is checked. Level C, the highest level, can be followed only by 
an order to take position. When a C-level alert is declared, all regular army personnel are 
alerted as are reserve mobilization personnel. Some additional support staff are mobilized, 
and all leave is canceled for those reserve personnel currently serving their tour of duty. 
Commanders activate forward headquarters and the General Staff mans the Supreme 
Command Post. The chief of staff can institute these alert procedures on his own authority. 
Schiff notes that a C-level alert is not, however, a specific order to deploy or take up positions 
(1974:50). A partial mobilization is the call-up of only certain units—generally paratrooper 
and/or armor; the size and scope of such mobilizations vary greatly under different 
circumstances. A full mobilization involves all units in the reserve system, and a total 
mobilization includes the non-military or civilian auxiliary units as well. Prior to October 
1973, the chief of staff needed cabinet approval for any level of mobilization. Since October 
1973 procedures have been revised somewhat to permit more flexibility for limited 
mobilization by area commanders. 
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mobilization may be a more efficient option. It is not linked to offensive 
action within a limited time period and permits a period for further 
evaluation. 
Partial mobilization could deter as well as defend. Although less credible 
than full mobilization, a partial move nevertheless signals commitment to 
an adversary and thereby reinforces deterrence. It simultaneously 
improves defensive capability should deterrence fail. As a strategy of 
defense, it can be considered risk-averse.48 The more preferred outcome 
would be deterrence without mobilization while the less preferred outcome 
would be defense without mobilization. As the first in a possible sequence 
of choices, partial mobilization minimizes the risk of the latter and 
sacrifices the former. As noted, Israel's decisionmakers chose this 
alternative in February 1960 when Egypt deployed a substantial number of 
troops in the Sinai.49 
Israel's strategic concepts do not distinguish formally between partial 
and full mobilization nor do they establish their relationship to deterrence 
and defense. This is a rather grave omission; in their treatment of 
mobilization, strategic arguments areflawed. Because partial mobilization 
is not considered separately, it is not compared systematically to large-scale 
mobilization. While their respective contributions to defense are obvious, 
their relative advantages and disadvantages as a deterrent strategy are not 
examined. Closely related is the failure to consider the appropriateness of 
partial and large-scale mobilization to different levels or kinds of warning 
that deterrence may fail. Strategic concepts do not distinguish those 
conditions which justify large-scale call-ups from those where partial 
mobilization would constitute an adequate response to warning. Such 
distinctions are especially important when an economy has difficulty 
sustaining a protracted mobilization of forces. 
Finally, strategic arguments draw no relationship between the 
occurrence of different casus belli and the scope of mobilization in 
response. Logically, since each is defined as a cause of war, the occurrence 
of any would require large-scale mobilization. In practice, some are more 
ambiguously defined than others. Should the West Bank be militarized, a 
large-scale call-up might be indicated while in the case of Egyptian troop 
deployments in the Sinai, a less clearly specified casus belli, partial 
48. Generally, concepts of risk-aversion and risk-acceptance are applied to individual 
preference structures. However, they have been used to examine the risk propensities of 
decisionmakers as a unit or a group (Triska, 1966; George and Smoke, 1974). Here, the focus 
is on the risk-calculation of doctrine which analyzes strategic situations in order to 
recommend alternatives. 
49. No published evidence exists on the number of partial, full, and total mobilizations in 
Israel over time. While full and total mobilizations arc reported, partial mobilizations are not 
always reported by the media. It is difficult to estimate the proportion of partial to full 
mobilizations; nor is it possible to list all the circumstances under which Israel's 
decisionmakers chose partial mobilization. Whaley states that partial mobilization was a 
"rather ordinary event" in the year or two preceding the Sinai Campaign (I969:A538). 
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mobilization might be an appropriate choice. Strategic concepts engage in 
no such analysis. Although they recommend mobilization as the initial 
response to an imminent failure of deterrence, they are incomplete in their 
examination of the appropriate level of response and, consequently, silent 
on the impact of differences in the scope of mobilization on deterrence and 
defense. 
Strategic doctrine also analyzes the second phase of defense, the 
response after mobilization. Even with fully mobilized reserves, military 
decisionmakers still confront the acute problems created by the lack of 
strategic depth, the possibility of a multi-front war, the active interest of the 
great powers, and a strong desire to minimize casualties in a citizens' army 
drawn from a small population base. An emphasis on the lowest possible 
level of casualties places a premium on as short a conflict as possible. Long 
battles of attrition inevitably would increase military casualties and 
threaten the limited manpower base that supports the armed forces. To be 
effective, therefore, defense must be quick. 
This emphasis on a short war is consistent with the analysis by both 
civilian and military decisionmakers of the constraints imposed by external 
powers. A military conflict between Israel and any Arab state could not be 
isolated from the larger context of great power relationships. Once war 
begins, they argued, one or another of the great powers would intervene to 
impose a ceasefire on the belligerents after only a few days offighting (Tal, 
1976). Although the major powers might avoid direct intervention to 
reduce their risk of confrontation, they would cooperate to terminate 
hostilities as quickly as possible, especially if Israel's forces appeared to be 
victorious. These constraints imposed by external powers increase the 
importance of a short war which can be waged with existing stocks of 
equipment. Such a war is more difficult to control for those powers who are 
the principal sources of arms in the Middle East. 
A short war is also required by a militia-based army which makes 
extended mobilization of a large number of forces very difficult. General 
Weizman, a commander of the air force and chief of operations in the 
I.D.F., stressed the particular importance of time in Israel's strategic 
environment: 
In Israel's wars, the factor of time [is] of critical importance. There 
are two interconnected aspects to this time factor. A small people has only 
limited breathing space. Our standing army is small, and war requires mass 
mobilization of reserves, which paralyzes the whole economy. A long war means 
a lot of casualties and heavy bloodshed; it also means that a lot of material is 
used up, emptying our stocks (1976:166). 
The logic of low casualties, limited manpower, and dependence on external 
supplies of military equipment dictates a short war. 
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In examining strategies of defense, military analysts considered not only 
the constraints imposed by these three factors, but also the military 
implications of the country's long frontiers, the absence of strategic depth, 
and the likelihood of a multi-front war. Israel's chief of staff from 1949 to 
1952, Yigael Yadin (1967), attested to the strong influence of Sir Basil 
Liddell-Hart's thinking when the General Staff examined the impact of all 
these factors on defense.50 Writing after World War I and the carnage in the 
trenches, Liddell-Hart urged a "strategy of indirect approach" to reduce 
the level of military casualties. An attacking force could achieve its 
objectives by avoiding frontal assault and concentrating on flanking 
maneuvers which circumvent reinforced positions, confuse the adversary, 
and increase the "fog of battle." Defense should not only be quick, 
therefore, but also indirect. Through tactical surprise and indirection, 
advancing forces reduce direct combat with fully positioned units and 
decrease their level of casualties. 
Closely related to an emphasis on indirection is Liddell-Hart's stress on 
the use of "interior lines" which reduces the impact of a multi-front war and 
turns shallow space to advantage. If attacked on two fronts, Israel's armed 
forces can quickly concentrate their principal strength against one of the 
attacking armies. Since Israel's forces must travel a much shorter distance 
to reach the front lines, by massing at the point of greatest need they can 
quickly achieve local superiority before adversary forces can be joined by 
those of their allies.51 Through the effective use of interior lines, an army 
can convert a multi-front war to a multi-stage war. When the thrust of the 
first attacker is blunted, the army, working with short internal lines of 
communication and supply, can quickly turn its attention to a second 
front. If short lines are properly exploited, they may become an asset rather 
than a liability The core of defense becomes indirection in stages. 
A strategy of staged indirection, however, does not address directly the 
extraordinary vulnerability to attack of major population centers. 
Decisionmakers emphasized not only military but also civilian casualties of 
a major Arab ground and air offensive. Dayan (1959) argued that Israel 
could not afford to absorb an attack since no territory could be sacrificed 
even temporarily. Given the lack of depth within the country and the 
vulnerability to attack of major population centers, fighting must be 
transferred to the territory of the adversary. Prime Minister Ben Gurion 
formulated the maxim of "carry the battle into enemy territory" during 
hostilities in 1948, and the chief of staff immediately after the war con­
50. Yit/.hak Rabin, subsequently to become chief of staff of the I.D.F. and then prime 
minister, analyzed the application of the strategy of the indirect approach in the War of 
Independence in the armed forces journal, Ma'arachot 151 (April 1963). 
51. Liddell-Hart (1967) recommended that an army on interior lines mass against the 
weaker of two opponents so that one front would collapse as quickly as possible. The I.D.F 
generally has preferred to operate against the stronger or more threatening front lirst. 
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curred that analysis of the fighting produced the basic doctrine of defense 
which characterized subsequent defense planning: 
We have to think along different lines from those we used to. We cannot 
build a defence plan based on fighting in our own territory; that means of course 
that we have to transfer the war to the enemy's country. We can see all the 
borders of our state as one battlefield. The operational goal of our 
planning is to take quick decisive action and to transfer the war to the enemy's 
territory (Yadin, 1959:39-40; emphasis added). 
The "offensive execution of a defensive strategy" became a central strategic 
concept (Laskov, 1968b). The transfer of combat beyond Israel's borders 
was consistent also with the assumption of a short war and active interest 
by external powers; Israel could not afford a ceasefire imposed within the 
armistice lines. In determining their defensive strategy, Israel's planners 
focused on the amount to lose and chose the risk-averse option of the 
transfer of combat.52 Defense through offense became the axiom of 
operational planning (Tal, 1976). 
To transfer combat to the territory of the adversary and to achieve a 
rapid breakthrough, Israel's planners emphasized the advantage of a first 
strike, particularly by the air force. Decisionmakers, especially after 1956, 
assigned a high priority to the air force as the instrument of preemptive 
attack. Air support and reconnaissance are important to an army engaged 
in forward mobile operations, and a preemptive air strike at the beginning 
of the war may ensure air superiority in the subsequent ground fighting, 
where desert conditions offer virtually no protection from attacking 
aircraft. Most important, given the assumption of a short war, neither side 
has enough time to recover from the damage of a powerful first strike. 
Allon examined in detail Israel's vulnerability to a surprise attack both 
on the ground and in the air and discussed the concept of an "anticipatory 
counterattack" to reduce the cost of such an attack: 
Israel's only way of saving herself from such a surprise attack was to maintain 
her military readiness and her moral title to carry out an anticipatory counter­
attack. This is how I define the term: Israeli operational initiative taken against 
concentrations of enemy forces and the occupation of enemy territory of targets 
having a vital security significance, at a time when the enemy is mustering his 
forces for an attack, but before he has had time to actually start his offensive 
(1970:73). 
He then explained the necessity for such a preemptive attack.53 
52. A choice to transfer the fighting beyond the frontiers of Israel is risk-averse in that it 
concentrates on loss and reduces the probability of unacceptably high damage within the 
borders of Israel. Once the choice to use force is made, risk-aversity is replaced by risk-
acceptance in battlefield strategy and tactics. The battlefield strategy of the I.D.F places a 
high premium on taking considerable risks in expectation of immediate and substantial gains 
(H orowitz, 1970:202). Before choosing to defend, the focus is on loss; once defense begins, the 
focus is on gain. 
53. Allon is quoting his own arguments written in 1959 in Hebrew in Massach She! Hoi 
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The realities of the situation were that the enemy was concentrating his forces 
with an attack in view, that such preparations for an offensive were an integral 
part of the offensive itself, and that the enemy was bent on securing mastery of 
the air by an attack on Israel's air force while it was still on the ground, which, if 
successful, would at one stroke paralyze Israel's whole defence structure and 
expose her to total defeat. Given this situation, Israel was entitled, indeed called 
upon, to wrest the initiative from the enemy. 
In an anticipatory counter-attack, one would aim first and foremost at air 
superiority. This was to be achieved by destroying the enemy air force and its 
installations on the ground. One would then aim at breaking the concentration 
of land forces and taking up suitable positions on enemy territory to prevent a 
resumption of the aggression (1970:73-74). 
Allon does not distinguish an anticipatory counterattack from the more 
widely used concepts of preventive and preemptive attack. Harkabi, a 
former director of Military Intelligence and one of Israel's leading strategic 
thinkers, defines a preventive attack as the initiative of the deterrer while a 
preemptive attack occurs after hostilities have been initiated by the 
adversary: "A preemptive attack is launched upon the enemy at the very 
commencement of the latter's attack. In both preemptive attack and 
preventive war there is an element of advance punishment, but with 
preemptive attack the advance punishment is for actions the other side has 
already initiated. There is therefore a substantial degree of certainty that 
these actions will indeed be carried out. The anticipated aggression already 
appears to be a matter of fact rather than conjecture about actions in the 
distant future" (1966:43-44). 
A preventive attack is an option only when decisionmakers consider that 
the balance of military capabilities threatens to shift against Israel. 
Although an imminent attack is less likely than when other casus belli 
occur, preservation of an effective deterrent posture may encourage the 
choice of a military response. Allon refers to a preventive attack when 
he suggests that Israel may choose to respond "sometimes months ahead" 
(1970:74). The sudden expansion of the armed forces in Egypt after 1955, 
for example, challenged Israel's assumptions about the likely outcome of a 
future war. Its militia system was designed to defend in a war of infantry; 
Israel's military planners, like many others, had extrapolated from the last 
war. The acquisition by Egypt of substantial amounts of armor, motorized 
equipment, and jet aircraft dramatically increased the likelihood of a rapid 
breakthrough by Arab forces. The mobility and speed of armor increased 
the importance of air power which could disrupt moving columns in open 
desert terrain. As Israel's control of the skies became more important for 
defense, a strike at enemy airfields became an essential component of 
military planning. 
(A Curtain of Sand). Rather than translate his argument, his own English version is used 
after checking it with the original Hebrew written ten years earlier, prior to the Six Day War. 
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The change in quantity and quality of equipment led Israel's 
decisionmakers to consider a preventive attack in 1955. They argued that 
shipments of Soviet weapons to Egypt would not be matched by equivalent 
supplies from Western sources to Israel. The imbalance in quality as well as 
quantity made it imperative, leaders of the air force concluded, to destroy 
an adversary's air force on the ground in the first few hours of battle. In 
November of 1955, Commander in Chief of the Air Force Tolkovsky 
recommended a preventive air strike against Egyptian airfields and 
promised to achieve air superiority within two days without outside help. 
Ben Gurion and Dayan, then chief of staff, did not concur, however, in the 
estimate of Israel's aerial capability and rejected the proposal. The prime 
minister chose the option of preventive attack eleven months later when the 
support of a great power was assured. 
Other unacceptable violations of the status quo would signal intent by an 
adversary to initiate hostilities and consequently a choice of preemptive 
force. Allon's concept of an anticipatory counterattack generally refers to 
such a preemptive attack.54 Preemption had the additional advantage of 
reducing not only civilian but also military casualties. When the threat of 
air strikes against Israel's civilian centers was reduced, the air force could 
turn to close support of advancing ground forces. Inevitably, the number of 
battlefield casualties would decline if the army could draw freely on the fire 
power of the air force. Finally, a preemptive strike would shorten the war. 
The logic of low casualties, limited manpower, and dependence on external 
sources of supply which dictates a short war extends to support a 
preemptive strike as a principal defensive option. 
These two principles—the transfer of combat to adversary territory and 
preemption—provide the guidelines for Israel's strategic planning. Both 
imply speed and initiative. Dayan, in analyzing the Sinai campaign, 
underlined the importance of speed: 
I stressed the point that speed was the key factor. We must end the campaign in 
the shortest possible time. The longer it lasts, the greater will be the political 
implication—pressure from the United States, the dispatch of volunteers to aid 
Egypt and so on. It is not, however, only political considerations that call 
for speed. From the operational point of view, rapidity in advance is of supreme 
importance to us, for it will enable us to profit from our basic advantage over the 
Egyptian army (1966:34-35). 
54. Evron distinguishes four types of Israel-initiated war: "the preventive mode, when 
there was a danger that the military balance might shift in favor of the Arab side in the short or 
medium range; the anticipatory mode, as in 1967 when there was a large threatening 
concentration of Arab forces along Israel's borders; the preemptive mode, in case there was a 
very high probability of imminent attack by the other side; and, lastly, as an instrument to 
enhance Israel's deterrent posture" (1976:166). These four types are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive: intelligence may estimate a high probability of attack when troops are 
concentrated; or decisionmakers may consider a shift in the military balance a threat to an 
effective deterrent posture. 
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Strategic and tactical doctrine were consistent in their emphasis on speed 
and initiative; a preemptive strike across Israel's frontiers became an 
accepted strategic assumption. 
Major questions of timing and implementation of a preemptive attack 
nevertheless remained unspecified. This lack of specification is related to a 
third element in Israel's strategic doctrine—surprise. As early as 1950, 
Yigael Yadin, then the chief of staff, analyzed the lessons of the War of 
Independence: 
The full utilization of the advantages of the strategy of indirect approach 
stressed again that of all principles of war, the principle of surprise is the most 
important one. All of the other principles could be considered secondary and 
derivative, necessary for the achievement of the element of surprise. Of these 
secondary principles the following stood out: the offensive spirit, concen­
tration and mobility. Only when we utilized all these principles did we achieve 
complete surprise: when we achieved surprise, we won the battle (1950). 
In "Operation Kadesh" in October 1956 (the Sinai Campaign), Israel's 
strategists based their planning on surprise and deception. Initially they 
attempted to convince their opponent—Egypt—that military action was to 
be directed against Jordan, informal "word-of-mouth" mobilization 
procedures were used, and the emergency system of radio announcements 
was avoided until almost the last moment, 28 October. Mobilization was 
then justified by intelligence and information officials as a response to the 
entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan. In the second stage, offensive action on 
the first day, 29 October, was limited to the seizure by a paratrooper 
battalion of the Mitla Pass; army planners hoped to convince Egypt that 
this was only a somewhat larger reprisal raid (Dayan, 1966:61-63). The 
planning of the Sinai Campaign was consistent with much of the "strategy 
of indirect approach": statements of "alternative goals" or deliberate em­
phasis on several possible targets to confuse an adversary;55 a strike in an 
unexpected zone deep behind adversary lines; a departure from previous 
patterns of operation which could have been anticipated by military 
officers on the other side; and coordination of strategic and tactical 
surprise. Operation Kadesh terminated with a very low level of military 
casualties (191 killed), and planners continued to emphasize the 
importance of surprise in the decade after Sinai. Yitzhak Rabin, the chief of 
staff in 1967, in a post hoc analysis of Israel's political and military thinking 
in the period preceding the Six Day War, argued that two axioms were 
55. Iiddell-Hart (1967) placed particular emphasis on the concept of "alternative 
objectives" to make the calculation of an opponent more difficult. If decisionmakers 
emphasize alternative objectives, this may increase the uncertainty of an opponent. At best, 
such a strategy may cause an opponent to choose to defend the wrong objectives and, at worst, 
the opponent may disperse his forces to reduce the risk of surprise, thereby decreasing the cost 
of the subsequent attack. See also Whaley, 1969: A541-542, for an analysis of surprise as 
strategy in 1956. 
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fundamental: "Israel must not get into a situation where the Arab states 
dictate the time and conditions of opening warfare; and Israel must not lose 
its capacity for strategic surprise" (1971). 
Surprise may complement speed and initiative.56 If an opponent is 
permitted to determine either the field or the moment of battle, then Israel's 
forces lose the advantage of a first strike. A preferred strategy is to transfer 
combat to adversary territory in an unanticipated quick attack. The 
exploitation of the "line of least expectation" may make the achievement of 
air superiority and the transfer of combat easier in the first stages of the 
battle. It increases Israel's qualitative superiority by increasing the 
disorganization of adversary forces and by permitting the I.D.F to exploit 
its superior responsive capability and flexibility. A strategic approach 
which emphasizes surprise increases the density of the "fog of war" in the 
first stages of the battle. "Fog of war" refers to the effect of the complexity 
and unpredictability of warfare on the availability of immediate, 
comprehensive, and reliable information about the battlefield. The greater 
the fog of war, the heavier the burden on the command, communication, 
and control system of the adversary. 
Israel's system of command and control stresses flexibility which 
enhances the initial advantages derived from strategic surprise. Military 
planners developed a system of "optional control" at the tactical level of 
command. In this system, the power of immediate decision is left with units 
in the field, and higher echelons of command intervene when they think it 
necessary to provide an overview. Otherwise, unit commanders report 
back continuously but do not have to wait for orders before making 
decisions (Horowitz, 1970). Such a flexible system maintains the 
temporary advantage provided by preemption, rapid transfer of battle, and 
quick and mobile operations. Surprise may increase the fog of battle for the 
adversary while imposing no additional constraints on the operations of 
Israel's army. On the contrary, surprise may disorganize the forces of the 
opponent, and battlefield objectives may be achieved at a lower level of 
casualties. Israel's strategic and tactical doctrines were coherent: strategic 
surprise reinforced the advantages of speed and initiative in thefirst stages, 
and these advantages then were exploited through flexible systems of 
command and control as the battle progresses.57 
56. Surprise is not necessarily related to mobility and speed of attack. If an attack plan is 
mobile, then surprise may increase its effectiveness only in the first stage until the adversary 
has time to organize its forces. The ability of an opponent to regroup and reorganize while 
under attack will be critical in determining the effect of surprise. An attacker may also use 
surprise without mobility of attack. In 1973, for example, the Egyptian General Staff planned 
a strategic surprise linked to static and fixed lines of battle. Acknowledgments to Yair Evron 
for the analysis of the relationship between surprise and subsequent battle tactics. 
57. The concept of the "fog of war" can be applied as well to the period preceding the 
attack. In the prewar period, a strategy of deception may be used to increase the likelihood of 
adversary surprise. False signals, or "disinformation," deliberately are sent to the adversary to 
confuse the calculation of the likelihood of attack. For an analysis of Israel's use of deception 
as a strategy, see Whaley, 1969:A530-546 and A572-604. 
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Surprise as an offensive concept is one part of a larger decisional 
problem of timing. Decisionmakers must consider whether or not the 
context is appropriate for preemption and, if so, when. The emphasis on 
strategic surprise suggests that timing cannot be specified in advance; it is 
context-dependent. Moreover, calculation of the likelihood of surprising 
the adversary is one factor, among others, that affects the choice of 
preemption. Allon recognized 
the avowed duty never to resort to an action of this kind unless and until the 
absolute necessity for it had been established beyond reasonable doubt, and 
having been established, had also been subjected to the most serious political 
scrutiny. It might be difficult, but it was not impossible, with the help of 
efficient intelligence services such as Israel possessed, to distinguish between the 
massing of forces for an attack and, say, divisional manoeuvres, or one further 
move in a war of nerves. These were the discriminations that Israel was required 
to make (Allon, 1970:74-75). 
This examination of the appropriate timing of preemption raises several 
issues. First, policymakers must estimate a high probability of attack to 
decide whether or not to preempt. Allon suggests further that, even when 
decisionmakers are confident of attack, the option of a preemptive strike 
must still be subjected to "the most serious political scrutiny"; that is, 
factors other than the high probability of an adversary attack must be 
considered. Finally, he notes the absence of a set of decisional procedures 
to specify when Israel's attack should be launched. While more complete 
and coherent than the concept of deterrence, the doctrine of defense does 
not establish programs for the choice of preemption as a response to a 
likely failure of deterrence. 
Strategic Doctrine and Choice 
In their examination of the substance of the policy environment Israel's 
concepts of deterrence and defense address the principal components of the 
security dilemmas that those responsible for national security are likely to 
face. Indeed, military and civilian decisionmakers shaped and shared much 
of the argument, and some of those who formulated central assumptions— 
Allon, Dayan, Rabin—would be important participants in the national 
security crisis of J 967 The examination of the logic of strategic arguments 
prevailing before 1967 suggests a somewhat uneven impact of doctrine on 
process and choice. The more complete and coherent the set of strategic 
concepts, the easier an approximation to some variant of an analytic 
procedure. Flaws in the logic, however, could translate into constraints to 
rational choice. The first three requirements of a logical strategic 
argument— valuation of interests, specification of the object of deterrence, 
and examination of the calculus of an adversary—impinge most strongly 
on problem diagnosis, search for information, estimation, and revision. 
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The last two requirements—a credible threat to retaliate and appropriate 
defensive options—relate directly to search for and evaluation of options. 
At the core of a deterrence argument is an examination of the worth of 
the interests at stake and the cost of their protection. A subjective valuation 
of interests is a logical prerequisite to a delimitation of the appropriate 
scope of deterrence. In their demarcation of casus belli, Israel's leaders did 
specify interests that were worth going to war to protect. But the quality of 
the valuation was uneven: on at least two of the six issues—concentration 
of troops and a naval blockade—comparison of the cost of protection with 
the interest at stake was rudimentary. 
Even though valuation of interests was incomplete, deterrence could rest 
on the expectation that an adversary would acquiesce rather than challenge 
once a casus belli was declared. There is little evidence, however, that 
Israel's leaders did consider these risks carefully before formulating their 
intention to deter. The consequences of this omission are compounded by 
the interconnectedness of interests which deterrence highlights. Just as 
those responsible for national security do not appear to have considered 
seriously the likelihood of deterrence failure, so they paid little attention to 
the costs of permitting deterrence to fail. The argument was flawed by 
incomplete valuation of intrinsic interests and by the failure to consider the 
related costs of maintaining a credible deterrence reputation. On matters of 
critical importance, strategic arguments fell far short of norms of 
completeness and coherence. Deterrence was not carefully delimited. 
The designation of casus belli as the core of deterrence could have 
considerable impact on processes of problem diagnosis and definition and 
on estimation of adversary intent. Because Israel's leaders had declared 
certain actions to be provocations to war, they should find it easy to 
diagnose a problem should an unacceptable action occur. Policymakers 
working with these concepts would have little difficulty recognizing and 
structuring a problem for decision. 
The specification of casus belli was designed to communicate to potential 
challengers a commitment to a given set of conditions—conditions such as 
freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, low levels of militarization 
along Israel's border, and the exclusion of foreign troops from the West 
Bank of the Jordan. Through repeated demarcation of the unacceptable, 
Israel's leaders attempted to influence the calculus of their opponents. They 
spent little time examining the basis of their adversaries' calculus and the 
conditions which would provoke a challenge. Strategic doctrine does not 
examine formally, for example, the relationship of capabilities to 
intention. Indirectly, however, the designation of casus belli and the regress 
of expectations implicit in deterrence simplified the estimation of 
intentions. Because the defender anticipated that the challenger knew that 
the defender considered certain actions unacceptable, commission of any 
Deterrence and Defense / 131 
one action would indicate deliberate intention to challenge deterrence. 
Information relating to any of these casus belli was not likely to be 
discounted or denied. 
This logic breaks down if the scope of the unacceptable is ambiguous: 
violations committed by an adversary unknowingly rather than deliberate­
ly cannot be construed as deliberate challenge. When the object of 
deterrence is ambiguous, the difficulty of information-processing increases. 
The risk of faulty estimation and miscalculation is compounded further if 
those attempting to deter are unaware of the ambiguities in their signals; at 
the extreme, leaders may consider deliberate what is inadvertent. The 
ambiguous formulation of one of the major causes of war, the 
concentration of troops, runs such a risk; the scope and limits of 
unacceptable action remain undefined. At best, decisionmakers working 
with these strategic assumptions could get little help in reducing 
uncertainty and, at worst, they could seriously miscalculate the intentions 
of an adversary. The other casus belli are more precisely formulated and 
can serve as valid indicators of intentions. Israel's leaders, especially those 
who had participated in the formulation of the casus belli, could draw on 
these strategic arguments to assess the significance of relevant information 
and revise their estimates of their adversary's intent. The more complete 
and coherent the strategic argument, the more helpful in subsequent 
information-processing. 
The formulation of deterrent threats and the design of defensive options 
can have considerable impact on the search for and evaluation of options. 
If leaders are committed to a specific response, the boundaries of the 
problem for decision are narrowed as alternatives are foreclosed. Options 
have been identified, considered, costed, and formulated as programs. 
Generally speaking, commitment to a specific course of action is not usual, 
especially when more than one option promises to produce the desired 
consequences. If the modalities of the threatened retaliation remain 
flexible, the range of options leaders can identify and evaluate increases. It 
is when commitments to respond are flexible that the quality of strategic 
arguments which examine defensive options is particularly important. 
Israel's concept of defense was unambiguous in its recommendation of 
mobilization as an initial response to imminent deterrence failure. The 
small size of the standing army makes imperative a call-up of some reserve 
forces if any further defensive action is anticipated. The logic of a militia 
system was so obvious that analysis was standardized over time to serve as 
a surrogate program for choice. The pronounced risk-aversity of strategic 
doctrine virtually made mobilization an automatic choice. 
This logic is flawed, however, by the failure to distinguish partial from 
large-scale mobilization and to assess their respective contribution to 
deterrence and defense. Nor are different degrees of warning or different 
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casus belli matched to appropriate levels of mobilization. Strategic 
concepts do not differentiate those conditions which would justify large-
scale call-ups from those where partial mobilization would be an appro­
priate response. The omissions are especially unfortunate when a militia 
system makes mobilization important and a small economy makes 
mobilization expensive. 
The treatment of the defensive options which follow mobilization is 
much stronger. Strategic concepts examine the relevant environmental 
constraints and highlight an option of preemption if an attack seems 
imminent. The emphasis on preemption is so overwhelming that search for 
additional options is likely to be limited; the quality of the logic reduces the 
imperative to engage in extensive search for a range of alternatives. 
Analytic search is as likely to be constrained by the logical quality of 
prevailing strategic argument as by defective cognitive processes. 
Strategic concepts also list additional factors which decisionmakers 
should consider in evaluating an appropriate response to an imminent 
failure of deterrence. Two important considerations are the likelihood of 
military intervention by a great power on behalf of an adversary and the 
probability of great power support to deter such intervention and supply 
necessary military equipment. These factors tap the two values of 
international political support and military security. Strategic doctrine 
also emphasizes the value of human resources when it stresses the 
importance of preemption and surprise in reducing the number of civilian 
and military casualties. When urging the transfer of combat to the territory 
of an adversary, military planners stress the unacceptably high cost in 
human life of combat within the borders of Israel. 
Some of these factors may favor preemption while others constrain its 
choice and encourage the identification and evaluation of other options. A 
decisional dilemma of considerable value complexity is created. Neither 
the concept of deterrence nor that of defense establishes procedures for the 
ranking of competing dimensions; their relative weight is not considered, 
but the strong emphasis on cost predisposes a focus on loss. The 
enumeration of multiple factors for consideration decreases the likelihood 
that decisionmakers will ignore competing dimensions of value. Because 
strategic concepts highlight multiple dimensions of value and the 
complexities of choice, leaders who draw on these arguments are less likely 
to deny value complexity. Approximation to analytic evaluation is 
encouraged by the inclusiveness of available strategic logic. 
Even though the argument for preemption is strong, the general 
consideration of defensive options is not sufficiently differentiated. 
Strategic concepts do not relate different kinds of responses to the different 
casus belli and do not detail the required capabilities. While preemption 
may be the appropriate response to imminent attack or militarization of 
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the West Bank, a concentration of troops along the borders or a blockade 
of the Straits may require different kinds of responses. The design of a 
graduated series of responses is important also if a piecemeal challenge to 
deterrence is plausible. Just as strategic arguments failed to distinguish and 
link levels of mobilization to different kinds of challenges, so they are silent 
on the relationship between the objects of deterrence and the appropriate 
retaliatory response. These omissions are not trivial. 
Strategic concepts provide no explicit decision rule for policymakers. 
Although they examine complex constraints, they establish no procedures 
to weigh competing factors. Because more than one option—preempt or 
wait for great power support—can be deduced from prevailing strategic 
assumptions, they alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation of the 
decision leaders make; a full explanation of choice must go beyond 
strategic logic to the processes decisionmakers use. This inclusion of 
factors which pull in opposite directions, however, is an asset rather than a 
liability to leaders who work in a complex environment. Because it mirrors 
the difficulties of decision, completeness in argument is a help rather than a 
hindrance. 
Even if leaders must develop their own decision rule, the pervasive 
emphasis in strategic argument on the narrow margin of security and the 
unacceptably high cost of absorbing a first strike suggests a precept of 
considerable risk-aversity. This focus on loss is likely to lead decision-
makers to emphasize cost to correct for the aversion to risk. If Israel's 
leaders do not choose on the basis of the worst case, they will give it 
considerable attention. 
This review of strategic logic before 1967 suggests that its quality is likely 
to have considerable impact in shaping the process and rationality of 
choice. A number of preliminary conclusions suggest themselves. First, if 
leaders use strategic arguments as the relevant set of decisional premises, 
they are not likely to follow an exclusively cognitive path to choice. Both 
because concepts are complex and because more than one option can be 
deduced from these premises, strategic concepts are a necessary but not 
sufficient component in the explanation of decisions. Second, because 
strategic arguments are not perfectly complete or coherent, cognitive-
cybernetic paths to choice are precluded in all but the single case of some 
level of mobilization as a first-order response to challenge. Strategic 
arguments do not provide the programs. 
Third, insofar as strategic arguments are complete, they reduce the 
constraints to analytic performance. Particularly in the tasks of estimation, 
revision, and evaluation, strategic concepts can be of considerable 
assistance by highlighting factors for the attention of policymakers. The 
usual cognitive shortcuts of denial and discounting become more dfficult 
when discrepant information and value conflict are made salient. Strategic 
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arguments neither explore nor ignore the dimensions of complexity: 
because value conflict is not explored, evaluation is necessary, and because 
complexity is not ignored, analytic evaluation is easier. The completeness 
that does exist within prevailing strategic arguments promotes some 
variant of a cognitive-analytic path to choice. 
Fourth, the areas of incompleteness and incoherence within strategic 
arguments are not trivial in their consequences. The logic is flawed on 
issues central to the argument: incomplete valuation of interests; failure to 
consider explicitly interconnectedness among interests; some ambiguity in 
designation of objects of deterrence; and incomplete and only partially 
coherent examination of relationships between warning and response and 
challenge and defense. If the best insurance against defective decision-
making is the quality of assumptions leaders begin with, importantflaws in 
strategic logic are likely to impose severe constraints to rationality. In May 
of 1967, Egypt challenged deterrence and forced Israel's decisionmakers to 
reconsider the logic of their concepts of deterrence and defense. The next 
three chapters examine the quality of their argument and inference on their 
path to choice. 
chapter «J 
The Decision to Mobilize 
Introduction 
In the first week of May 1967, violence on the Syrian-Israel border 
increased sharply. Tension between the two states was not unusual, but, in 
early April, a routine incident had exploded into major violence. As they 
had done many times before, farmers in the north of Israel sent their 
tractors to work the agricultural land in the contested demilitarized zone. 
Syria responded by shelling Israel's agricultural settlements in the valley 
and, as the firing increased, Syria's and Israel's air forces engaged in a 
major air battle. Six Syrian MIGs were shot down in the course of combat, 
and Israel's planes pursued Syrianfighters toward Damascus (MER, 1967: 
176-177). Renewed shelling of the border area and agricultural settlements 
and a sharp increase in the mining of roads within Israel in late April and 
early May further escalated the tension between Israel and Syria. 
Israel's decisionmakers, in a series of public statements, attempted to 
deter further Syrian harassment along the border. When it became clear 
that a strategy of deterrence was not succeeding, policymakers shifted to 
one of compellence. On 7 May, Israel's cabinet decided to launch a limited 
retaliatory raid to compel Syria to reduce its support of cross-border raids.1 
I. Israel's intentions toward Syria in the early part of May have been the subject of 
extensive controversy. Egypt claimed in May and June of 1967 and later that Israel intended 
to launch a major invasion of Syria to overthrow the regime. In a series of speeches and in a 
memorandum he circulated at the end of May, 1967 to all countries who maintained 
diplomatic relations with Egypt, President Nasser stated that he had received intelligence 
information from the Soviet Union reporting that Israel had concentrated thirteen brigades 
on the border in preparation for an attack planned for 17 May (Nasser, 1967a). The 
memorandum alleged that the plot had been exposed on 14 May when the Sixth Fleet was on 
maneuvers in the Mediterranean (cited by Eban, 1977:382). These allegations were widely 
reported and repeated in the Soviet press and by Soviet decisionmakers. The evidence, 
however, is somewhat more contradictory and difficult to interpret. Israel's chief of staff, while 
denying that Israel intended such action, subsequently interpreted Egyptian behavior as a 
response to its inaccurate perception that Israel intended some such action (Rabin, 1967b). 
Foreign Minister Eban subsequently explained the strategy of his government: "[Israel] 
would reinforce defensive remedies on its own soil by minefields and barbed wire, and it would 
interpose a stage of verbal warnings to Syria before any military action was approved. Only if 
all this failed and violence had to be met by force would its response come into effect. Even 
then, it would be swift and of local scope, falling short of a general confrontation and leaving 
the existing borders intact" (1973b: 196-197). Eban's account, though after the fact, is 
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From 9 to 13 May, several senior officials—Prime Minister Eshkol who 
also held the portfolio of minister of defence, Foreign Minister Eban, 
Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Gideon Rafael, and a high-
ranking military officer—all issued public warnings of the grave 
consequences should the border incidents continue. 
During this period, the Soviet Union reported both directly and 
indirectly to Egypt that Israel was concentrating large forces near the 
Syrian border in preparation for a massive attack and urged Egypt to take 
appropriate measures both to deter and to defend. On 13 May, President 
Podgorny repeated these warnings in his discussions with Anwar el-Sadat 
who was visiting Moscow and promised assistance to Syria and Egypt 
should Israel attack (Heikal, 1973). Sadat recalled: 
I was seen off at Moscow airport by Mr. Semenov, the Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister who was accompanied by the Speaker of the Soviet Parliament. 
They told me specifically that ten Israeli brigades had been concentrated on 
the Syrian border. When I arrived back in Cairo, I realized that the Soviet Union 
had informed Nasser of this (1977:171-172). 
The Soviet foreign minister added a further intelligence detail that Israel 
might attack between 16 and 22 May (Dayan, 1976:246-247 and Eban, 
1977:318). The next day, at 1430 hours Cairo time, the Egyptian army was 
put on a full state of alert, the head of the reserve administration was 
ordered to mobilize men and equipment, and army units stationed along 
the Canal crossed and began to move into Sinai. The Egyptian chief of 
staff, General Fawzi, flew to Damascus to coordinate military action. 
On that same afternoon of 14 May, General Rabin, Israel's chief of staff, 
was informed by the director of Military Intelligence, General Aharon 
Yariv, that the Egyptian army had been placed on full alert and that some 
units had crossed into Sinai to join Egyptian forces normally deployed in 
the desert. At 0930 hours the following morning, immediately before a 
military parade in celebration of Israel's Independence Day, General 
Rabin informed the prime minister of Egyptian troop movements. 
This information on Egyptian troop movements was the stimulus to 
consistent with the strategy of compellence practiced by Israel since the early 1950s. The
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scope of this study; any definitive interpretation of Israel's intentions must await the opening

of cabinet papers. What is certain—and immediately relevant—is that the Soviet Union

warned Egypt that Israel intended to initiate a major action against Syria.
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decisional activity by the responsible civilian and military decisionmakers 
in Israel. To process this information, they drew on a series of assumptions 
or hypotheses which were developed from prevailing strategic concepts and 
incorporated indicators of capability and intent (Table 5.1). Policymakers 
used these arguments, individually and cumulatively, to interpret 
ambiguous data and predict the probability of an Egyptian attack. These 
estimates of Egyptian intent and capabilities affected their evaluation of 
policy options and their choices to deter and defend. 
TABLE 5.1 
EXPLANATIONS OF LIKELY EGYPTIAN BEHAVIOR 
Probable Behavior Hypothesis or Explanation 
Hi No Attack Capability argument; Egyptian capabilities 
were inadequate as long as Egyptian troops 
were committed in Yemen. 
H2 Attack Egyptian capabilities adequate; forces can be 
transferred easily from Yemen. 
H, No Attack Intent argument; Egypt bluffing to deter a 
reprisal by Israel against Syria; troop movements 
are diversionary. 
H< Attack Troop movements are preparations for 
attack. 
H5 No Attack Capability argument; concentration of 
Egyptian forces in the Sinai inadequate to 
attack. 
H6 Attack Forces in the Sinai adequate for Egyptian 
strike. 
H7 No Attack Capability and intent argument; Egypt deterred 
by Israel. 
H8 Attack Egypt undeterred in the face of weakened 
deterrent posture of Israel. 
H9 No Attack Capability argument; Arab allies not 
sufficiently united to permit a successful 
attack on several fronts. 
Attack Arab unity sufficient to permit a multi-front 
attack. 
16 May: The Decision to Mobilize Partially 
Israel's decisionmakers did not expect President Nasser to come to the 
assistance of Syria. Military Intelligence estimated that Egypt would not be 
prepared tofight a major war until, at the earliest, 1970(Hi; Eshkol, 1967b 
and Yariv, 1974).3 Egyptian forces were heavily committed in the civil 
3. In a speech to the Knesset in the fall of 1968, Eshkol expressed his long-standing 
skepticism of the forecast by M ilitary Intelligence that Egypt would not be prepared tofighta 
major war for two or three years: "The experience of the Six Day War has shown that the 
concept of deterrence is a relative one. As you may remember, it was the general view in 
1967 not only here but among experts abroad that no Egyptian assault was to be expected 
before 1970" (1968a). Earlier, he had used more colorful language to describe the intelligence 
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war in Yemen, and intelligence analysts argued that present Egyptian 
capabilities were inadequate for a serious offensive (Eshkol, 1967b). The 
prevailing assumption was that Egyptian capabilities constrained their 
intent. Moreover, military analysts suggested, President Nasser was 
sensitive to the risk of escalation through miscalculation. Unprepared for a 
large-scale offensive, he did not wish to be "dragged" into such a conflict 
through escalation from local violence ("Mizrahan," 19674). 
Although Israel's decisionmakers were surprised, they were not threat­
ened. Confronted by discrepant information, they quickly revised their 
assumption that Egypt would remain aloof from the escalating conflict 
between Syria and Israel and interpreted the Egyptian troop movements as 
limited and diversionary rather than as preparation for a major attack (H3). 
The chief of staff subsequently recapitulated the prevailing interpretation 
of Egyptian intent: "In this phase, the Egyptians wanted to deter Israel, to 
demonstrate the deterrence of Israel before Syria and not to initiate or 
create conditions that would lead to war" (1967b). To support his inference 
of Egyptian intent to deter, Rabin suggested that Egyptian decisionmakers 
were drawing an analogy to 1960 when Egyptian forces deployed, Israel's 
forces responded with a limited mobilization, and both sides withdrew. 
President Nasser could claim that Israel had been successfully deterred 
from attacking Syria in 1960 and would be deterred again in 1967 (Rabin, 
1967b). The chief of staff assumed that his Egyptian counterparts were 
drawing an analogy to 1960 and that they expected Israel to know that 
Egypt was doing so; deterrence rested on the regress of expectations.5 
Decisionmakers argued not only that intent was limited, but also that 
capabilities were inadequate (H5). As General Gavish, the commander of 
the southern front, later recalled: 
On the afternoon of the 15th I received a call in Beersheva from the Chief of 
Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, who told me it seems a movement of Egyptian units into 
Sinai had begun. He said that it was unclear what the aims of the Egyptians are, 
but it does not seem serious. I estimated that as long as there are one-and­
a-half Egyptian divisions in Sinai, the matter is not serious. This is not a force 
that can attack the State of Israel. A state that has lost in two wars, in 1948 and 
1956, would not go to war with such a small force (1970). 
From limited capabilities, Gavish inferred that an attack was unlikely. 
Despite considerable uncertainty about the "aims" of Egyptian decision-
forecast: "We knew about Egypt's economic difficulties, about the Egyptian army being tied 
down in Yemen. The calculations of all the great luminaries as well as of the lesser military 
lights were—Nasser will not fight before 1970, maybe not even during the first years after 
1970" (1967b). 
4. Colonel "Mizrahan" was a pseudonym for an official analyst of the Israel Defense 
Forces. In Hebrew, the term means "Orientalist." 
5. Rabin's assumption appears to have been correct. President Nasser did consider that 
Israel's decisionmakers would recall the analogy of Operation Rotem in I960 and so interpret 
his intentions (Heikal, 1973). 
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makers, the General Staff and Military Intelligence estimated the 
probability of attack as low. 
The prime minister nevertheless considered the information sufficiently 
important to warrant an unscheduled meeting at his home with Foreign 
Minister Eban and Ya'acov Herzog, director-general of the prime 
minister's office. Officials also attempted to reduce the chance of 
unintended escalation through miscalculation. The foreign minister 
instructed Israel's ambassador to the United Nations to assure Egypt and 
Syria, through the secretary-general, that Israel had no intention of 
initiating conflict in any sector. This was not the first attempt to reduce the 
likelihood of escalation through miscalculation. Four days earlier, the 
director-general of the Foreign Ministry, A. Levavi, had called the 
attention of the Soviet ambassador to the escalating violence on Israel's 
northern border. When Ambassador Chuvakin had countered that Israel 
was concentrating troops on the Syrian frontier, he was invited personally 
to inspect the front. As he had done several times before, the ambassador 
declined the invitation. 
Consultations between Eshkol and the military command continued 
throughout the day into the evening. Decisionmakers considered not only 
unintended escalation but also the requirements of defense. During the 
day, the prime minister approved Rabin's instructions to General Gavish in 
the south to reinforce the front with additional armored units. Available 
forces were very thin since only one battalion and several dozen tanks were 
on duty (Gavish, 1970 and Rabin, 1979:68). At an evening meeting, al­
though there was no change in the intelligence evaluation, the prime 
minister, the chief of staff, and the chief of operations agreed on the ne­
cessity to alert the regular army and transfer units to the south. An alert 
and transfer of regular forces were fairly routine operations which were 
part of standard military programs. To be on "the safe side," decision-
makers followed routine procedures to choose the first and most obvious 
step in a series of options (Weizman, 1973). Searching by analogy, they 
evaluated and chose through programmed procedures. 
On 16 May, Military Intelligence reported that Egypt had moved 30,000 
troops, 200 tanks, and a large number of planes to reinforce the troops 
already deployed in Sinai. Rabin presided over an early morning meeting 
at General Staff Headquarters where military decisionmakers discussed the 
possibility of mobilization. The prime minister reported the continuing 
troop deployments to his colleagues at the regular cabinet meeting later 
that day at 1600 hours. Eshkol interpreted Egyptian intent as deterrent 
rather than offensive, and Eban noted that this interpretation was 
consistent with that of Washington and London. The military and 
diplomatic consensus was that Egypt's president was engaging in 
diplomatic maneuvers rather than in preparations for a general attack (H3). 
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Their low estimate of the probability of attack was based not only on 
analogy to 1960 but also on an evaluation of military capabilities. Military 
decisionmakers argued that, as long as Egyptian forces were heavily 
committed in the Yemen, President Nasser did not have the capacity to 
attack (Hi). Capability indicators converged with a hypothesis of bluff to 
support the estimate of Egyptian intent. 
Despite the low probability of attack, decisionmakers emphasized the 
risk of unanticipated escalation—"There was always the danger of an 
unexpected deterioration of the situation" (Eshkol, 1967d). The prime 
minister subsequently explained his predisposition to caution: 
When I was told that according to every sign, war will not break out within a 
year, or within two years, I used to say: "Wherefrom this certainty?" I used to 
say: "This depends to a considerable extent on one man —a dictator who can 
decide this matter" (1967c). 
This emphasis on a low probability but high cost contingency is consistent 
with the risk-aversity of Israel's strategic doctrine in the first phase. The 
cabinet therefore approved the precautionary measures that had been 
instituted by the prime minister and the chief of staff and authorized 
additional measures should they be necessary. In the evening, after 
additional information on continuing Egyptian troop movements, Eshkol, 
on the advice of Rabin, decided to mobilize a reserve regiment of armor as 
well as some artillery (Rabin, 1979:69). 
The Rationality of the Process 
The choice of partial mobilization can best be explained by a 
combination of cognitive and cybernetic processes (Table 5.2). Prime 
Minister Eshkol and his military advisers used prototypical cognitive 
processes of diagnosis and search to define their decisional problem and 
identify a policy option. Working by analogy, military officers drew an 
explicit comparison with Operation Rotem in 1960: indeed, on 16 May, the 
army spokesman briefed military correspondents about the precedent 
series of deployments and withdrawals (Weizman, 1971 and 1976:209 and 
Eban, 1967 and 1977:323).6 Their earlier experience highlighted the 
obvious policy option of a partial mobilization of reserves. Search ended 
with the identification of an alternative closely tied to existing programs. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Eshkol or the General Staff engaged in 
6. Eban writes in his autobiography that on 16 May the military spokesman of the I.D.F. 
briefed military correspondents on the precedent of 1960 "when Egyptian troops had 
advanced across Sinai to the Israeli border in demonstrative solidarity with Syria, only to be 
withdrawn a few weeks later." The foreign minister has a rather particular understanding of 
the prevalent hypothesis of deterrent or "diversionary" maneuvers: "The prevalent view of 
military men everywhere seemed to be that Egypt hoped the presence of her forces would give 
Syria a greater sense of security for the dispatch of guerrilla raiders into Israel" (1977:323). 
The more generally accepted explanation was that Egypt was attempting to deter a reprisal by 
Israel against Syria. 
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further search for additional options. On the contrary, General Weizman, 
the chief of operations during this period, recalls that "We didn't even 
consider calling up a significant number of reservists" (1976:209). 
Analogical reasoning established the contours of the decisional problem 
and the obvious remedy. 
TABLE 5.2 
16 MAY: A COGNITIVE-CYBERNETIC PATH TO CHOICE 
(Path 2) 
STIMULUS: Movement of Egyptian troops across the Canal into the Sinai. 
SEARCH: By analogy to 1960 to define the problem; through available 
strategic concepts to identify the obvious policy option. 
ESTIMATION: By analogy to 1960 and by monitoring selected and prevalidated 
indicators. 
EVALUATION: Reliance on available defensive routines based on risk-aversity. 
CHOICE: A satisfying and incremental choice of partial 
mobilization. 
Estimation of Egyptian intent was the product of both cognitive and 
cybernetic procedures. When senior military officers interpreted Egyptian 
troop movements as an attempt to deter a raid by Israel across the Syrian 
frontier, they drew on analogous experience to infer Egyptian purposes. 
However, they also tracked a limited number of environmental indicators 
to estimate the probability of attack and reduce uncertainty. Weizman 
summarized the monitoring of these prespecified indicators: 
We were sure that there was very little likelihood of hostilities. Together 
we reviewed the Egyptian steps that would be regarded by Israel as a casus belli: 
a blockade of the Straits or forces of a certain size entering Sinai (1976:209). 
When available indicators showed no change, members of the General 
Staff considered the low estimate of the probability of attack as valid and 
moved to the routine consideration and recommendation of an ap­
propriate response. 
To select the appropriate response, Eshkol and his advisers used 
cybernetic processes of evaluation and choice. Those who participated in 
the informal meetings during the two days preceding the partial 
mobilization recall the routine and programmed procedures of choice. 
General Weizman remembers that: 
Rabin called me aside and said: "Move such-and-such forces, just in case there's 
any trouble." A typical routine move, dictated by basic prudence, but resting on 
the assumption that there wouldn't be any trouble (1976:209, emphasis added). 
Throughout this period, the prime minister and those he consulted relied 
on standard programs which incorporated prior evaluation and analysis to 
recommend the prudent choice. The logic they used was developed earlier 
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and considered and refined over time. There is no evidence that they went 
beyond existing programs to consider systematically any additional 
consequences of the one option they did identify. They do not appear to 
have discussed, for example, the likelihood that partial mobilization would 
itself contribute to unintended escalation. Rather, participants in the 
discussion emphasized that the choice was routine, precautionary, and 
primarily defensive. The first response to Egyptian troop movements was a 
conservative and satisficing choice. 
As a first cut at a problem, the use of a mixture of cognitive and 
cybernetic procedures is not difficult to explain. Since neither the prime 
minister nor the General Staff perceived a serious threat or a deadline,7 
there was little incentive to use demanding procedures; under such 
circumstances, the use of ordinary rather than extraordinary processes is to 
be expected. In this case, the stimulus to decision—the Egyptian troop 
movements of 14 May—though unexpected, had been the object of prior 
consideration, and precedent experience was analyzed and incorporated 
within existing programs. When threat and time pressure are low and 
programs anticipate a stimulus to decision, some variant of a cybernetic 
choice is likely. 
The prime minister, in informal and constant consultation with the chief 
of staff, also drew on analogous experience to diagnose the problem for 
decision. To reduce uncertainty, military officers in particular both 
monitored changes in Egyptian military deployment and also used 
indicators drawn from strategic concepts to validate their estimate of 
Egyptian intentions. Prevailing concepts of defense made salient an initial 
option of mobilization which minimized risk in an inhospitable strategic 
environment. Eshkol and those he consulted relied on standard programs 
to recommend a conservative choice. Partial mobilization was risk-averse 
and prudent: it was not linked immediately to further action, and it 
permitted a period of further evaluation of the likelihood of deterrence 
failure; at the same time, it compensated for Israel's lack of strategic depth 
and narrow margin of security. An incremental and conservative choice is 
the expected outcome of a cybernetic process shaped by risk-averse 
strategic concepts. 
19 May: The Decision to Mobilize on a Large Scale 
After the prime minister and the chief of staff ordered the mobilization of 
7 An analysis of the level of threat perception by Israel's decisionmakers in the months of 
May and June 1967 finds that level to be low on 15 May. On a scale of -1.0 to +5.0, two 
different measures indicate that the level of threat perception is approximately .02. The same 
study finds the perceived pressure of time to be low; on a scale of .000 to .008, perceived time 
pressure in mid-May is only .002. The investigator expresses high confidence in his measure of 
threat perception but notes that the measure of time pressure may be less valid. He suspects 
that the measure he used, a content analysis of public documents, indexes only the peaks of 
"real" time pressure. See McCormick, 1975:52,33. Eban (1977:321) recalls that during this 
early period, "The scale of these movements created no immediate military threat." 
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a reserve regiment on 16 May, they waited to evaluate its deterrent effect. If 
the analogy to 1960 were apt and the lessons of history were relevant, 
mutual deterrence between Egypt and Israel would prevail, and military 
forces would gradually withdraw. A pause for evaluation, moreover, is 
consistent with cybernetic decision-making; further choices are necessary 
only if the first decision fails to achieve the minimum requirements of 
policymakers. Evidence that this first choice had failed to manage, much 
less solve, the problem was not long in coming. 
That evening, at 2200 hours, Egyptian Brigadier Mukhtar transmitted to 
the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), General 
Rikhye, a letter from Egypt's commander-in-chief, Mahmud Fawzi. In his 
letter, General Fawzi wrote that "for the sake of complete security of all UN 
troops which install OPs [observation posts] along our borders, I request 
that you issue orders to withdraw all these troops immediately."8 Orally, 
Mukhtar added that UN forces must be withdrawn from the El-Sabhaand 
Sharm el-Shaykh posts since Egyptian forces intended to occupy the two 
strategic posts that night. The commander of UNEF explained that he was 
not authorized to comply and cabled the secretary-general for further 
instructions. After very brief consultations, U Thant informed Egypt's 
ambassador to the United Nations that any request for a partial withdrawal 
of UNEF would be considered as a demand for complete withdrawal of UN 
forces from Gaza and Sinai. In the opinion of the secretary-general, Egypt 
was, of course, legally entitled to make such a request.9 The next morning, 
at 0600 hours, Radio Cairo broadcast the text of the Egyptian request for a 
partial withdrawal. 
Even as dipomatic activity intensified, Egypt continued to reinforce its 
military preparedness. By 17 May, two additional divisions had moved into 
Sinai, and high-flying reconnaissance planes had penetrated deeply into 
Israel's air space. One plane in particular had photographed Israel's 
nuclear installation at Dimona. In the past, Israel's decisionmakers had 
declared that any intent to attack these nuclear installations would be 
considered a casus belli. In Damascus, government spokesmen announced 
that Syria's armed forces were now on a full state of alert. 
Throughout the day, Israel's civilian and military decisionmakers met 
formally and informally to consider Egypt's request for the partial 
withdrawal of UNEF and the continuing troop deployments. At an eleven 
o'clock cabinet meeting that morning Intelligence still estimated the 
probability of an attack as low. Only one infantry division with armored 
X. The text of the Egyptian request is included in the Report of the Secretary-General on 
Withdrawal of the Emergency Force, 26 June 1967, United Nations Document A/6730/Add 
3. Published in the United Nations Monthly Chronicle IV, 7. 135-161, citation from p. 136. 
The report also includes the oral request from Brigadier Mukhtar. 
9. The text of U Thant's reply to Egypt can be found in his 26 June 1967 report. The 
secretary-general also informed the General Assembly on 18 May 1967. See United Nations 
Document A/6730. 
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support in the rear had been deployed against the Negev border, and 
military decisionmakers did not consider such a deployment as a 
"concentration" of forces (H5). Using an indicator of limited capabilities, 
they inferred a low probability of attack (Eban, 1977:323). Senior officers 
nevertheless considered it necessary to strengthen Israel's weak deterrent 
and defensive posture in the south. They estimated that they required a 
period "not to be measured in a few days" to complete military 
preparations along the border (Eban, 1977:324). The chief of staff 
suggested that Israel request a meeting of the Security Council to provide 
additional time for the necessary defensive deployment. 
After consulting his staff in New York and evaluating the consequences 
of this option, Eban rejected Rabin's proposal. The foreign minister 
reasoned that a request for a Security Council debate could weaken 
deterrence. Should the Soviet Union veto Israel's request, a likely 
contingency given its support of Egypt, the ensuing political defeat could 
provide considerable diplomatic benefit and "vast encouragement" to 
President Nasser (Eban, 1977:324). Even more important, a request for a 
Security Council meeting would signal to Egypt a reduction, no matter 
how temporary, of Israel's intention to resist; it would decrease the 
credibility of Israel's commitment to retaliate. As long as debate within the 
council continued, Israel would be unable to choose retaliatory action, and 
it was difficult to estimate the length of Security Council discussion: "I 
knew from long experience that it was easier to turn on the tap of United 
Nations debate than to turn it off' (Eban, 1977:324). Although additional 
time would be gained, the cost to deterrence compromised the benefit to 
defense. As an alternative, Eban proposed that Israel's ambassador to the 
United Nations suggest an immediate visit by U Thant to Cairo and 
Jerusalem. Should the secretary-general arrange his departure while 
UNEF forces were still at their observation posts, President Nasser might 
refrain from further escalation until U Thant's arrival in Cairo. This option 
would provide the time needed for defense, would not weaken deterrence, 
and might reduce the likelihood of further escalation. Ambassador Rafael 
proposed such a visit to friendly delegations in New York. 
When formal cabinet and Knesset committee meetings ended, informal 
consultations among civilian and military decisionmakers continued for 
several hours. The prime minister met with Eban and Galili of the cabinet, 
Generals Rabin and Weizman of the General Staff, Director of Military 
Intelligence Yariv, and other officials from the prime minister's office and 
the Foreign Office. At a late evening meeting, reacting to a flow of 
information on continuing Egyptian troop deployments, Eshkol and 
Rabin decided to mobilize additional military reserves. Although their 
choice was the next step in a programmed series, the relevance of this set of 
routines was diminishing as the pace of Egyptian diplomatic and military 
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activity increased. Already Rabin and Eban had extended their search and 
evaluation of options beyond available programs in an effort to reinforce 
deterrence, strengthen defense, and reduce escalation. Because Israel's 
decisionmakers still considered it possible, however, that some UNEF 
forces would remain in place, they continued to draw on those programs 
designed around the presence of buffer forces and chose the prescribed 
precautionary measures to increase incrementally their level of military 
preparedness. 
Early on the morning of 18 May, Eshkol and Rabin were joined by Eban, 
Amit, the head of Ha-Mossad, Israel's counterintelligence, the director of 
Military Intelligence, and other members of the General Staff to discuss the 
daily intelligence report. Although the probability of attack was still 
considered low, there were changes in Egyptian military capabilities. 
Operational activity at air bases in north and central Sinai had intensified, 
and Egypt announced that its missile bases were in a state of alert with its 
missiles ready to be fired at the first sign of movement by Israel (Yonah, 
1968:78).10 On the other hand, the Fourth Armored Division, Egypt's most 
effective striking force, was still positioned on the west bank of the Canal. 
Syria announced that the mobilization of its reserve forces was now 
complete. The prime minister approved further mobilization of reserve 
units, an accelerated delivery of military supplies, and an increase in civil 
defense preparedness. 
M ore important, news of the decision of Egypt's president to demand the 
formal termination of UNEF in Gaza and Sinai reached Israel's 
decisionmakers during the day. The optimistic evaluation that any further 
escalation might be prevented disappeared; as the foreign minister recalls, 
"all lenient prediction collapsed" (Eban, 1977:324). An immediate visit by 
the secretary-general to Cairo was aborted by President Nasser and 
surpassed by events. The president had explicitly requested that U Thant 
await a formal invitation although it was already apparent that the 
secretary-general could not forestall an Egyptian request for the complete 
withdrawal of the peace-keeping force. Alarmed by the report that the 
secretary-general was about to order the withdrawal of UNEF in 
compliance with the Egyptian request,11 Eshkol and Rabin met later that 
evening to review ongoing military and diplomatic developments. It was 
only when the withdrawal of UNEF became likely that both decision­
10. "Major Yonah" was a pseudonym for a high-ranking military officer writing in the 
army journal Ma'arachot of the daily reports of information from Arab countries. 
Presumably, he relies heavily on data gathered by Military Intelligence. 
M. By this time, U Thant had already agreed to the withdrawal of United Nations forces.
Considerable confusion existed at UN headquarters in New York, however, and Eshkol and
Rabin did not receive definitive information until the following morning, Israel time, which
was six hours ahead of New York time. Throughout this examination of Israel's decision
process, time refers to local Israel time. 
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makers considered seriously the possibility of an Egyptian attack (Bar-
Zohar, 1970:46 and Rabin, 1979:70-71). 
The more salient consequences of a choice to retaliate became apparent 
even as the likelihood of deterrence failure grew. During the day, Eskhol 
received his first message from President Johnson following the cycle of 
troop deployments by Egypt and partial mobilizations by Israel. Though 
the president principally addressed the by-now less relevant issue of tension 
along the Syrian border, he did warn that "I cannot accept any 
responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as 
the result of actions on which we are not consulted" (cited by Eban, 
1977:329). The complexity of the decisional problem was obvious: an 
immediate choice to retaliate, even if deterrence failure appeared 
imminent, would not meet with American approval. In his reply to the 
president that same day, the prime minister held Syria responsible for the 
escalating tension and insisted that Egyptian forces must be withdrawn. 
Even more significantly, hoping to forestall further Soviet involvement, 
Eshkol asked President Johnson to reaffirm publicly the American 
commitment to the security of Israel and to inform the Soviet Union of this 
commitment (Quandt, 1977:40,41).12 Implicitly acknowledging the limits 
of Israel's capacity to deter, the prime minister attempted to draw upon the 
global resources of the United States. This would not be the last time 
Israel's prime minister would seek a public commitment to reinforce 
deterrence. 
By 19 May, Israel's estimate of the likelihood of an attack had begun to 
change. General Yariv presented the daily intelligence report to Eshkol and 
Rabin at a 0930 meeting. United Nations forces had withdrawn, and Sharm 
el-Shaykh was now occupied by Egyptian forces while units of the 
Palestine Liberation Army were stationed along the Gaza border. Egyptian 
military capability was increasing rapidly: 70,000 soldiers and 600 tanks 
were now deployed in Sinai. Even more important, infantry from Yemen 
had been recalled in secrecy to Egypt.13 The intelligence forecast that Egypt 
would not be ready to fight a major war until 1970 had been based in large 
part on the continued involvement of a significant proportion of the 
Egyptian army—some 60,000 to 70,000 men—in Yemen (H i). The transfer 
of troops indexed both an increase in Egyptian capabilities and a change in 
12. Quandt (1977) is the only source which cites this request for a public commitment by 
the United States. As a deputy to Harold H. Saunders in the Middle East Office of the 
National Security Council from 1972 to 1974, Quandt had extraordinarily good access to 
relevant American documentary material. 
13. Some confusion exists about intelligence information on the Egyptian transfer of 
troops from Yemen. Burdett (1969:236) reports that Military Intelligence discovered the 
secret transfer of one infantry brigade and two armored battalions from Yemen. A senior 
officer of Military Intelligence recalls an explicit report that only infantry were recalled from 
Yemen; moreover, they were not deployed east of the Suez Canal (Interview, Military 
Intelligence). His evidence is consistent with that of Heikal (1973) who writes that sizable 
units, with armor, were moved from Yemen only at the end of May. 
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Egyptian intent. Military and civilian leaders were nevertheless uncertain 
of Egypt's purposes. In his assessment, General Yariv suggested that Egypt 
would continue its military preparations as a prelude to choice among four 
options: no further action accompanied by a claim that it had deterred 
Israel from attacking Syria; a strategy of provocation to force Israel to 
strike; an immediate surprise attack; or a long period of tension 
culminating in a surprise attack (Rabin, 1979:71). 
The seriousness with which Israel's decisionmakers viewed the rapidly 
increasing troop deployment is underscored by Eban's conversation later 
that morning with Soviet Ambassador Chuvakin. The foreign minister 
made explicit the relative weight attached to changes in military capability: 
I emphasized that facts are more important than rhetorical declarations. The 
bombardment of Manara, the mining of the road to Rosh Pina, the vast 
concentrations of Egyptian troops in Sinai were facts which must be considered 
to be far more serious than any speeches. If our neighbors would only make 
speeches without accompanying them by such acts, the position would be less 
dangerous (1977:325). 
Eban emphasized particularly the heavy concentration of Egyptian troops 
which were now deployed in the desert. 
The prime minister and the chief of staff considered two alternatives: to 
mobilize a large number of reserves immediately and begin planning for 
preemptive military action, or to refrain from large-scale mobilization and 
continue with previous plans for a limited deployment of forces along the 
border for localized defense. A strategy of localized defense was less 
consistent with the changing evaluation of Egyptian intent. Large numbers 
of troops were now concentrated in Sinai, and a blockade of the Straits of 
Tiran was considered possible though not probable.14 Adequate as a 
response if Egyptian purposes were deterrent, activation of further reserves 
was inadequate if Egyptian intentions were offensive. By 19 May, Eshkol 
and Rabin no longer accepted the argument that Egyptian objectives were 
"diversionary" or "demonstrative" (H3 to H4). Responding to an estimate 
of a higher probability of attack15 and in close consultation with the 
General Staff, the prime minister chose to mobilize the reserves on a large 
scale and to begin the planning of a preemptive strike into Sinai (Eshkol, 
1967b). 
14. Eban recalls that, as soon as President Nasser requested the withdrawal of UNEF, 
Israel's decisionmakers considered a blockade possible (Eban, 1977:326). Rabin recalls that 
he told the prime minister as early as 18 May that Egypt was "liable" to close the Straits within 
two or three days (Rabin, 1979:70-71). 
15. In a postwar interview, Rabin referred to the increase in his estimate of the probabijity 
of attack: "Although I thought at that stage [15-16 May] that the purpose of the concentration 
was not war as yet, I took into account the possibility that we can plunge into war as a result of 
the concentration. When UNEF evacuated its positions, it seemed to me that war was 
unavoidable" (1967a). The categorical language is partly explained by the post-hoc character 
of the evidence. 
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The Rationality of the Process 
The prime minister and his military advisers shifted from one form of 
constrained rationality to another to make the choice to mobilize on a large 
scale (Table 5.3). When available programs were no longer adequate, 
Eshkol and his senior military officers combined cognitive and analytic 
procedures to process choice. The quality of decisional activity was very 
uneven; at best, the prime minister and those he consulted approximated 
analytic performance in only some of the principal tasks and, even then, 
only partially. 
TABLE 5.3 
19 MAY: A COGNITIVE-ANALYTIC PATH TO CHOICE 
(Path 7) 
STIMULUS: President Nasser requests the withdrawal of UNEF on 
16 May; Egyptian planes overfly Dimona on 17 May; 
Egyptian troops are recalled from Yemen on 19 May. 
SEARCH: Limited; identification of only those options con­
sistent with strategic assumptions. 
ESTIMATION AND Analytic revision of unconditional estimates of the 
REVISION: likelihood of an Egyptian attack with heavy reliance 
on validated capability indicators; cognitive differ­
entiation to exclude conditional estimates of the 
probability of attack. 
EVALUATION: Analytic; acknowledgement of value complexity within 
the constraints established by problem definition. 
CHOICE: Less costly option for defense. 
Military and civilian decisionmakers did extend their search for options 
beyond an ordered series to identify a second alternative and structure a 
dichotomous decision problem: further incremental mobilization of forces 
or a large-scale call-up of reserve units. Both these options could be 
deduced from accepted strategic doctrine which recommended mobiliza­
tion as the immediate response to an unacceptable violation of the status 
quo. Strategic concepts did not discriminate, however, between these two 
alternatives; the logic of the argument was flawed by incomplete analysis. 
Search activity did not continue but stopped when the two options 
consistent with prevailing strategic assumptions had been identified. There 
is no evidence that the prime minister or his military advisers deliberately 
sought to uncover additional alternatives. Neither Eshkol nor Rabin 
appear to have considered making any further response to Egypt's military 
and diplomatic activity, nor did they entertain the option of immediate 
attack as soon as military preparedness would permit. An analytic 
investigation of relevant courses of action would have identified a wider 
range of alternatives. Both civilian and military policymakers appear to 
have drawn on prevailing strategic concepts to diagnose and structure the 
problem for decision. Since the two alternatives were the outputs of 
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constrained search, evaluation and choice between these options were 
circumscribed within the boundaries established by strategic concepts. At 
the very best, leaders could choose efficiently only between the two options 
identified by cognitive processes. 
Strategic assumptions were much less pervasive, however, in the 
processing of incoming information and in the revision of estimates of the 
likelihood of an Egyptian attack. When Israel's leaders were confronted 
with information which challenged the prevailing hypothesis of Military 
Intelligence that President Nasser would be unable to fight a major war 
before 1970, there is no evidence that Eshkol, Rabin, or indeed members of 
the General Staff and intelligence attempted to discount, deny, or avoid to 
manage the inconsistency. On the contrary, when forces were recalled 
secretly and unexpectedly from Yemen, policymakers revised their 
hypothesis (Hi to H2) and updated their estimate of the probability of 
attack. Similarly, military officers quickly revised their initial hypothesis 
that President Nasser was attempting to deter (H3 to H4) as the pace of 
troop deployment into the Sinai increased. This response to discrepant 
data approximates analytic procedures of estimation and revision. 
No one in high office expected either the redeployment of troops or a 
request to withdraw United Nations forces. Foreign Minister Eban, in a 
press conference on 30 May. subsequently expressed the strong sense of 
challenge to prevailing assumptions: 
When there occurs a disturbed situation, it is natural for people to ask 
themselves in a self-critical spirit why they should have been so surprised. There 
are many factors here which could have been and were taken into account, but / 
don't think it is reasonable to think that anybody should have believed or need 
have expected that a request for such a fundamental change in the structure of 
the area would be met with such an uncritical response, without the broad and 
deliberate consultation that should have taken place. Of all the things which 
were unexpected, and that nobody of rational mind could have expected, I 
would say this was the thing least to be anticipated. Of course, at any time the 
Egyptian Government could have requested and secured the withdrawal of 
those forces, but to think that it could secure their withdrawal overnight, 
without any parallel attempt to solve the problems which the presence of the 
forces secured, this was such an irrational thing that everybody in the world 
could be forgiven for not having taken it into account (1967, emphasis added). 
Eban argued that an irrational act by an adversary, compounded by an 
irrational response by an international agency, challenged a rational 
exclusion of such contingencies from consideration. Nevertheless, in 
acknowledging his surprise, he acknowledged miscalculation "in a self-
critical spirit" and moved quickly to revise what had only a few days earlier 
seemed a reasonable hypothesis.16 Responding to an influx of discrepant 
16. Even though Eban made his statement ten days after the choice to mobilize, he offered 
this explanation when the perception of threat and urgency were even higher. Acknowledg­
ment ol misperception under these circumstances is not usual. 
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information within a very short period of time, members of the cabinet, 
who participated actively in the discussion, and military officers showed 
considerableflexibility and a capacity to revise standing estimates. Perhaps 
because the evidence was so strongly discrepant, information-processing 
approximated analytic rather than cognitive procedures more closely. 
Although the prime minister, the foreign minister, and senior military 
advisers approximated analytic revision of the estimated likelihood of 
attack in response to changes in Egypt's capabilities and intention, they 
were considerably less careful in estimating the probability of an Egyptian 
attack as a consequence of their own behavior. In their evaluation of the 
consequences of a large-scale call-up, for example, Eshkol and Rabin 
focused principally on the cost of defense should deterrence fail and paid 
little attention to the likely impact of a large mobilization on deterrence.17 
After 17 May, they increasingly considered the probability of an Egyptian 
attack independent of any deployment of forces by Israel. Had they 
considered the likely impact of mobilization on deterrence, their 
conditional estimate of the probability of attack might have been 
somewhat lower. By considering the likelihood of an Egyptian attack 
separately from their policy options, they assumed independent rather than 
interdependent decision-making. Egyptian decisionmakers, by implica­
tion, were not sensitive to changes in Israel's military capability. 
The General Staff in particular paid little attention to the likely impact of 
mobilization on escalation.18 In ignoring escalation as an outcome of a call-
up of reserves, they avoided a possible conflict among the consequences of 
a large mobilization. Unlike Egypt, which deployed a large standing army, 
Israel could not attack on the ground without mobilizing a large number of 
reserve forces. The paradox, therefore, was unavoidable: as Israel 
increased its capacity to defend against a possible Egyptian attack, it 
simultaneously acquired a capacity to strike. Indeed, strategic doctrine 
considers mobilization for preemption a defensive response to an 
impending attack. The international security dilemma occurs in its most 
acute form when an increase in defense simultaneously and in­
17. In writing about these decisions after the fact, some decisionmakers did place 
considerable emphasis on deterrence. Allon, for example, explains: "Of great importance was 
the swift and practically complete mobilization of the Defence Forces of Israel, for the dual 
purpose of discouraging the enemy attack and of repulsing it, should he move forward" 
(1970:80). Allon was out of the country, however, when this decision was made, and his 
evidence must therefore be treated with great circumspection. 
18. Rabin and Eshkol did consider escalation as a consequence of mobilization, but only 
with respect to Syria. On 18 May, for example, Rabin reported to the prime minister that the 
entire Syrian army was on an emergency footing, but Eshkol agreed to the mobilization of 
only one battalion in Galilee since "any mobilization exceeding our vital needs was likely to 
lead to further escalation, which we were anxious to prevent" (cited by Rabin, 1979:70). In 
explaining the purposes of the large mobilization of reserves directed against Egypt to Ben 
Gurion three days later. Rabin referred only to the requirements of defense: "I recommended 
mobilization to make sure we were ready" (1979:76). 
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distinguishably increases capacity for offense. Neither military officials nor 
civilian decisionmakers confronted this dilemma squarely when con­
sidering the likely consequences of different levels of mobilization. 
It is possible that the prime minister, in consultation with his foreign 
minister, had considered and then ruled out the possibility of Egyptian 
escalation in response to Israel's action. If escalation were excluded as 
irrelevant after careful consideration, then its omission would not distort 
the process of choosing between the two military options. The evidence 
does not support this interpretation. On the contrary, the prime minister 
and his advisers considered escalation through miscalculation a relevant 
possibility, but compartmentalized the problem to manage defense 
through mobilization and escalation through the diplomatic process. 
The same day that Israel chose to mobilize on a large scale, Prime 
Minister Eshkol cabled President de Gaulle of France: 
Israel on her part will not initiate hostile acts, but she isfirmly resolved to defend 
her territory and her international rights. Our decision is that if Egypt will not 
attack us, we will not take action against Egyptian forces at Sharm el-Sheikh— 
until or unless they close the Straits of Tiran to free navigation by Israel (cited by 
Eban, 1977:327). 
In discussions with the Soviet ambassador and in a series of written 
messages to his counterparts in London and Paris, Eban stated explicitly 
that Israel had no intention of attacking should Egypt refrain from further 
provocation (Eban, 1977:325,327). In these indirect signals to Egypt's 
president, Israel's decisionmakers indicated their awareness of possible 
escalation through misinterpretation. 
The prime minister appeared to operate, then, with some inconsistency 
in his assumptions about Egyptian decision-making and behavior. When 
he and his military advisers ignored escalation and deterrence as 
consequences of mobilization, they assumed an independent decision 
process and unconditional Egyptian action. They estimated likely 
Egyptian intent independent of any consideration of the consequences of 
alternative policies available to Israel. Simultaneously, when the prime 
minister sent messages indirectly to President Nasser, he acted as though 
Egyptian decision-making were interdependent and Egypt's action 
conditional on its interpretation of Israel's intent. In attempting to reduce 
the likelihood of escalation and to reinforce deterrence, Eshkol and Eban 
assumed a rational adversary who would appreciate Israel's decisional 
calculus and revise its estimates accordingly. It is difficult to defend the 
logic of simultaneous assumptions of independent and interdependent 
decision-making. By separating consideration of deterrence and escalation 
from evaluation of defense, the prime minister avoided these complexities 
and simplified the decisional problem. 
Even though the prime minister and those whom he consulted did not 
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approximate analytic procedures in their consideration of option and 
consequence, they did not follow prototypical cognitive processes of 
evaluation to structure a single-value decisional problem. The evidence 
suggests something less than a careful calculation of the cost and benefit of 
the consequences of the two options, but Eshkol and his senior military 
advisers did consider more than one value (Table 5.4). While focusing 
principally on military security, military officers in particular paid 
attention to the economic cost of large-scale mobilization. General 
Weizman, the chief of operations, recalls the argument that, if Israel were 
forced to keep large numbers of reservists under arms for any considerable 
length of time, its economy would be severely damaged (1976:213).19 
TABLE 5.4 
PRINCIPAL ESTIMATES OF COST, BENEFIT, AND 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONSEQUENCES OF OPTIONS, 19 MAY 
Mobilize on a Large Scale: Probability of Egyptian attack low but growing 
Economic cost considerable 
Benefit to defense considerable 
Further Partial Mobilization: Probability of Egyptian attack low but growing 
Economic cost negligible 
Cost to defense considerable should deterrence 
fail* 
* Eshkol paid greatest attention to this dimension of value. 
In evaluating the cost and benefit to military security, however, the prime 
minister, working closely with the chief of staff, concentrated 
overwhelmingly on defense. This heavy emphasis on defense flowed 
logically from a failure to specify a wider range of outcomes of partial or 
large-scale mobilization. Omission of deterrence and escalation could 
affect the final outcome of the decisional process very differently. Had the 
prime minister incorporated the obvious benefit to deterrence of a 
substantial increase in Israel's military preparedness, large-scale mobiliza­
tion would have become an even more attractive option. Had he considered 
escalation as a consequence of large-scale mobilization, it is possible that 
the net benefit of large-scale activation of reserve units would have been 
reduced. Choice would not be sensitive to the omission of deterrence, but 
the failure to estimate the likelihood and cost of escalation could seriously 
distort the final decision. 
19. Dayan (1976:251) makes a similar argument. He subsequently wrote: "When 
Egyptian forces began moving into Sinai in mid-May, and four days later mobilization was 
begun of Israeli army reservists, the immediate effect was a partial paralysis of the Israeli 
economy." Israel's decisionmakers have frequently referred to the heavy cost of a prolonged 
mobilization of a large number of reserves. During the early stages of the development of 
I.D.F. strategy, Chief of Staff Yadin argued that the militia system was made necessary by the 
prohibitive economic cost of maintaining large numbers of men under arms. See Chapter 4. 
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The cognitive distortions which occurred in the process of evaluation 
were not precisely the kind anticipated by psychological explanations of 
choice. Eshkol and his military advisers were able to handle the trade-off 
between values. Although they considered cost and benefit in qualitative 
rather than in quantitative terms, they did acknowledge value complexity 
in their examination of the two options. In so doing, they loosely 
approximated analytic procedures of evaluation. They were considerably 
less thorough in their analysis of complexity within rather than between 
dimensions of value. Although they recognized the economic cost of 
improving defense through large-scale mobilization, their evaluation of the 
cost as well as the benefit to military security was less than complete. 
Since neither Eshkol nor his civilian or military advisers have provided 
direct evidence of the decision rule used to make the choice of large-scale 
mobilization, the procedure can only be inferred by elimination rather than 
established with precision. Because the prime minister and members of the 
General Staff considered more than one value and acknowledged the 
conflict between them, they could not make their choice by simplifying and 
avoiding value trade-offs. Single-value calculation also is eliminated as a 
possible decision strategy. Eshkol could have followed a lexicographic 
decision rule to order his values and then used each value in succession to 
discriminate between alternatives. In this case, however, military security 
alone would have discriminated sharply between the two options, and there 
would have been no necessity to consider any additional values. The use of 
a lexicographic strategy would be inconsistent with the evidence that 
military officers especially did emphasize the economic cost of mobiliza­
tion. A weak approximation to analytic procedures, within the framework 
established by constrained search and estimation of limited consequences, 
provides an explanation more consistent with the available evidence. 
Equipped with qualitative estimates of probability and value, Eshkol and 
his senior military advisers attempted to choose intuitively the most 
efficient option. Chapter 9 evaluates the rationality of the choice to 
mobilize. 
To make the choice, the prime minister and those whom he consulted 
closely shifted from a combination of cognitive and cybernetic procedures 
(Path 2) to one of cognitive and analytic processes (Path 7). Neither 
military planners nor civilian decisionmakers had anticipated a request to 
withdraw the United Nations force and had prepared no contingency 
plans.20 No programs could be available to manage what had not been 
considered. Leaders quickly acknowledged their misperception and shifted 
20. The one exception was General Dayan, a former chief of staff and not yeta member of 
this cabinet. On 16 May, on a visit to aT/.ahal (l.D.F.) base with other former chiefs of stall', 
Dayan suggested that "As a first step, he [Nasser] is quite likely to expel the UN force and his 
next step may be an attempt to blockade the sea lanes to F.ilat" (l.au-Lavic, 1968:201). 
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to a process of choice which did include an analytic component. Although 
rationality was constrained in both processes, there are important 
differences between the procedures of 16 and 19 May. That the prime 
minister and his advisers were able even partially to approximate analytic 
performance in making the second choice to mobilize is unexpected. The 
limited improvement that did occur may be explained primarily by 
prevailing perceptions of threat and time and, secondarily, by the quality of 
available strategic logic. The impact of strategic argument, however, was 
uneven: strengths and weaknesses in the logic of the argument were 
reflected in the process of choice. 
Although Eshkol, Eban, and Rabin were surprised by the rapid 
withdrawal of UNEF,21 their perception of threat and time apparently did 
not increase significantly (McCormick, 1975:52,33). Despite some increase 
in the estimated probability of attack, the Foreign Minister still perceived 
time for decision; he considered that the problem might be resolved 
through international diplomacy (Eban, 1977:326). Surprise which is 
unaccompanied by high threat and short decision-time may stimulate 
analytic processing by disrupting inertia and routine procedures. Once 
those who advised the prime minister acknowledged misperception, there 
was additional incentive and opportunity for estimation and evaluation. 
Because civilian and military advisers were surprised but not simultaneous­
ly threatened and pressed for time, it was easier to shift toward even a 
partial approximation of analytic procedures. 
The logic of strategic argument made this transition easier in one critical 
area, but also contributed significantly to the principal distortion in the 
processing of choice. Strategic concepts had identified a series of indicators 
for special attention, and some change in these indicators did occur: a 
concentration of troops along Israel's southern border and an overflight 
and reconnaissance of Israel's nuclear installations at Dimona. Eshkol's 
principal advisers, the foreign minister and the chief of staff, did begin the 
first critical revision of the estimated probability of an Egyptian attack in 
response to this new information. Prime Minister Eshkol considered the 
concentration of forces and particularly the transfer of troops from Yemen 
the most diagnostic indicator of the likelihood of attack; indeed, he 
subsequently explained that it had a decisive impact on his choice to 
mobilize large numbers of reserve forces (1967c). 
Strategic concepts were not fully complete, however, in their listing of 
indicators. Israel's deterrent strategy had not focused directly on the 
withdrawal of the buffer force and, when it occurred, members of the 
21. This was the peak of surprise in the decisional process of 1967 The withdrawal of 
UNEF led decisionmakers to consider the possibility of a blockade of the Straits of Tiran. 
Although its probability was considered low on 19 May, President Nasser's closure of the 
Straits three days later challenged decisionmakers' calculations rather than their perceptions. 
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cabinet and of the General Staff could not draw on strategic doctrine to 
assess its implications for deterrence. To assess the relevance of each 
indicator to the cumulative estimate of the probability of an Egyptian 
attack, moreover, the prime minister and his military advisers had to make 
independent judgments about the relative importance of changes in 
capabilities in comparison to indicators of intent; strategic concepts were 
an incomplete guide to inference. Although strategic doctrine provided 
only a partial guide to the use of indicators, it was useful in provoking the 
initial revision of past judgments. Obstacles to initial revision are 
frequently among the most difficult to overcome. 
The flaws in strategic logic had their greatest impact on the process of 
evaluation. Israel's strategic concepts emphasized the narrow margin of 
security and the consequent importance of reducing loss. They paid little 
attention to the problem of escalation through miscalculation and gave 
overwhelming priority to defense. The heavy emphasis on defense by 
Eshkol and Rabin is consistent with the risk-aversity of strategic 
arguments. Following the direction of the argument, the prime minister 
and his chief of staff gave priority to one dimension of military security 
above all others and evaluated options by their capacity to reduce damage 
should deterrence fail. In their examination of alternatives, they paid 
virtually no attention to the political uses of military force. Strategic 
arguments, silent about escalation and deterrence as consequences of 
defense, facilitated this constrained evaluation; the logic of the argument 
was weak by omission. 
The choice to mobilize forces on a large scale was a decision of major 
consequence for deterrence and defense. A growing pace of troop 
deployment in the Sinai and the expulsion of buffer forces were the first 
important indications of the possibility of a major challenge to deterrence; 
although ambiguous, they were a warning. Even ambiguous warning 
provides opportunities for a defender. Leaders can strengthen defense, 
attempt to strengthen deterrence, and try to control escalation, but these 
are not always fully compatible. When defense and deterrence are 
strengthened by increasing military preparedness, a challenger may 
respond in kind to a change in military capabilities. If leaders try to 
reinforce deterrence by reiterating their commitments, they may 
simultaneously harden the resolve of a challenger and reduce the political 
flexibility necessary for de-escalation. A complete and coherent strategic 
analysis recognizes these complexities and attempts to calibrate response 
to the likelihood of challenge. The more ambiguous the warning, the 
greater the opportunity for restraint and flexibility in response. 
When the choice to mobilize a large number of reserve forces was made, 
the majority of Egyptian forces in Sinai had not yet been deployed in 
strength against Israel's borders, and no other important casus belli had 
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occurred. Israel's leaders were still very uncertain of Egyptian intentions. 
Yet, the prime minister, acting on the advice of his senior military staff, 
virtually foreclosed an option of gradual remedial action. Once large 
numbers of reserve forces are mobilized, a prolonged period of gradual 
conflict de-escalation becomes difficult; patience is not a characteristic of a 
citizen army. Evaluation of the two options of partial and large-scale 
mobilization, at best an approximation to analytic procedures, was 
constrained severely by flaws in strategic logic. 
The prime minister and the foreign minister also used the warning time 
to try to reinforce deterrence. Neither Eshkol nor Eban took the 
opportunity to reassess, clarify, or redefine Israel's commitments, but 
reiterated the gravity of the casus belli. Within a few days, President Nasser 
would challenge deterrence and the worth to Israel of the interests at stake. 
chapter v l 
The Decision to Delay 
23 May: The Decision to Delay the 
Use of Military Force to Explore Diplomatic Options 
While the large-scale mobilization of reserves was being completed, Israel's 
decisionmakers turned their attention to reinforcing deterrence. In a series 
of cables and letters, they informed the principal maritime powers that 
Israel would resist any blockade of the Straits. After the withdrawal of 
UNEF, decisionmakers defined deterrence as immediate rather than 
general and concentrated on making explicit their commitment to retaliate. 
The foreign minister summarized this effort: 
Our intention to regard the closing of the Straits as a casus belli was 
communicated to the foreign ministers of those states which had 
supported international navigation in the Straits in 1957 and thereafter. There 
can be no doubt that these warnings reached Cairo. One thing was now clear. If 
Nasser imposed a blockade, the explosion would ensue not from "miscalcula­
tion," but from an open-eyed and conscious readiness for war (1977:328). 
Eshkol and Eban were attempting to accomplish multiple purposes 
simultaneously. By making their deterrent strategy more precise, they 
hoped to improve the credibility of their commitment to retaliate. Eban 
also considered that deterrence could be reinforced by strong support 
from those maritime states who had guaranteed freedom of navigation in 
1957. Finally, decisionmakers were improving the validity of their 
indicators of Egyptian intent. Decisionmakers generally tend to assume 
that a signal they send is unambiguous and obvious, and Eshkol and Eban 
were no exception. If their adversary ignored this clear and precise 
warning, then uncertainty about Egyptian intent would be reduced 
significantly. 
Israel's cabinet met in its regular Sunday morning session on 21 May to 
hear reports of the concentration of Egyptian forces as well as the 
intelligence evaluation of the probability of an Egyptian attack. An attack 
was not considered likely, and the chief of staff reported that there was no 
need for further mobilization as the Egyptian build-up was still defensive 
(H5).' 
1. General Matityahu Peled, later to become one of the strongest critics of the government 
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The prime minister and the foreign minister reported on the diplomatic 
efforts they had made to deter a blockade.2 Egyptian intent was still 
uncertain. The day before, a small Egyptian naval task force of one cruiser, 
four torpedo boats, and two submarines passed through the Canal on their 
way to the Straits of Tiran and a battalion of commandos was dropped 
over Sharm el-Shaykh. On the other hand, a cargo ship bound for Eilat 
went through the Straits unchallenged. Eban reported that U Thant had 
arranged to visit Cairo and would leave the following day. Both 
decisionmakers considered it possible that international pressure would 
deter a blockade of the Straits (Eban, 1977:328).3 Neither the prime 
minister nor the chief of staff recommended further action, and the cabinet 
proceeded to give retroactive approval to the large-scale mobilization. 
Members of the cabinet also approved Eshkol's intention to speak to the 
Knesset the following day. Israel's decisionmakers waited to see if 
deterrence had been reinforced.4 
At the same time, the chief of staff attempted to expand processes of 
search and evaluation beyond the official circle of decisionmakers. The 
next day, Rabin met with Ben Gurion, Eshkol's predecessor as prime 
minister and Israel's elder statesman par excellence. Ben Gurion accused 
the chief of staff of escalating the conflict with Egypt when the army was 
insufficiently prepared and Israel was without an ally.5 Implicitly, the 
former prime minister argued from premises of escalation through 
miscalculation. President Nasser was likely to interpret the large 
mobilization as intent to attack and escalate in return. Only if Israel 
intended to attack and had the capability and support to do so should large 
and a "revisionist" in his interpretation of the events in these critical weeks in May and June, 
recalled that until 22 May the General Staffconsidered Egypt's intent diversionary (th). They 
reasoned that, since there was no concentration of the I.D.F. forces along the Syrian border, 
President Nasser would not miscalculate. Second, there had been previous concentrations of 
troops in Sinai in analogous situations, and they had subsequently dispersed. Third, although 
the speed and size of the Egyptian build-up were somewhat unusual, Egypt currently had 
moved only 80,000 troops into Sinai and "it is clear that in 1967, 80,000 Egyptians could not 
endanger the safety of Israel" (H5; Peled, 1973). 
2. In addition to the letter to President Johnson and the cable to de Gaulle, Israel's 
ambassador to the United States, Abraham Harman, had met several times with 
Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow and with Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle. 
See Eban, 1977:325-329 and Quandt, 1977:39-44. 
3. Eban is somewhat inconsistent in his retrospective estimate of the likelihood that 
international pressure could deter a blockade. In his autobiography he also writes: "Any 
residual prospect of a peaceful issue now depended on a firm and, therefore, improbable show 
of international resolution" (1977:328). 
4. Not all members of the cabinet concurred that the effectiveness of deterrence should be 
examined. The minister of transport, Moshe Carmel, argued that international commitments 
were valueless and would not deter Nasser. Moreover, he insisted, the first five minutes of 
hostilities might be decisive (1972). 
5. In a recently published biography of Rabin, the chief of staff recalls the meeting with 
Ben Gurion: "What's going on?" Ben Gurion demanded. "Are you trying to endanger Israel? 
In 1956 I didn't begin the waruntil I was sure the skies over Tel Aviv and our other cities were 
protected by the French air force—and here you are, entering into a war in just any old way" 
(cited by Slater, 1977). See also Rabin, 1979:73-76. 
The Decision to Delay / 159 
number of reserves be mobilized. Ben Gurion considered that Israel had 
neither the capability nor the international support for a strike against 
Egypt. 
Later that same evening, on 22 May, Rabin met with Moshe Dayan, a 
former chief of staff and at that time a private citizen. With Eshkol's 
permission, Dayan had toured the southern front the day before. Rabin 
asked for Dayan's evaluation of Egyptian intent. Dayan subsequently 
recalled the discussion: 
I told him that I thought Nasser would close the Straits of Tiran that Israel 
would be obliged to counter with military action. Yitzhak [Rabin] said 
these were also his views. Rabin also said that a condition for our success 
was a preemptive air strike. Yitzhak seemed not only tired, which was 
natural, but also unsure of himself, perplexed, nervously chain smoking, with 
hardly the air of a man "impatient for battle" My principal impression of 
the evening was that Rabin was in a state of dejection (1976:253). 
Dayan's evidence suggests that Rabin had begun to revise his estimate of 
Egyptian intent. At the same time, however, the chief of staff displayed 
unmistakable signs of stress.6 
Before the prime minister delivered his scheduled address to the Knesset 
on 22 May, a second letter arrived from President Johnson. The president 
reassured Eshkol that the Soviet Union understood the American 
commitment to Israel,7 but explained why a public statement would be 
inappropriate. Johnson did speak of the necessity for "suitable measures 
either through the U.N. or independent of that international organization" 
(cited by Quandt, 1977:42). Eban noted the retreat from President 
Kennedy's earlier promise to "adopt" an appropriate course of action if 
Israel were threatened with aggression. The foreign minister concluded 
that the difference between the two was not trivial; it was a distinction 
"between responsible initiative and mere joining" (Eban, 1977:329). Eban 
was closely monitoring the nuances of American terminology to assess the 
intentions of Israel's most powerful friend. 
Although his audience later that afternoon was the Knesset, Eshkol 
designed his speech for President Nasser. He focused principally on the 
danger of escalation and deliberately avoided any public challenge which 
could further inflame an already tense situation. The prime minister was 
explicit both about Israel's intentions and capabilities. Israel planned no 
6. Eban recalls that General Rabin met with him that day to discuss the likelihood of an 
Egyptian blockade at Sharm el-Shaykh. He noted that the chief of staff "was very tense, 
chain-smoking all the time" (1977:333). Rabinvs biographer emphasizes his "doubts and 
anxieties" over the direction of a successful military campaign and notes the chief of staff's 
unhappiness with the substantial delegation of authority by the prime minister (Slater, 1977). 
7. In response to Israel's request on 18 May, Johnson had indeed written the following 
day to Premier Kosygin, affirming American support for Israel, but suggesting a "joint 
initiative of the two powers to prevent the dispute between Israel and the U.A.R. and Syria 
from drifting into war" (cited by Quandt, 1977:40-41). 
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attack against any Arab country, nor did it intend to challenge their 
security or international rights. He strongly denied any concentration of 
forces on the Syrian frontier and called on all responsible parties to 
promote a reciprocal reduction of forces in the south (1967e). Deliberately 
unprovocative, the prime minister hoped to allow Egypt the opportunity of 
a "face-saving retreat" (Eban, 1977:330). Eshkol not only made explicit the 
limited scope of Israel's intent toward Syria, but also attempted to 
reinforce a clear commitment to retaliate should deterrence fail. He warned 
that Israel had both the capability and the will to defend; the army was 
prepared. The prime minister was attempting to renew a relationship of 
mutual deterrence; implicitly acknowledging the success of Egypt's 
deterrent strategy—if that indeed were its objective—he strengthened 
Israel's weakening deterrent posture by emphasizing the capability to 
defend. 
President Nasser's response was not long in coming. Anwar el-Sadat 
recalls the meeting of the Supreme Executive Committee in Cairo which 
made the decision: 
Nasser said: "Now with our concentrations in Sinai, the chances of war are fifty-
fifty. But if we close the Strait, war will be a one hundred per cent 
certainty. " We all knew that our armaments were adequate. When 
Nasser asked us our opinion, we were all agreed that the Strait should be closed 
(1977:172).8 
On 22 May, speaking to the Air Force Command at the base of Bir Gafgafa 
in the Sinai, he announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to all ships of 
Israel registry and to all others with "strategic materials" destined for Eilat 
(1967a). Reports of the speech reached General Staff Headquarters 
between 0200 and 0400 on 23 May.9 Rabin telephoned the prime minister at 
0430, and Eban was informed at 0500 hours. Both immediately summoned 
their advisers for consultation and then proceeded to Tel Aviv for a 
meeting with the General Staff and a previously scheduled meeting of the 
Ministerial Committee of Defense.10 
8. Only the prime minister, Sidqi Sulayman, opposed the decision. Sadat reports that the 
prime minister "pleaded with Nasser to show more patience, to take into account our 
economic situation and the ambitious development projects that were now mostly frozen, 
particularly after U.S. aid had been cut off and so on. Nasser paid no attention to Sulayman's 
objections. He was eager to close the Strait [to] maintain his great prestige within the 
Arab world" (1977:172). Participating in the meeting were Field Marshall Amer, Zakaria 
Mohieddin, Hussein el-Shafei, Ali Sabri, Sidqi Sulayman, and Anwar el-Sadat, as well as 
President Nasser. If Sadat's evidence is reliable, Egyptian decisionmakers moved from 
uncertainty to certainty in considering the consequences of their action. If they were certain of 
retaliation by Israel yet chose the blockade, then deterrence did not fail through 
underestimation of the defender's resolve by the challenger. Calculation of capability rather 
than credibility was the critical component in deterrence failure. 
9. General Gavish, the commander of the southern front, was notified at 0400 hours on 23 
May, two hours before Radio Cairo broadcast the news of the blockade (1970). 
10. The Ministerial Committee of Defense included only ten of the eighteen cabinet 
ministers. It was designed as a smaller body to consider major issues of defense and security, 
and its deliberations were secret. In May, 1967. the committee included Allon, the minister of 
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Decisionmakers now began a lengthy debate about the scope of the 
challenge and the timing and appropriateness of their response. Central to 
the discussion was their definition of the problem for decision. At General 
Staff Headquarters some of the assembled military leaders argued that the 
credibility of Israel's deterrent capability was the issue (Rabin, 1979:76). 
They also focused on the cost of military action and spoke of the casualties 
of a large-scale strike. At this early meeting, military decisionmakers did 
not urge immediate military action but used the opportunity for a pre­
liminary exchange of views. 
The formal meeting of the Ministerial Committee of Defense began at 
0930 hours with the added participation of some of Eshkol's and Eban's 
principal advisers, the three senior military officers—Rabin, Weizman, and 
Yariv—and Golda Meir, then secretary-general of Mapai, the major party 
in the governing coalition. After an hour and a half, coalition and 
opposition leaders joined the discussion, and informal consultations 
continued into the early afternoon. The prime minister introduced the 
problem for decision with deliberate understatement: "We have news on 
the political front. It requires consultation and, probably, action as 
well" (cited by Eban, 1977:332). 
The chief of staff began by assessing Egyptian capability. Egypt's 
deployment was not yet offensive.11 Although activity had quickened at 
airfields, technical preparedness was deficient, and the crack Fourth 
Armored Division was still positioned on the west bank of the Canal. The 
Jordanian and Syrian borders were quiescent. More ominous were reports 
of frenzied public pressure in Arab capitals for war with Israel. In revising 
their estimates of the likelihood of attack, military decisionmakers now 
gave less weight to capability than to the blockade and the public 
statements of purpose. 
Rabin then outlined the available military options. He eliminated 
immediately the option of a strike at Sharm el-Shaykh alone: "That would 
be to start the war at the worst and most difficult place" (cited by Eban, 
1973c). A quick rejection of this option is consistent with prevailing 
strategic concepts which emphasize surprise as strategy and tactic; to 
"exploit the line of least expectation" an adversary must not be permitted 
to determine either the field or the moment of battle. The chief of staff 
outlined two viable military alternatives: a general attack or a preemptive 
labor; Aranne, the minister of education; Barzilai, the minister of health; Eban, the foreign 
minister; Eshkol, the prime minister; Galili, minister without portfolio; Kol, the minister of 
tourism; Sapir, the minister of finance; H. M. Shapira, the minister of the interior; and 
Warhaftig, the minister of religious affairs. Members were chosen both by portfolio and by 
party membership. When the wall-to-wall coalition was formed on 1 June, the three new 
ministers Dayan, the new minister of defense, Begin and Joseph Saphir, ministers without 
portfolio as well as Sasson, the minister of police, and Y. S. Shapira, the minister of justice, joined the committee. 
11. Eban describes the military evaluation that morning as "restrained" (1977:332). 
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air strike against the Egyptian air force and the occupation of Gaza as a 
"bargaining chip." 
The chief of staff could not supply precise estimates of the cost of either 
option, but he emphasized the differences between 1956 and the present 
balances of capabilities. Then Israel had the support of two major powers 
against a single adversary while now Israel was without an ally against a 
possible coalition of Arab adversaries. Any analogy to 1956 was 
inappropriate. Although Rabin was confident of the ultimate outcome, he 
warned that there would be "no walkover"; the cost would be heavy (cited 
by Eban, 1977:333). Although he did not urge immediate action, the chief 
of staff explained that the sooner Israel acted, the better. In response to a 
question by Eban, however, he responded that a delay of some forty-eight 
hours would entail little military cost.12 Additional time would be used to 
complete military preparations (Rabin, 1979:78). 
While Rabin concentrated on the military consequences of any choice 
Israel might make, Eban focused attention on the international 
repercussions. The foreign minister was equivocal, however, in his 
definition of the problem. The decisive issues were the challenge to a vital 
national interest and, simultaneously, to Israel's deterrent capability. This 
diagnosis of the problem permitted Eban to blur the value trade-offs in his 
formulation of the options. After quickly eliminating acquiesence to the 
blockade as a viable alternative—"There was no possibility for us to adopt 
a doctrine of peace at any price"—the foreign minister acknowledged that 
the remaining options were few (1977:333-334). He defined them as 
resistance alone or resistance with the support of others. Such a 
formulation masked the complexity of the problem: By suggesting that 
military resistance could take place under better or worse international 
conditions, it ignored the possible costs of delay. It also appeared to 
eliminate non-military "resistance" to the blockade. Yet Eban was not fully 
consistent in ruling out a solution to at least one of the issues—the 
blockade—through international action. 
As the acknowledged expert on past international commitments and 
present international realities, Eban argued persuasively that Israel had to 
explore the intentions of the two world powers. He insisted that it was no 
more appropriate to ignore possible Soviet reaction than to dismiss 
Egyptian military preparations. Whatever its original intention, the Soviet 
Union now stood in strong support of President Nasser. Moreover, it had 
warned repeatedly of "the heavy price" Israel would pay if it acted. 
Admitting uncertainty about Soviet intentions—"who could be sure?" 
12. From this reply, Eban drew the inference that no proposal for military action was 
made (1977:335). The evidence does not support this interpretation. Military decisionmakers 
did propose action in the air and in northern Sinai but, in the evaluation of the alternative, 
concurred that delay would impose no severe cost. See Rabin, 1979:77-78. 
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Eban emphasized the need for more information and further exploration. 
In particular, the likelihood that the United States would "neutralize a 
Russian menace" had to be assessed (Eban, 1977:334). 
Turning his attention to the United States, Eban reported that President 
Johnson had sent urgent messages to Cairo, Damascus, and Moscow, 
calling for de-escalation of troop movements and respect for free 
navigation in the Straits of Tiran. The foreign minister read to his 
colleagues a cable from Ephraim Evron, then minister in the Israel embassy 
in Washington, which transmitted a formal request from Undersecretary of 
State Eugene Rostow. On behalf of the President, Rostow urged Israel to 
make no decision for forty-eight hours and to consult with the United 
States in the interim. President Johnson reiterated his earlier warning that 
he would not be responsible for any action on which he was not consulted 
(Eban, 1977:334). 
In urging acceptance of the American proposal, Eban drew an explicit 
analogy to 1956: regardless of the military outcome, if Israel did not secure 
American diplomatic support, "we could well win a war and lose the 
victory" (Eban, 1977:334). If President Johnson were satisfied that all 
efforts to achieve a political solution had been exhausted, he was more 
likely to extend American support in the crucial postwar phase. The United 
States also was more likely to supply necessary military equipment should 
Israel attack only after international efforts had failed to reopen the 
blockaded Straits. 
Finally, since most of his colleagues were unfamiliar with the details, 
Eban reviewed for those present the international commitments to freedom 
of navigation made by the maritime powers in 1957. Britain, France, and 
the United States had guaranteed the right of free passage through the 
Straits for ships of their own registry and had recognized Israel's right to 
self-defense to assure innocent passage for its ships.13 In his presentation to 
13. The "commitments" to which Eban referred were made by maritime powers in 
February and March 1957, in the aftermath of the Sinai campaign when Israel's withdrawal of 
forces was negotiated. The American position was stated in an aide-memoire from Secretary 
of State Dulles to Eban on 11 February 1957: "With respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and access 
thereto the United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that 
no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits 
giving access thereto. . In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by 
the International Court of Justice, the United States on behalf of vessels of United States 
registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to 
secure general recognition of this right" (Dulles, 1957). In the debate of the General Assembly 
that followed, Foreign Minister Meir made a formal statement of Israel's interpretation of its 
rights and concluded by referring to a public statement by President Eisenhower on 20 
February in which he stated that "We [the United States] should not assume that if Israel 
withdraws [from the Sinai], Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or 
the Gulf of Aqaba" (cited by Meir, 1957). Ambassador Lodge, the United States 
representative to the United Nations, was quick to qualify this statement in his address to the 
Assembly: "The United States also takes note of the declarations made in the statement of the 
representative of Israel. We do not consider that these declarations make Israel's withdrawal 
'conditional.' For the most part the declarations constitute hopes and expectations 
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the cabinet, Eban placed much greater emphasis on the commitments of 
maritime powers than on their recognition of Israel's right to action and 
suggested that intensive political effort might compel the fulfillment of 
these pledges by Britain, France, and the United States. He argued that the 
Western powers should be reminded that not only Israel's capacity to deter 
but also the credibility of their commitments were at issue. Israel must not 
miss the opportunity to put these promises to the test (Eban, 1977:335). 
Eban concluded by arguing that any military option which did not remove 
Egyptian forces from the Straits of Tiran would be a strategic failure even if 
it were a tactical success. Gaza or northern Sinai could not offset the 
strategic importance of an open port to Israel; they were not effective as 
"bargaining chips." 
Other cabinet ministers and leaders of the opposition now joined the 
debate. Dayan, while not opposing a short delay, estimated as low the 
probability that international action would be effective in lifting the 
blockade: 
My own view, which I put to the meeting, was that we should give the U.S. the 
forty-eight hours she wanted. If she were prepared to use her forces to guarantee 
freedom of Israeli shipping, I would be very pleased. But I did not think anything 
would come of it. Therefore, at the end of forty-eight hours, we should launch 
military action against Egypt with the aim of inflicting heavy losses on her armed 
forces (1976:254). 
which seem to us not unreasonable in the light of the prior actions of this Assembly" (Lodge, 
1957). The statements by Israel and the United States were followed by those of 14 member 
states in the course of the assembly debate. The statement by Georges Picot, France's 
ambassador to the United Nations, on 1 March 1957 was more favorable: "The French 
Government, certainly, intends to exercise its right of free navigation effectively in the Gulf of 
Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran. It considers that any obstruction of its freedom of 
passage would be contrary to international law and would, accordingly, entail a possible 
resort to the measures authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." The statement 
by Britain's ambassador three days later was also supportive: "It is the view of Her Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an 
international waterway, through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Her 
Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping and is prepared to 
join with others to secure general recognition of this right" (General Assembly Official 
Records [GAOR] 1957, 666th and 667th Plenary Meetings, 1277-1304. Also cited'in Israel, 
Foreign Relations, Basic Documents, Document 49,272.) In all three cases, the maritime 
powers were careful to restrict their declarations to protection of their maritime rights. There 
is nowhere an explicit guarantee of Israel's right to innocent passage and, consequently, no 
explicit guarantee to protect Israel's shipping through the Straits. 
Interpretation of these commitments was to become a matter of considerable controversy 
between Israel and the United States. When Eban arrived in Washington, American officials 
at first could not recall and then could not find all the relevant documentation. President 
Johnson contacted former President Eisenhower, who confirmed that in 1957 the United 
States had recognized that, if force were used to close the Straits, Israel would be within her 
rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter to respond with force (Johnson, 1971:291). 
American officials, however, emphasized that the "commitment" did not extend to using force 
to open the Straits for Israel's shipping, but only to the explicit recognition of Israel's right to 
do so. This was not Foreign Minister Eban's interpretation of the Dulles undertaking. 
Secretary of State Rusk would argue further that any commitment to Israel that did exist 
would not be activated until Egypt actually resorted to the use of armed force; the blockade 
was not so considered (Quandt, 1977:51-52). 
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Dayan argued further that delay might produce undesired diplomatic 
consequences, since great power pressure on Israel to refrain from military 
action was likely to increase. In an effort to reduce the consequences of such 
pressure, he especially urged that, in the course of diplomatic dis­
cussions, no official commitment be made by Israel to a principle of prior 
consultation. 
Eban replied that, even without diplomatic consultation, the United 
States was exerting considerable pressure for "restraint." The presentation 
of Israel's case and a reminder of commitments made in 1957 would make 
pressure more rather than less difficult (Eban, 1977:336). Dr. Warhaftig, 
the minister of religious affairs, suggested that a decision to wait could both 
improve Israel's security and increase its international support; it was best 
on both counts. If anti-Nasserite forces could be mobilized, it was worth 
doing, even if military action were delayed two or three weeks. During that 
period, the level of Egyptian tension and preparedness would decline while 
Israel's would increase (cited by Eban, 1977:335-336). Warhaftig insisted 
that a strategy of waiting was dominant. 
Decisionmakers considered that the probability of an Egyptian attack 
had increased. The prime minister, in summing up the debate in the Min­
isterial Committee, expressed this consensus by stating that the closure 
of the Straits was itself an act of war and that every passing hour was 
fraught with danger. He supported a proposed trip to Washington by 
Eban,14 but argued that any request for an American destroyer escort of a 
shipflying Israel's flag would be valueless, for the issue of Israel's freedom 
of navigation would not be addressed directly (Dayan, 1976:254). With full 
understanding that the delay might extend beyond forty-eight hours, the 
Ministerial Committee voted formally on Eshkol's proposal to postpone 
action so that the foreign minister could explore the position of the United 
States.15 His proposal was approved without dissent. 
The Rationality of the Process 
In making their choice to delay military action, Israel's leaders shifted 
14. When it became clear that a majority supported a short delay to explore American 
attitudes, decisionmakers turned their attention to the details of how this could best be done. 
I he discussion became acrimonious as disagreements over whom to send where sharpened. 
Senior officials of the Foreign M insitry supported a visit to Washington only, but Golda Meir 
suggested a meeting with de Gaulle as well: "After all, it was French equipment that stood 
between us and disaster" (cited by Eban, 1977:336). Others suggested sending an unofficial 
emissary, like Meir, who could make demands while avoiding commitments. Eban objected 
vigorously, Meir refused, and Eshkol favored official rather than unofficial representation. 
The M inisterial Committee approved only a trip to Washington, and some of its members, as 
well as coalition and opposition leaders, were disconcerted to discover subsequently that 
Eban had added Paris and London to his itinerary. 
15. The official text of the decision is as follows: "I. The blockade is an act of aggression 
against Israel. 2. Any decision on action is postponed for 48 hours, during which time the 
Foreign Minister will explore the position of the United States. 3. The Prime Minister and 
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the forum as well as the focus of decision. The group rather than the 
individual became the decisionmaker of record as the Ministerial 
Committee convened to debate the appropriate response to the blockade. 
Members' preferences were explored through discussion and aggregated 
through voting on a formal proposal which required decision. Individuals 
contributed to the group which made the final decision. 
The imposition of the blockade also provoked a shift in emphasis from 
deterrence and escalation to defense. After the large call-up of reserves four 
days earlier, the prime minister had concentrated on reinforcing deterrence 
by warning of the consequences of a blockade. When President Nasser 
closed the Straits, the challenge became patently obvious. Because 
deterrence had failed, at least in part, decisionmakers turned to the defense 
of what had been earlier defined as a vital national interest. 
Some of the most important ministers were flawed in their logic, how­
ever, as they struggled to diagnose the problem for decision. Eban in par­
ticular denned the blockade as the principal problem (1977:326, 334). If 
this were the case, then search for and evaluation of options which could lift 
the blockade were priorities and, indeed, the foreign minister spent a great 
deal of time discussing the possibility that the maritime powers would 
enforce freedom of navigation. Simultaneously, however, Eban insisted 
that "if Israel did not break the ring of blockade and encirclement, her 
deterrent power would be destroyed and her international position brought 
to ruin" (1977:333). When deterrence became irrelevant as strategy, it 
became central as a value. The foreign minister, and senior military officers 
as well, insisted that the principal problem was to preserve a credible 
deterrent reputation. If this was the problem Israel's decisionmakers 
confronted, then international maritime action was irrelevant. Israel's 
capacity to deter could not be restored by the fulfillment of international 
commitments to freedom of navigation. Only independent military action 
could reestablish the primary deterrent relationship between Egypt and 
Israel. International support then becomes support for the exercise of 
Israel's military option. 
An attempt to secure the fulfillment of commitments to freedom of 
navigation, it can be argued, was a necessary precursor to securing 
international support. The major powers were unlikely to condone 
independent action by Israel until and unless the unwillingness of the 
maritime states to lift the blockade had become apparent. Although at 
times decisionmakers formulated the issue precisely that way, they were 
not consistent.16 Had they been consistent in their emphasis on the value of 
Foreign Minister are empowered to decide, should they see fit, on a journey by the Foreign 
Minister to Washington to meet President Johnson" (cited by Eban, 1977:337). 
16. At one point Eban argued: "The question was not whether we must resist, but whether 
we must resist alone or with the support and understanding of others" (1977:334). Here he 
The Decision to Delay / 167 
a deterrent reputation, logically they should not only have expected but 
hoped that international enforcement would fail. If their problem were the 
lifting of the blockade, then fulfillment of maritime commitments should 
have been an object of central concern. In the process of making their 
choice, senior cabinet members wavered from one formulation of their 
problem to the other without fully understanding the differences in the 
policy implications of each. Indeed, with only mild exaggeration, it can be 
suggested that Eban struggled simultaneously with two problems which he 
treated as one. Because he did so, he was inconsistent and uncertain about 
what he expected to achieve. 
Within this context of an ambiguously specified decisional problem, 
members of the cabinet restricted their search for and identification of 
options to those consistent with prevailing strategic assumptions (Table 
6.1). Indeed, Eban acknowledged that, after the closure of the Straits, 
decisionmakers felt their options were few (1977:335). An option of 
acquiescence was eliminated out of hand as clearly inconsistent with 
deterrence. A second alternative, a limited strike against Egyptian forces at 
Sharm el-Shaykh, also was ruled out with little consideration. It too is 
inconsistent with a concept of defense which prescribes a response 
calculated to maximize surprise. Choice began by elimination as 
decisionmakers used strategic concepts as a filter to narrow the range of 
relevant alternatives. 
TABLE 6.1 
23 MAY: A COGNITIVE-ANALYTIC PATH TO CHOICE 
(Path 7) 
STIMULUS: President Nasser blockades the Straits of Tiran to Israel's 
shipping. 
SEARCH: Constrained; decisionmakers acknowledge their options 
are few; belief system serves as filter to eliminate all but 
two options, each of which is deduced from different 
components of strategic doctrine. 
ESTIMATION AND Analytic; strategic concepts establish the blockade as a 
REVISION: diagnostic indicator; estimate of the probability of attack 
responds to changes in both capability and intent vari­
ables; structured consideration of cause and effect 
sequences highlighted by strategic concepts; estimates 
of likelihood of attack, American support, and Soviet 
intervention responsive to new information. 
EVALUATION: Analytic comparison within constraints; consideration of 
multiple values; diplomatic cost of preemption consid­
erable and military benefit moderate; diplomatic benefit 
of delay considerable with little military cost; estimates 
qualitative and intuitive. 
CHOICE: Analytic; calculation of trade-off obvious and easy. 
defines the problem as international support of Israel's military action. In his emphasis on the 
blockade as the core of the dilemma and his attempt to secure fulfillment of maritime 
commitments, however, he defines the problem as the defense of a vital national interest. 
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Two options were given serious consideration. The chief of staff 
discussed a preemptive strike against the Egyptian air force to be followed 
by the occupation of Gaza or a larger part of northern Sinai. Either of these 
variants of a preemptive strike would be supported by the prevailing 
concept of defense. The second alternative, that of a forty-eight hour delay 
to consolidate American support, is consistent with that part of strategic 
doctrine which emphasizes the absence of an ally as an important 
constraint to military action. Strategic assumptions were pervasive in the 
process of search as decisionmakers drew heavily on strategic concepts 
both to eliminate and to identify policy options. 
Despite their difficulty in structuring their problem and their constrained 
search for alternatives, decisionmakers did approximate analytic processes 
in their revision of the estimated probability of attack. They were helped 
immeasurably by the strong diagnosticity of the indicators they used. In 
particular, the closure of the Straits is identified unambiguously by the 
concept of deterrence as a casus belli; strategic concepts provided guidance 
in the use of indicators. Drawing on these concepts in the days immediately 
preceding President Nasser's announcement, the prime minister and the 
foreign minister had deliberately strengthened the validity of this indicator 
of Egyptian intent. 
Responding to information whose significance had already been 
validated, members of the cabinet and of the General Staff revised their 
estimates of Egyptian intent. There is no evidence to suggest avoidance or 
discounting of new evidence to depress revision nor of exclusive reliance on 
one indicator to produce a quantum jump in the estimated likelihood of 
attack. Before the closure of the Straits, military officers in particular had 
relied principally on capability arguments to infer a relatively low 
probability of attack (Hi and H5) and had explained Egyptian military 
activity as deterrent and diversionary. After the blockade, they no longer 
referred to hypotheses of bluffto explain Egyptian activity (H3 to H4). They 
also reduced the relevance of the analogy to Operation Rotem and no 
longer argued that Egyptian forces would disperse quietly in response to a 
controlled response by Israel (H7 to H8). The director of Military 
Intelligence and the chief of staff revised prevailing assumptions when the 
data were sufficiently discrepant. Indeed they now rejected any interpreta­
tion premised on successful deterrence. A blockade had been a central 
object of deterrent strategy, and when it occurred, decisionmakers could 
appreciate the bankruptcy of deterrence as an explanation of their 
adversary's behavior. With the help of a specified indicator, they 
recognized the scope of the challenge to deterrence. 
The temptation was great to rely on this single, highly diagnostic 
indicator to update drastically estimates of the likelihood of an Egyptian 
attack. Indeed, some of the principal participants have written subsequent­
ly that, after the closure of the Straits, they no longer thought that war 
The Decision to Delay / 169 
could be avoided (Eban, 1977:331 and Dayan, 1976:247). Decisionmakers 
were frequently imprecise and sloppy, however, in their use of the terms 
"attack" and "war." The first referred exclusively to Egyptian or Arab 
intent to attack while the second frequently referred to the "inevitability" of 
retaliation by Israel once deterrence had failed. Decisionmakers tended to 
refer to unavoidable war when they defined their problem as the restoration 
of the credibility of deterrence. No evidence suggests that either civilian or 
military decisionmakers estimated a high probability of an Egyptian attack 
on 23 May. On the contrary, reconstruction of the decisional process 
suggests that military officers especially combined multiple indicators 
which limited the increase in their estimate of attack far short of certainty. 
Their evaluation was, as Eban noted, restrained. They drew on capability 
variables as well as intent inferred from the imposition of the blockade, and 
the revision of their prior estimates did not oscillate dramatically. Both in 
their processing of information which challenged prevailing assumptions 
and in their use of multiple indicators, those principally responsible for the 
estimation of military capability and political intent approximated analytic 
procedures. 
The prime minister and some of his principal advisers were considerably 
more analytic than they had been four days earlier in their estimation of the 
consequences of available options. The improved performance was due at 
least in part to the group context of discussion where members brought to 
bear their respective areas of expertise. The foreign minister, for example, 
focused attention on the probability of American support and Soviet 
intervention as consequences of any decision to preempt. Eban urged the 
importance of an evaluation of the likelihood of Soviet intervention on 
behalf of Egypt should Israel choose to preempt. In the absence of 
adequate information, he was unable to estimate its probability with any 
precision; further search was necessary before alternatives could be 
formulated. The foreign minister argued further that Soviet intervention 
was contingent on American action and insisted on additional information 
to better estimate the possibility of American deterrence of Soviet 
intervention (Eban, 1977:335). The likelihood that one great power will 
deter the other from military intervention is among the factors highlighted 
by strategic concepts. 
The concept of defense also specifies that a choice to preempt should be 
made only when the political support of a great power capable of supplying 
Israel with arms and equipment in the postwar period is assured. Eban paid 
overwhelming attention to the likelihood of American support in his 
presentation of the consequences of alternative courses of action. The 
salience of diplomatic support was reinforced by frequent analogies to the 
aftermath of the Sinai campaign in 1956-1957 where political defeat 
circumscribed the results of a military victory. 
Eban was more thorough in his examination of the consequences of 
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preemption than of the consequences of delay. Nevertheless, although he 
devoted little time to the likelihood of an attack, an area generally outside 
his competence, he did press the chief of staff for an estimate of the military 
consequences of delay. The foreign minister also provoked discussion of 
the possibility that concerted international pressure could or would lift the 
blockade. There was no agreement among those who participated in the 
deliberations. Eban suggested that the maritime powers "might" fulfill the 
commitments they had made on the right of innocent passage in the Gulf of 
Aqaba while Dayan considered the likelihood of effective international 
pressure on President Nasser to be remote. 
The prime minister, the foreign minister, the chief of staff, and some of 
the other participants in the discussions performed better than is generally 
expected; they were able to identify the obvious and important 
consequences of the alternatives they considered. In national security 
decision-making, as in many other policy arenas, an inability to specify a 
range of relevant outcomes—structural uncertainty—often is a major 
impediment to an analytic process of choice. When Israel's leaders met to 
consider an appropriate response to a challenge to deterrence, they could 
draw on relevant strategic concepts which highlighted the important 
consequences for consideration. Strategic arguments were a useful guide to 
members of the Ministerial Committee of Defense who were working in a 
structure of uncertainty. 
Estimates offered by members of the committee of the cost and benefit of 
most of these consequences were qualitative and intuitive rather than 
quantitative and precise. Discussion did range beyond the consideration of 
a single value, however, to examine international, military, and human 
factors of cost and benefit. Not surprisingly, Rabin and Eban paid 
particular attention to military security and international support 
respectively in their evaluation of the attractiveness of the two options 
(Table 6.2). The major cost of a choice to preempt was evident—a loss of 
TABLE 6.2 
PRINCIPAL ESTIMATES OF COST, BENEFIT, AND 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONSEQUENCES OF OPTIONS, 23 MAY 
Attack:
Wait:
 Probability of American support decreases 
Probability of Soviet intervention uncertain but greater without American 
support 
Cost to international support considerable if Israel does not consult* 
Benefit to military security moderate to low 
 Probability of Arab attack increases after blockade 
Benefit to international support considerable; fulfillment of great power 
commitments 
Cost to military security moderate or low; a short delay not serious; 
additional time could be used to improve planning and deployment 
* Decisionmakers paid particular attention to this dimension of value. 
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international support with the attendant risk to arms supplies, deterrence 
of external intervention, and crucial diplomatic support in the postwar 
phase—while the principal benefit was to military security. Even then, 
those with acknowledged expertise on matters of defense were far from 
unanimous that an immediate attack would improve military security. As 
Moshe Carmel, the minister of transport, later recalled: 
It was known that BG [the former prime minister] opposed taking military 
action. Ben Gurion did not believe that we were capable offighting this 
war alone. Members of the Cabinet heard from him that as long as we did not 
have any of the Powers on our side, any action taken by us would be a dangerous 
adventure. He influenced quite a few Ministers; for them he was after all still an 
authority on military matters (1972). 
It is not surprising that some invoked authority and were persuaded by the 
evaluation of the former prime minister. Not only would preemptive 
retaliation reduce the likelihood of international support, but an attack 
without an ally could be costly and dangerous. Members of the Ministerial 
Committee who were not expert on military matters also listened to the 
restrained evaluation of the chief of staff. Those who shared Ben Gurion's 
estimate of the military danger faced a simple rather than a complex choice: 
their values of military security and international support did not conflict. 
The costs of a delay were less significant: some loss of the power to deter 
and higher casualties if Israel had to absorb an Egyptian first strike. Even 
the General Staff estimated, however, that a delay of forty-eight hours 
would impose no serious military cost, and indeed some officers considered 
that the additional time might be of some benefit as the deployment of 
troops and planning for an attack could be completed. The principal 
benefit was that of concerted international pressure to compel President 
Nasser to lift the blockade. 
Although strategic doctrine specified most of these factors for 
evaluation, it provided no procedures for their weighting. Those who drew 
on strategic arguments could deduce both constraints and inducements to 
preempt, but no decision rule to resolve complexity. The evidence does not 
suggest that the prime minister, the foreign minister, the chief of staff, those 
who dominated the discussion, resorted to single-value calculation. Rabin 
could have argued, for example, that military security took precedence 
over all other values. In a single-value decision problem, or even with some 
variant of a lexicographic decision rule, the net benefit to military security 
would have dictated a choice to preempt. No participant in the meetings 
recalls any such argument. 
Fortunately, the choice was not very difficult or painful. Even though 
there were differences in emphasis among the participants—Rabin and 
Eban attached greater weight to military security and diplomatic support 
respectively- these differences were not large. If the diplomatic cost of 
immediate military action were considerable and military benefit 
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moderate, a choice to preempt might produce a net loss. On the other hand, 
if delay would benefit international support and impose little military cost, 
as the chief of staff suggested, the net advantage was obvious. Calculation 
of net worth was easy and obvious, and there was little incentive to simplify 
or bolster. Although members of the Ministerial Committee of Defense 
aggregated their preferences formally through a recorded vote, differences 
among the participants were narrow. It was not difficult for members to 
choose the option which promised the greater benefit. Once they heard the 
presentation of the arguments and the examination of the likely 
consequences of the two options, they needed neither great sense nor great 
wit to make an analytic choice. Chapter 9 evaluates the rationality of their 
choice. 
Within the constraints established by problem diagnosis and definition, 
most of the principal participants were proficient in their processing of 
choice. At least three factors may explain this capacity to approximate 
analytic performance in three of the five decision-making tasks (Path 7). 
First, even though leaders were now operating under crisis conditions, 
stress was not intense for most. The chief of staff did exhibit unmistakable 
symptoms of acute anxiety, but available evidence suggests that his 
reaction was more intense than the others. Generally, perceptions of threat 
and time pressure did increase but remained moderate (McCormick, 
1975:52, 33).17 Moreover, surprise was less intense than it had been four 
days earlier. Not only had the possibility of a blockade been anticipated 
since the withdrawal of UNEF, but it was also the object of extensive prior 
consideration by strategic doctrine. Decisionmakers had less miscalcula­
tion to acknowledge. Some anticipation and perceptions of moderate 
threat and time pressure are considered optimal for performance. 
Second, the collective context of decision-making also appears to have 
facilitated analytic evaluation. As part of a group, members had access 
both to information and to argumentation that they did not have as 
individuals. Participants in the discussion not only exchanged information 
about each other's preferences but also shared "relevant information." The 
foreign minister, in an impressive presentation, informed members of the 
cabinet of prior commitments made by maritime states and argued 
persuasively that these commitments must be tested. Many ministers, 
unfamiliar with the details of these commitments, now heard these 
arguments presented by an expert. Undoubtedly, the authoritative 
presentation of new evidence and argument led ministers to consider 
outcomes which they otherwise would have ignored. 
17. McCormick finds from a content analysis of public documents that threat perception 
increased but time pressure decreased (1975:33). He notes the low confidence in the validity of 
his measure of felt urgency. Even Rabin, the most anxious among the participants, suggested 
during the discussions of 23 May that he anticipated no serious cost to a delay of forty-eight to 
seventy-two hours. This evidence is used to infer only moderate time pressure. 
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Members not only heard new argument and evidence but requested 
amplification and clarification of estimates during the meeting of the 
Ministerial Committee. In their questioning, moreover, members did not 
appear to be awed by the experts among them. Although some invoked the 
authority of former Prime Minister Ben Gurion, others challenged the 
evaluation of political consequences offered by the minister of foreign, 
affairs and requested further precision from the chief of staff. Even when 
individual members tried to minimize value conflict in their presentation of 
options, they were challenged by others: Dayan, for example, pointed out 
the diplomatic cost as well as the benefits of delay. Debate was exhaustive 
and exhausting and, at times, discussion became acrimonious in a group 
that was expanded to include a range of government, party, and opposition 
opinion in a situation of crisis. This diversity of opinion, which was 
reflected in the give-and-take of debate, encouraged more careful 
consideration of the consequences of policy arguments. Individual 
members had to argue persuasively. 
While there is considerable evidence to support the impact of persuasive 
argumentation and group discussion, there is little support for either an 
explanation of concurrence-seeking or of coalition-building. At no time 
did members press for closure of discussion. Nor did they make reference to 
group solidarity or the importance of consensus. On the contrary, the 
prime minister invited wide participation from among party and 
opposition members. Participation by opposition leaders would broaden 
the range of opinion rather than promote concurrence. Although the 
choice to delay was made with no dissent, there is little evidence to suggest 
that it was the product of groupthink. 
An explanation of coalition-building, while complementary, is not 
convincing. The two essential members of any coalition, the prime minister 
and the foreign minister, did support the option that was chosen. But so did 
those who should have headed a competing coalition—the chief of staff and 
military experts among opposition leaders like Dayan. Nor is there any 
evidence of bargaining by those who led the majority coalition. The 
preferred option was not modified to accommodate objections raised by 
participants in the discussion. Rather, its chief proponent, Eban, argued 
rather than bargained. Coalition-building appears to be redundant in the 
explanation of this choice. 
Third, the content and structure of strategic argument is a necessary but 
insufficient component in an explanation of the decision to delay. Because 
both of the options on the table for discussion were consistent with some 
component of prevailing strategic concepts, an explanation of the choice 
must go beyond strategic doctrine to include the processes members of the 
Ministerial Committee used. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
processes, however, appear to be related to the quality of strategic logic. 
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The higher-than-usual quality of estimation and evaluation can be 
explained, at least in part, by the logic of strategic arguments available to 
the participants. Eban and Rabin, the two experts in the discussion, could 
draw on concepts to interpret indicators and to identify the consequences 
of options. The principal obstacle to a fully analytic process of decision was 
neither structural uncertainty nor simplification, however, but problem 
diagnosis and definition. Israel's leaders evaluated and chose between 
options produced by constrained search and imprecise conceptualization. 
Proficiency within the framework of an ambigiously conceived problem 
cannot in and of itself compensate wholly for faulty premises. 
Most of the principals did not distinguish sharply between deterrence as 
strategy and deterrence as value and oscillated between the restoration of 
the credibility of deterrence and the lifting of the blockade as their principal 
problem. This blurred diagnosis of the problem is consistent with the rather 
cursory evaluation of the interest at stake to Israel should a blockade be 
imposed. Unlike the other casus belli, strategic arguments had paid less 
attention to the economic and political consequences of a blockade in 
comparison with the cost of defeating one should it occur; the argument 
was incomplete. Israel's leaders had not reassessed this commitment in the 
decade since free passage through the Straits of Tiran was first established 
as an object of deterrence. Once President Nasser challenged deterrence, 
however, those responsible for national security had to consider not only 
the direct but also the indirect consequences of acquiescence or retaliation. 
Even though the challenge was partial rather than total, failure to respond 
to a blockade could have consequences for the protection of other interests. 
Neither civilian nor military leaders had ever paid much attention to the 
contingency of a challenge to deterrence in stages. On the contrary, casus 
belli were formulated as unrelated, discrete, and well-defined challenges. 
Israel's leaders now confronted a partial challenge to deterrence which was 
difficult to define and to circumscribe, and their discussions reflected this 
difficulty At times the prime minister and the foreign minister emphasized 
the intrinsic issue at stake—the blockade—and at times they stressed the 
interconnectedness among interests. They moved back and forth from one 
diagnosis of the problem to another without quite knowing it, yet each 
diagnosis had quite different policy implications. If their principal purpose 
was to restore the credibility of deterrence through retaliation, then 
American support of Israel's right to exercise a military option was of 
central concern. If their objective was to open the Straits, then an American 
commitment to freedom of navigation was critical. The two were not the 
same. 
The decision of 23 May, which authorized the foreign minister "to 
explore the position of the United States," could encompass either 
purpose, and members of the Ministerial Committee avoided a more 
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precise formulation of their problem. The concept of deterrence proved 
elastic as leaders expanded its meaning to encompass two quite different 
problems. The consequences of this elasticity and imprecision in problem 
diagnosis would only become fully apparent when the cabinet prepared to 
make its next major choice. 
28 May: The Decision to Delay Military Action to Allow Time for 
International Maritime Action 
After the lengthy meeting ended on 23 May, military and civilian 
decisionmakers separated to attend to their specific responsibilities. Prime 
Minister Eshkol returned to Jerusalem to prepare his reply to the Knesset 
debate later that evening. In his brief statement, he spoke of the growing 
troop concentrations in Sinai and emphasized Israel's capacity to defend 
itself against any attack. Without alluding directly to the blockade, the 
prime minister urged maritime powers to assure freedom of navigation. 
Eban met with the prime minister before his speech that evening and with 
his consent decided to stop in Paris en route to Washington to try to 
arrange a meeting with General de Gaulle (Eban, 1977:337). The attitude of 
France, Israel's major arms supplier and a principal maritime state, was of 
considerable importance to Israel. 
Even before Eban's departure early the following morning, decision-
makers had preliminary information on American and Soviet reaction to 
the blockade. In Washington, President Johnson had issued a statement 
condemning the blockade as illegal and a danger to the cause of peace 
(Johnson, 1967:294). Evron, on the basis of a meeting he and Ambassador 
Harman had held with Undersecretary Rostow in Washington, cabled that 
the United States had decided to convene the Security Council as a 
necessary preliminary to any unilateral action. The American objective was 
to restore the status quo ante. Evron also reported that a senior official had 
assured him that "We could rely on the President" (Foreign Ministry 
sources, cited by Brecher, 1975:381). In Tel Aviv, the American 
ambassador had repeated the President's request for a delay of forty-eight 
hours. Ambassador Barbour also discussed a British-sponsored proposal 
of a multinational naval force to protect maritime rights should action at 
the United Nations prove ineffective (Quandt, 1977:43). Prime Minister 
Eshkol subsequently recalled that as early as "Tuesday, 23 May, we were 
already told by the U.S. that she will do everything to open the Straits" 
(1967b). In a tacit signal, on President Johnson's orders, units of the Sixth 
Fleet began to move toward the eastern Mediterranean. 
The same day, the Soviet Union issued itsfirst official statement since the 
closure of the Straits. The statement made no reference to the blockade but 
praised those Arab states who had honored their commitments for joint 
defense with Syria when it was faced with aggression. Moscow concluded 
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with the warning that any state that attempted to "unleash aggression" in 
the Middle East would meet the strong opposition of the Soviet Union.18 
While civilian decisionmakers were monitoring international reaction, 
military officers met at General StaffHeadquarters under the chairmanship 
of the chief of staff. Rabin did not feel well, left the meeting, and was 
ordered by his physician to rest for thirty hours. General Weizman, the 
chief of operations, served as temporary replacement. At the time, Rabin's 
illness was described as nicotine poisoning, and he was absent for two days. 
Subsequently, Weizman alleged that the chief of staff had suffered an 
attack of acute anxiety.19 There is little doubt that, from 24 to 26 May, the 
chief of staff experienced considerable stress. 
At the same time, in a private capacity, General Dayan met with 
Southern Command to discuss operational plans. Plans were not yet final 
since military officers were still considering various options. Later that 
evening, Dayan met with the commander of the southern front, Gen. 
Gavish, at his headquarters. Dayan subsequently recalled the discussion: 
Shayke [Gavish] explained the difficulty of breaking into the heavily fortified 
Egyptian strong points, whereas by capturing the Gaza Strip, we would gain a 
valuable bargaining card, being able to trade the return of the strip for freedom 
of shipping through the straits. I said that this plan did not seem feasible to 
me for both political and military reasons. The Gaza Strip bristled with a variety 
of problems. Egypt was unlikely to consider the strip an important 
enough card to make a trade. But the more decisive reason was a military one. 
The aim of this was armed confrontation with Nasser. The real gravity of his 
closing the Straits of Tiran lay not simply in the blockade itself, but in his 
attempt to demonstrate that Israel was incapable of standing up to the Arabs. If 
we failed to disprove this thesis, our situation would steadily deteriorate. I 
detected a certain doubt on the part of some of the officers at Southern 
Command as to whether we had the strength to rout the Egyptian forces. And 
one asked if we were justified in risking heavy losses for such a campaign, or 
whether we should not try to avoid such casualties—even if this meant a failure 
to gain our full purpose (Dayan, 1976:323-324). 
Dayan clearly defined the problem as one of deterrence failure. The 
blockade was symptomatic rather than primary, and any feasible military 
option must address the primary problem of restoring the credibility of 
18: Cited in The New York Times, 24 May 1967. 
19. Weizman published an aide-memoire he had written on 6 November 1967 seven years 
later when Rabin became a candidate for prime minister. According to the Jerusalem Post (23 
April 1974), the document alleges that Rabin contacted Weizman at 0800 on 24 May and 
asked him to come to his home. When he arrived, the chief of staff told him that he had 
mistakenly involved the country in a big and dangerous war and asked Gen. Weizman if he 
would agree to replace him as chief of staff. The chief of operations refused and offered his 
support and encouragement. An hour later, at the request of Mrs. Rabin, he returned and met 
an army physician who diagnosed acute anxiety. They decided to inform the prime minister 
and to release the information that the chief of staff was suffering from nicotine poisoning. 
Rabin, in his autobiography, confirms all essential details of the Weizman document and adds 
that the meeting with Ben Gurion profoundly shook his confidence and evoked feelings of 
guilt and depression. See Rabin, 1979:79-83. 
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Israel's deterrent posture. Even if the problem were the blockade, 
moreover, the likelihood of reopening the Straits by bargaining with 
President Nasser was low. Dayan rejected the limited use of force for 
political purposes; the capture of Gaza would provide little benefit and 
considerable loss. 
Other officers, however, expressed their uncertainty about the 
consequences of a more extensive military strike. They questioned not only 
its likely outcome but also its cost and referred explicitly to the trade-off 
between the restoration of a credible deterrent reputation and the cost in 
human resources. Long after the commitment to deter had been made, 
those charged with the responsibility for retaliation when deterrence failed 
questioned the value of deterrence. Even more so than their civilian 
counterparts, military decisionmakers recognized considerable uncertain­
ty and value complexity.20 In their consideration of military alternatives, 
they wondered out loud—at least for a moment—whether Israel had 
committed itself to a strategy of rational irrationality and whether such a 
strategy was rational. 
The next morning, Gen. Weizman met with the heads of Operations, 
Military Intelligence, Southern Command, and the armored corps and 
ordered the preparation of a plan for military action in the south. The 
acting chief of staff then lunched with the prime minister and later that 
afternoon, at 1730 hours, Eshkol came to General Staff Headquarters for a 
three-hour meeting. The prime minister brought with him the deputy 
minister of defense, Zvi Dinstein, the director-general of the Ministry of 
Defense, Moshe Kashti, and his military secretary, Colonel Lior; except for 
Generals Yaffe and Sharon who remained with their divisions in the south, 
all senior officers attended the meeting. 
After a general review of intelligence information, the commander of the 
air force presented the plan for preemptive action against the adversary's 
air force and expressed his confidence in its outcome. Military Intelligence 
estimated that, after a preemptive strike, Israel's forces would have no 
more than forty-eight hours until the superpowers would intervene to 
impose a cease-fire (Weizman, 1976:215-216). Gavish, the commander of 
the southern front, then presented three possible options for ground action: 
occupation of Gaza; occupation of part of the Sinai up to el-Arish; or 
occupation of the northern part of Sinai to the Canal. Although no formal 
choice was made,21 Southern Command favored the most extensive plan of 
20. Wei/man confirms the intense uncertainty among military officers: "There was a great 
deal of confusion. It stemmed largely from uncertainties about forthcoming 
steps. . There were, indeed, doubts among the political echelon, but it was the top 
military echelon that nourished them. If the government was groping in the dark, it was the 
General Staff that strengthened and reinforced its doubts, because it too was perplexed and 
confused" (1976:210-211). 
21. General Bar-Lev, alone among the participants at the meeting, recalls that a major 
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attack. The prime minister, who was also minister of defense, then asked 
everyone present for their evaluation of the military options on the 
southern front. General Weizman ended the meeting by telling Eshkol that 
mobilization was now virtually complete; by the following day, the army 
would be ready and prepared to attack. Once forces were mobilized and in 
position, military leaders began to exert significant pressure on the prime 
minister and other members of the cabinet to choose preemption. When 
force became usable, military decisionmakers concentrated increasingly on 
restoring the credibility of deterrence. 
While military officers intensified their contingency planning, Eban 
began his exploration of the intentions of friendly maritime states. Before 
dawn on 24 May, he left for Paris with his political secretary, Moshe Raviv. 
At noon, accompanied by Israel's Ambassador Eytan, the foreign minister 
was ushered into the office of President de Gaulle. Immediately, the 
president warned: "Do not make war. At any rate, don't shoot first. 
It would be catastrophic if Israel were to attack" (cited by Eban, 1977:341). 
Eban responded that the crisis had been created by Syrian-based 
terrorism, Egyptian troop concentrations in Sinai after the withdrawal of 
United Nations' forces, and the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. The 
blockade was not only a threat but an act of aggression which must be 
rescinded. Israel was still exploring whether it would have to fight alone, 
even though the price in blood would be heavy, or resist in cooperation 
with maritime powers who would fulfill their commitments. "Israel without 
honor is not Israel," he argued. "Our nation faces a stern choice" 
(1977:342). The foreign minister simultaneously emphasized the centrality 
of the blockade—the disruption of the commercial and communications 
complex at Eilat and the rupture of the extensive trading relationships with 
the East—and the obligation to restore Israel's honor or deterrent 
reputation. He saw little distinction between them. 
General de Gaulle remained unconvinced. He insisted that any solution 
must include the Soviet Union in a four-power agreement. He added that 
strike across the whole of Sinai was chosen that day. He subsequently argued: "The several 
possibilities were discussed and the accepted summary was: the destruction of the Egyptian 
army and the occupation of the whole Sinai Peninsula, up to the Suez Canal" (1973a). General 
Weizman is ambiguous about whether a choice was made that day or not. He recalled that he 
presented Eshkol with the final plan (1976:215), but stated subsequently that the plan was 
completed finally only after Dayan became minister of defense (1973; 1976:216). Dayan 
reported that the operational orders at Southern Command on 24 May, which are quite 
distinct from final authorization from General Headquarters, indeed included action in Gaza 
but also an advance by the 7th Brigade deep into Sinai, the capture of el-Ansh, and an 
advance toward the Canal (1976:259). General Sharon maintains that, on 1 June 1967, the 
"large-scale" plan was still a strike only along the northern axis (1973a). At a meeting of the 
commanders of the southern front with Eshkol on 25 May, General Sharon voiced his 
criticism of the limited plan "of action; it is difficult to infer, therefore, that a choice to eliminate 
the limited strike had been made the previous day. Finally, the military historian of Tzanal, 
with access to official documentary evidence, writes that thefirst plans were to strike along the 
northern coast of Sinai (1973:725-726). The process of choosing among options for an attack 
on the ground would continue until early June. 
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1967 was no longer 1957 In a thinly veiled reference to Israel's dependence 
on arms and equipment, the president warned that Israel must not act 
unilaterally; she was not "sufficiently established to solve all her problems 
herself" (cited by Eban, 1977:343). Eban replied that at times inaction may 
be more dangerous than action. 
The foreign minister drew immediate and drastic conclusions from his 
meeting with the French president. Three points were salient: "the 
emphatic advice to abstain from active resistance; the diminution, almost 
to a vanishing point, of the 1957 maritime commitment; and the constant 
accent on the 'Four Power' solution. There was not the slightest 
room for any conclusion except that France was disengaging herself from 
any responsibility for helping us if we chose early resistance" (1977:344). 
Despite his hope that France would fulfill its international obligations, at 
least in part, Eban engaged in little wishful thinking.22 His investigation of 
French intentions provided cold comfort. If the problem were the 
blockade, then the withdrawal from the undertakings of 1957 and the 
substitution of a "Four Power" condominium were not encouraging; and if 
the problem were the restoration of deterrence, then the stern strictures 
against military action by Israel's principal arms supplier were discourag­
ing. Even though Eban did not distinguish carefully between the two 
problems, de Gaulle eliminated a solution to either. Raviv cabled a brief 
resume, and Eytan followed with an almost verbatim account. By early the 
next morning, decisionmakers in Jerusalem had documentary evidence of 
the change in French attitudes. 
Eban's report from London, his next stop, was more encouraging. 
Britain was both a principal maritime power and a significant supplier of 
armor to Israel. Prime Minister Wilson informed Eban that the cabinet had 
met that morning and reached a consensus that the blockade must not be 
permitted to succeed. Accordingly, Britain would join with others to open 
the Straits and was consulting with the United States about how best to 
22. Two days earlier, on 22 May, spokesmen for the British and French Foreign 
Ministries had announced that the 1950 Tripartite Declaration was no longer valid. The 
Tripartite Declaration was issued by Britain, France, and the United States principally to 
control the arms race in the Middle East. Its concluding paragraph spoke in deliberately vague 
terms of their commitment to the integrity of all states in the region: "The three Governments 
take this opportunity of declaring their . unalterable opposition to the use of force or 
threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find 
that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, 
consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take 
action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation" (United States 
Senate Documents, Document 7, 131). The Declaration had become largely irrelevant after 
the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal in 1955, when one of the principal states in the 
region was able to go beyond the three powers to purchase military equipment. After the 
withdrawal of UNEF, however, President Johnson asked his secretary of state to ascertain the 
French and British interpretation of their responsibilities under the declaration (Johnson 
1971:292). A few hours before Nasser declared the blockade, the two governments declared 
the declaration no longer valid. Although Israel had never regarded the 1950 statement as an 
effective guarantee, its disavowal at precisely that moment was considered as an indicator of 
the attitudes of martime powers (Eban, 1977:341). 
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proceed. Wilson had already sent his minister of state for foreign affairs, 
George Thomson, to discuss the "nuts and bolts" of a common plan of 
action (Eban, 1977:346-347 and Wilson, 1971:397). 
The thrust of British reaction to the closure of the Straits was 
substantially different from that of France. Prime Minister Wilson 
supported international action to lift the blockade, either inside or outside 
the United Nations and, as Eban observed, made no comment on whether 
Israel should use force (1977:347).23 At worst, Britain's attitude was 
permissive; at best, it was supportive. More significantly, Prime Minister 
Wilson precluded neither of the two principal alternatives under 
consideration by Israel's decisionmakers. In a detailed telegram to 
Jerusalem, however, Eban cautioned that, although Wilson's views 
increased the probability of international support, their impact would 
depend on what was agreed upon in Washington (1977:347). The following 
morning, Eban left for the United States. 
While the foreign minister was en route, the evaluation of the probability 
of an Egyptian attack had changed. On 25 May, Prime Minister Eshkol 
met first with Rabin, who had resumed his responsibilities, and then heard 
the daily intelligence report at a 0945 meeting with military commanders. 
General Yariv now estimated that a serious military threat existed: troop 
concentrations in the Sinai were dense, Egyptian airfields were on alert, 
and MIG reconnaissance planes continued to overfly southern Israel. Even 
more important, the Egyptian Fourth Armored Division had begun to 
cross into Sinai that morning; this "lit the lights on all the boards of the 
General Staff in Tel Aviv" (Ben Elissar and Schiff, 1967:89). By the 
redeployment of its crack armored force, Egypt had significantly increased 
its capacity for offense. Responding to the change in capabilities, Military 
Intelligence increased its estimate of the probability of an Egyptian attack 
(Rabin, 1979:85). 
Later that morning, Prime Minister Eshkol toured the southern front 
and met with its commanders at 1115 at the headquarters of General Tal. 
These officers had been told the day before that an attack was set for the 
following morning and only at 1700 hours did they receive word that it had 
been postponed for an additional twenty-four hours (Dayan, 1976:259). 
Dissatisfied with the hesitation of civilian decisionmakers and concerned 
by the increase in Egyptian offensive capabilities, military officers pressed 
Eshkol to approve a strike against Egyptian forces. They presented the 
plans of Southern Command for ground action to the prime minister; these 
23. Wilson's recollection of the thrust of the cabinet discussion earlier that morning is 
somewhat different: "We had one of our gravest discussions. . We were all agreed to urge 
the utmost restraint, at a very difficult time, on her [Israel] while doing everything possible by 
direct diplomatic pressures and at the UN to urge that similar pressures be put on the Arab 
countries by those in a position to influence them" (1971:396). Wilson does not record, 
however, that he urged restraint directly on Eban. 
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still emphasized the occupation of part of the Sinai as a bargaining chip to 
trade for the reopening of the Straits. General Sharon challenged this 
strategy of the political use of limited force and listed the cost of its 
consequences: 
We invited him [Eshkol] two days after the Straits were closed, when the General 
Staff presented a limited plan to occupy the Gaza Strip as a bargaining device for 
the Straits. 1 was the only speaker on this matter, and I told Eshkol that we 
are making a big mistake, that we must not enter the war in stages, for after each 
stage, in a big or small war, you are subject to the same international pressures, 
and if the bargaining does not succeed and we will not get what we demand, you 
cannot reopen the war. I said that in my opinion we have the full capacity to 
destroy the Egyptian army and that the aim has to be the destruction of the 
whole Egyptian army (1973b). 
Sharon concluded with the evaluation that the growing strength of 
Egyptian forces would increase the cost of Israel's military action. Since the 
Straits could not be reopened and the concentration of forces reversed 
through diplomatic action, the earlier the attack, the easier the defeat of the 
Egyptian army. Using an inference of impossibility, General Sharon 
bolstered support for his preferred option. 
Although General Sharon was the only speaker, he expressed the 
consensus of the assembled military commanders who now agreed on the 
definition of the larger decisional problem (Gavish, 1970, 1971). 
Unequivocally, they considered the restoration of Israel's deterrent 
capability to be the central issue and urged the choice of military action as 
the only relevant response. Their clear formulation of their problem and 
their urgent demand for action coincided with the completion of the 
deployment of the reserve forces and with a significant increase in Egypt's 
offensive capabilities. Their perception of changes in capabilities affected 
both their estimate of the likelihood of an Egyptian attack and their 
evaluation of their own options. 
The consensus among military commanders did not appear to be the 
product of a search for concurrence. General Bar-Lev, soon to be 
appointed deputy chief of staff, was present at the meeting, and he did not 
press the prime minister to approve an immediate attack. Although he 
agreed with his colleagues in their definition of the problem, he considered 
that an extra few days delay would not be serious (1973b). Despite the 
increase in stress, minority opinion was still possible. 
The changes in Egypt's capabilities and in the estimated likelihood of 
attack led Eshkol to cable Eban later that day. In his cable, the prime 
minister informed his foreign minister of the entry of Egyptian armor into 
Sinai, of the trip of Egyptian Minister of War Badran to Moscow to request 
additional aid, and of the movement of Iraqi and Syrian forces toward the 
Jordanian frontier. More important, Eshkol restructured the problem for 
decision: "You should explain to President Johnson that the danger no 
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longer lies simply in the closing of the Straits but also in the concentration 
of troops and in the prospect of an Arab attack on Israel. Can President 
Johnson advise us what to do in this situation?" (cited by Rabin, 1979:85 
and Bar-Zohar, 1970:108-109). Responding to an upward revision in the 
probability of an attack, Eshkol expanded—rather than narrowed—the 
parameters of the decisional problem and extended the scope of search 
beyond the blockade to include an appropriate response to the massed 
Egyptian troops. 
Still later, on the advice of his staff, Eshkol agreed to send an even 
stronger telegram. Chief of Staff Rabin best describes the decision to 
extend the evaluation of American intentions even further: 
in order to test where Israel stood the Director-General of the Prime 
Minister's Office, the late Ya'acov Herzog, in a conversation with me, suggested 
that we send a telegram to the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, who was then in 
Washington, and in it we would say that, according to the information in our 
hands, there may be the development of an Egyptian offensive initiative against 
Israel as the events evolve. And Mr. Herzog further suggested to me that we ask 
Mr. Eban to clarify to what extent the United States is prepared to make good 
on obligations, given in the past to Israel's leaders for real help in such an event 
(1972). 
While the first cable had emphasized the change in Egypt's capabilities and 
in the estimated probability of an attack, the second telegram warned 
directly of the imminence of attack and requested the United States to 
reinforce deterrence by promising to come to Israel's defense: 
Israel faces a grave danger of general attack by Egypt and Syria. In this 
situation, implementation of the American commitment is vital—in declaration 
and action—immediately, repeat, immediately, meaning a declaration by the 
U.S. government that any attack on Israel is equivalent to an attack on the 
United States. The concrete expression of this declaration will be specific orders 
to U. S. forces in the region that they are to combine operations with the IDF 
against any possible Arab attack on Israel (cited by Rabin, 1979:87). 
Considerable controversy has arisen as to whether Israel's intelligence 
services did forecast an imminent attack or whether political advisers 
disingenuously decided to test American intentions before rather than after 
the fact. There is strong evidence that at least one of the intelligence 
agencies was predicting an Egyptian attack,24 but the two explanations are 
24. In his autobiography, Dayan writes of his conversation on 25 May with Meir Amit, 
the head of Ha-Mossad, or Special Services: "On the general military situaiton, he [Amit] said 
that all the neighbouring Arab states were geared for an overall attack on Israel, that Egypt 
already had some eight hundred tanks in Sinai and was continuing to secure reinforcements. 
The attack would be launched very soon. We had transmitted this information to 
Washington, stressing its gravity, and asked whether the United States would now declare her 
readiness to'come to the defense of Israel as if it were the United States' "(1976:262). Rabin 
reports that on the evening of 25 May, Yariv expressed his concern to the prime minister that, 
if Israel took no action the following day, Egypt might attack (1979:86). Quandt reports that 
Israel's intelligence experts submitted several specific items as evidence of Egypt's intention 
to attack imminently. After examining the evidence throughout the night of May 25-26, 
American intelligence concluded that there was no indication of imminent attack (1977:49, 
50). 
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not mutually exclusive. Certainly, the cable was designed to force the 
United States to clarify its intentions. 
In formulating their request to President Johnson in precisely this way, 
however, Israel's decisionmakers were transforming the definition of their 
decisional problem. They had sent Eban to Washington to explore the 
likelihood of American support should they choose preemptive retaliation 
to restore the credibility of their deterrence posture. They were now asking 
the President to commit the United States to the defense of Israel to deter 
an Arab first strike. The logical consequences of this reformulation are 
considerable. By requesting a statement that an attack on Israel was 
tantamount to an attack on the United States, Israel's policymakers were 
acknowledging implicitly their inability to deter independently. It can be 
argued that Israel's deterrent capability became inadequate only after it 
failed to respond to the closure of the Straits, a declared casus belli. With its 
own deterrent capacity destroyed, the logical step was to draw on 
American resources to reinforce deterrence. 
But Israel's deterrent posture was shaken not by inadequate 
capabilities—in the logic of this argument—but by inadequate resolve to 
fulfill the commitment to retaliate when the challenge to deterrence became 
apparent. Indeed, military experts had offered no evidence that Israel's 
capabilities did not permit retaliation to restore deterrence. The principal 
obstacle was rather the absence of American political support. Those 
decisionmakers who emphasized the reestablishment of deterrence as the 
principal problem logically should have asked only for American support 
of a retaliatory strike by Israel.25 
A request to deter Egypt and Syria from attacking, moreover, might 
expose Israel to a parallel request to refrain from military action. If 
American support of a preemptive attack were indeed important, then 
Israel would suffer a further loss of deterrent capacity. The logic led to the 
substitution of American deterrence for that of Israel. The circle was 
squared because decisionmakers did not consider whether reestablishment 
of Israel's deterrent capability through retaliation or deterrence of an 
Egyptian and Syrian attack took precedence. If the appeal to the United 
States was only a testing device, moreover, its logic is even less obvious. 
Rather, its illogic lay precisely in ambiguous problem definition and 
imprecision in the applied concept of deterrence.26 
25. Dayan made precisely this argument when Amit told him of the cable to Johnson: "It 
would be catastrophic if Israel were to be seized by hysterical fear and start banging on the 
doors of the Big Powers, begging them to come to her rescue and all this when, in fact, as 
I firmly believed, we were capable of putting the Egyptians to rout. To end up by 
proposing that they [the United States] should settle the matter for us was both naive and 
foolish. Rather it should be our purpose to convince them that because of Nasser's dangerous 
acts, we were compelled to strike immediately at Egypt" (1976:263, emphasis in original). 
26. Eban displays this confusion in the application of the concept of deterrence and in 
problem definition when he describes his reaction to the two cables. Eban does note that "the 
direction and thrust of my mission were changed by a cabled message that reached me from 
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On his arrival in Washington on 25 May, Eban first received the second 
telegram and then the first. After reading the reports of an imminent attack, 
he asked for an earlier meeting with Secretary of State Rusk and informed 
him, as well as Eugene Rostow and Lucius Battle who were both present, of 
the latest intelligence. Surprised, Rusk asked for an immediate adjourn­
ment to apprise the president of the contents of the cables. Before arranging 
for another meeting later that evening, he did tell Eban that the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee had expressed support for Israel but on the 
condition that the United States acted in cooperation with others 
(Johnson, 1971:291-292). 
An hour later, Eban returned to the State Department with Am­
bassadors Rafael and Harman and Minister Evron to meet with senior 
officials of the State Department.27 Eban opened the discussion with his 
statement that freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran was "a paramount 
and unconditional national interest" (1977:350). If the statement of the 
foreign minister was indeed an accurate reflection of his evaluation, rather 
than a tactical preliminary to difficult bargaining, then the original 
commitment to deter and retaliation to defend after deterrence failed were 
both rational. 
The working dinner then turned its attention to the discussion of 
procedures to lift the blockade. State Department officials were optimistic 
about the prospects. Their plan included a joint declaration by maritime 
states on the right of free passage, the dispatch of a naval task force to the 
Straits, and coordination with the Security Council. As Eban later 
reported to Eshkol, some officials predicted that the president would 
pledge that the Straits would be opened, even if there were resistance 
(1977:350). The foreign minister pressed for a timetable of implementation 
and expressed his skepticism of the effectiveness of any arrangement which 
included the United Nations (1977:350-351). Later that evening, alarmed 
by the possibility of limits on Israel's right of innocent passage in the 
Straits, he sent Ambassador Harman back to the State Department to 
reemphasize Israel's need for a concrete and precise statement of American 
intentions. In a midnight meeting with Eugene Rostow and Sisco, Harman 
warned that Israel would not accept any plan which would open the Straits 
to all ships except those of Israel (Quandt, 1977:49). 
Jerusalem." Correctly concerned that his request for an American commitment would signal 
weakness rather than military confidence, he continues: "Instead of asking for specific 
political support and deterrence in the matter of the blockade, I would in effect be saying that 
Israel felt her life to be at Egypt's mercy unless there was an American intervention beyond the 
limits of the Gulf of Aqaba problem" (1977:348,349, emphasis added). Logically, Israel could 
not ask for American help in deterring the blockade. It could ask for political support for 
retaliation or for American action to lift the blockade. Eban does not distinguish between 
these two requests, much less the substitution of American deterrence for that of Israel. 
27. Present were Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow; Foy 
Kohler, a Sovietologist; Lucius Battle, responsible for the Middle East and South Asia; 
Joseph Sisco, charged with responsibility for the United Nations; Leonard Meeker, legal 
counsel; and Townsend Hoopes, representative of the Pentagon. 
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After the working dinner, Eban and Harman met again with Rusk who, 
in the interim, had seen the president and consulted the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler. American military officials did 
not share Israel's appraisal of an imminent Arab attack. Moreover, the 
guarantee that Israel was seeking was not within the prerogative of the 
president; it existed only in the NATO alliance and depended on 
congressional approval. Nevertheless, Eugene Rostow had summoned 
Egyptian Ambassador Kemal and warned against any offensive military 
action. The Soviet Union had also been asked to use its influence with 
President Nasser (Quandt, 1977:49). Eban reflected privately on the 
contradiction between American deterrence of military action by Egypt 
and support of preemptive retaliation by Israel (1977:352). Harman cabled 
Jerusalem the results of the working dinner and at 0130 New York time on 
26 May, Eban sent Eshkol a brief telegram summarizing the results of the 
three meetings. 
Only a half-hour later, at 0800 hours in Israel, the Ministerial Committee 
of Defense began a meeting which lasted for six hours. The committee was 
to be in almost continuous session for the next three days. Yariv presented 
the latest intelligence report, underlining the increase in Egyptian 
capabilities, especially the redeployment of its crack armored division.28 
The chief of staff reviewed the cumulative evidence of the last ten days and 
listed the advantages of a preemptive strike.29 The army was deployed, 
equipped, and prepared to attack (Rabin, 1979:89). Warhaftig, the minister 
of religious affairs, was more restrained; he referred to Ben Gurion's 
reservations about the capacity of the I.D.F to fight alone. Allon, Carmel, 
and Galili were confident of Israel's capacity to defend, with or without an 
ally. Allon, participating in the deliberations of the committee for the first 
time,30 shared the estimate that an Arab attack was likely. As he later 
recalled: 
28. One analyst notes that the pace of deployment of the Fourth Armored Division 
indicated a sudden decision to attack. Unlike the first wave of troops which had deployed in 
orderly fashion, this second transfer across the Canal was disorganized and precipitate with 
poor infrastructure and supplies (Burdett, 1969:257). 
29. Weizman recalled the reduction of uncertainty among members of the General Staff: 
"It's hard to pinpoint the precise day, but around 26 May there were no further doubts left in 
the General Staff about the necessity of Israel breaking out of the noose Nasser had placed 
around its neck. At that point, two things were clear: first, diplomatic activity had no hope 
whatsoever of resolving the crisis; second, from our viewpoint, the blockade of the Straits was 
not, in itself, the principal problem. The large concentration of forces in Sinai, even if there 
were no immediate attack, would require Israel to keep enormous numbers of reservists under 
arms, undermining the economy. This situation was a dangerous one and of far-reaching 
consequences to the credibility of Israel's deterrent capacity" (1976:213-214). Weizman's 
reconstruction of the evaluation of the General Staff is ex post facto, and this may account in 
part for its categorical language. Multiple sources attest, however, to the change in the 
intelligence estimate of the likelihood of attack and to the change in the General Staffs 
definition of the decisional problem. 
30. Allon had returned from the Soviet Union on 24 May and was immediately briefed by 
Jhe General Staff. As an experienced military officer and the originator of the concept of 
"anticipatory counterattack," Allon was active and influential in the ensuing ten days. He was 
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Apprehensive about possible Israeli reactions [to the blockade of the Straits], 
Nasser bolstered his forces in Sinai with further motorized infantry and armour 
divisions, and alerted his air force and navy. The concentration of Egyptian 
forces became a menace per se. Israel's anxiety increased. She was evidently 
facing more than an attempt on her freedom of navigation; there was a real 
danger of an imminent invasion of her territory (1970:78). 
Allon urged an immediate preemptive strike and argued that, if Israel 
attacked before Egyptian forces were fully deployed and organized, losses 
would be less (1970:80). Carmel and Galili agreed and suggested that the 
prime minister be empowered to authorize appropriate action if necessary. 
Information on the results of Eban's consultations in Washington, 
however, was still incomplete. The lengthy summaries of his discussions in 
Paris and London had arrived, but the cabled reports of meetings with 
Rusk and State Department officials were only preliminary. The 
information that did exist placed heavy emphasis on the importance of 
consultations in Washington. 
Eshkol summarized the debate by stressing the change in the problem for 
decision. The blockade of the Straits was no longer the only or the primary 
focus; rather, the concentration of forces was the greater danger. The prime 
minister now distinguished among the challenges and ordered them in 
importance. If the logic of the argument were pursued, decisionmakers 
would focus their attention principally on the likelihood of American 
support if Israel attacked. At the suggestion of Minister of Industry and 
Commerce Ze'ev Sharef, the committee decided to postpone further 
discussion to await clarification from Washington. Immediately following 
the meeting, at Allon's insistence, the prime minister sent a third cable to 
Eban instructing him to emphasize in his meeting with President Johnson 
not the reopening of the blockaded Straits but the threat imposed by the 
massed Egyptian troops on Israel's southern border (Allon, 1968 and 
Eban, 1977:351). These instructions were consistent with the respecifica­
tion of the decisional problem to emphasize defense. 
In Washington, Eban, accompanied by Ambassador Harman and the 
Embassy's military attache, Yosef Geva, met with Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, 
CIA Director Richard Helms, and Townsend Hoopes. Pentagon officials 
disputed both Israel's estimated likelihood of attack and its evaluation of 
relative capabilities. American intelligence did not consider that Egyptian 
forces were deployed for early attack but argued rather that President 
Nasser intended to provoke Israel to attack in the confident expectation 
that his reinforced army in the Sinai could absorb and repel thefirst strike. 
The problem of defense was neither immediate nor serious. Senior officials 
to meet frequently with Eshkol and Rabin and pressed the prime minister to agree to a 
preemptive strike. 
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also reported the results of Pentagon studies prepared for President 
Johnson which suggested that, although casualties would be higher if 
Egypt struck first, Israel would win a military victory whether it preempted 
or absorbed a first strike.31 Finally, they argued that a delay in military 
action increased the effectiveness of Israel's fighting capacity, while 
Egyptian lines of communication and supply were long, overextended, and 
a logistical nightmare (Eban, 1977:352).32 
Although General Wheeler did not consider preemptive action a matter 
of urgency, he and Secretary McNamara opposed the organization of an 
international naval task force. More precisely than Israel's decisionmakers, 
they suggested that the problem was not the blockade but the failure of 
deterrence. The opening of the Straits by an internationalflotilla would not 
restore Israel's deterrent capability; that problem was principally Israel's 
(Geva, 1971; Bar-Zohar, 1970:116-118; and Quandt, 1977:47).33 Even if 
tacit, the policy implications were obvious. 
By mid-afternoon, Eban's meeting with President Johnson had not yet 
been officially confirmed. Concerned by aflow of telegrams from the prime 
minister insisting that he return for a cabinet meeting the following 
evening, Eban sent Evron to the White House "to make urgent inquiry" 
(1977:353). When Evron assured Rostow that Eban would disclose nothing 
of his conversation with the president to the press, a meeting was quickly 
arranged for 1900 hours. In the interim, President Johnson asked to see 
Evron and, in the half-hour before Eban arrived, outlined the essentials of 
the American position. Later that evening, Evron cabled a detailed report 
of his conversation with the president to Jerusalem. President Johnson, 
unlike his military counselors, considered the blockade to be the principal 
problem: "The objective is to open the Straits for navigation by all States 
31. Quandt (1977:50) reports that both the CIA and the Pentagon considered a victory by 
Israel likely no matter who struck first. Both estimated that the fighting would last no longer 
than a week. 
32. The logic of this argument, as reported by Eban, is somewhat difficult to follow. Israel 
had derived military benefit from delay from 19 to 25 May when it was completing the 
mobilization of its forces and discussing contingency plans for attack. The army was now 
prepared, however, for military action. The Egyptian army had deployed additional forces 
hastily on 25 May and should have benefited from additional time to organize. Eban does not 
distinguish, in his reporting, between past and future benefits of delay. Quandt makes no 
mention of such an estimate by American military officials when he summarizes CIA and 
Pentagon evaluations. It is possible that Eban is bolstering support for his preferred option. 
Bolstering would explain Eban's omission, in his account of the meeting, of Pentagon 
opposition to the flotilla on military grounds. 
33. Quandt reports that the Pentagon strongly opposed the limited use of military force. 
Military officials raised such issues as the likely American response if Egypt fired on an 
American ship, the possible commitment of American ground troops if Egypt used military 
force, and the likelihood of an open-ended commitment even if Egypt did not respond. 
Success of such an operation was far from assured and, as Quandt notes, McNamara could 
scarcely hide his skepticism. The multinational fleet was "a military man's nightmare" 
(1977:47). Many of the arguments raised by McNamara were similar to those made by Allon 
in Israel's cabinet discussions. 
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including Israel and this objective shall be carried out."34 Although he was 
optimistic about the prospects of a flotilla with Britain and other maritime 
states, the president underlined the importance of full congressional 
support and consultation with the United Nations. He was explicit in his 
warning, moreover, that the United States could not extend political 
support to unilateral military action by Israel. Any such action, the 
president insisted, would cause Israel severe damage. The thrust of the 
president's message was clear: although time and effort would be necessary 
to organize a flotilla, support for a preemptive strike was not likely. 
Eban and Harman arrived shortly thereafter for the formal meeting with 
the president.35 Eban began by telling the president that he had come to 
discuss the blockade but, in the meantime, the graver issue of an imminent 
attack had arisen. Even then, however: 
If the President would tell me that the Straits were going to be opened again, and 
if he would make common cause with Israel on this matter, then there was still a 
possibility that Nasser would retreat, and a victory would be won for legality 
without war (1977:356). 
Despite his reference to the troop concentrations, the foreign minister 
emphasized the problem of the blockade and urged international rather 
than national action. He and President Johnson argued from similar 
premises: both focused on opening the closed Straits and paid less attention 
to defense or deterrence. 
The president reiterated the importance of congressional support for any 
American initiative and argued that the United Nations must try and fail 
before Congress would support independent action by maritime powers. 
He was hopeful that Britain, Canada, and other European states might 
34. The text of Evron's cable to Jerusalem is as follows: "When I entered the room, the 
President told me that he fully understood the gravity of Israel's position. The first step 
would have to be the laying of a Congressional basis for any support of Israel's 
position. . The United States had pledged itself to preserve freedom of passage in the 
Straits of Tiran and the United States would carry out that obligation. But anything involving 
even a possibility of force would be impractical unless the proper Congressional basis 
were laid in advance. The President spoke optimistically about the possibility of setting 
up a structure with the active support of Britain and other maritime powers after the 
conclusion of a quick debate at the United Nations. [His advisers] had expressed their 
support in the following formulation: 'The objective is to open the Straits for navigation by all 
States including Israel and this objective shall be carried out.' Mr. Johnson made it clear that 
the appraisal in Jerusalem about an imminent Egyptian surprise attack was not shared by the 
United States. Israel was a sovereign Government, and if it decided to act alone, it could of 
course do so; but in that case everything that happened before and afterwards would be upon 
its responsibility and the United States would have no obligation for any consequences that 
might ensue. He refused to believe that Israel would carry out unilateral action which was 
bound to bring her great damage. He said that . . he was not prepared to act in a 
manner . to bringaboutthe intervention of the Soviet Union"(Foreign Ministry sources, 
cited by Brecher, 1975:390-391). 
35. Six of President Johnson's advisers also participated in the meeting: Secretary of 
State Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow from the White House, Eugene Rostow and 
Joseph Sisco from the State Department, and George Christian, the president's press 
secretary. 
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contribute to a naval task force. Johnson assured Eban that "you can tell 
your Cabinet that the President, the Congress, and the country will 
vigorously support a plan to use any or all measures to open the Straits" 
(cited by Eban, 1977:358 and Johnson, 1971:293). The Straits must be 
opened not only to international shipping but specifically to ships of Is­
rael's registry. The president was optimistic that the problem of the block­
ade would soon be settled and repeated his earlier warning against uni­
lateral action by Israel: 
I do not believe that the procedure outlined for building up an international task 
force is going to take too long. The purpose is to see to it that Israeli ships go 
through. I have been into all aspects of Israel's security situation. I am aware of 
what it is costing but it is less costly than to precipitate the matter while the 
jury is still out and to have the world against you. Israel will not be alone 
unless it decides to go alone (cited by Eban, 1977:358). 
President Johnson repeated this last phrase three times. As Eban noted, it 
was to become his watchword during the next week. 
Ambassador Harman had taken detailed notes of the conversation and, 
at the end of the meeting, the president gave Eban an aide-memoire 
summarizing the scope and limits of the American undertaking to open the 
Straits of Tiran and reiterating the injunction against military action by 
Israel: 
The United States has its own Constitutional processes, which are basic to its 
actions on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet 
reported to the UN Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated 
what it may or may not be able or willing to do, although the United States will 
press for prompt action in the UN. I have already publicly stated this week our 
view on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait we 
plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations 
to assure that the Strait and the Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of 
all the vessels of nations. I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make 
itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it 
decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision (Quandt, 
1977:53-54 and Eban, 1977:359). 
Eban left the meeting more optimistic about the likelihood of an 
international task force than about American reaction should Israel choose 
preemption. One purpose of his mission had been achieved: American 
intentions, should Israel act alone, were now much clearer. 
Eban and Harman left for New York, Harman to prepare minutes of the 
meeting with the President and Eban to consult briefly with the American 
ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. U Thant had just 
reported to the Security Council the assurances given him by President 
Nasser during his trip to Cairo that Egypt would not initiate hostilities 
against Israel.36 Skeptical of the results of multilateral action, the 
36. Sec the Report of the Secretary-General, 26 May 1967, Security Council Document 
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ambassador urged Eban to give greatest weight to the words of the 
President himself in interpreting the variety of available evidence. In an 
America torn by Vietnam, President Johnson's statements were the most 
valid indicator of American intentions. After the meeting, Eban enplaned 
for Jerusalem with a copy of the minutes of the discussion with the 
president which Harman had prepared. Late that night, Ambassador 
Harman cabled that Eban had not had time to report fully on his 
conversation with President Johnson before his departure, but that he was 
bringing the full protocol with him.37 
While Eban gathered evidence on likely American behavior, President 
Nasser clarified his intentions and made explicit his revised estimate of 
relative capabilities which led him to challenge deterrence. In a speech to a 
delegation of the Damascus-based Arab Workers Conference on 26 May, 
the president explained: 
Recently we have felt strong enough that if we were to enter a battle with 
Israel we would triumph. Taking over Sharm el-Shaykh meant 
confrontation with Israel. Taking such action also meant that we were ready to 
enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation. If Israel 
embarks on an aggession against Syria or Egypt, the battle against Israel will be 
a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel. I probably 
could not have said such thingsfive or even three years ago. Today, some eleven 
years after 1956, I say such things because I am confident (1967b). 
The president himself interpreted the imposition of the blockade as a 
general challenge to deterrence. His close adviser, Mohammed Hassanein 
Heikal, extended the analysis further to insist that Israel had no choice but 
to act to restore its deterrent reputation. Writing in Al-Ahram that same 
day, Heikal argued: 
Therefore, it is not a matter of the Gulf of Aqaba, but of something bigger. It is 
the whole philosophy of Israeli security. Hence I say that Israel must 
resort to arms. Israel has no alternative but to use arms if it wants to 
exercise power. The logic of the confrontation between 
Egypt and Israel, which is fortified by the illusion of American might, 
dictates that Egypt after all it has now succeeded in achieving, must wait, even 
though it has to wait for a blow. Let Israel begin; let our second blow then be 
ready (1967).38 
S/7906. In his discussions in Cairo, U Thant apparently persuaded President Nasser not to 
stop and search ships while in return Israel would be asked not to send a test ship through the 
Straits. U Thant did not publicize the agreement lest it convey acceptance of the blockade. The 
promise to refrain from a first strike, however, was consistent with the American estimate of 
President Nasser's strategy. 
37. The text of Harman's cable was quoted by Eshkol in an answer to a question in 
parliament, See Eshkol, 1968b. 
38. President Nasser's speech was broadcast by Radio Cairo, and Eban was handed a text 
of it as well as a copy of the article by Heikal when his plane stopped for refueling in Paris en 
route to Jerusalem. There are minor differences in several available translations of Heikal's 
column. This version is that provided by Eban which presumably is a record of the document 
he received that night. 
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His analysis was a model of logic and precision. It defined the problem 
clearly: the issue was not the blockade but the challenge to Israel's capacity 
to deter. Heikal was even more helpful. He informed his readers that the 
hypothesis that an American commitment could reestablish deterrence was 
a delusion. Finally, he clarified Egypt's strategy of provoking a first strike 
by Israel in order to retaliate. His interpretation was consistent with that of 
U Thant and American intelligence. Israel's problem was not to lift the 
blockade or to defend against imminent attack; it was principally to 
reestablish deterrence. 
During the night of 26-27 May, the Soviet ambassador requested an 
urgent meeting with Eshkol. When they met at the prime minister's home in 
"pajama conference" at 0235 in the morning, Chuvakin transmitted a note 
from Prime Minister Kosygin which, in restrained language, appealed to 
Israel to refrain from the use of force: "it is essential to find means to settle 
the conflict by non-military means. It is easy to light a conflagration but 
difficult to put out the flame" (Kosygin, 1967 and cited by Eban, 
1977:366).39 The Soviet leader issued no threat in his appeal to Eshkol, nor 
did he make the usual charges holding Israel responsible for the escalating 
tension. On the contrary, as Eban would subsequently note, "there was less 
invective here than usual and a perceptible note of anxiety" 
(1977:366). The tone of Kosygin's note would be important evidence in the 
attempt later that day to evaluate Soviet intentions.40 
Israel's decisionmakers now began a collective process of revision, 
evaluation, and decision that would extend for almost twenty-four hours. 
Since the last cabinet meeting, a great deal of new information on Egyptian 
intent and capabilities and on Soviet and American intentions had 
accumulated. When the cabinet began meeting in secret session,41 however, 
information was still incomplete. Evron's long cable had arrived, but 
ministers knew only that Eban was bringing the full record of his 
discussions with President Johnson with him. They had no way of 
anticipating the convergence between the two reports. 
The cabinet was joined in its deliberations by the senior military 
leadership—Rabin, Weizman, Bar-Lev, and Yariv—by Dinstein, the 
deputy minister of defense, and by Levavi, the director-general of the 
39. Again, there are insignificant differences of language between Eban's version of the
Soviet note and that published by the Jerusalem Post on 4 June, 1967. 
40. The stimulus to the urgent Soviet request for restraint was Eban's transmission to 
Washington of Israel's estimate of an imminent Arab attack. President Johnson warned 
Egypt against military action and requested the Soviet Union to reinforce his attempt at 
deterrence. The Soviet Union consequently delivered warning messages to both Egypt and 
Israel in the early hours of 27 May. At the time, Israel's decisionmakers were unaware of the 
simultaneous message to Cairo. 
41. If a choice to preempt were anticipated by decisionmakers, a secret meeting would be 
of critical importance in preserving tactical surprise. Eban had informed Washington,
however, of the crucial cabinet meeting when he pressed for an appointment with President
Johnson. 
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Foreign Ministry, who served as Eban's surrogate in his absence. The 
ministers did not adjourn their meeting until after 0400 hours the next 
morning. Discussion was exhaustive and exhausting but produced no 
decision. Cabinet members could not agree on the best course of action in 
part because they were imprecise in denning the problem for decision. 
Although they were not fully conscious of it, decisionmakers discussed 
several problems simultaneously 
The director of Military Intelligence presented his report which 
emphasized the increasing military preparedness of Arab armies. Dayan 
subsequently summarized the intelligence estimate of 27 May:42 
Within Sinai, the Egyptians already had some 900 tanks, more than 200 
warplanes, and about 80,000 troops. From the data and a good deal of 
additional information it seemed that apart from the operational plans for 
her ground forces, Egypt also had plans for an air attack, which might be 
launched simultaneously with her ground attack or in response to action by us 
(1976:265). 
The intelligence estimate placed heavy emphasis on capability variables. It 
now considered Egyptian capabilities adequate for a general attack (Hi to 
H2). Whether the problem was defense or the reestablishment of 
deterrence, Israel's army faced growing strength in the Sinai. Military 
leaders expressed confidence in Israel's military capabilities but warned 
that additional delay would impose heavy costs in casualties and 
compromise the chances of success.43 The prime minister then reported on 
his early morning conversation with Ambassador Chuvakin. Some of 
those he had consulted interpreted the Soviet note as an attempt to gain 
time to better coordinate action with Egypt.44 
Eban arrived shortly after the cabinet meeting began and briefly 
reviewed the results of his meetings with President de Gaulle and Prime 
Minister Wilson. Although cabled summaries of these conversations had 
been available for three days, Eban felt it necessary particularly to 
emphasize de Gaulle's unyielding opposition to military action by Israel. 
The foreign minister then read to the cabinet parts of Ambassador 
42. Dayan was not a member of the cabinet and did not participate in the meeting. He 
provides the most reliable evidence, however, of that day's estimate by Military Intelligence. 
Dayan had met with Weizman that morning and expressed his uncertainty about Egyptian 
intent. He requested the opportunity to see the relevant intelligence information and, at 1500 
hours that afternoon, the deputy chief of intelligence brought him the data he requested. 
43. Eban challenges the divergence in military estimates of the consequences of immediate 
military action and delay. It is difficult to understand, he argues, how the cost could increase 
so heavily if Israel waited (1977:371). 
44. At 0800 that morning, Eshkol met with Amit, the head of Ha-Mossad. At 0900 he 
reviewed the daily intelligence report with Rabin and Yariv and at 0930 he met with a group of 
invited colleagues-Galili, Allon, Sasson, Meir, Rabin, Yariv, Herzog, and Levavi—to 
discuss his meeting with the Soviet ambassador. The dominant interpretation of a Soviet 
attempt to delay was reinforced by the announced visit of Egyptian Minister of War Badran to 
Moscow. 
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Harman's detailed summary of the meeting with President Johnson and 
reviewed the American proposal for an international naval patrol. 
Although he could not guarantee that the flotilla would indeed 
materialize, Eban emphasized that President Johnson had committed 
himself to use every possible means to break the blockade.45 Despite his 
emphasis on the blockade, he concluded by defining the problem as one of 
political timing for military action and acknowledging the conflict of 
values: 
Had we created political conditions in which a victory, if achieved, would be 
ratified by political success? Or, conversely, would the political advantages of 
some further diplomatic action outweigh the physical dangers inherent in delay? 
(1977:365). 
Eban insisted that both because President Johnson had undertaken 
responsibility to open the Straits and because Israel had requested 
Washington to restrain Egypt, Israel must now delay military action to 
ensure diplomatic support (1977:367, 368). Even if American efforts to 
open the Straits should fail, Israel would derive political benefit in its 
relationship with the United States if it waited. Sensing the deep division 
within the room, the foreign minister concluded with the proposal that the 
cabinet decide to wait an additional forty-eight hours. 
In his report to the cabinet, Eban continued to discuss the two problems 
of blockade and deterrence as well as the relationship between them. 
Although, logically, Israel could expect greater diplomatic support for 
retaliation if it waited for a flotilla that did not materialize, the reverse was 
not true. If theflotilla succeeded, there would be no corresponding benefit 
to Israel's independent capacity to deter. Eban made the first and ignored 
the second argument.46 
The prime minister disputed Eban's equation of the two problems and 
accorded priority to the reestablishment of a credible deterrent. He could 
see no benefit, therefore, from delay which would compensate for the 
45. Dayan (1976:265) recalls that the intelligence estimate of American intentions on 27 
May, done independently of the Foreign Office, stressed the ambiguity of the evidence and the 
consequent uncertainty. The deputy director of intelligence had summarized the thrust of 
President Johnson's position: first, given time, the United States would open the Straits; 
second, Israel must not take unilateral action; and third, if Egypt attacks, the United States 
would support Israel. Dayan continues his summary of the intelligence estimate: "On the 
other hand, we had information that the Americans were trying to appease the Egyptians. 
Johnson was ready to invite Nasser to Washington to give him grants and loans, and the 
American ambassador to Cairo had told Nasser that the United States was not with Israel. 
However, there was no information repudiating the report that the same ambassador had 
officially requested that Egypt open the Straits, restore the UNEF, and withdraw her troops 
from the border." Military Intelligence appeared to be using multiple sources of evidence and 
to be assessing the impact of information on competing hypotheses of American intent. 
46. Eban argues: "To defeat Nasser's blockade and troop concentration in May by a 
combination of military preparedness and political pressures would be no less . . signifi­
cant than to bring him low by an actual trial of strength"( 1977:372). Eban does not distinguish 
between national deterrent capability and international coercive diplomacy. 
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continuing erosion of Israel's deterrent reputation and for the increasing 
military cost of attack as the Egyptian army organized. If Israel did not 
attack, he argued, it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. 
Allon challenged the logic of Eban's analysis even more forcefully. The 
issue was not the blockade, he subsequently wrote, but the challenge to 
deterrence and defense: "Freedom of navigation has become a secondary 
consideration. The concentration of offensive forces in Sinai had 
become the crucial challenge" (1970:81). Israel would improve its power to 
deter if it acted alone rather than with the help of a great power; had it done 
so in 1956, it would have avoided some of its postwar difficulties. The 
wrong lessons were being learned from history. The foreign minister's 
trip, he insisted, was a mistake and should never have been made; it had 
already proven costly by limiting Israel's freedom to act. 
Allon went even further in his criticism. Not only was the flotilla 
irrelevant to the central problem, but it could precipitate an Egyptian 
attack and deprive Israel of the important advantages of preemption and 
surprise: 
Even supposing that an international fleet had reached the Red Sea, this in itself 
would have had no effect on the land and air fronts. On the contrary, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that, in anticipation of the arrival of such an 
international expeditionary fleet, the Arab High Command might have put 
forward the date of its attack on Israel in order to establish a fait accompli before 
the arrival of the fleet. [Israel] could not wait for something to turn up— 
not even an illusory international fleet. She could not wait for a major Egyptian 
attack before launching her counter-attack; since wars do not start with a "first 
shell" but with a major air attack, this might have proved fatal. It is quite 
probable that the Egyptian High Command, seeing through such a strategem, 
would have refrained from attacking this isolated ship and instead launched its 
full-scale offensive against Israel (1970:81-82). 
Allon emphasized the cost to Israel if it absorbed an Egyptian first strike. 
Moreover, the cost of military action was increasing as Egyptian forces 
deployed and organized; time was working against Israel (1967b). Allon 
concluded by expressing his confidence in the capacity of the I.D.F- to win 
a military victory and urged an immediate preemptive strike. 
Moshe Carmel, the minister of transport, agreed with Allon's definition 
of the problem for decision, his estimate of the probability of an Arab 
attack, and his evaluation of the consequences of further delay: 
There was no prospect whatsoever that the Straits would be reopened. And even 
if, by some miracle, they were, that would not solve the main problem—the 
threat of the massed Egyptian troops poised along our southern border. I feared 
their military initiative. There was the overall military-political view of the 
necessity for us to take our fate in our own hands and to smash the aggressive 
Egyptian build-up (1972). 
Like Allon, Carmel urged a choice to preempt. 
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Members of Mapam, a smaller party in the governing coalition, agreed 
that the concentration of Egyptian forces, not the blockade of the Straits, 
was the central challenge to decision. However, they did not accept the 
estimate of a high probability of an imminent Arab attack. At least in the 
short run, they argued, Nasser would consolidate his considerable victory. 
There was still time, therefore, to examine further diplomatic alternatives 
(Bentov, 1972). Ministers representing the National Religious Party 
(Mafdal) in the coalition shared Eban's emphasis on the importance of 
opening the Straits. They found his report encouraging and argued that the 
possibility of an international flotilla could not be dismissed. They too 
urged that diplomatic opportunities be explored further before Israel took 
independent military action. 
From the long discussion, it was apparent that the cabinet was 
deadlocked as ministers divided evenly in favor of and against preemp­
tion.47 The three members of Ahdut Ha'avodah, led by Allon, and six 
Mapai ministers, including the prime minister, supported preemption. 
Opposed were the three remaining Mapai ministers, led by Eban, the two 
members from Mapam, the representative of the Independent Liberals, 
and all three ministers from the National Religious Party.48 In many cases, 
party affiliation overlapped with support or opposition to immediate 
action; in this case, party affiliation is more strongly related to preference 
than is organizational interest. The differences in preferences, however, 
flowed logically from different definitions of the principal alternatives and 
different evaluations of the cost and benefit of these consequences. 
For the ministers represented by Allon and Carmel, a choice to preempt 
was obvious and easy. They defined the problem both as defense against an 
imminent attack and the reestablishment of deterrence. They considered an 
Arab attack very likely and American support as unimportant to Israel's 
future capacity to deter. Logically, if American diplomatic support was 
unimportant, then the flotilla was irrelevant. In attempting to persuade 
their colleagues of the dominance of a strategy of preemption, however, 
both Allon and Carmel resorted to inferences of impossibility to dismiss 
the international naval patrol. They did not need to do so, given their logic 
which eliminated the flotilla from consideration. Rather than rely 
exclusively on the logic of their argument, however, they used extra-logical 
techniques to reduce the attractiveness of the competing option. By 
insisting that theflotilla was impossible, they weakened their argument that 
it was irrelevant. 
47. Eban (1977:367) insists that no formal vote was taken that evening and that the 9 to 9 
division among cabinet members was inferred from the content of their speeches. Carmel 
(1972), on the other hand, and Rabin (1979:91) insist that a formal vote was taken. 
48. For preemption were Allon, Carmel, and Galili (Ahdut Ha'avodah) and Eshkol, 
Gvati, Sasson, Shapira, Sharef, and Yeshayahu (Mapai). Opposed wereSapir, Aranne, and 
Eban (Mapai), Barzilai and Bentov (Mapam), Kol (Independent Liberals), and Burg, H. M. 
Shapira, and Warhaftig (Mafdal or National Religious Party). 
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The prime minister and most of his Mapai colleagues now shared this 
emphasis on defense against an imminent attack and the restoration of a 
credible deterrent posture. The concentration of forces, rather than the 
blockade, was the primary problem. Unlike Allon, however, they 
considered American diplomatic support important to Israel's future 
capacity to deter and valued it highly. Their choice was not easy, therefore, 
and they had made it more difficult by changing their definition of the 
problem for decision in midstream. Although they acknowledged that the 
likelihood of this support would be less if they chose military action after 
American planning for a flotilla had begun, they reluctantly supported 
preemption. 
The Mapam ministers defined the problem more narrowly as the 
recreation of a credible deterrent. While they challenged the estimate of a 
high probability of an Egyptian attack, they did agree with the prime 
minister that American support was very important. Consequently, they 
preferred to continue to try to consolidate international support; there was 
time to wait. 
The last group, represented by Eban, concentrated primarily on the 
blockade and secondarily on deterrence.49 They considered that President 
Nasser might delay if not refrain from the use of force, given his enormous 
diplomatic success and, more so than their colleagues, they relied heavily 
on American support. Members of the National Religious Party, in 
particular, were influenced by Ben Gurion's strong emphasis on an ally as a 
prerequisite to attack (Eban, 1977:371). They were also less skeptical than 
most of their colleagues about the possibility of an international flotilla 
which could address the problem of the blockade directly. Even if the 
flotilla failed, since the problem of defense was present but not urgent, 
Israel could then retaliate to restore deterrence with enhanced American 
support. For the moment at least, a strategy of waiting was preferable. 
Here matters stood as cabinet ministers debated the alternatives. They 
began from different premises, worked with different estimates, and, at 
times, argued past rather than with each other. Finally, at 0400 in the 
morning, the prime minister suggested to his tired colleagues that they 
adjourn for a few hours, reconsider their positions, and meet again that 
afternoon. Important new information would arrive during the morning, 
however, before the cabinet reconvened at 1500 hours. 
To ensure symmetry in reporting, Ambassador Barbour of the United 
States brought to the assistant director-general of the Foreign Ministry, 
49. In his autobiography, Eban argued that the decisive question was the blockade of the 
Straits of Tiran: "a blockade in the Straits and in the Gulf of Aqaba, unlike the troop 
concentrations, would take us to a point of no return. Troop movements, after all, could be 
ordered and later dispersed without loss of face or implication of retreat. But if a blockade was 
imposed, its cancellation was inconceivable except under pressure or threat of physical force" 
(1977:326). 
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Moshe Bitan, an official State Department summary of Eban's discussions 
in Washington. The summary reiterated the three-stage plan to organize a 
naval presence50 and reported that President Johnson had repeated his 
determination to make the maritime plan work. Finally, the department 
summary acknowledged that the president "had decided to make every 
possible effort to assure that the Straits and the Gulf would be open to free 
and innocent passage" (cited by Eban, 1977:369). The thrust of Eban's 
report to the cabinet was confirmed by independent evidence.51 
A little later that morning, at 1100 hours, Prime Minister Eshkol 
received a note from President Johnson. The president wrote that he had 
received a message from the Soviet Union indicating that it had 
information that Israel was preparing to attack. "The Soviets state that if 
Israel starts military action, the Soviet Union will extend help to the 
attacked States" (Foreign Ministry, cited by Brecher, 1975:398). This was 
the most explicit threat of Soviet intervention that Eshkol had received. 
Johnson reported that the Soviet Union had asked the United States to 
prevent such an attack, and he concluded by telling Eshkol that, as Israel's 
friend, he must repeat more strongly what he had already told Eban: "Israel 
just must not take preemptive military action and thereby make itself 
responsible for the initiation of hostilities" (cited by Eban, 1977:370). The 
president then requested a two- to three-week delay before Israel would 
resort to force to open the Straits (Quandt, 1977:54-55).52 
More decisive was a written memorandum which Rusk attached to the 
president's letter. The secretary told his ambassador to convey the 
following message to Eshkol and Eban: 
The British and the United States are proceeding urgently to prepare the military 
aspects of the international naval escort plan. The Dutch and Canadians 
have already joined even before a text was presented to them. With the assurance 
of international determination to make every effort to keep the Straits open to 
50. Eban quotes the State Department summary as follows: "The preparation of a plan

for a naval presence which hopefully would be enough to deter the U AR from interfering with

freedom of passage in the Straits if the United Nations proceedings failed" (1977:368). This is a

considerably weaker version than earlier formulations since it places heaviest emphasis on the

threat rather than the use of force and attempts to deter a blockade that had already been

imposed. There is also the somewhat curious use of the concept of deterrence. Brecher,

quoting Foreign Ministry sources, cites the same document somewhat differently: "An

international naval presence in the area of the Gulf to be made operative only if the Security

Council failed to keep the Straits and the Gulf open to the shipping of all nations as a matter of

right" (1975:399-400). The discrepancy suggests that Eban is applying his particular concept

of deterrence to the American plan for a flotilla.

51. Eban (1977:369) refers to the repeated challenges by colleagues of the reliability of his

report and notes his practice of having important conversations recorded by an associate to

improve the reliability of the record. If political advantage is discounted, members of the

cabinet appeared to place considerable emphasis on the quality of the information they

received.

52. Eshkol also received a telegram from Prime Minister Wilson which was similar in

thrust if gentler in tone: "We understand that you are approaching a moment of fateful

decision, and we strongly urge you to continue a policy of restraint, as long as diplomatic

efforts are under way to find a satisfactory solution" (cited by Bar-Zohar, 1970:147).
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the flags of all nations, unilateral action on the part of Israel would be 
irresponsible and catastrophic (cited by Eban, 1977:370). 
A cable from Ambassador Harman provided convergent evidence of the 
higher probability of an international flotilla. He reported that Eugene 
Rostow had informed him that Britain and Holland had agreed to join the 
flotilla and Canada had promised a ship for the naval patrol. Moreover, if 
necessary, the United States would act alone. 
The cabinet reconvened with a review by Eban of the new evidence on 
President Johnson's commitment to try to open the Straits. The foreign 
minister also reported the unequivocal warnings against unilateral 
military action by President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk and 
referred to the contents of the Soviet note to Washington. He considered 
these less decisive than the increase in the probability of an international 
flotilla in persuading his colleagues to change their preferences: "It was not 
the Soviet warnings, but the American show of resolution which won the 
day" (1977:370). 
The prime minister acknowledged that he had been prepared to 
recommend a preemptive strike the night before, but he was particularly 
impressed by Secretary Rusk's progress report on the naval escort. 
Although he was considerably less optimistic than Eban about the 
probable success of theflotilla, he argued nevertheless that the request from 
the United States must be considered seriously. Nor could American 
warnings against unilateral action be ignored.53 Eshkol was now prepared 
to advise the cabinet to give the United States and its allies the two weeks 
required to organize theflotilla. On the basis of new information, the prime 
minister increased his estimate of the cost of military action as well as the 
probability of a naval patrol and altered his choice. He emphasized that, 
although he was recommending further delay, the army would remain 
mobilized and changes in Egyptian capabilities and intent would be closely 
monitored. 
The prime minister carried with him his Mapai colleagues who had 
supported preemption the night before while the new information 
strengthened the decision of the Mapam and Mafdal ministers who already 
preferred delay. Together with those who had followed Eshkol, there was 
now an overwhelming majority for delay. Carmel was the lone dissenter, 
while his fellow member of Ahdut Ha'avodah, Allon, abstained. Carmel 
argued strongly that with every passing day the probability of an Egyptian 
attack would grow as Israel's capacity to deter diminished. Allon stated 
53. The prime minister would later explain one of his reasons for changing his preference 
from preemption to delay. After reading Johnson's letter and Rusk's message, he argued: "I 
did not want him [President Johnson] to come afterwards and say: 'I warned you in advance 
and now you cannot make any claims whatever on the United States and its allies' " (1967b, 
also cited in Eban, 1977:372). 
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formally that he reserved the right to call the cabinet back into session to 
reconsider its decision, for he considered the decision fundamentally 
wrong. If military action were delayed for two weeks, the Egyptian army 
would improve its deployment and logistics and the cost of military action 
then would be much greater than now (1967b, 1968). The chief of staff 
concurred with this analysis. 
Slightly more than two hours after the cabinet began meeting, the prime 
minister asked for a vote where members would express their differences, 
record their preferences, and produce a collective decision. Sixteen 
ministers chose formally to refrain from military action, taking note of the 
promise of the president of the United States to undertake efforts to assure 
freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. At the same time, the cabinet 
decided to maintain the level of alert and mobilization of reserves in the 
army. 
The Rationality of the Process 
How can this decision of 28 May best be explained? What kinds of 
processes did individual members of the cabinet use to make their choices? 
And why did seven of the eighteen ministers shift their preferences in less 
than twenty-four hours? Did members of the cabinet simply "follow their 
leader"? If so, why did the prime minister change his decision? Or, does 
coalition-building in a multi-party government provide a better explana­
tion of the processes members of the group used to make their decision? 
Intergovernmental bargaining, persuasive argumentation, and rationaliza­
tion within the comfort of a group of concurrence-seeking colleagues are all 
plausible explanations of the processes that led to the decision to delay. 
The record of cabinet deliberations is most consistent with an 
explanation of a cognitive-analytic path to choice by a pivotal group of 
ministers. The capacity of some members of the cabinet to follow such a 
path to decision can be related, in turn, to the pattern of crisis-induced 
stress, group norms and procedures, and the quality of available strategic 
logic. In the first instance, however, this decision to refrain from military 
action is best explained by the performance of the prime minister and some 
of his colleagues who, unlike other members of the cabinet, acknowledged 
value complexity and avoided claims of dominance for their preferred 
strategy. And more so than at any other moment since Egypt began to 
move its forces across the Canal, values conflicted and choice was difficult. 
The difficulties began at the beginning as members of the cabinet 
struggled to diagnose the problem for decision. They could and did 
consider the blockade, the capacity to deter, and defense against imminent 
attack, singly or in combination, as the central issues. Strategic concepts 
detailed both a blockade and a concentration of forces as unacceptable, but 
provided no guidance on the relative importance of the two casus belli. 
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When deterrence failure was multiple but not yet total, strategic doctrine 
provided no procedures for establishing priorities. Strategic concepts were 
sufficiently imprecise so that decisionmakers could draw on different 
components to focus on one or another issue as the principal problem. The 
logical implications of different definitions of the problem were not always 
apparent to those making the decisions; on the contrary, they could avoid 
some troublesome contradictions by shifting from one definition to 
another. The most serious obstacle to rational decision was not complex 
calculation but rigorous definition. 
The difference in problem diagnosis had no immediate impact on the 
search for policy options (Table 6.3). The two principal options which had 
been identified earlier in the decisional sequence were relevant to all 
conceptualizations of the problem for action, and key members of the 
cabinet concentrated on refining those options rather than identifying 
additional alternatives. The first option of unilateral military action now 
included a preemptive air strike and a limited or large-scale ground attack 
in the Sinai peninsula. Either variant was consistent with the general thrust 
of strategic thinking which emphasized the importance of initiative, 
indirection, and tactical surprise. 
TABLE 6.3 
28 MAY: A COGNITIVE-ANALYTIC PATH TO CHOICE 
(Path 7) 
STIMULUS: Increase in Egyptian military capabilities; Nasser's speech 
of 26 May redefining the challenge. 
SEARCH: Very limited; no search for new options but refinement 
of the two options already identified. 
ESTIMATION AND Analytic; careful about reliability and validity of the evi-
REVISION: dence; use of multiple indicators to revise estimate of 
probability of attack; use of multiple sources of evidence 
to assess likelihood of American support; sensitive to 
new evidence; strategic concepts provide little guidance 
in weighting importance of different indicators; differ­
ent weighting associated with different definitions of the 
problem for decision. 
EVALUATION: Analytic by core group of decisionmakers who acknowl­
edge value complexity; preemption brings military 
benefit but increased diplomatic cost; delay provides 
diplomatic benefit but growing military cost; two sets of 
more firmly committed decisionmakers deny value 
complexity and claim dominance. 
CHOICE: Analytic; decisionmakers recalculate probability of US 
support and diplomatic cost of preemption and admit 
the complexity of choice; choice is difficult and painful. 
The only other alternative on the table was a delay in military action, and 
it had now been amended and extended to include a wait for the 
organization of an international flotilla. Although this alternative was 
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inspired by those strategic arguments which stress the importance of 
international support as a prerequisite to military action, there was a 
logical slip in their application. As the problem persisted, the likelihood of 
support from the great powers became indissolubly tied to permitting plans 
for an international naval patrol to go forward. This connection obscured 
the logical distinction between international support for independent 
action to restore deterrence and international action to lift the blockade. In 
translating the concept from the general to the specific, decisionmakers did 
not pay much attention to these nuances. Search was constrained both by 
the logic of strategic argument and by its application. 
Ministers were much more careful in their handling of information. 
Indeed, they approximated analytic procedures in their scrupulous 
attention to the reliability and validity of the information they examined 
and in their careful attention to indicators to revise their estimates. When 
members of the cabinet received official confirmation of the content of 
Eban's discussion with President Johnson, their confidence in the 
reliability of their information increased, and they were more willing to 
draw inferences from it. Decisionmakers also recognized the limits of their 
evidence and tried to compensate for it. When they had only Evron's report 
on American intentions, they postponed choice to await better quality and 
more complete information. 
Policymakers also were sophisticated in the use of multiple indicators to 
increase the validity of the estimates they made. In assessing likely 
American behavior, for example, Eban was sensitive to the relative 
importance of commitments from the Pentagon, the State Department, 
and the White House. Although he used multiple sources of evidence, he 
weighted the statements of the president most heavily to reflect their 
greater validity as an indicator of American intentions. 
To update their estimate of the probability of attack, military 
decisionmakers used capability and intent indicators and discriminated 
between them. They examined changes in the deployment of armor and 
aircraft, the state of alert in the Egyptian armed forces, and the 
commitment of manpower to forward positions in Sinai. Military 
Intelligence gave special weight to an indicator they considered particularly 
valid. The qualitative increase in capabilities signaled by the transfer of the 
Fourth Armored Division was treated as highly diagnostic. Special 
Services (Ha-Mossad) independently examined and evaluated the changes 
in capabilities, and the estimates of the two intelligence agencies converged. 
Finally, capability indicators were used jointly with statements of intent as 
President Nasser's fiery speech led decisionmakers to revise further their 
estimated probability of attack. 
All the members of the cabinet revised their assumptions in response to 
changes in these diagnostic indicators, and there was a general consensus 
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that Egyptian capabilities were now adequate for attack (Hi to H2). For 
some, however, the argument was permissive rather than conclusive. Eban 
and the two Mapam ministers gave greater weight to President Nasser's 
statements to the secretary-general and Heikal's explanation of Egyptian 
strategy. Working with these indicators, they inferred that an Egyptian 
attack, though likely in the longer run should Nasser's present challenge 
to deterrence succeed, was not imminent. Indeed, Eban had argued forty-
eight hours earlier that Egypt's president did not want war, but victory 
without war (1977:360). Military Intelligence, the chief of staff, and Allon 
and Carmel relied more heavily on capability variables and estimated a 
higher probability of attack. 
These competing interpretations of Egyptian strategy were voiced and 
considered during cabinet discussion and, indeed, became the central focus 
of debate. Members of the cabinet were not agreed on the scope of the 
challenge to deterrence, and reference to prevailing strategic concepts 
could not resolve these differences. Although strategic doctrine was useful 
in listing indicators to be monitored, it did not establish the relative 
importance of capability and intent variables in assessing the likelihood 
and scope of deterrence failure. Strategic arguments were insufficiently 
coherent to guide the use of indicators. 
This difference in emphasis on capability and intent facilitated the 
difference in problem definition. Military decisionmakers emphasized 
capabilities, estimated a higher likelihood of attack, and stressed defense 
and the need for credible deterrence. Eban gave greater weight to intent, 
inferred a lower probability of attack, and concentrated primarily on the 
blockade and only secondarily on the reestablishment of deterrence. It is 
difficult to know whether decisionmakers derived their procedures for 
weighting from their definition of the problem or defined the problem for 
decision in response to their estimates of likely Egyptian behavior. In the 
absence of conclusive evidence, the former is more likely. 
In comparison with their process of estimating likely Egyptian behavior, 
most members of the cabinet brought much less intellectual baggage with 
them when they considered the probability of an international flotilla. 
Generally, Israel's decisionmakers were skeptical of great-power action 
and considered the probability of effective international action to be low; 
such attitudes were part of the traditional emphasis on self-reliance. These 
initial assumptions were less salient, however, and consequently more open 
to revision. When cabinet members received additional information from 
Johnson and Rusk on 28 May, therefore, many increased their estimate of 
the likelihood of the flotilla. 
Those who were most strongly committed to a particular definition of 
the problem, however, diverged from this generally reasonable process of 
estimation and produced distorted estimates of likelihood. Allon and 
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Carmel, who logically considered a flotilla irrelevant, argued that it was 
impossible. Their expectations were not independent of their preferences. 
But they were the exception rather than the rule. Eban, who was strongly 
committed to defeating the blockade, was scrupulously careful to avoid 
categorical estimates in his presentation to the cabinet: "I would not 
commit myself to the view that the international patrol would ever come to 
anything" (1977:367). Most decisionmakers tried to separate what they 
wanted from what they expected in a high quality process of inference. 
Decisionmakers also were effective in linking the options they identified 
to their consequences. They thought in cause-effect sequences and did see 
the behavior of others as contingent on their own. Allon, for example, 
argued strongly that the longer Israel delayed its retaliatory strike, the 
more likely that Egypt would attack; delay would signal weakness and 
invite an Egyptian first strike. Decisionmakers also considered the 
probability of American support and Soviet intervention as a function of a 
choice to preempt. In their meeting with President Johnson, Eban and 
Evron explored American willingness to deter Soviet military interven­
tion.54 Johnson's verbal response was not encouraging, and his letter to 
Prime Minister Eshkol on 28 May reinforced the low estimate. 
Decisionmakers were also aware of the impact of their past choices on 
future contingencies. Regardless of the importance they attached to it, 
cabinet members were agreed that the likelihood of American support had 
decreased should Israel now choose preemption. 
Within the confines of the alternatives they identified, members of the 
cabinet reasoned causally. In linking consequences to cause, they received 
considerable help from prevailing strategic concepts which highlight the 
importance of great-power support should Israel preempt. Strategic 
doctrine argues as well that Soviet intervention is contingent not only on 
Israel's action but also on that of the United States, and decisionmakers 
considered this causal sequence in their assessment of likely Soviet action. 
Cabinet members could draw also on the structure they had established 
only four days earlier to evaluate the consequences of these policy options. 
They had attributed cause to consequence then and, with some variation, 
continued to refer to these same causal sequences. Benefiting from past 
54. Evidence of the preoccupation with American willingness to deter possible Soviet 
intervention is provided by Eban who describes a letter sent by Prime Minister Eshkol to 
President Johnson on the morning of 5 June. Eshkol expressed the hope that everything 
would be done by the United States to prevent the Soviet Union from enlarging and exploiting 
the conflict. In transmitting the document to the President, Eban indicated through 
diplomatic channels that this sentence about the Soviet Union was the most crucial point in 
the long letter. Eban subsequently explained: "[Johnson] now had the opportunity, which 
belongs to Presidents of the United States alone, to ensure that a regional conflict was not 
enlarged by the intervention of a Great Power. This, after all, had been one of the main themes 
of my talks in Washington on May 25 and 26, and most of President Johnson's 
communications to us since then had concentrated on the Soviet prospect" (1977:404-405). 
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experience and prior analysis, most decisionmakers were able to reduce the 
pervasive uncertainty that is characteristic of the strategic environment 
without resorting to the classic shortcuts described by many cognitive 
psychologists. If they did not include all possible consequences, they did 
not ignore the obvious. Uncertainty, whether structural or not, was not a 
major obstacle to analytic inference. 
Ministers were somewhat more precise in their qualitative estimates of 
cost and benefit than they had been earlier (Table 6.4). Many of the cost-
benefit factors had been identified in the initial decision to explore 
American intentions, and members of the cabinet had had some time to 
work with these estimates in response to new and better information. A 
core group within the cabinet considered cost and benefit along more than 
one dimension and openly acknowledged the conflict of values and the 
difficulty of their choice; revision of probability estimates had made choice 
more rather than less difficult. Most members of the cabinet now 
considered an Egyptian attack more likely than they had thought four days 
earlier, but considered American support—if they preempted—much less 
likely. In the phraseology of the foreign minister, the cabinet debated 
"[whether] the political advantages of some further diplomatic action 
[would] outweigh the physical dangers inherent in delay" (1977:365). 
TABLE 6.4 
PRINCIPAL ESTIMATES OF COST, BENEFIT,

AND LIKELIHOOD OF CONSEQUENCES OF OPTIONS, 28 MAY

Attack: Probability of US support decreases further 
Probability of Soviet intervention low 
Cost to international support increases after initial delay and request for 
help* 
Benefit to military security increases due to restored power to deter and 
lower casualties 
Wait: Probability of flotilla, new and increasing 
Benefit to international support increases; even if flotilla fails, Israel 
gains 
Probability of Arab attack increases after 4th Armored Division 
committed 
Cost to military security increases because of rapidly deteriorating 
military situation, loss of deterrent credibility 
* Decisionmakers paid particular attention to this dimension. 
Different definitions of the problem for decision frequently were 
reflected in different estimates of cost and benefit and, at the extreme, some 
decisionmakers who were strongly committed to one particular view of the 
problem denied value complexity and claimed dominance for their 
preferred option. Allon and his colleagues from Ahdut Ha'avodah and 
members of the General Staff defined the problem as defense and an 
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independent capacity to deter. They placed a lower value on American 
support, therefore, since it could not contribute to the power to deter, much 
less to defend. Either directly, through the organization of a flotilla, or 
indirectly through big-power benevolence should the naval patrol fail, 
delay could provide no benefit to military security. On the contrary, delay 
would increase the cost in military casualties if Israel attacked later rather 
than sooner, and in civilian casualties if Israel were forced to absorb an 
Arab first strike rather than preempt. A choice to preempt, on the other 
hand, would increase Israel's capacity to deter future attacks. This group of 
decisionmakers concentrated on the values of military security and human 
resources and saw no conflict between them. Preemption would benefit 
both—it was the dominant strategy and an easy and obvious choice to 
make. Because international support was largely irrelevant, logically and in 
fact their calculations were insensitive to an increase in the likelihood of an 
international effort to break the blockade. Their process of evaluation and 
choice had the elegance of simplicity and inner consistency even if it was 
less nuanced and sophisticated than that of their colleagues. They could 
simplify by ignoring the problem of external intervention during a war and 
Israel's dependence on external sources of arms supply after a war. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Eban and those ministers from the 
National Religious Party placed primary emphasis on the opening of the 
Straits with Israel's deterrent reputation a corollary consideration. They 
considered an imminent Egyptian attack less likely and, because defense 
was not an immediate problem, they estimated that further delay would not 
impose a substantial cost to military security. Indeed, Eban consciously 
discounted the estimates of his military colleagues,55 arguing that it was 
their professional business to produce worst-case estimates based on an 
adversary's capability rather than intent (1977: 371). If the costs of delay 
were not substantial, the benefits were considerable. The organization of an 
international naval presence might compel President Nasser to rescind the 
blockade. Indeed, although he usually acknowledged the complexity of the 
problem, at times the foreign minister extended the scope of his argument 
to claim that Israel could not lose by waiting: 
Either the multilateral naval action would collapse, in which case the United 
States would have little right or cause to restrain Israel's independent action, or 
if it succeeded, Nasser would for thefirst time believe that Israel had political
backing as well as military strength (1977:372). 
55. Eban remembers the explanation he gave to two members of the Labor Alignment in
the Knesset on the evening of 29 May: "There was military as well as political logic in choosing 
our time. Their information was that we had no time to lose and nothing to gain by 
letting time pass. They painted the catastrophic picture of an Israeli military defeat that might
arise out of any further delay. , I replied that if we fought in another week or two, our 
military prospects would be just as good as now, while our political prospect would be better"
(1977:387). The foreign minister saw no military cost whatsoever to delay in this presentation
of his argument. 
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A choice to delay would produce benefits for military security, diplomatic 
support, and would reduce casualties if war could be avoided. A decision to 
delay was therefore the best on all counts—it was an obvious choice to 
make. Eban could claim dominance for his preferred option only by 
ignoring the importance of unilateral action to an independent capacity to 
deter. One set of decisionmakers simplified by ignoring dependence while 
another set reduced complexity by ignoring independence. 
For all but three of the Mapai ministers, however, matters were not so 
simple.56 Typical was the prime minister who began by concentrating on 
the blockade and then expanded the parameters of the problem to include 
the concentration of forces. He focused on defense and deterrent capacity 
but also placed a high value on the support of a major power both during 
and after military hostilities. In analogy to 1956-1957,57 the complexity 
rather than the simplicity of the problem was obvious. If Israel chose to 
preempt, its capacity to deter would increase and military casualties would 
decrease, but the loss of international support would be considerable. If the 
cabinet chose to delay, however, the capacity to deter would suffer 
considerably, and Israel would risk an Arab first strike. There was no easy 
choice, and these decisionmakers knew it. After the all-night evaluation of 
26-27 May, this group favored preemption. 
The prime minister revised his estimate of the cost of preemption, 
however, when he read President Johnson's warning and Rusk's promise. 
Once the United States committed its prestige and resources to organizing 
an international naval flotilla, if Israel chose preemption it would preempt 
not only Egypt but also the president. If Israel wanted American support, it 
would have to give the United States time to honor its commitment. For 
those who valued American support, the increase in their estimate of the 
diplomatic cost of preemption was indeed logical. And the vast majority of 
the cabinet considered American diplomatic support important, both in 
the short and longer term.58 Responding to "relevant information," by the 
afternoon of 28 May a pivotal group of decisionmakers had recalculated 
value and probability to change their preferences. This shift in their 
calculation of value and probability provides a convincing explanation of 
the shift in the group choice. The prime minister, along with almost all of 
his colleagues, chose to trade in "time as currency to secure ultimate 
56. Aranne, Eban, and Sapir of Mapai favored delay the night of 27-28 May. 
57. Eban suggests that, in giving great weight to President Johnson's warning, "Eshkol 
was here acting under the influence of the 1957 trauma, which had also haunted me at every 
stage" (1977:372). 
58. An analysis of the arguments of members of the cabinet suggests that 15 of 18 placed a 
moderate or high value on American support. Eban, at the extreme, considered it most 
important (1977:375). Only Allon, Carmel, and senior military officers who exercised no 
formal vote considered American diplomatic support less important. Even then, Allon (1968) 
argued that he was prepared to "risk American embarrassment," implying that he placed some 
value on American support. 
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political support" (Eban, 1977:372). Chapter 9 evaluates the efficiency of 
their choice. 
Performance by members of the cabinet was uneven during the long 
deliberative process that produced this decision. Most members ap­
proximated analytic procedures of estimation in their handling of evidence 
and indicators, and most could connect consequence to option. Within the 
constraints imposed by problem diagnosis and limited identification of 
options, ministers were able to revise their opinions and modify at least 
some of their assumptions in response to the flow of new information. 
Evaluation of the two options, however, was less well done by important 
members within the cabinet. Although none resorted to simplification 
through single-value calculation, Allon and Eban and those who thought 
very much like them denied the complexity of their problem and claimed 
dominance for their preferred option. Several members of the cabinet 
closely associated with Eshkol, however, did approximate analytic 
procedures in their evaluation of the consequences of the two options. Even 
when value conflict was severe, they acknowledged the trade-offs. 
Although the choice was neither easy nor obvious, the prime minister and 
some of his colleagues recalculated their estimates and changed their 
minds, and it is this shift in their preferences which produced the decision to 
delay. 
A process of decision which includes analytic as well as cognitive 
components is neither expected nor usual when uncertainty and 
complexity are acute. The three factors of crisis perceptions, group norms, 
and the quality of strategic argument may help to explain this path to 
choice by some of the members of Israel's cabinet. Ministers certainly 
perceived grave threat, and many felt the pressure of time. When warned of 
"catastrophic" consequences should they choose preemption, most could 
not ignore the threat to basic values. When military officers reiterated the 
growing threat of massing Egyptian forces and urged a rapid decision to 
preempt, most of those listening felt some sense of urgency. Although felt 
threat and time pressure increased significantly from 23 to 28 May,59 some 
members of the cabinet were nevertheless able to approximate analytic 
procedures in their decision-making activity. In this instance, crisis-
induced stress did not appear to constrain analytic performance. 
One reason why perceptions of threat and time pressure may have had 
little impact is the cumulative impact of the processing of choice. Just as 
members of the cabinet drew on structures and options they had identified 
earlier, so they drew on estimates they had made and evaluations they had 
performed before; prior analysis provided a reference point for present 
processes of revision and updating. Once factors had been identified for 
59. McCormick (1975:52, 33) finds a significant increase in threat and time pressure 
measured by a quantitative content analysis of the public statements of decisionmakers. 
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evaluation and arguments introduced and considered, they were more 
difficult to ignore. Some prior sophistication in the analysis of an ongoing 
decisional problem may be a considerable advantage to decisionmakers 
working under stress. Prior experience alone, however, cannot explain the 
difference in the performance of Eshkol and that of Allon or Eban. Eban 
had been working with the problem for days, and Allon was an experienced 
analyst of strategic problems. 
Probably more important in reducing the impact of a perception of crisis 
and in improving performance was the predisposition of the prime minister 
to consider extensively and avoid premature closure. Eshkol generally 
favored a wide-ranging and open process of deliberation.60 Under routine 
circumstances, he encouraged broad participation and a free exchange of 
opinion. He actively solicited advice and attempted to build consensus 
from below rather than impose it from above. The gravity of the 
consequences in a crisis induced Eshkol to be more rather than less careful, 
more rather than less exhaustive in argument and counterclarification, and 
more rather than less reluctant to close offdebate. On "fateful" matters, the 
prime minister explained, prudent reflection was especially important 
(Eshkol, 1967b). Crisis accentuated the deliberative style of the prime 
minister's leadership and shaped the collective context of decision. 
Group procedures, a second factor which may affect the process of 
choice, reflected this emphasis by Eshkol on free-wheeling discussion and 
debate. The sometimes sharp disagreements within the cabinet attest to the 
absence of concurrence-seeking. Even in the Sunday afternoon meeting, 
after the preferences of their fellow cabinet ministers were clear, Carmel felt 
free to oppose and Allon to criticize the decision made by an overwhelming 
majority of the group. There appeared to be few personal or social 
consequences to dissent in a multiparty coalition. Because dissent was 
permitted, evaluation of alternatives was more effective as competing 
arguments were aired and Cabinet ministers listened. 
Rather than distorting the process of choice, the collective context 
reduced the impact of the distortions of individual decisionmakers. Had 
either Allon or Eban alone been responsible for making the choice, it is 
more likely that the decision would have been made decisively as part of a 
dominant strategy. Because each was only one among many, even if each 
was more persuasive than most, their stronger commitments were diluted 
by the appraisal and examination of the rest of their colleagues. Although 
each developed only one side of the argument, the rest of the cabinet heard 
both, and a critical group amongst them acknowledged the clear conflict of 
values. With a prime minister who considered himself no more than primus 
60. When he served as minister of finance before becoming prime minister, one of 
Eshkol's aides used the phrase "open deliberation" to characterize his style of leadership in 
decision-making. 
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inter pares in the chair, group discussion promoted rather than impeded 
individual analytic processing.61 
Persuasive argumentation and high quality group procedures are not the 
only plausible explanations of the processing of the choice to delay. The 
decision can also be understood as the successful effort of Prime Minister 
Eshkol, working within a multiparty cabinet, to build a majority coalition 
in favor of one alternative. Indeed, an explanation of coalition-building 
seems much more plausible in this case than it did for the earlier cabinet 
choice of 23 May. The initial deadlock early on the morning of the 27th 
represents a failure by the leadership to formalize a coalition. The failure 
can be explained in part by the presence of the prime minister and the 
foreign minister in opposing coalitions. If both were "essential" members 
of a winning coalition, each could block the strategy of the other.62 Eban 
provides some evidence of his calculation of the relative strengths of the 
two coalitions when he recalls that, sensing the deep division within the 
room, he asked for a delay of forty-eight hours (1977:367). Anticipating 
that he would be unable to build a winning coalition, he tried to stall. 
The core elements of the two coalitions, moreover, can be explained 
partially by party affiliation if not bureaucratic loyalty. Institutional 
loyalty was not an obvious factor. Although military officials were strongly 
in favor of preemption, the minister of defense in this government was also 
the prime minister who represented broader interests. Although senior 
military officers exerted considerable pressure on individual decision-
makers in private discussion and participated as experts in cabinet 
discussion, they had neither voting privileges nor formal representation. 
Party affiliation, however, is correlated with membership in opposing 
coalitions. Ahdut Ha'avodah supported a preemptive strike while Mapam, 
the Independent Liberals, and the National Religious Party all favored 
delay. 
The evidence is not fully consistent, however, with the explanation. 
First, there is some evidence that Eshkol could indeed have gotten majority 
support for preemption at the end of that long night meeting. The obstacle 
was not quantity but quality. When asked why he did not force a decision, 
the prime minister explained: 
61. Janis (1971:44, 74) argues that, once a preferred option is identified or recommended 
by a group leader, other alternatives are likely to receive diminished attention and scrutiny. 
Critics of Eshkol have accused him of indecisiveness (cf., Safran, 1969:314), yet it may be 
precisely because the prime minister did not make an early and strong commitment to one 
option that the rest of his cabinet felt free to contest, argue, and debate. 
62. Rabin, in his autobiography, recalls that, during the long deadlocked cabinet meeting, 
the prime minister passed him a note that the members of the National Religious Party were 
threatening to resign if the cabinet chose pre-emption. After the meeting, in private 
conversation, Eshkol added that Eban too was prepared to resign if military action were 
chosen (1979:91). No other participant in the deliberations, however, makes any reference 
whatsoever to threats of resignation. The prime minister made no note o( imminent 
resignations in his diary, Eban makes no such reference in his autobiography, and no member 
of the National Religious Party has alluded to an implicit or explicit threat to resign. 
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I am certain that it would not have been difficult to achieve a majority, though 
not a large one, during the night meeting of the Government on May 27 The 
clarifications in that meeting lasted until the light of day and it did not seem to 
me that on such a fateful issue one ought to decide in the early hours of the 
morning. It was better to "sleep on it" and wait (1967c). 
Eshkol's calculations are not inconsistent with those of Eban who tried to 
stall rather than lose. It can be argued, however, that Eshkol at best could 
have built a minimum winning coalition, a slim majority, without the 
support of his foreign minister. Indeed, if Eban is considered an "essential" 
member, not even a minimum winning coalition was possible. While the 
foreign minister was essential, however, to any choice of diplomatic action, 
neither his skills nor his influence were essential to the implementation of a 
strategy of preemption; Eban was not necessary to a majority coalition in 
favor of military action. The prime minister could have built a minimum 
coalition, but deliberately chose not to do so. 
More important, the behavior of the Mapai ministers is anomalous in an 
explanation of coalition-building. Mapai was the pivotal party in the 
broader coalition cabinet; it held 9 of the 18 ministries. Explanations 
of coalition-building expect the pivotal party to secure the support of one 
or another additional parties to assure domination of the outcome. This 
was not, however, what happened. Contrary to expectation, the critical 
element in any winning coalition, Mapai, split as its members voted 6 to 3 in 
the initial decisoin. While party affiliation is related to the preferences of 
members of the smaller parties, this is not so for members of the dominant 
party. And members of the pivotal party behaved contrary to the 
expectation of a hypothesis of coalition-building. 
Even more embarrassing, coalition-building cannot explain why six 
Mapai ministers, as well as one from Ahdut Ha'avodah, changed their vote 
from Sunday morning to Sunday afternoon. Any decision, by virtue of the 
fact that it gets majority support, logically can be seen as the product of 
coalition-building. The power of the explanation, however, lies in its 
interpretation of the processes that produced the majority. If the 
explanation is valid, there must be some evidence of strategy modification 
or compensatory side-payments by those close to achieving a majority 
coalition. There is no such evidence whatsoever. Those in support of delay 
made no concessions to those opposed; they neither modified their strategy 
to entice others to join nor did they offer any kind of side-payment. An 
explanation of the processes that produced the shift—or the successful 
construction of a coalition—cannot be developed from the premises of 
coalition-building. 
Finally, strategic concepts had a considerable impact on the processing 
of choice. Indeed, the options strongly promoted by Eban and Allon each 
could be deduced from strategic arguments for preemption and the 
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importance of great-power support. Because both options under 
discussion were consistent with strategic concepts, an explanation of the 
choice between them must include the processes cabinet members used. 
The quality of strategic logic, however, may help explain the strengths and 
weaknesses in the making of the decision to delay. 
Those who were most active in the discussions—Eban, Rabin, Eshkol— 
approximated analytic procedures in identifying the consequences of the 
two options and in estimating their likelihood. They may have done so in 
part because they could draw on a relatively complete list of indicators and 
a coherent discussion of the obvious consequences of preemption and delay 
to seek great-power support. Strategic concepts were of some help to 
decisionmakers in organizing processes of estimation and evaluation. 
While the impact of strategic arguments was not determining, even those 
who denied value complexity at least had to deal with the other side of the 
argument. 
Although strategic concepts did help to promote analytic performance 
of some decision-making tasks, their impact was not all benign. The 
principal obstacle to higher quality decision-making was not parochial 
interests and institutional loyalties, or the necessity to compromise with 
fellow group members, or the stress induced by crisis. The prime minister 
and some of his colleagues managed all these fairly well. They were possibly 
more proficient technically in this decision than they had been when they 
made their earlier choice to delay. The consequences of ambiguous 
problem definition and imprecision in the application of central concepts, 
however, now became apparent. Ambiguity and imprecision were 
consistent with important areas of incompleteness and incoherence in 
strategic arguments. 
In defining and developing casus belli, strategic concepts had paid no 
explicit attention to the interconnectedness among interests established as 
worthy of war. Nor had strategic doctrine examined the relationship 
between different kinds of challenges and different kinds of responses. 
Deterrence failure in stages had not been seriously considered. These 
critical areas of incompleteness and incoherence in strategic arguments 
were reflected in competing problem diagnoses, divergent estimates of 
Egyptian intentions, and the ensuing policy confusion. Members of the 
cabinet were less constrained by biological or psychological processes than 
by sloppy argument. They were trapped by the poor quality of their logic. 
When the cabinet decided on 23 May "to explore the position of the 
United States," it did not make precise exactly what it wished the United 
States to do and why. Ministers did not specify whether they wished the 
United States to support Israel's right to military action to restore 
deterrence, as Washington had promised to do in 1957, or whether they 
wanted the United States to fulfill its commitments as a leading maritime 
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power. Although both were plausible, each flowed logically from a 
different objective which in turn created a different context for decision. 
Either decisionmakers were trying to restore freedom of shipping in the 
Gulf of Aqaba—which they had repeatedly defined as a vital national 
interest—or they were trying to reconstruct Israel's deterrent reputation 
which President Nasser had shattered so successfully by imposing a 
blockade. Although the blockade figured in both, it could not 
simultaneously be the symptom and the core of the problem. Although 
related, the two problems were analytically distinct, and each had quite 
different policy implications. 
From their failure to make this initial logical distinction, all else fol­
lowed. Without completely understanding the consequences, the explora­
tion of the American position was translated into a solicitation of a 
promise from President Johnson to make every effort to open the Straits. 
When they exacted this promise, decisionmakers automatically decreased 
the likelihood of American support for unilateral action. When a few days 
later Johnson warned and Rusk promised, as Eban noted, "an Israeli 
government receiving such a message had very few options" (1977:370). 
This was partly the case because decisionmakers increased the cost of the 
other alternative by their own action. It is not unlikely that the United 
States would have urged restraint on Israel no matter what Israel's 
policymakers would have proposed. Indeed, President Johnson did so in 
his first official request to Eshkol after Nasser closed the Straits. 
Nevertheless, the active involvement of Israel's decisionmakers in soliciting 
an American commitment to try to lift the blockade further increased the 
cost of any alternative but delay. Without fully realizing it, decisionmakers 
preempted their choice of preemption. 
Encouraging the United States to defeat the blockade would not have 
been illogical if most members of the cabinet had considered the blockade 
to be the central issue. Indeed, an argument can be made that this should 
have been their primary focus. This, however, was not the case. The 
substitution of deterrence as value for deterrence as strategy and the 
consequent treatment of the blockade as symptom rather than substance 
led most decisionmakers to concentrate on restoring the credibility of 
deterrence. Confusion was compounded when some within the cabinet 
shifted their attention to the massing of Egyptian troops and focused 
almost exclusively on defense. Although the promised flotilla did not 
address either of these issues, it was now a necessary precursor to American 
support of the independent action which would address both. The logical 
paradox was apparent: given the estimates of cost, benefit, and likelihood 
that decisionmakers made when they considered deterrence and defense, 
the analytic choice was the logically irrelevant option. 
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The paradox would disappear only if President Nasser did not attack 
and the flotilla did not succeed. The dilemma created by faulty logic could 
be resolved only by the action of others. In the absence of logic, Israel's 
decisionmakers needed luck. 
chapter I 
The Decision to Preempt 
4 June: The Decision to Preempt 
The cabinet, just before it concluded its meeting on 28 May, charged the 
prime minister with the responsibility of informing the nation of its 
decision to delay. That evening, Eshkol broadcast to the country and then 
met with the General Staff. Their meeting was tense and acrimonious, but 
the broadcast was a political disaster. 
The prime minister, with the help of Eban and Galili, drafted the 
announcement of the decision for public broadcast at 2030 hours. His 
statement emphasized the continuation of the high level of military 
preparedness and Israel's readiness to act in self-defense. At the same time, 
Eshkol continued, the government had heard a report from the foreign 
minister 
on the increasing readiness in the international sphere to work, without delay, 
towards the speedy cancellation of the embargo. [The Government 
therefore, had] laid down principles for the continuation of political 
activities. Lines of action have also been adopted for the removal of 
military concentrations from Israel's southern border (Eshkol, 1967f, and Eban, 
1977:374). 
The message of readiness for defense and decision for delay was lost, 
however, in a stumbling and hesitant delivery by an exhausted prime 
minister. Eshkol's stammering and ineffective presentation created a public 
image of hesitation and confusion and precipitated a serious crisis of 
confidence in his capacity for political leadership. 
The prime minister, at the insistence of the chief of staff, then proceeded 
to General Staff Headquarters to inform senior military officers of the 
cabinet's decision. Military commanders had been expecting an authoriza­
tion to attack for the last two days and were unprepared for the restraining 
order. Eshkol again explained the reasons for the cabinet's decision and 
then asked for their free expression of opinion: "You can and should say 
anything you like to me. Talk as if you were out of uniform" (1967b). 
The generals took the prime minister at his word and let loose a storm of 
criticism. Yariv reported that the Egyptian army had moved from defensive 
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to offensive deployment and emphasized the increasing danger of an 
Egyptian first strike. Ariel Sharon, Matityahu Peled,1 and Avraham Yaffle 
told the prime minister that the crisis could not be resolved through 
international diplomacy; military action was the only alternative. Further 
delay would expose Israel to an Egyptian preemptive attack which would 
deprive the army of the advantage of tactical surprise, increase the damage 
to the air force, and increase the number of civilian and military casualties 
(Gavish, 1971, Rabin, 1979:92, and Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975:223). 
General Sharon estimated that delay could cost Israel "thousands of dead" 
while General Yaffe argued that Israel could face "catastrophe" (Sharon 
1973b, Bar-Lev, 1973b and Weizman, 1976:213-214). Allon, Rabin, and 
Bar-Lev did not join the chorus of criticism, but neither did they defend the 
decision made by the cabinet. 
The criticism of the military commanders was no longer premised on the 
damage to Israel's deterrent reputation but on the imperative to defend. 
They urged preemption not only by claiming that it was dominant as a 
strategy but also by emphasizing the multiplying military cost of delay. The 
prime minister defended the decision to delay by drawing an analogy; he 
argued that negotiations must continue so that the postwar diplomatic 
isolation which Israel had suffered in 1957 would be avoided. Eshkol left 
the meeting unconvinced by the estimates of the military consequences 
while the General Staff rejected his analysis of the benefit of delay.2 The 
sharp conflict in values was reflected in the tempestuous meeting between 
the prime minister and his military advisers. From that day on, the General 
Staff would exert concerted pressure for a choice to preempt.3 
The following day the leaders of Israel and Egypt each spoke to their 
parliaments. In his speech to the Knesset, the prime minister (1967a) added 
little to what he had said the night before. President Nasser, however, 
speaking to Egypt's National Assembly, stimulated a redefinition of the 
problem for decision by providing new evidence on Egypt's intentions: 
Just as we have been able to restore the pre-1956 situation, we shall
certainly, with God's help, be able to restore the pre-1948 situation. Today 
we are ready for a confrontation, we are ready to raise the whole question of 
Palestine. Today it is not a question of the Gulf of Aqaba, nor of the Straits of 
1. General Peled was later to revise his explanation of Egyptian intent and argue that 
hostilities erupted through mutual miscalculation. At the time, however, he, like almost all the 
other senior commanders, considered an Egyptian first strike likely. 
2. Eban, admittedly with some self-interest, reports that, after the prime minister had 
listened to the "tenacious" lecture of the senior military officers, he shrugged his shoulders and
said: "You are exaggerating quite a lot" (1977:371). Other analysts have described the prime
minister as shaken by the stormy encounter (Ben-Elissar and Schiff, 1967:95-97, cf. Rabin, 
1979:92). 
3. Not only the General Staff pressed the cabinet for permission to preempt. The respected 
military correspondent, Ze'ev Schiff of the independent daily Ha'aretz, wrote on 29 May of 
missed tactical opportunities before the Egyptian army was fully deployed and urged 
immediate military action. 
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Tiran, nor of the Emergency Force. It is a question of the rights of the people of 
Palestine, of the attack on Palestine in 1948, carried out with the aid of Britain 
and America. They want to confine the issue to the Straits of Tiran, 
U.N.E.F., and the right of passage. We are not afraid of the United States and its 
threats, of Britain and its threats or of the entire Western world and its partiality 
to Israel. We want the full and undiminished rights of the people of 
Palestine (1967c). 
Egypt's president was explicit that the problem was neither the blockade 
nor the removal of the international peace-keeping force. Moreover, he 
was no longer prepared to permit Israel's decisionmakers to so delimit their 
problem; the challenge was posed in the broadest possible terms.4 As Prime 
Minister Eshkol defended a delay to determine whether international 
maritime powers would translate words into actions, President Nasser 
underlined the futility of an international effort to reopen the Straits. Even 
if the maritime powers should organize, they could neither compel Egypt to 
lift the blockade nor deter an attempt to restore the pre-1948 geopolitical 
realities. 
Information about the probability of the flotilla, moreover, was 
somewhat inconclusive. Ambassador Harman had cabled on 28 May that 
he had been told by Walt Rostow, the national security adviser in the White 
House, that the president's mood was somber as he could see no solution to 
the crisis (Eban, 1977:383). At noon on 30 May, Eban received a second 
message from Harman which reported on a conversation with the State 
Department the previous evening. A declaration of the maritime powers 
was being drafted for signature by other states, and the United States and 
Britain were contacting some eighty capitals in an effort to obtain 
international support of the intention to enforce freedom of passage in the 
Straits. The statement would contain no threat of force but would provide 
a sufficient basis for the signatories to act. The United States had again sent 
a message to the Soviet Union underlining American concern about 
freedom of passage in the international waters of the Straits of Tiran. A 
joint resolution of both houses was now being prepared in Congress and, in 
the meantime, Israel would be offered economic aid to compensate for the 
cost of prolonged mobilization (Eban, 1977:383). 
There were also contradictory reports. Information from Ottawa 
4. President Nasser's speech was in marked contrast to his press conference broadcast live

over Cairo Radio the day before. While he termed "the mere existence of Israel . . an

aggression" and emphasized the territorial character of the Straits of Tiran and the illegal

occupation by Israel of Eilat in 1949, he placed the responsibility for the recovery of

Palestinian rights on the Palestinians rather than on Egypt: "We shall wait patiently for a year,

ten years, or even more, for the Palestinian people to recover their rights. " He also

referred to possible negotiations through the Joint Armistice Commission set up by the

Armistice Agreement in 1949 which was still acceptable to Egypt. On the other hand, he

implied that Egypt was no longer prepared to absorb thefirst blow:" if they [Israel] want

to try war, I tell them they are welcome. Naturally, in doing this we choose the place and

the time in which we say 'welcome' " (1967d:549).
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suggested that Canada's participation in the proposed naval patrol was 
very unlikely. And Robert Anderson, a personal emissary of President 
Johnson, was meeting in an unofficial capacity with President Nasser in 
Cairo. Eban worried that a face-saving compromise would be negotiated 
which would permit free passage to all ships other than those flying Israel's 
flag.5 Eban's definition of the problem for decision edged closer to that of 
the majority of his cabinet colleagues: "For us, the importance of denying 
Nasser political and psychological victory had become no less important 
than the concrete interest involved in the issue of navigation" (1977:384, 
emphasis added). A psychological or political victory would compromise 
Israel's capacity to deter. 
To reduce the growing uncertainty about the prospects of the flotilla, 
Eshkol and Eban decided to send Meir Amit, the head of Mossad (Spe­
cial Services), to Washington. As Amit later recalled: 
The American intentions were not clear, better stated, there was not sufficient 
light. Things are said for publication but in direct personal contact 
you can arrive at the basis, the truth. I believed I could fathom their real 
intentions (1973). 
An assessment of the likelihood of international maritime action was not 
the only purpose: 
A second aim of my mission was to make the Americans realize, in direct 
contact, the seriousness of the situation, to make them see that Israel had been 
forced into a situation where there was no way out and hear their reactions 
(1973). 
A major purpose of Amit's trip was the exploration of the likely American 
attitude should Israel choose unilateral military action. 
The prime minister attempted not only to assess but also to increase the 
probability of international maritime action. He asked Eban to draft a 
reply to President Johnson's letter of 28 May and to hold a press conference 
to emphasize publicly the limits of Israel's capacity to wait. The foreign 
minister spoke to the press at noon that day and warned that, if 
international action were not forthcoming, Israel reserved the right of self-
defense: "Normal rationality suggesets a policy: alone if we must, with 
others if we can." He argued that the blockade and the concentration of 
Egyptian troops must be rescinded "in the shortest possible time" and ex­
plained that "while we recognize the risks of action, we also understand the 
5. The lead article on the front page of The New York Times of 30 May suggested that a 
compromise plan was being prepared in Washington "under which the Gulf of Aqaba would 
be opened immediately to all ships except those flying the Israeliflag." Although subsequently 
denied at President Johnson's request, versions of this story received wide currency in 
Washington. Eban, in writing of the Anderson mission, considered it "probable that this 
initiative would aim at a face-saving compromise- and that the face to be saved would be 
Nasser's, not Israel's" (1977:383-384). 
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dangers of inaction" (1967). That same afternoon, in his reply to the presi­
dent's letter drafted by Eban, the prime minister reminded Johnson of his 
commitment to take "any and all measures" to open the Straits and empha­
sized Israel's determination not to wait too long: 
I feel that I must make it clear in all candour that the continuation of this 
position for any considerable time is out of the question. It is crucial that 
the international naval escort should move through the Straits within a week or 
two (Foreign Ministry, cited by Brecher, 1975:413). 
After their choice to delay, Eshkol and Eban both felt and expressed an 
increased sense of urgency. 
This sense of urgency and threat increased dramatically when Israel's 
decisionmakers heard the startling and unexpected news, broadcast by 
Radio Cairo shortly after noon, that King Hussein was meeting in Cairo 
with President Nasser. Two hours later, it broadcast live the signing of a 
defense pact between Egypt and Jordan. The text of the agreement, similar 
to that which already existed between Syria and Egypt,6 was read over the 
air. Article 7 in particular stipulated that "in the event of military 
operations, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab 
Republic shall assume command of operations in both states" (Inter­
national Documents on Palestine, 1970:569). This provision was activated 
immediately. President Nasser dispatched Egypt's assistant chief of staff, 
General Riad, to Amman to direct the military operations of the United 
Arab Command effective 1 June. Radio Cairo also reported the 
congratulatory telephone call of President Aref of Iraq who expressed his 
support for the agreement and promised to provide whatever assistance he 
could. King Hussein publicly requested President Aref to send Iraqi troops 
to Jordan and the president agreed. 
Israel's leaders were stunned by the joint defense pact. In view of the 
unremitting hostility and continuous propaganda attacks by President 
Nasser on King Hussein, such an agreement was not considered at all 
likely. Israel did not expect it and, indeed, military decisionmakers had 
prepared no contingency plans to defend against it (Eban, 1977:380). 
Although decisionmakers had not anticipated a joint Arab military 
command, they had little difficulty in interpreting its significance. Israel 
had repeatedly defined the stationing of other Arab forces on the West 
Bank of the Jordan as a casus belli. Identified by strategic concepts, the 
Jordanian-Egyptian pact was considered a particularly valid indicator of 
6. The Syrian-Egyptian defense pact was signed in November 1966. When King Hussein 
met with President Nasser in Cairo, he recalls that "I was so anxious to reach an agreement 
that I contented myself with a rapid perusal of the text [of the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact] 
and said to Nasser: 'Give me another copy; let us replace the word Syria by the word Jordan 
and the matter will be arranged' " (1969). 
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the likelihood of an Arab attack,7 and decisionmakers acknowledged 
miscalculation almost immediately. There was no attempt to deny or 
depress the significance of this new and discrepant information; it would 
have been extraordinarily difficult to do so. Leaders quickly jettisoned the 
prevailing hypothesis that Arab unity was insufficient to permit an attack 
(H9 to Hio) and drastically updated their estimate of the likelihood of joint 
Arab military action. Eban, for example, argued: 
The Egyptian-Jordanian agreement made it plain that we would probably have 
to fight on three fronts. Arab unity, which seemed an unsubstantial 
mirage a few days earlier, was now becoming impressive (1977:381). 
Not only Israel's strategic doctrine but also Egypt's analysts attached 
great importance to the establishment of a united front. President Nasser 
had argued repeatedly, for example, that one explanation of the poor 
performance of the Egyptian army in 1956 was the absence of coordinated 
military support from other Arab states and insisted that a prior condition 
for a renewed attack against Israel was military and political cooperation 
among front-line states.8 The strategic analysis of Egypt and Israel 
converged: a necessary condition of attack for Egypt was considered a 
strong diagnostic indicator by Israel. 
This increase in the estimate of an Arab attack produced some 
convergence among those who had disagreed in their diagnosis of the 
problem for decision. Eban now considered an attack from the West Bank 
probable and an Egyptian attempt to seize Eilat a credible threat (1977:381, 
383). The challenge to deterrence had grown in scope, and the problem was 
defense. Allon provided the most detailed explanation of the impact of 
cumulative deterrence failure on the definition of the challenge. He 
subsequently wrote: 
It seems that as from mid-May 1967 every possible Rubicon was crossed by the 
Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. And having crossed, they had 
no way out: a military confrontation had to take place. Impressive Egyptian 
forces were massed in the Sinai peninsula. The Straits of Tiran were closed to 
Israeli shipping. Jordan entered into an aggressive military alliance with Egypt, 
throwing her borders open to Egyptian and Iraqi troops and putting her own 
military forces under Egyptian command. The Egyptian President 
admitted, with astonishing frankness, that all these preparations were directed 
7. Eban considered this increase in Arab military capabilities through cooperation in 
multi-front planning a more important indicator than President Nasser's strong speech the 
day before: "Scarcely had Nasser's tirade been digested in Jerusalem than we suffered another 
and more decisive blow to peace" (1977:380). 
8. In an interview a year earlier. President Nasser argued that "We could annihilate Israel 
in twelve days were the Arabs to form a united front. Any attack on Israel from the south is not 
possible from a military point of view. Israel can be attacked only from the territory of Jordan 
and Syria" (1966). 
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towards a war of extermination against Israel. The enemy's openly 
declared intention of launching an attack from the Sinai peninsula and the 
concentration of offensive forces therein was tantamount to the first phase of an 
attack. Once these forces had been marshalled, air, land and up to a point naval 
initiative by Egypt and her allies became an imminent possibility. The 
gravity of the situation increased when it became evident that Arab air and land 
offensives might be launched simultaneously on three fronts: the Egyptian, 
Jordanian and Syrian. When Egyptian and Iraqi troops were integrated into the 
Jordanian geo-strategical set-up on the West Bank, the die was virtually cast 
(1970:76, 79). 
Indicators of capability and intent converged, and those decisionmakers 
who had considered an Arab attack only possible now considered it 
probable. Eban and Allon were agreed on the problem for decision. 
In response to his revised estimate of the likelihood of an Arab attack, 
Eban decided to reopen the decision of a two-week delay in military action. 
The next day, 31 May, he informed the heads of departments in the Foreign 
Ministry that prevailing assumptions must be reexamined and revised and 
the continuing dialogue with the United States modified accordingly 
(1977:381). Eban's decision is striking in that such behavior is neither usual 
nor expected of decisionmakers under stress. Indeed, his first reaction to a 
dramatic increase in probability estimates in response to strongly 
discrepant information is more typical. On learning of Hussein's mission to 
Cairo, Eban concluded that "Hussein had made it certain that war would 
break out" (1977:380, emphasis added). This is the only categorical 
estimate the foreign minister offered during the decisional sequence. By 
implication, he short-circuited the process of decision, chose quickly, and 
defended categorically a preemptive military strike should the Arab states 
not attack first. After this first, almost instinctive response, however, Eban 
did not close but reopened the process of decision. Despite his earlier 
commitment to international action, he instructed his staff to initiate a 
thorough reexamination of their assumptions and premises.9 
Eban's reassessment was eased considerably by evidence of the declining 
probability of concerted international action. The signals were subtle but 
suggestive. Although the State Department had reassured the embassy that 
the organization of the flotilla was proceeding and that letters had been sent 
to twenty-five governments requesting their signature on the declaration, 
Israel's diplomats could not have failed to observe the change from the 
original eighty capitals proposed only four days earlier. On 31 May, the 
president's national security adviser asked Evron to come to the White 
9. Eban reports a similar reaction from the deputy director general of the Foreign 
Ministry: "In a telephone conversation . Arthur Lourie told me that senior officials 
would respond willingly to a suggestion that we reopen our minds and hearts" (1977:384). 
Again, this is not the theoretical expectation of the bureaucratic politics explanation of 
decision-making. 
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House to discuss Eshkol's letter which President Johnson had now read. 
The president was disturbed by Eshkol's reference to his "assurances that 
the United States would take any and all measures to open the Straits of 
Tiran to international shipping. " This could not be an accurate 
report of what he had told Eban, the president insisted, since such a 
commitment was not within the constitutional powers of the presidency. 
Rather, Johnson insisted, he had stressed that he would make every effort 
within his constitutional authority. Evron replied that the phraseology 
drew on Ambassador Harman's notes of the conversation and on the State 
Department summary forwarded to Ambassador Barbour. These 
documents, Evron added, had been critically important in Israel's decision 
to delay military action. The minister concluded with a warning of the 
consequences of even the appearance of a weakened American commit­
ment.10 Although the quarrel about terminology was no more than a 
quibble, the quibble signaled to Israel's decisionmakers a decrease in 
American commitment. 
American officials also were inconsistent about the necessary role of the 
United Nations in any international maritime action. Secretary of State 
Rusk reportedly told the International Relations Committee of the House 
of Representatives that the United States would not act unilaterally but 
only within the framework of the United Nations. And in New York, 
Ambassador Goldberg introduced a draft resolution in the Security 
Council to "insure a cooling off period . without prejudice to the 
ultimate rights or claims of any party" n Eugene Rostow at the State 
Department, however, told Ambassador Harman that the President was 
trying to get the declaration signed as quickly as possible and that the 
necessary consultations with Congress had already begun—the Secretary 
of State was testifying before the International Relations Committee of the 
House and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on two 
successive days. He added that the United States would make every effort 
to terminate the proceedings in the Security Council as quickly as possible. 
Before he began meeting with his senior advisers late in the afternoon of 
1 June, Eban received three additional pieces of information relevant to 
his review. First, Amit, reporting on his initial discussions in Washington, 
reflected the contradictory evidence in his conclusion: 
10. Bar Zohar (1970:160) and Quandt (1977:56) report this conversation between Rostow
and Evron. The president was somewhat inconsistent in his objection to Eshkol's use of 
terminology. The State Department summary, transmitted to Eshkol and Eban, referred to
"every possible effort" and Eban used such language in his presentation to the cabinet. 
Johnson recalled in his autobiography, however, that he spoke of "any and all possible 
measures" (1971:293), and Eban uses this latter version in his autobiographical account 
(1977:358). 
11. Ambassador Goldberg's explanation of vote was carried in full in The New York 
Times, 1 June 1967. The full text of the draft Security Council resolution is found in United 
Nations Document S/7916/Rev. I, dated 1 June 1967. 
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We should still wait for a few days in order to give a chance for the 
operation of forcing the Straits. From hints and scattered hints the 
maritime-force project is running into heavier water every hour (cited by 
Eban, 1977:384). 
Eban later revealed that Amit had added: "There is a growing chance for 
American political backing if we act on our own" (Eban, 1972). While Amit 
considered the flotilla increasingly unlikely and American support of 
unilateral action by Israel increasingly likely, he nevertheless recommend­
ed further delay of at least a few days. 
The foreign minister also was told of a report coming over the 
international wire services of a reply by Secretary of State Rusk to a 
journalist's question. When asked whether the United States would make 
an effort to restrain Israel from precipitate action, he replied tersely: "I 
don't think it is our business to restrain anyone" (cited by Eban, 1977:385). 
Finally, Eban received a summary of the evaluation of an American, well-
connected to the administration, whom the foreign minister does not 
identify. The American understood that "time was running out and that it 
was a matter of days or even hours." But, "if the measures being taken by 
the United States prove ineffective, the United States would now back 
Israel" (cited by Eban, 1977:385). While evidence from public sources was 
ambiguous, that from private sources converged: the probability of 
American support for unilateral military action by Israel was related 
inversely to the likelihood of effective international action, and the 
probability of the maritime patrol was decreasing. 
The interpretation of the ambiguous and often contradictory public and 
private evidence, however, was not easy or unimportant, and decision-
makers were careful. When the meeting began, Eban requested a 
"meticulous scrutiny" of all cables and communications with the United 
States of the last forty-eight hours. The scrutiny revealed that not since 28 
May had a senior American official requested that Israel either refrain from 
military action or rely on international solutions. Searching for what was 
absent rather than what was present, decisionmakers found what they were 
not looking for; what was omitted was more significant than what was 
committed. 
The foreign minister concluded that the United States was now less 
confident about the success of international action and therefore less likely 
to restrain Israel (1977:385). On the contrary, unilateral military action by 
Israel now promised some diplomatic benefit: those who would be relieved 
of an increasingly unwelcome responsibility would extend support to 
Israel. Indeed, Eban noted, some in the military establishment suspected 
that the United States now preferred to "unleash Israel" since independent 
action would cause fewer complications than an international armada 
which would be resisted by Egypt and the Soviet Union. As the probability 
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of a flotilla decreased, some cost as well as benefit became apparent to the 
foreign minister. When the patrol became less likely, it became less 
desirable; his preferences were not independent of his expectations.12 
Should Israel now choose preemption, Eban continued, the Soviet Union 
was not likely to intervene in the impending conflict and "the shorter the 
clash the less likely Soviet intervention would be" (1977:393). 
Eban and his advisers also increased their estimates of the probability 
and cost of an Arab attack. Advance units of Iraq's army were reported to 
have reached Egypt the day before, and others were allegedly on their way 
to Syria and Jordan (Yonah, 1968:90). Even more significant in changing 
the earlier estimate of attack was the Egyptian-Jordanian pact. By 
encircling Israel on all fronts, it made an attack more likely and more 
dangerous. Officials of the Foreign Ministry also reported the disquieting 
news from Ambassador Eytan in Paris that French customs and transport 
authorities were causing some difficulty with landing rights and clearance 
of planes loading military equipment for Israel (Bar-Zohar, 1970:163). 
While the diplomatic cost of preemption had diminished, the military cost 
of delay had increased. Eban decided to inform Rabin and Yariv of the 
change in his evaluation. 
Accompanied by his director-general, Eban crossed the compound to 
meet with the chief of staff and the director of Military Intelligence. In a few 
brief sentences, he explained the change in his preference: there was little 
further to be gained by delay; the need to withstand Arab aggression was 
paramount; and any decision should now be reached on military grounds 
alone. There were no longer any political inhibitions to effective military 
resistance (Eban, 1977:386). Even for the foreign minister, traditionally 
concerned and constitutionally responsible for international reaction, 
there was no longer a conflict of values. A strategy of preemption was 
dominant. 
On his way back to his office, Eban met the prime minister and told him 
of his meeting with the army's leaders. Under intense military13 and 
political pressure, Eshkol greeted the news with undisguised relief. The 
prolonged mobilization and delay, compounded by Eshkol's uninspiring 
speech three days earlier, had by now created a grave internal political crisis 
which overlay the security problem. The intense political bargaining of the 
last two days had culminated in an explosive demand for a major change in 
12. When decisionmakers engage in wishful thinking, they inflate the probability of what 
they want. Their expectations are influenced by their values. In a related process, Eban 
deflated his value estimate in response to a decrease in his estimate of probability. This was the 
first time that the foreign minister considered that a flotilla could have negative as well as 
positive consequences. 
13. Eban recalls that the prime minister told him "of tense debates that he was having with 
senior officers concerning the grave implications of any further waiting" (1977:386). Since 28 
May, after the stormy meeting with the General Staff, military leaders exerted intense pressure 
on the prime minister to change his decision. 
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the leadership. Common to all the suggestions and proposals was the 
attempt to remove Eshkol from exclusive responsibility for defense. The 
critical factor was the threat by the National Religious Party, a member of 
the governing coalition, to defect if the cabinet were not broadened to 
include opposition representatives. Their defection would have left the 
prime minister with the slimmest of majorities in the Knesset. To 
accommodate the demand of his coalition partner, Eshkol was forced to 
pay with the defense portfolio. Paradoxically, the prime minister made 
this substantial payment for an oversized coalition he was no longer certain 
to control. After an arduous process of negotiation, Eshkolfinally agreed 
on 1 June to form an all-party cabinet which would include Moshe Dayan 
as minister of defense. More curiously, Eshkol's junior coalition partner 
supported the inclusion of those whose policy preferences they opposed but 
whose judgment they trusted.14 The addition of Begin and Dayan to the 
cabinet inevitably would reduce the weight of those who, like the NRP, 
opposed preemptive action. 
Dayan's appointment as minister of defense relieved the political and 
military pressure on the prime minister and permitted decisionmakers to 
return to consideration of their security problem.15 The cabinet met late the 
evening of 1 June to ratify the political changes of the last few days and 
formally approve the formation of a new government. Dayan and the new 
minister-designate without portfolio, Menachem Begin, joined the 
meeting, and the cabinet began its first review of new information in four 
days.16 The chief of staff briefed the ministers on Arab military capabilities 
and troop deployments and observed that, had Israel attacked five days 
earlier, it would have done so with a marked advantage in its favor (Dayan, 
14. It can be suggested that analytic processing may be politically expensive. The 
prolonged evaluation of the consequences of options and the scrupulous attention to evidence 
must have contributed to a public image of hesitation, caution, and indecision. It was the 
image of indecision rather than the substance of policy which provoked the demand for an all-
party government. 
15. Eshkol's schedule is evidence of his preoccupation with the domestic political crisis. 
Of his fourteen appointments on 31 May, none was devoted to security matters, and on 1 
June, of his twenty-four appointments, only three were devoted to defense—and one was a 
courtesy call on General Bar-Lev, the newly appointed deputy chief of staff. By 2 June, 
however, of thirteen appointments, eight were devoted to defense (Eshkol, 1967d:358). Even 
the army was not immune. In the course of the political negotiations, it was suggested at one 
time that Dayan become commander of the southern front with General Gavish as his deputy. 
The proposal preoccupied both Southern Command and the chief of staff. Only after the 
formation of the wall-to-wall cabinet did political and military decisionmakers concentrate 
exclusively on the security problem. Although the domestic process of coalition formation is 
of no direct interest here, it did distract the principal decisionmakers and postpone processes 
of evaluation and choice. For a detailed examination of the processes of internal bargaining, 
see Nakdimon, 1968 and Wagner, 1974. 
16. The cabinet had met the evening before, but it had concentrated exclusively on domes­
tic issues. The third new member of the cabinet, J. Saphir of the Liberal faction ofGahal, did 
not join the meeting of the cabinet until the next day. Dayan represented Ran, the party of 
Ben-Gurion after his split with Mapai. 
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1976:271). The foreign minister's review of the history and current status of 
the international flotilla was followed by a general, if somewhat 
inconclusive, discussion. Dayan cut through the discussion to argue that 
the cabinet could no longer avoid a consideration of the logical 
consequences of the available options. Should the choice be further delay, 
the closure of the Straits would become a fait accompli; in that case, half 
the reserves should be demobilized, and the remainder must "dig in." 
Should the cabinet prefer preemption, then the choice must be made 
immediately (Teveth, 1972:568-569). Dayan argued implicitly that the 
earlier decision must be reconsidered and reconsidered quickly. A decision 
to delay a decision much longer—or no decision—was not an acceptable 
option.17 
Discussion lasted only until after midnight since Dayan insisted that he 
had to familiarize himself with current plans before he could present 
concrete proposals (1976:271). The new defense minister was in fact 
formalizing a process which was already underway. As the likelihood of 
effective international action decreased, qualified decisionmakers turned 
their attention to refining and finalizing the military option. The cabinet 
decided to postpone further discussion until the morning when they would 
meet with senior officers at General Staff Headquarters. 
Before the morning meeting of the Ministerial Committee of Defense, 
Dayan met briefly with the chief of staff. The committee, which began its 
deliberations at 0915, stayed in session for over two hours and, at the prime 
minister's request, Allon, Dayan, Eban, and Rabin and their advisers 
remained for another hour of informal—and freer—discussion. General 
Yariv began the formal meeting with an hour-long intelligence presenta­
tion in which he described "how the enemy from the south concentrated, 
day after day, his battalions, and positioned seven divisions, with powerful 
armour" (cited by Begin, 1972). Although Jordanian participation in a 
coordinated attack was considered possible rather than probable, Military 
Intelligence emphasized the growing danger of a surprise attack. Despite 
the possibility of a multi-front war, the General Staff was confident of 
victory; military defeat was not a possible outcome of a choice to preempt 
(Begin, 1972). Nevertheless, senior officers argued forcefully that the choice 
must be made immediately. As Begin, participating in a Ministerial 
Committee meeting for the first time, recalled: 
The commanders revealed their basic concern that every additional day without 
a decision would increase our losses when the hour of implementation arrived
(1972). 
17. Bitan (1968), a deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry, later said that 
Dayan's principal contribution was to force the cabinet to make a decision. A reexamination 
of the earlier decision was likely anyway, however, once Eban spoke with the chief of staff and 
the prime minister. Dayan did increase the sense of urgency, however, and put into sharp relief 
the military consequences of delay. 
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The cost of delay was not defeat but an increase in casualties in an army and 
country short of men. 
The chief of staff presented a broad outline of the military's plans. 
Generally, the army would concentrate on the defeat of the Egyptian forces 
in Sinai; capture of Sharm el-Shaykh was a secondary objective. Dayan did 
not encourage more detailed discussion of military options,18 but rather 
offered three general arguments to support the broad plans outlined by the 
General Staff. First, if the choice were to be preemption, then delay was 
becoming more costly every day as the Egyptian army fortified its positions 
in the desert. Second, military hostilities, if successful, would be short 
because of the inevitable external pressure to cease fire. Within that short 
period, the I.D.F had to defeat Egyptian armed forces if the political and 
military battles were not to end in failure. Third, Dayan concluded, the first 
stage must concentrate on the capture of central Sinai to rout the Egyptian 
army and only if it were successful could the I.D.F begin action in the 
southern desert (1976:271). Time was expensive, valuable, and short, and 
operational plans had to reflect military priorities linked to longer-term 
political objectives. 
At the smaller meeting that followed, Dayan openly urged an immediate 
preemptive strike. The cabinet was scheduled to meet two days later on 4 
June and, if it were to authorize military action, Israel could and should 
strike the next morning. Allon of course supported military action but 
challenged Dayan's emphasis on central Sinai as the principal military 
target. Israel's future capacity to deter would benefit if its forces advanced 
as close to the Canal as possible. Overlooking the waterway, Israel could 
forestall any future attempt to blockade the Straits by threatening to 
disrupt navigation through the Canal. Dayan objected strongly: 
I said that our proximity and threat to the Suez Canal would be a serious error. 
It would affect the interests of powerful forces in the world and turn some of our 
friends against us. We should certainly not adopt as a political tool the 
threat of its closure (1976:271). 
In his evaluation of military options, Dayan consistently emphasized 
international political consequences.19 
18. Dayan had not yet had adequate time for discussion privately with senior military 
commanders. He also, however, had reservations about the presentation by military officers 
which he may have been reluctant to express in open forum. Dayan wrote: "it seemed to me 
that the issues—time and our operational plans—were not presented in the most appropriate 
way [by the General Staff]" (1976:271). This may explain his emphasis on general principles 
rather than specifics. 
19. Dayan objected to the seizure of the Canal as early as 26 May, when he was still 
officially a private citizen. He met with Amit to make explicit "my objections to the present 
operational plans and my proposed changes as follows. . The campaign would take in all 
Egyptian forces in Sinai, including airfields, armor, and other formations lying between Israel 
and Egypt. The aim of the campaign should be to meet and destroy Egypt's military strength. 
This should be confined to the eastern half of the Sinai. I rejected the assumption that seizure 
of territory and holding onto it could be used as a bargaining card in exchange for freedom 
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Dayan's strong advocacy of a preemptive strike suggests that he made up 
his mind before examining the information provided by his staff. His 
problem for decision was not whether to attack or delay but a much 
narrower one of the optimal military option. At the end of the meeting, 
Eban remained unenthusiastic about military action while the prime 
minister expressed no formal opinion (Dayan, 1976:272).20 This smaller 
group agreed to continue consultations the following evening after Dayan 
met with his military advisers and Eban consulted with his staff at the 
Foreign Ministry. 
Dayan met with senior military officers that evening to review the current 
plan for military action. Operational plans had been amended several 
times, and General Gavish, with the approval of the chief of staff, presented 
the revised version to Dayan. Like all earlier plans it began with a 
preemptive air strike against the Egyptian air force and then, in a full-scale 
ground offensive, three divisional task forces would cross the armistice 
lines simultaneously and advance along four axes, two in northern Sinai 
and two in central Sinai. Its principal objective was to engage and defeat 
the bulk of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, and it no longer included the 
occupation of Gaza or an advance to the Suez Canal. Since the operational 
plan was consistent with the thinking of the defense minister, Dayan 
approved the plan presented that evening by Southern Command (Dayan, 
1976:272).21 Just as their civilian counterparts did not ignore the military 
of shipping. By 'territory' I included the territory of Egypt proper. I was also 
against reaching the Suez Canal, which could provoke an international crisis. . We 
would arouse all the Canal users against us and they would do Egypt's work for her and help to 
destroy us. In the second phase, once we had routed Egyptian air and armored forces, and if 
political conditions permitted, we could proceed to capture the straits" (1976:264). Weizman 
(1976:216) corroborates Dayan's opposition to seizing the Canal in his description of military 
decision-making. 
20. Eban's account of his changed evaluation on 1 June is somewhat inconsistent with 
Dayan's report of Eban's lack of enthusiasm for military action at the meeting on 2 June. Eban 
does not discuss this meeting at 1130, so no direct comparison is possible. Some of the 
secondary literature (Geist, 1974:350) suggests that Eban's presentation of the maritime 
project to the cabinet meeting on 1 June was reasonably positive. If this were the case, then 
Dayan's version would be substantially correct. It is possible that additional information 
which arrived during the day made Eban hesitate. Eugene Rostow, in another meeting with 
Harman, emphasized that, although President Johnson had not yet fully determined his 
course of action, the planning of maritime action was proceeding. The undersecretary of state 
inquired anxiously whether Israel intended to challenge the blockade by sending a ship 
through the Straits, and underscored the vital American interest in denying President Nasser a 
diplomatic victory which could endanger pro-Western regimes in the Middle East. Amit's 
report also recommended a further delay of a few days. If Eban were troubled by his choice, 
when he received evidence which supported his earlier decision, he may have reverted to a line 
of argument which was more familiar to him. Such an oscillating pattern is not 
uncharacteristic of a decisionmaker troubled by competing values and conflicting evidence. 
Rabin recalls that even the prime minister still seemed wary. Eshkol again defended the 
decision to explore every possible political option and reiterated the importance of American 
support, if not during the lighting, in the post-war period. See Rabin, 1979:97. 
21. Considerable controversy surrounds Dayan's role in choosing among military 
options. Some have argued that the plan was fully prepared by Rabin, Weizman, and Gavish 
and that Dayan merely gave his imprimatur to it. Weizman (1973), however, maintains that, 
228 I Part Two: Decision-making in Israel, 1967 
consequences of delay, so military decisionmakers evaluated options by 
considering their international as well as military consequences. Concern­
ed that the consequences of any future strategy of coercive diplomacy 
would be negative, Dayan approved a strategy of limited defense which 
would also reestablish deterrence. The decision-making process among 
military options had ended. 
Once the operational plan had been finalized, decisionmakers still had to 
decide questions of timing and coordination. Weizman best describes this 
secondary process of decision-making: 
In setting zero hour for the ground attack, we had to prefer one of two 
considerations; if we pinned our hopes on air force participation in the land 
battles, it would be better to set the zero hour for our ground forces later than for 
the air force. The other consideration: a few hours after the attack on their 
airfields, the Egyptian command would be ready for a ground attack. If zero 
hour for both air and land attacks were the same, the ground forces would also 
benefit from the element of surprise. After thinking it over, we preferred the 
second option, both because we were confident that the air strike would succeed 
and because we thought that surprise would be of great help to our ground forces 
(1976:226-227). 
Tire choice of a coordinated air and ground attack may well have been 
rational under the circumstances. If the preemptive air strike were 
successful, the Egyptian air force would be unable to provide support for its 
defending forces. If it were unsuccessful, logically there was little to be 
gained in delaying a ground attack which would then meet better prepared 
and supported Egyptian units. There were significant advantages to 
waiting only if Israel's ground forces required close air support. 
although the broad plan was presented to Eshkol, nothing was finally decided until Dayan 
became minister of defense. Gen. Gavish (1970), the commander of the southern front, argues 
further that the limited plan was only eliminated during the 2 June meeting with Dayan, and 
Sharon (1973b) reports that Dayan amended existing plans to include a simultaneous advance 
along the principal axes in central Sinai as well as the northern route. Dayan himself uses the 
words "the one [plan] now before us received my approval" (1976:272). The most 
authoritative record of military decision-making is that provided by the official historian of 
Tzahal who writes as follows: "Two plans for counter-attack were prepared in the period 
between the evacuation of UNEF and the closure of the Straits: a limited and a broad one. The 
starting point of both was the destruction of the Egyptian air force by surprise, and the 
difference lay in the deployment of ground forces. The broad plan envisaged the occupation of 
the forward area of Sinai, while avoiding a frontal attack on the Urn Katef-Abu Ageila 
strongholds; while the limited one was directed towards the occupation of the Gaza Strip 
alone. After the blockade of the Straits by Abdel-Nasser, Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence Levi Eshkol was presented with a plan to advance along the Northern axe until the 
Suez Canal. . With this, the limited plan was put aside. . . The final plan, which was 
approved by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan on June 2, 1967 stated that in the 
breaching phase, the forces are to establish a line not east of the line of el-Arish-G'ebel Livni, 
i.e., short of the Canal and to be in a stage of preparedness for moving towards the Suez Canal 
and Sharm el-Shaykh" {Encyclopaedia Hebraica, 23:726). The military historian does not 
disclose whether Dayan considered both a more limited advance along the northern route as 
well as the broader thrust into central Sinai. What is clear, however, is that Dayan would not 
have approved any plan which concentrated on Gaza or on a limited encounter with Egyptian 
forces. The principal thrust of his argument was the importance of defeating the Egyptian 
army and dispersing the troop concentrations. 
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Decisionmakers were not unreasonable, however, in their estimate that 
armored forces could operate in the exposed desert without close air 
support as long as they were not subjected to intense enemy air strikes. 
In making their choice, military decisionmakers appear to have given 
great weight to the factor of surprise.22 Their heavy emphasis is not 
unexpected, since surprise is an integral part of Israel's concept of defense. 
While "thinking it over," decisionmakers drew on a concept made salient 
by strategic doctrine. Members of the General Staff also considered a 
second factor highlighted by strategic doctrine—the importance of speed 
due to the time constraints created by an externally imposed ceasefire. 
Dayan made just this argument in his general remarks to the Ministerial 
Committee meeting on the morning of 2 June. The official historian of the 
army made clear the impact of this perception of limited time on 
decisionmakers' calculations: 
because of calculations connected with the "political clock" ticking away, 
[a plan of attack] must include a minimal span of time between the air 
force's first strike and the first breach of ground forces in the Egyptian arena 
(1973:726). 
In deciding questions of implementation, military decisionmakers paid 
particular attention to the consequences of short time and surprise for 
military operations. These two factors, each drawn from prevailing 
strategic concepts, converged to produce a choice of a coordinated air and 
ground attack as the preferred military option.23 
22. Once the decision to coordinate air and ground strikes had been made, military 
planners attempted to increase the likelihood of tactical surprise. Several thousand soldiers 
were given short leaves to create an impression of further delay. The General Staff also 
attempted to create a set of alternative objectives which would force the opponent to divide 
defending forces. In a simulated plan for an attack on Sharm el-Shaykh, the navy created the 
impression of a major build-up of landing aircraft in the Gulf of Aqaba by repeatedly sending 
the same four boats overland to Eilat, while the air force engaged in intensive aerial patrolling 
over the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea (Whaley, 1969:A576-579). Sharon's division 
deployed in a two-pronged formation, using dummy tanks, to suggest that it planned to 
advance southwest as it had done in 1956; its assigned mission was a westward thrust (Liddell-
Hart, 1968:18). These tactics are perfectly consistent with the "strategy of the indirect 
approach" which influenced Israel's military thinking so heavily. Dayan also attempted to 
increase tactical surprise by discounting reports of an imminent attack in the press briefings he 
gave on 3 June: "The point . is that it is more or less a situation of being too late or too 
early too late to react regarding our chance in the military field—on the blockading of the 
Straits of Tiran and too early to draw conclusions as to the diplomatic way of handling the 
matter" (1967). After his press conference, many reporters left convinced that no immediate 
attack was likely. Dayan subsequently acknowledged the deliberate attempt to disseminate 
disinformation: "Without being explicit, I was hoping that despite the popularly drawn 
implications of the establishment of the National Unity Government and my own 
appointment to the Defense post, the impression might be gained that we were not about to go 
to war but were intent on exhausting all the diplomatic possibilities" (1976:273). 
23. On the same day that Israel's senior military officials were meeting to make their final 
choices, their counterparts in Egypt were finalizing their plans. Sadat recalls Nasser's 
estimates of the time and scope of the anticipated strike by Israel: "With the Tiran Strait 
closed, war became a certainty. . On Friday, June 2, 1967, Nasser endorsed the defensive 
War Plan in his capacity as President and supreme commandei of the armed forces. On 
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That same day, Eban met with his staff late that afternoon to review once 
more the estimates they had made. Because their enthusiasm for delay was 
now much less, they paid particular attention to the likely reaction of the 
big powers should Israel attack. The news from the Soviet Union was not 
encouraging. Eban argued that, as the West became more timid, Soviet 
militancy grew more intense—the two were inversely related (1977:393). 
That morning, the Kremlin had delivered through Israel's ambassador in 
Moscow a note significantly more intimidating in tone than its last message 
a week earlier. It warned Israel of the dangers of initiating military action: 
"Should the government of Israel take upon itself the responsibility for an 
outbreak of war, it will have to pay the full price for the results" (cited by 
Dayan, 1976:274). Although the evaluation of the day before still held, 
delay was increasing rather than diminishing Soviet hostility. 
Even more disturbing was the news from France. The French cabinet 
had issued an official statement at noon that day warning that it could 
neither approve nor support any government which fired the first shot. 
More to the point, it had decided to declare an embargo on arms deliveries 
to the Middle East, effective as of 5 June. In fact, some equipment was 
embargoed immediately, and the delivery of planes stopped (Limon, 1972). 
that day, I remember Nasser told Air Force Commander Sidqi Mahmoud that the air force 
would be dealt the first blow, whereupon the latter turned to him in obvious nervousness, and 
said: 'We've taken that into account, sir; we shan't sustain any losses beyond the calculated ten 
percent'. On the same day, Nasser said that Israel would attack on Saturday or Sunday 
or, at the latest, on Monday" (1977:173-174). 
The Egyptian estimate of a ten percent loss was dramatically different from the gains 
anticipated by Israel from a preemptive strike—and from the losses they expected should 
Egypt strike first. Egyptian calculations were based on an estimate of Israel's operational 
capability in the air relative to their own substantial air capability. At the time, the Egyptian 
air force included approximately 360 fighters and 70 bombers deployed in 18 bases 
throughout Egypt. Around the airfields were substantial concentrations of anti-aircraft 
weapons and a small number of SAM-2 missiles, and a sophisticated network of radar 
stations monitored the air perimeter. 
In calculating the impact of the anticipated attack in the air, Egyptian officials expected 
Israel to reserve a substantial portion of its air force for air defense and ground support. 
Discounting for combat aircraft that would be non-operational, as in any air force, they 
concluded that less than half of Israel's combat aircraft would participate in the first attack. 
Even if thisfirst strike were partially successful in destroying some of the planes on the ground, 
the attack could not extend to the bases dispersed throughout the country. And the attacking 
planes would be detected by radar, harassed by groundfire, and destroyed. The rest of Egypt's 
air force could then assume the offensive. 
Rabin suggests that these calculations by Egypt's planners were not unrealistic. The 
operational plan of the air force reserved only 12 planes of 200 for the defense of Israel's skies 
in order to concentrate offensive capability in the initial waves. He acknowledges that had 
Syrian and Jordanian aircraft attacked during the initial two or three hours, or had the strike 
against Egypt's airfields taken longer than anticipated, the consequences could have been 
considerable (1979:98). In addition to the commitment of virtually all aircraft to offensive 
action, a higher percentage of planes than is usual were operational. Finally, military plans 
called for aircraft tofly below the radar screens in a simultaneous attack on more than half of 
the Egyptian air bases in the expectation that the anti-aircraft defenses would be neutralized. 
These three factors explain President Nasser's underestimation of the effects of a preemptive 
air strike by Israel. 
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The embargo would have a grossly uneven impact on the major parties to 
the Middle East conflict. France was Israel's principal source of supply but 
a marginal supplier of Arab states. Only Lebanon bought a small number 
of French planes while Egypt and Syria received most of their equipment 
from the Soviet Union. Although the embargo would not have an 
immediate impact in Israel's military capabilities—stocks were high and 
some replacements could be obtained from other sources—its effect would 
increase through time. The embargo increased the felt pressure of time and 
the consequent cost of delay. It also made a short war even more important, 
so that existing stocks of equipment, spare parts, and ammunition would 
be sufficient. Because a preemptive attack would shorten a war, the 
embargo increased the benefit of preemption. 
Information coming officially and unofficially from the United States 
also converged to favor preemption. Effective international action 
appeared increasingly less likely. The day before, after he had completed 
his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dean Rusk 
told the press that the United States had no immediate plans either to test 
the blockade or to act unilaterally. Secretary Rusk emphasized the 
importance of action through the United Nations.24 Also on 1 June, Robert 
Anderson, President Johnson's personal envoy, who had met in Cairo with 
Nasser, reported that Egypt's president was not likely to compromise on 
the issue of the Straits. What was agreed to, however, was a high-level 
exchange of visits. Vice-President Zahariyah Muhi-a-Din would come to 
Washington on 7 June, and Vice-President Humphrey would reciprocate 
soon thereafter. News of the secret meeting and the agreed exchange were 
leaked to Israel's embassy that day. Israel's decisionmakers became 
increasingly concerned that further delay might produce a diplomatic/a// 
accompli.25 
A telephone call from Ambassador Harman was put through while 
Eban's session with his officials was still going on. The two had been in 
constant touch throughout the day, and they decided that Harman should 
return to Jerusalem immediately to report personally on his discussions 
with American officials. He had just had another meeting with Rusk and 
Rostow at the State Department and asked that any decision await his 
arrival. From his cautious and abbreviated comments on the telephone, 
Eban gathered that he had no good news to bring of his conversation with 
24. His comments, along with similar remarks by Vice-President Humphrey, were 
reported in the press in the United States and Israel. See The New York Times and Davar, 2 
June 1967. 
25. Their interpretation of events was correct. Quandt (1977:57) notes that, from 31 May 
on, the State Department was searching for possible compromises to end the crisis. 
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Secretary of State Rusk (Eban, 1977:394). Amit, too, would return the 
following day, and decisionmakers would have more reliable and valid 
information. Pending that information, Eban reconfirmed his prior esti­
mate that preemption would no longer jeopardize American support: "If 
we were successful, the United States would feel relieved at being liberated 
from its dilemma, and would not support international pressures against 
us" (1977:394). 
After it had been decided that Harman would return to Jerusalem, 
Evron arranged a last-minute meeting with Walt Rostow at the White 
House for 1100 hours that morning. Evron stressed that time was growing 
short as the military cost of delay multiplied. Prefacing his query with the 
explanation that he was not inquiring in an official capacity, Evron asked 
what the American response would be if Israel were to try to break the 
blockade with one of its ships, meet Egyptian fire, and respond with an 
attack on Sharm el-Shaykh. Would the United States interpret such an 
action as an exercise of Israel's right to self-defense? What would the 
United States do if the Soviet Union intervened? The president's adviser 
replied that he would seek Johnson's views and quickly asked Evron how 
much time remained. Evron insisted that no decision had been made but 
mentioned 11 June. 
For the first time, Israel's minister in Washington then raised the second 
part of the 1957 commitment made by Secretary of State Dulles. Eban had 
discussed only the first—the American undertaking to assert the right of 
free passage in the Straits—and Evron now wished to discuss the second— 
the recognition by the United States of Israel's legitimate right to use force 
if the Straits were blockaded. He observed that there would be far fewer 
complications for the United States if Israel rather than America opened 
the Straits. For the first time, Evron distinguished between the two 
obligations and tried to build support for independent military action by 
stressing its benefit to the United States.26 Simultaneously, he made a final 
effort to reduce uncertainty. 
A hiatus in decision-making activity occurred during the Jewish Sabbath 
from sundown on Friday, 2 June until an important meeting at the prime 
minister's home the following evening. The new minister of defense spent 
that Saturday morning organizing work procedures within his ministry 
and in meetings with the General Staff. That afternoon, he held deliberately 
low-keyed press conferences and suggested to reporters that diplomatic 
possibilities had not yet been exhausted (Dayan, 1976:273). Late that same 
afternoon, Ambassador Harman, just arrived from Washington, went 
straight to Eban's home for preliminary discussions. The two of them 
26. Johnson (1971:294), without identifying Evron by name, reports part of the 
conversation. A much fuller version, based on an interview with Evron in 1974, is that of 
Quandt (1977:58). 
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joined Allon, Dayan, Yadin, and senior military officers and civil servants 
at the home of the prime minister later that evening.27 This informal 
meeting produced a consensus in favor of preemption. 
New information on the prospects for the flotilla was reviewed. Harman 
had reported earlier to Eban on his final conversation with Rusk and 
Eugene Rostow before leaving Washington. Rusk had assured him that 
plans for maritime action were proceeding and would be completed within 
seven to nine days. The secretary had told Harman that, although measures 
to be taken by the maritime powers were still under consideration, "nothing 
had been firmly decided" (cited by Eban, 1977:394). Rusk warned that the 
issue of who fired first would be extremely important and cautioned again 
against unilateral action by Israel (Quandt, 1977:59). Harman recommend­
ed that evening that Israel delay an additional week since officials in 
Washington believed that they had been given that amount of time to 
organize international naval action.28 
Amit, who had returned from the United States the same day, reported 
on his discussions with Secretary of Defense McNamara and CIA Director 
Helms. He had not met with officials at the State Department or the White 
House. Those he had spoken with in Washington scoffed at the proposed 
naval task force, and Amit concluded that the United States would do 
nothing to open the Straits (Dayan, 1976:273).29 Eban summarized the 
consensus of those present: the United States would not undertake 
27. Present were Prime Minister Eshkol; the minister of labor, Allon; the minister of 
defense, Dayan; the minister of foreign affairs, Eban; Chief of Staff Rabin; the director of 
Military Intelligence, Yariv; the head of Ha-Mossad, Amit; Ambassador Harman; the 
director-general of the Foreign Ministry, Levavi; the deputy minister of defense, Dinstein;the 
director-general of the prime minister's office, Herzog; and Yigael Yadin, a trusted adviser of 
Eshkol and a go-between for the prime minister and the minister of defense after Dayan 
assumed the portfolio. 
28. Harman's recommendation of a further delay of a few days is a modification of a 
consensus reached earlier when he met with Amit and Evron in Washington for a final review 
before the two reported to the cabinet. All three agreed that Israel should now take 
independent military action (Evron, 1972). Gideon Rafael, Israel's ambassador to the 
United Nations, who met Harman when he stopped briefly in New York en route to Israel, 
also told him that the international regatta would never leave port and argued strongly that 
the time had come to attack (Rafael, 1972). Professionals from the Foreign Ministry could 
sec no further benefit to delay. 
29. Amit met principally with Pentagon officials who had suggested indirectly as early as 
their 26 May meeting with Eban that the international task force was an inappropriate 
solution to a problem of national deterrence and defense. It is not surprising that they 
"scoffed" at the task force or that they subtly encouraged Israel to solve its problem 
independently. Amit's dismissal of any possibility of international action undoubtedly 
reflected this influence. He subsequently recalled his evaluation: "It became totally clear that 
they [the U nited States] are not planning to do a thing. This does not mean that there were no 
intentions here or there, or at the time, certain things were said that were not true, or that there 
was full agreement on what to do. But it was clear that when the time for action came, they 
would not do a thing" (Amit, 1973). It is not certain, however, that all those listening to Amit 
were sensitive to the different nuances in policy coming from the Pentagon, the State 
Department, and the White House. They may not have been expert in assessing the impact of 
"bureaucratic politics" on American policy. 
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unilateral or multilateral enforcement action within the immediate future, 
and time was of the essence (1977:395). 
Decisionmakers turned their attention to what they now regarded as the 
principal issue: probable American behavior should Israel choose to strike. 
On the basis of his private conversations in Washington, Amit argued that 
the United States "would do nothing if we went to war. There was even a 
possibility that the United States might help us in the political 
sphere. " (cited by Dayan, 1976:273). Eban agreed: if Israel were 
successful in ending the siege and the blockade, the United States would no 
longer be hostile to such action (1977:395). Decisionmakers assessed the 
probability of American support as high. 
Israel's decisionmakers hoped not only for American assistance in the 
Security Council and the General Assembly but, even more important, for 
American deterrence of Soviet intervention should Israel attack. In his 
final meeting with Rusk and Eugene Rostow, Harman had explored the 
likelihood that the United States would act to "neutralize" Soviet 
intervention if necessary. They were equivocal in their estimate of Soviet 
intentions and of the likely American response. Amit concluded, however, 
from his informal soundings that the United States would deter the Soviet 
Union from intervening in the conflict between Israel and Egypt (Dan, 
1974). This search for great power support to forestall possible intervention 
by another major power is prescribed by Israel's strategic doctrine, and 
decisionmakers did explore actively the likelihood that the United States 
would deter the Soviet Union. Their estimate of the likelihood of American 
deterrence increased as American support for independent action became 
more probable.30 
Before they separated, decisionmakers looked briefly at the current 
operational plan for military action. Dayan reviewed the military option 
chosen the day before: a three-pronged large-scale assault into northern 
and central Sinai. Israel would not attack Jordan unless Jordan attacked 
first and would under no circumstances activate the Syrian front. Only 
appropriate defensive measures would be taken in the north (Eban, 
1977:395 and Dayan, 1976:278).31 There was consensus among decision­
30. Eban underlined the importance of American deterrence of Soviet intervention in his 
autobiography. He recalls that, even after news of the success of the preemptive air strike 
reached Israel's decisionmakers, "There were heavy tasks before us. The first was to ensure 
that Soviet intervention would be deterred" (1977:404). In a eulogy to President Johnson 
some six years later, Eban (1973a) disclosed the great weight given to the personal rela­
tionship with the president in the expectation that he would deter the Soviet Union: "After 
so many days of contact with him, in writing and in speech, we could all feel that if Israel took 
up its own responsibility and emerged intact, it could count on him not to support or even 
permit a policy of international intimidation." 
31. Dayan (1976:278) reports that he met with Major General David Elazar, the 
commander of the northern front, immediately after the cabinet meeting the next day. 
Contrary to Elazar's request, Dayan precluded any offensive action, even against three Syrian 
border emplacements that Elazar wished to capture. Dayan did authorize an advance into the 
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makers that there was little benefit and substantial cost to further delay. 
Eshkol, Allon, Dayan, and Eban all agreed to recommend to the cabinet 
meeting scheduled for the following morning that it authorize a preemptive 
attack. 
On 4 June, the Ministerial Committee of Defense met at 0830 in the 
morning, continued at 1100 hours as a full cabinet meeting, and then sat 
again as the Ministerial Committee until 1500 hours. Eban described this 
series of meetings in stark terms: 
The atmosphere was now strangely tranquil. All the alternatives had been 
weighed and tested in recent days. It seemed as if our adver­
saries had narrowed our options down to a single compulsion. 
Everything in Arab utterance and posture confirmed our impression that our 
physical survival was at stake, and the attitude of the powers clearly proclaimed 
our solitude (1977:395). 
Changed estimates of the likelihood of an Arab attack and of American 
action were decisive in making the decision to attack. They made the choice 
simpler. 
General Yariv began with an extensive review of the increase in Arab 
military capabilities.32 Egypt had now deployed in Sinai some 100,000 
troops and 1000 tanks, organized in seven divisions. The Second and 
Seventh Divisions were the object of particular concern: they had dug 
themselves in deeply in the northeast corner of Sinai, only moments away 
from civilian centers in the northern Negev, and their extensive 
fortifications would now pose a serious obstacle to advancing forces. The 
Egyptian air force had approximately 400 interceptors and fighter-
bombers as well as 75 or 80 medium and lighter bombers. And Egyptian 
capabilities were being augmented by the growing commitment of other 
Arab states. An armored brigade from Kuwait was en route to Sinai and a 
battalion from Iraq was ordered to Gaza. The expeditionary forces 
promised by Libya and Sudan had not yet arrived. 
Egyptian military capability could no longer be assessed in isolation 
from that of other Arab states who had joined in a common defense 
agreement. Just that morning, Radio Cairo broadcast the news that Iraq 
had officially become a party to the Syrian-Jordanian-Egyptian defense 
pact. Military Intelligence expected Syria to join actively in any armed 
demilitarized zone which had been the object of so much controversy, but only as far as the 
international line. The minister of defense recommended that Northern Command strengthen 
defensive arrangements and extend the minefields and fortifications. 
32. Dayan (1976:273) reports that Eban opened the meeting with a review of diplomatic
developments while Eban remembers that the meeting began with a military appraisal
(1977:395-397). It is standard procedure for cabinet meetings to begin with an intelligence
evaluation. This summary of Yariv's presentation is based on that of Dayan and Eban, rather
than on any independent estimate of comparative military capabilities, since these are the
estimates cabinet members heard that morning. See Dayan, 1976:274-275 and Eban, 
1977:395-397. 
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conflict, and it could commit its army of 50,000 troops, 200 tanks, and over 
100 Soviet aircraft, including 32 ultra-modern MIG-21s. Although they 
were less certain that Jordan would participate in the fighting, military 
officers could not afford to ignore the possibility. General Riad, who by 
now had established a front command subordinate to the United Arab 
Command, had ordered Jordanian forces deployed along the border with 
Israel. Jordan's army, which consisted of 50,000 to 60,000 troops and some 
250 Patton and Centurion tanks, was being reinforced by troops from Iraq. 
In an explicit challenge to a declared casus belli, an Iraqi armored division, 
which had entered Jordan the day before, was on its way to Israel's border, 
and Iraq had promised the immediate dispatch of four infantry brigades 
(Yonah, 1968:94). 
If Arab capabilities now permitted a major attack, they also increased 
Arab intent to do so. The defense pact among the principal front-line states 
had created both psychological and military conditions which greatly 
increased the probability of an Egyptian attack. Israel had received reports 
that President Nasser's strategy of absorbing a first strike was itself under 
attack as Arab military capabilities increased (Eban, 1977:397). Egyptian 
generals now estimated that a coordinated first strike victory was possible 
and were pressing hard for authorization to attack from President Nasser. 
Popular enthusiasm for war in Arab capitals further increased the pressure 
on Egypt's president, and his capacity to restrain his eager officers was 
doubtful. Responding to the increase in military and political cooperation 
among front-line states, Israel's decisionmakers estimated that Arab 
military capability had increased. Equally important, they considered that 
Egypt's decisionmakers accurately perceived this increase and that their 
higher estimate of their capabilities increased their intent to attack. 
Capability and intent indicators converged.33 
There was no dissent from this revised estimate of Arab intent. Eban felt 
obligated to report the estimate of American intelligence, conveyed to him 
by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, that "while Egypt would probably 
take military action against Israel, an immediate attack was not expected" 
(cited by Dayan, 1976:275, emphasis in original). The foreign minister, 
however, no longer argued that Nasser wanted victory without war. He too 
33. Israel's most experienced military leaders considered that the increase in Arab unity 
contributed directly to an increase in the likelihood of an Egyptian attack. For their analysis 
of Nasser's strategy at that time, see a group interview of seven former chiefs of staff in 
Ma'ariv, 16 February 1973. Participating were Bar-Lev (1973d), Dayan (1973), Laskov 
(1973), Makleff(1973), Rabin(1973),Tzur(1973),and Yadin(1973). Bar-Lev(1973c)recalled 
in another context that the General Staff thought at the time that President Nasser would 
attack. Allon (1967c) argued onlyfive days after Israel's decision to attack that the change in 
Nasser's estimate of Egyptian capabilities changed his intent: "Nasser had planned to destroy 
the Israel Air Force on the ground and to cut off the Negev and Eilat in a lightning strike of the 
Egyptian armour, thus solving the Tiran problem. He believed that his army would be 
victorious." 
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considered that President Nasser's intent had changed in response to the 
dynamics of Arab unity.34 
Dayan added another dimension to the analysis of Egyptian intent. The 
probability of a first strike had increased not only because of the increase in 
military capabilities and the Arab estimate of this increase, but also 
because of Egypt's calculation that Israel would strike first: 
The Egyptians might not strike the next morning, but I believed they were 
anxious to get in the first blow. If they thought that was our intention too, they 
would not hesitate to beat us to it and launch their attack the day before we did 
(1976:275). 
Anticipating preemption by Israel, Egypt would preempt the preemption. 
Dayan argued that hypotheses of either failed deterrence or spiraling 
escalation suggested a strong likelihood of an Egyptian attack. 
Should the cabinet choose to delay further, the minister of defense 
continued, and permit Egypt to strike first, the cost to Israel would be 
heavy: 
If they succeeded, the implications for us would the loss of our advantage of 
surprise. There were two aspects of our loss of surprise. What we failed to 
gain in a preemptive strike we would be unable to achieve later. We were 
not like the United States which could throw in wave after wave of 
reserves. I had to point out that each passing hour made our task more 
complicated and bloody. Anyone who felt that in the end we were likely to 
be involved in war should know the value—and the cost—of each day. If 
we took the enemy by surprise, we would knock at least one hundred of their 
warplanes out of action. This, for us, would be the equivalent of all additional 
arms supplies we might receive for the next six months—if indeed there was a 
country that would agree to supply us with weapons. Thefirst shot would 
determine the side which would suffer the heaviest casualties and would 
assuredly change the balance of forces. Our best chance of victory was to 
strike the first blow. Considering the situation in which we found 
ourselves, with hundreds of enemy tanks poised on each of the axes leading into 
Israel from the Egyptian bases in Sinai, together with the last minute 
preparations they were making, it would be fatal for us to allow them to launch 
their attack. We should decide to strike the first blow (Dayan, 1976:277, 
emphasis added). 
Dayan was explicit. Even an assurance of postwar supplies could no longer 
compensate for the loss of a first-strike advantage. The costs of delay were 
now overwhelming: the loss of the advantages of tactical surprise, higher 
34. In his autobiography, Eban gives great weight to the impact of Arab unity on 
Egyptian intent. He writes also of the reports of war enthusiasm and the skepticism that 
Nasser could restrain the forces pressing for attack. In support of his increased estimate of the 
likelihood of an Egyptian attack, he cites an account of the prevailing atmosphere in Cairo by 
Eric Rouleau, the well-connected correspondent of Le Monde in the Middle East. Rouleau 
described the mood in Egypt thus: "We have waited long enough. It serves no useful purpose 
to wait any longer. Let's finish with Israel and be done with it. No more words; prompt action 
is needed. Forward to Tel Aviv!" (cited by Eban, 1977:397). 
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casualties, and higher losses of equipment. Like his military advisers, the 
minister of defense urged an immediate end to delay and a choice to 
preempt. 
There was no longer any strong proponent, however, of further delay. 
When the military evaluation was completed, the prime minister asked 
Eban to assess likely international reaction. Eban read to his colleagues the 
text of a letter from President Johnson which had arrived the day before. 
The President wrote the prime minister that the United States hoped to 
secure signatures for the declaration on maritime freedom from all the 
states it had approached other than France. France, unfortunately, had 
thus far refused to sign. The United States was also continuing its effort to 
establish the naval task force which should include at least six other 
countries. At the moment, however, only Australia and one Latin 
American state had agreed to participate. Present plans called for the naval 
task force to escort a ship of Israel flag through the Straits on 11 June and, 
if Egypt opened fire, the escorting warships would return the fire (Dayan, 
1976:273-274). Although the president reiterated his commitment to the 
right of innocent passage through the Straits, he concluded on a distinct 
note of caution: 
I explained to Mr. Eban that I want to protect the territorial integrity of 
Israel and the other nations in this area of the world, and will provide as effective 
American support as possible to preserve the peace and freedom of your nation. 
I stressed too the need to act in concert with other nations. Our leadership 
is unanimous that the United States should not move in isolation (Foreign 
Ministry, cited by Brecher, 1975:420). 
The President made no special promises; on the contrary, he emphasized 
the constraints to unilateral action by the United States. The point was not 
lost on his readers. Eban considered this to be a significant retreat from the 
President's earlier position (1977:397-398).35 
Even though the probability of international action was much lower, 
President Johnson repeated his earlier warning: 
I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the 
initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone 
(Foreign Ministry, cited by Brecher, 1975:420). 
This was the first warning against unilateral military action by a senior 
American policymaker since 28 May. Eban suggested, however, that the 
35. Eban's estimate appears to have been more or less correct. Later that same day, in 
Washington, Senator Mansfield released a report on the testimony of Vice-President 
Humphrey and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. The report distinguished sharply between a declaration, the use of force, and the 
use of force to guarantee freedom of passage for ships of the United States as distinct from 
those of Israel. The Committee had been promised that "so far as using force is concerned, 
anything beyond the declaration would be taken up with Congress" (The New York Times, 
5 June 1967). 
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formal appeal for further restraint not be given undue weight. American 
political and moral responsibility was now much greater than it had been 
ten days earlier and, consequently, the United States was not likely to 
abandon and isolate Israel as it had in 1956 (Eban, 1977-400). 
The foreign minister told his colleagues that there were different 
estimates of Soviet intentions. He informed them that Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko had summoned Ambassador Katz two days ago to 
warn again of the consequences should Israel initiate hostilities. Eban 
considered that, although Israel could expect political hostility, there was 
no indication of armed intervention. This indeed was the majority 
assessment, especially if the war were short (1977:398).36 
Eban turned to an evaluation of the intentions of Israel's principal arms 
supplier, France. He told the cabinet of a meeting between de Gaulle and 
Ambassador Eytan the day before when the French president had warned 
Israel of the dire consequences of independent military action: Arab 
bombing of Israel's cities and the loss of American support. De Gaulle had 
told Eytan that France was embargoing arms to Israel to prevent Israel 
from undertaking military action; the embargo would remain in force "as 
long as it is not clear if you will go to war" (cited by Eban, 1977:399). 
The foreign minister concluded his assessment by arguing that the 
evaluation of the military authorities must be reconsidered within the 
context of the embargo. Not only had the likelihood of an attack increased, 
but Israel's military capability was now at its peak. If supplies continued to 
flow to the Arab states from the Soviet Union while Israel's pipeline was 
cut, the arms balance would deteriorate (1977:399).37 The moment was now 
opportune. The diplomatic cost of preemption had been reduced 
considerably; indeed, if military action were successful, there could be an 
improvement in Israel's political position. Eban recommended that the 
cabinet decide in favor of preemption. 
The prime minister was in fundamental agreement with his principal 
ministers. President Johnson s letter was, at best, "disappointing," and the 
time had come for military resistance (Dayan, 1976:277). In the general 
discussion that followed, the minister of the interior, H. M. Shapira, 
36. Allon subsequently explained that the Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene because 
of the risk of confrontation with the United States and because of their military weakness in 
the Middle East. He recalls that, in cabinet discussions of the likelihood of Soviet 
intervention, only Dayan considered an intervention plausible because of the Soviet 
commitments to Arab states and the possibility of loss of face which would flow from failure 
to honor those commitments (Allon, 1968). 
37. Mordechai Limon, the military attache at the embassy in Paris, succeeded in securing 
a twenty-four hour delay to enable materials already loaded to be released (Bar-Zohar, 
1970:182-183). The effect of the embargo would be felt most seriously in the supply of aircraft. 
The news was not much more encouraging from the United States. In response to requests to 
the Pentagon, the Department of Defense had pointed out that, even if the weapons were 
supplied, they would not reach Israel in time to have any impact on the current crisis (Dayan, 
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interjected the views of Ben Gurion whom he had seen again two days 
earlier. The former prime minister urged that Israel refrain from the use of 
military force until the support of a powerful ally was assured. Shapira 
recommended as a third alternative that Israel send a test ship through the 
Straits; this would put the onus of a first strike on Egypt. 
Dayan disputed Shapira's estimate of the cost of military action and the 
benefit of sending a test-ship.38 If a ship were sent through the Straits, Israel 
would transmit an unambiguous signal to Egypt that it intended to attack 
and would therefore lose all the advantages of surprise. And, as he had 
argued earlier, the cost of absorbing a first strike would be enormous. The 
minister of defense insisted that the time had come to strike: the probability 
of an Arab attack was high and increasing as was the military cost of delay. 
Although he urged the choice of preemption, Dayan did not bolster 
support for his preferred option. He recalled subsequently: 
I could not dismiss lightly the words of Ben Gurion, who had warned against 
embarking on this war. Nor could I ignore the stand taken by de Gaulle, the 
cautionary advice of Dean Rusk, and particularly the threats of the Russians 
(1976:279). 
Aware of the cost of its consequences, the minister of defense 
recommended the choice of preemption. He proposed a formal resolution 
that the cabinet authorize the prime minister and the minister of defense to 
approve the timing of the action and to so order the General Staff of the 
Israel Defense Forces. The two Mapam ministers, Barzilai and Bentov, 
moved a second resolution that Israel postpone any decision for the time 
being and await the efforts of President Johnson to set up a multinational 
fleet to open the Straits, while making clear that Israel's security and 
existence were in grave danger and demanding immediate supplies of arms 
as required by the increasing seriousness of the security situation (Dayan, 
1976:277). 
The prime minister called for a formal vote on the two resolutions. 
Eighteen members of the cabinet voted in favor of the resolution 
authorizing military action, while the Mapam resolution received only the 
two votes of the party's ministers. After further consultations with their 
party colleagues, they added their assent to what then became a unanimous 
vote. The formal resolution stated: 
After hearing a report on the military and political situation from the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff, and the 
38. Dayan subsequently explained his rejection of the advice of his long-time political 
mentor: "Ben Gurion, whose political wisdom I had always admired, was now staying not far 
from my office, but I forebore from taking counsel with him. I thought he had an imperfect 
vision of our situation. . He . . had an exaggerated opinion of Nassers power and 
underrated the controlled strength of the Israel Defense Forces" (1976:279). Disagreeing with 
Ben Gurion's estimate of relative capabilities, Dayan did not succumb to the judgment of an 
authority figure. 
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head of military intelligence, the Government ascertained that the armies of 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate multifront aggression, 
threatening the very existence of the State. 
The Government resolves to take military action in order to liberate Israel from 
the stranglehold of aggression which is progressively being tightened around 
Israel. 
The Government authorizes the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to 
confirm to the General Staff of the I.D.F the time for action. 
Members of the Cabinet will receive as soon as possible the information 
concerning the military operation to be carried out. 
The Government charges the Foreign Minister with the task of exhausting all 
possibilities of political action in order to explain Israel's stand to obtain the 
support of the powers {Jerusalem Post, 5 June 1972). 
After the vote, the minister of defense telephoned the chief of staff to 
inform him that the operational plan, with the hour of attack set for 0745 
the following morning of 5 June, had been approved for action. 
The Rationality of the Process 
Within the space of a week all but one of Israel's leaders changed their 
minds. A week earlier only Carmel favored preemption but, by the end of 
the cabinet meeting on 4 June, the choice to preempt was unanimous. A 
unanimous decision by such a large group is often suspect; it can indicate 
the dynamics of collective solidarity operating in a group under intense 
pressure. A review of the evidence, however, suggests more complicated 
processes at work as ministers struggled to reconsider their prior estimates 
in an increasingly threatening and inhospitable environment. Although 
there was some variation in individual performance during the week, the 
change in preference is best explained by analytic recalculation by cabinet 
members of the probability and cost of an Arab attack (Path 7). 
Paradoxically, the more menacing strategic environment made these 
calculations simpler for most members of Israel's cabinet. They received 
help both from friend and foe but principally from foe. Most important, as 
uncertainty about Arab intentions declined, decisionmakers stopped 
arguing about the scope of the challenge to deterrence; President Nasser 
and King Hussein made academic any debate about the central issue on the 
agenda for decision. Those responsible for decision no longer talked past 
but to each other. 
Decisionmakers now defined their problem as defense in response to 
massive and immediate failure of deterrence. Almost all the actions which 
had been specified individually as casus belli had now occurred: a blockade 
of the Straits; concentrations of forces along all of Israel's borders; an arms 
embargo which would affect future military capability; and a high 
probability of an Arab first strike. In defining the issue, Israel's leaders no 
longer faced the logical problem of which was more important or more 
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dangerous. The violations were now so many and so severe that it did not 
make sense to consider each one separately. Decisionmakers did not have 
to resolve the conflict of priorities among the multiple challenges to 
deterrence. Rather, they aggregated all and redefined the problem as one of 
immediate and massive deterrence failure. The lacunae in the logic of the 
strategic argument became irrelevant when decisionmakers had to add 
rather than compare. They did not so much solve their problem logically as 
their logical problem was solved for them. 
TABLE 7.1 
4 JUNE: A COGNITIVE-ANALYTIC PATH TO CHOICE 
(Path 7) 
STIMULUS: Jordan concludes a defense pact with Egypt on 30 May. 
SEARCH: Very limited; two principal options of attack and delay 
brought forward from earlier problems; third option of 
test-ship rejected as inconsistent with strategic doctrine. 
ESTIMATION AND Analytic; easy use of convergent indicators of capability 
REVISION: and intent to increase probability of attack; careful 
revision of estimates of likelihood of the flotilla, Soviet 
intervention, and US support; some inconsistency in 
management of evidence toward the end of the process. 
EVALUATION: Calculation of cost and benefit easier in analytic process; 
military cost of delay high and growing; no further 
diplomatic benefit of delay; military benefit of pre­
emption high and no further diplomatic cost. 
CHOICE: Analytic; easy because of reduced conflict of values which 
makes preemption obvious choice. 
Once members of the cabinet had a clear definition of the problem, little 
additional search activity was necessary (Table 7.1). Delay and preemp­
tion, which had been identified ten days earlier, continued to be the obvious 
alternatives. Each was consistent with a different component of strategic 
doctrine, and both were now thoroughly familiar to participating 
decisionmakers. Now that the problem was unmistakably one of defense, 
however, military experts in particular extended their search beyond the 
very general option of preemption to refine their plans. All the military 
alternatives under consideration emphasized tactical surprise and 
initiative, two key components in Israel's concept of defense. In the more 
narrowly defined military problem, the minister of defense and senior 
officers worked essentially within the permissive framework of relevant 
strategic concepts, and their emphasis on a surprise air strike followed by 
an indirect ground attack should have been no surprise to any assiduous 
reader of army publications. The only other alternative discussed in the 
cabinet was the sending of a test-ship through the Straits to force Egypt "to 
fire the first shot." It was immediately rejected out of hand by both Dayan 
and Rabin as, in effect, inconsistent with prevailing strategic assumptions 
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which emphasize the enormous advantages of surprise. Once again, leaders 
began by eliminating unacceptable alternatives and then proceeded to 
direct comparison of the remaining two options. 
Strategic concepts also were of some use in revising estimates in selected 
areas. They were most helpful in estimating the likelihood of attack, and it 
was the change in this estimate which stimulated a redefinition of the 
problem for decision and a reevaluation of the cost and benefit of the 
consequences of the two principal options. The entry of foreign troops into 
the West Bank of the Jordan had been repeatedly and vigorously defined as 
a casus belli. The consummation of the Jordanian-Egyptian defense pact 
and the anticipated arrival of Iraqi troops in Jordan were therefore 
considered particularly valid indicators of the probability of attack. The 
availability of a valid indicator decreased the likelihood that decision-
makers would depress the impact of information which challenged their 
prevailing assumptions. No senior military officer, or civilian decision-
maker for that matter, had considered it likely that Jordan would 
cooperate with Egypt; the antagonism between the president and the king 
was mutual and intense. Israel's decisionmakers, like President Nasser, 
considered Arab disarray a constraint on Egyptian intent to attack. When 
they learned of the agreement between Egypt and Jordan and the 
establishment of a functioning United Arab Command, they understood 
its significance immediately, revised their hypothesis of Arab fragmenta­
tion (H9 to H10), and updated their estimate of the probability of attack. 
Because they had a strongly diagnostic indicator, Israel's leaders quickly 
acknowledged miscalculation and compensated for it. Indeed, partly 
because the indicator was so diagnostic and the information so unexpected, 
some members of the cabinet may have overcompensated as they 
drastically increased their estimate of the likelihood of an Arab attack. 
Generally, however, sensitivity to uncomfortable and unexpected news is 
characteristic of analytic information-processing. 
When they made their last decision to delay a week earlier, ministers 
debated whether to give greater weight to capabilities or intent since the 
two diverged to some extent. Some members of the cabinet relied more 
heavily on capability indicators than others, and strategic concepts were of 
little help in settling the dispute about the relative importance of the two 
sets of indicators in estimating the probability of attack. One week later, 
the divergence between Arab military capabilities and their intent had 
virtually disappeared. Although they could get little guidance from 
strategic doctrine, decisionmakers needed little since all important 
indicators now pointed in the same direction. 
Those decisionmakers who looked principally at the deployment of 
Arab armies along the borders of Israel estimated a high probability of 
attack. Those who focused on the strategic balance and the deterrent 
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calculus expected Egypt to increase its estimate of joint Arab capability 
after the Egyptian-Jordanian pact and inferred a high probability of 
attack. Those who gave greater weight to the statements of Arab leaders 
listened to speeches hailing Arab unity as the prelude to holy war and 
inferred intent to attack. And those who considered Egypt's decision-
makers sensitive to Israel's signals in an interdependent relationship of 
deterrence expected Egypt to anticipate an attack by Israel after the 
wholesale series of violations of declared casus belli and inferred Egyptian 
intent to preempt. Whatever indicators members of the cabinet used, their 
estimates converged; there was no longer any problem of interpretation. 
Again it was not that decisionmakers solved their problem; rather their 
problem disappeared when indicators converged. 
The convergence of indicators may explain the substantial increase in the 
use of categorical language to describe the probability of an Arab attack. 
For the first time, decisionmakers appeared certain rather than uncertain. 
Generally, judgments of certainty indicate biased or poor processes of 
inference; the capacity for probabilistic thinking is an important 
component of an analytic process. In this case, however, the estimates of 
certainty or near-certainty reflected the convergence of multiple indicators 
of Arab intent and capability. Moreover, since most of these indicators had 
been validated individually before they were used, the effect of their 
convergence was cumulative. For policymakers working with multiple 
rather than single indicators, uncertainty about the probability of an Arab 
attack would, indeed, be drastically reduced. If estimates of the likelihood 
of attack had not responded to change in several indicators, strong 
conservative bias or inertia effects would likely have been at work. 
Although evaluation of the scope of revision must await more formal 
consideration,39 the qualitative increase in estimates does not appear 
irrational given the set of indicators members of the cabinet used and the 
evidence they saw. Although decisionmakers were not analytic only 
because it was easy, it was easy to be analytic. 
Decisionmakers considered not only the likelihood of an Arab attack 
but also the probability of American support and Soviet military 
intervention should they preempt. While strategic concepts identified these 
factors as important, they provided no guidance whatsoever in the 
selection and use of appropriate indicators; decisionmakers were, in effect, 
on their own. Members of the cabinet had considered these factors before, 
however, during this decisional sequence, and that made their task much 
easier. Now reassessing rather than assessing de novo, they were 
scrupulous and careful in their search for and weighing of evidence. This 
39. Chapter 9 uses Bayesian analysis to establish the optimal scope of revision. 
Decisionmakers' qualitative estimates can be compared to these more precise figures to 
evaluate the quality of their intuitive revision. 
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was the case when evidence was ambiguous and not easily interpretable and 
when the information was discrepant and the news unpleasant. In the later 
stages of their review, however, as the moment of decision approached, 
some ministers developed stronger commitments to particular inter­
pretations and attached less significance to discrepant information than 
they had earlier. 
In a close approximation to analytic procedures, decisionmakers built in 
reassessment of prior estimates and mined multiple sources of evidence. 
Eban was principally responsible for this review process, and his 
management of it is particularly striking. With strong commitments to 
international action, the foreign minister nevertheless deliberately initiated 
a reexamination of his prior estimates. He agreed with Prime Minister 
Eshkol that someone of independent judgment be sent on special mission 
to Washington to provide a comparative estimate of the likelihood of the 
naval task force and of American diplomatic support. The reassessment 
process was stimulated by the increase in the probability of an attack and 
made much easier by the unmistakable decrease in the prospects of the 
international regatta. Foreign Office personnel monitored the statements 
of Western leaders for changes in nuance and tone and quickly spotted the 
attrition in the number of those prepared to support and participate in a 
naval show of force. Indeed, by 3 June, there was little disagreement among 
Israel's foreign policy experts in Washington and Jerusalem, and their 
consensus was not artifactual but responsive to a range of public and 
private evidence. Their expert judgment was reinforced by the independent 
estimate of Amit relying on very different sources. Under considerable 
stress, Eban and Eshkol showed themselves able to use multiple indicators 
and varied evidence to change their earlier judgments even when the change 
was unpleasant. 
In the later stages of the decision-making process, as the prospect of the 
flotilla receded, Eshkol, Eban, and Dayan, as well as their advisers, paid 
increasing attention to the likelihood of Soviet intervention and to 
American willingness to deter it. Here the basis of evidence was much 
thinner, but decisionmakers used what they had. Harman, Evron, and 
Amit independently explored and assessed the likelihood that the United 
States would forestall a Soviet attempt to intervene. The rather equivocal 
answers they got were transmitted separately to key policymakers in 
Jerusalem. Nor did decisionmakers suppress information or estimates 
which contradicted their evaluation. Eban told his cabinet colleagues that 
his staff was not unanimous in their evaluation of Soviet intentions. And 
although Eban considered military intervention highly unlikely, he told his 
colleagues of the unpleasant note received from the Kremlin only two days 
before the day of decision. The note was considerably more menacing in 
tone than the message Eshkol had received the day before the cabinet last 
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chose to delay. And yet decisionmakers now gave much less weight to a 
harsher Soviet threat in the context of a higher estimate of American 
support. In the absence of better and more complete evidence, this was not 
prima facie an illogical judgment to make. If indeed the United States was 
more likely to approve tacitly independent action by Israel, it should be 
more willing to deter Soviet intervention. The key was the estimate of 
American support. 
Toward the end of the decisional process, Eban and his associates 
focused most of their attention on the likelihood of this diplomatic 
support. After a careful and almost textual analysis of public and private 
communications, they skillfully detected signals by omission. They 
attached considerable significance to the absence of an explicit warning 
from senior American officials and upgraded their estimate of the prospect 
of American support. They treated the same indicator very differently, 
however, after their review was complete. In his letter to Prime Minister 
Eshkol on the morning of 3 June, President Johnson, in language almost 
identical to that he had used on 28 May, warned Israel under no 
circumstances to initiate military action. When Eban read this warning to 
his cabinet colleagues, however, he advised them to discount its 
significance. He was no longer responsive to the presence of a presidential 
warning even though its absence had provoked his original increase in the 
estimated likelihood of American support. 
It is possible that at this late stage in the decision-making process, having 
made a renewed commitment to a revised hypothesis, Eban was now 
considerably more reluctant to admit any discrepant information. A 
complementary explanation would suggest that the warning derived its 
significance as much from its context as from its content: a warning 
delivered when international maritime action was no longer likely did not 
have the same impact. But even these explanations are not fully 
satisfactory. If American support—crucial to the estimate of Soviet 
intervention—was more likely principally because President Johnson did 
not warn, the arrival of a stern warning should have provoked at least a 
momentary downgrading of its probability; there is no evidence that it did. 
Because it did not, the estimate of American support must have been 
sensitive to other factors as well. 
Eban increased his estimate of the probability of American political 
support for military action when he decreased his estimate of the likelihood 
of the naval patrol. The two appeared to be inversely related; this was due 
in part to Eban's definition of the problem for decision at an earlier stage. 
The two were linked by argument rather than assessed independently by 
evidence. The logic of this linkage is not inherently unpersuasive. It was 
conceivable that an American president would feel especially annoyed that 
the international diplomatic process had been prematurely terminated, and 
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that is just the point Harman made in urging one more week of delay. 
Generally, however, the argument that the United States wouldfind it more 
difficult to isolate Israel after the obvious failure of the flotilla was not 
unreasonable. The failing flotilla reduced the danger of American 
abandonment and, consequently, of Soviet intervention. Again, decision-
makers did not have to solve the logical dilemma they had created by 
inversely relating American support and maritime action. The sinking 
flotilla removed the problem for them. 
The extraordinary readiness to reexamine and reassess the likely 
consequences of preemption and delay can be explained partly by the 
presence of these inverse relationships. Since both American support and 
international action were desirable, a decrease in the probability of one was 
less painful than it might have been if it were not compensated for by an 
increase in the likelihood of the other. Despite some inconsistencies in the 
management of evidence whichflowed from the logic of the argument, the 
general pattern of careful scrutiny, reexamination of the reliability and 
validity of evidence, use of multiple indicators, and openness to revision 
approximates analytic procedures of inference. 
The calculation of the cost and benefit of the consequences of the two 
options was much easier than it had been a week earlier. As uncertainty 
about an Arab attack and American support was reduced, cost and benefit 
became obvious (Table 7.2). Eban as well as Allon, Dayan, and Rabin now 
gave greatest weight to military security in assessing the already high and 
ever-growing cost of delay. The list was long: increasing military casualties 
as Egypt improved the deployment and organization of its forces; 
TABLE 7.2 
PRINCIPAL ESTIMATES OF COST, BENEFIT,

AND LIKELIHOOD OF CONSEQUENCES OF OPTIONS, 4 JUNE

Attack: Probability of US support increases after long delay and decline in 
probability of flotilla 
Probability of USSR military intervention decreases as probability of 
US support increases 
Benefit to military security increases, restoration of the power to deter, 
end to threat of Arab attack 
Cost to international support decreases after long wait; successful 
military action could produce gain. 
Wait: Probability of flotilla decreases 
* Probability of Arab attack increases after Egyptian-Jordanian	 defense 
pact 
Benefit to international support constant or reduced; no further	 benefit 
could be expected from additional delay 
* Cost to military security escalating due to multiplicative cost of three-
front war 
* Decisionmakers paid particular attention to this dimension. 
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increasing casualties in a multi-front war; higher casualties if Israel lost the 
advantage of tactical surprise; damage to the air force should Egypt strike 
first; decrease in long-range military capability as a result of the arms 
embargo; and loss of the capability to deter. Indeed, military officers were 
so convinced of the cost of delay that they resorted occasionally to 
categorical estimates of "catastrophe." Decisionmakers also considered the 
economic cost of maintaining a large-scale mobilization of reserves if 
action were further delayed, and they stressed the damage to civilian 
centers should Egypt strike first. Since the foreign minister and his staff 
could see no further diplomatic benefit to delay, the net cost was obvious. 
Eban also estimated that the diplomatic cost of preemption had 
decreased. Military action might create some short-run loss of diplomatic 
support: the opposition of France, a principal arms supplier, was not an 
inconsiderable military and diplomatic loss. Generally, however, inter­
national opposition to unilateral action by Israel had decreased as the 
blockade continued. The foreign minister argued, on the contrary, that 
some diplomatic benefit might accrue if Israel relieved others of a 
burdensome international obligation. Preemption also promised greater 
benefit to military security than it had a week earlier. Not only would it 
restore the capacity to deter, but it would also forestall an imminent Arab 
first strike. Dayan and others with military expertise paid less attention, 
however, to the military benefit of preemption than they did to the military 
cost of delay. In their evaluation, they focused on the amount to lose rather 
than on the amount to win. This focus was consistent with the risk-aversity 
of strategic doctrine. 
The choice that morning of 4 June was easy. Once Eban, Dayan, and 
Allon were agreed that preemption promised greater benefit on most 
dimensions and delay greater loss on all dimensions, calculation was not 
difficult or painful. This simplification of choice was not the doing of 
decisionmakers; they did not have to simplify an unpleasant conflict of 
values since the conflict of a week ago had all but disappeared. Changes in 
the estimates of cost and benefit converged to favor preemption, and 
members of the cabinet had very little integrating and trading-offto do. If 
delay were costly on all dimensions and preemption beneficial on most, 
simple processes of addition and subtraction would produce an analytic 
choice. Israel's leaders saw the obvious and chose it. Preemption was the 
obvious choice not because policymakers bolstered or simplified their 
accounting, but because their estimates changed in response to changes in 
the environment. It was in this sense that Eban could speak of a tranquil 
atmosphere, where alternatives had been weighed and tested and "our 
adversaries had narrowed our options down to a single compulsion" 
(1977:395). The choice to preempt is explained by the use of analytic 
procedures of estimation and evaluation within the constraints imposed by 
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organizing concepts. Members of Israel's cabinet were lucky: dominance 
was logical and, because it was logical, an analytic choice was 
psychologically easier. 
If the change in choice from delay to preempt is explained by a cognitive-
analytic path to decision, at least three factors may be relevant to this 
capacity for even partial analytic processing by members of Israel's cabinet. 
Contrary to current interpretations, the first factor—high levels of stress— 
apparently did not constrain analytic processing. The environment in 
which Israel's leaders made their choice was not conducive to sober 
analysis. In the week from 28 May to 4 June, they were surprised and they 
perceived intense threat and urgency.40 These conditions are not at all 
optimal for analytic processing—indeed, this was the only time since the 
problem first arose that decisionmakers were simultaneously threatened, 
pressed, and surprised. Although the Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact was 
unexpected, however, it was not uninterpretable. Once decisionmakers 
acknowledged their miscalculation, they were less rather than more 
bewildered. After Jordan joined forces with Egypt, senior military officers 
and members of the cabinet were much less uncertain about the probability 
of an Arab attack even though they were considerably more threatened. 
When threat and pressure of time became intense, some did wish to curtail 
the decision-making process and act. Rabin (1972), for example, recalls 
that he thought at the time that Israel should have attacked on the thirtieth 
of May and one of the members of Knesset, Michael Hazani, was heard 
shouting in the corridors: "This cannot go on any longer. Take a 
decision, and quickly" (Nakdimon, 1968:169). 
This push for closure was resisted. On the contrary, the clarification of 
Arab intent led Eshkol and Eban to redouble their efforts to reduce 
uncertainty about international action and American support. When their 
perceptions of crisis intensified, they expanded rather than contracted their 
processes of search and evaluation. They were able to do so partly because 
they could draw on estimates they had generated earlier in less frantic 
moments and use these as the basis for review and reassessment. 
The second factor, group procedures, was also a helpful antidote to the 
impact of crisis on decision-making processes. At their evening meeting at 
the prime minister's home on 3 June, for example, a small group of key 
decisionmakers did reach a consensus on the choice of preemption. At the 
cabinet meeting the following morning, however, they did not com­
municate their shared preference but again reviewed evidence and 
argument. The minister of the interior felt free to challenge prevailing 
opinion and offer a third option; he could dissent without reference to 
40. McCormick (1975:52, 33) finds that both threat and time pressure rise after 28 May 
and peak on 30 May, also a moment of surprise. Threat and time pressure then decline sharply 
in the ensuing four days and rise again on 4 June. 
250 I Part Two: Decision-making in Israel, 1967 
group pressure. The two Mapam ministers offered and voted for a 
competing resolution, and only after consultation with their party 
colleagues did they add their assent to the majority resolution. Consensus 
was not forced from above but built from below by a careful and patient 
prime minister. That morning, cabinet discussion lasted for over seven 
hours as members considered and reconsidered. 
Coalition-building is no more convincing than concurrence-seeking as 
an explanation of the processes of collective decision. A concept of 
coalition politics is useful in the interpretation of the deep domestic 
divisions which culminated in the formation of a new government, and 
the change in the composition of the cabinet, though not related directly to 
policy preferences, inevitably affected the relative weight of important 
ministers. Even then, however, the principles of coalition-building cannot 
explain why a junior partner pressed to include those whose policy 
preferences it opposed or why the coalition leader refused to risk a 
minimum winning coalition. 
Even more to the point, coalition-building cannot explain the shift in 
policy preference of sixteen cabinet ministers. The coalition of 28 May 
remained largely intact on 4 June; only its fringe members changed. Ahdut 
Ha'avodah members Carmel and Allon, who had dissented from the earlier 
decision, joined wholeheartedly in support of the choice to preempt, while 
the two Mapam members were now more reserved in support of the 
majority decision. But the sixteen cabinet ministers who were members of 
the overwhelming majority in both cases shifted their preferences from 
diplomatic to military action. 
The shift cannot be explained plausibly by a requirement of majority 
support for a revised set of proposals. A large majority already existed on 
28 May; virtually all the members of that majority changed their preference 
for an alternative that was already on the table when they supported delay. 
There is no evidence, moreover, that the prime minister anticipated any 
difficulty in building a majority coalition for preemption or that he 
modified strategy to assure the participation of marginal supporters. 
If majority support was not the issue, perhaps the role of members 
"essential" to any majority coalition was critical. The new minister of 
defense could be considered an essential member and he strongly 
supported preemption. The foreign minister also was fully aware that his 
recommendation carried special weight among his colleagues: 
In constitutional theory the Foreign Minister is one of many whose votes have 
equal weight; in practice, however, his vote, if given for military action, has the 
strength of many. It is, after all, his business to exhaust peaceful remedy. I 
had lived with the knowledge that if I withdrew my inhibiting hand, military 
resistance would become certain (Eban, 1977:386). 
Eban does not argue, however, that his support is essential in a decision to 
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preempt, only that it is valuable. He could not block. Dayan, the new 
minister of defense, was an essential member of any coalition. There is no 
evidence, however, that any other group members, including the prime 
minister, changed their mind in order to assure Dayan's participation in the 
majority position. If the coalition leader is neither building a majority 
around a new or revised set of proposals nor modifying strategies to placate 
essential members, then coalition dynamics do not provide a powerful 
explanation of the change in the cabinet's decision. Once competing 
interpretations are eliminated, the shift in the collective choice from delay 
to attack is explained most plausibly by the reconsideration of estimates of 
probability and value by group members committed to careful review and 
thorough investigation. 
The most important aid to decision came neither from within the group 
nor from prior processes, but from the actions of others which 
compensated for the third factor of flawed logic in strategic argument. 
While strategic concepts were of some assistance in organizing estimation 
and evaluation, areas of incompleteness and incoherence had permitted 
ambiguity in problem diagnosis and inconsistency in definition of options. 
Both ambiguity and inconsistency disappeared when Egypt and Jordan 
reduced uncertainty and the United States and the maritime powers 
reduced complexity. When Arab intent and capability converged to 
indicate a high probability of attack, members of the cabinet could 
diagnose their problem as a massive and immediate challenge to 
deterrence. When leaders were less uncertain, the conflict of priorities 
disappeared, and the gaps in strategic concepts became unimportant. 
When the flotilla failed, there were no consequences to the earlier illogical 
attempt to solve several problems simultaneously. Even an analytic 
component in the processing of choice could not adequately compensate 
for faulty premises, poor problem diagnosis, and confusion in the 
definition of options, but members of Israel's cabinet were lucky: although 
their thinking was not error-free, there were no costs for logical error. 
8chapter 
Methodology for Revision and Choice 
Model Specification and Design 
This chapter presents a methodology for evaluating revision and choice. It 
consists of model specification and design, decision analysis, sensitivity 
analysis, Bayesian inference, and data acquisition. The chapter presents 
criteria for assessing the quality of decision-making, i.e., the degree to 
which the processes of inference and choice are rational. This is one of the 
first efforts to use empirical evidence in conjunction with rational criteria to 
evaluate the process and product of decision-making. Going beyond prior 
attempts, the present inquiry translates primary source statements into 
quantitative estimates and uses these estimates with mathematical models 
as a basis for the evaluation of Israel's process and choice calculations. 
The examination of Israel's decision-making processes during 1967 
suggests that policymakers used analytic procedures of choice to select 
options that were identified through cognitive search. They integrated 
information-processing and consideration of options into the broader 
structure of cognitive beliefs. Even though search was limited to those 
options consistent with prevailing beliefs, the processing of information 
and evaluation approximated the procedures suggested by analytic models 
of choice. A careful consideration of cost, benefit, and likelihood of 
consequences, within the constraints established by beliefs, should produce 
a more rational decision than those choices made through purely cognitive 
mechanisms. Indeed, the rationality of a decision cannot be assessed at all if 
policymakers ignore probability and value in making their choice. 
Discovery of statements containing words describing likelihood and value 
is evidence of a process of choice that strives toward rationality. For 
example, if one finds statements making value trade-offs, such a discovery 
suggests that a rational process of decision-making generated the empirical 
traces. The absence of value trade-off data or other cost-benefit evidence, 
however, need not imply lack of rationality. Given the presence of value 
data, it is possible to consider whether choice is "expected-value 
maximizing," i.e., rational. 
Even though Israel's decisionmakers in 1967 approximated analytic 
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techniques of evaluation and choice, they used cognitive processes to 
identify options and principal consequences. Strategic doctrine identified 
in Chapter 4 represents cognitive beliefs relevant to model specification 
here. In other words, doctrine represents a set of core beliefs that may be 
used to specify the parameters of a decision model. Before 1967. strategic 
concepts focused on deterrence and defense. These concepts implied that 
policymakers could anticipate deterrence failure by monitoring violations 
of declared casus belli. Israel's decisionmakers' subjective estimates of the 
probability of attack can be considered as an indicator of the likelihood of 
deterrence failure. The analysis of strategic concepts suggests concentra­
tion of Arab armies as one measure of the likelihood of attack by Israel's 
adversaries. The perceived probability of attack increased, for example, 
after Egypt redeployed some of its forces from Yemen. Although 
decisionmakers revised their estimates of the probability of an attack in 
response to information of force concentration, there is no evidence to 
suggest an automatic choice of mobilization. On the contrary, in a near-
analytic process, policymakers considered multiple consequences and 
dimensions of value before they chose. 
While the major impact of a choice to mobilize is on the likelihood of an 
adversary attack, the two decisions to delay have additional consequences.1 
Israel's strategic doctrine before 1967 specified such factors as strategic 
surprise (an unanticipated attack by Arab armies) as well as great-power 
support of the belligerents. For example, the higher the estimate of sur­
prise attack, the more likely that Israel's decisionmakers would choose to 
strike first. The higher the probability of Soviet support for Egypt, how­
ever, the lower the likelihood that Israel would preempt. On the other 
hand, the higher the probability of American support for Israel, the more 
likely is a choice to preempt. 
Consequences of choice specified by doctrine may be interrelated: the 
likelihood of Soviet intervention is conditional upon American support for 
Israel; Soviet intervention on behalf of the Arab states may be perceived as 
less likely, given U.S. deterrence of the Soviets. Another aspect of doctrine 
relevant to model specification concerns coordination with the great 
powers. In this respect, Israel's leaders considered the potential for an 
international flotilla to be a consequence of its choice to delay on 28 May 
1967 The doctrinal base for specifying the model to include the flotilla 
derives from former Prime Minister David Ben Gurionvs belief that Israel 
should take military action only if it is in the company of, or has the tacit 
consent of, a great power(s). 
In summary, strategic surprise in the form of an unanticipated Arab 
attack is the main consequence of a choice of whether or not to mobilize. 
I. All likelihood statements that follow refer to Israel's perceptions of probability, i.e., 
their subjective probability estimates. 
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In considering options of strike or wait, Israel's leaders took into account 
multiple considerations: should Israel choose to strike, the two primary 
consequences are Soviet intervention and U.S. support; should Israel 
choose to wait, the two main consequences are Arab attack and, after 24 
May 1967, an international flotilla. Combinations of such consequences 
yield outcomes for choice. Underlying mobilization outcomes are military 
security and economic value dimensions. In addition to these two 
dimensions, the choice to preempt includes the dimensions of international 
support and domestic politics. 
Decision Analysis 
Given the specification of consequences for choice, an appropriate tool 
for evaluation of the rationality manifest in mobilization and preemption is 
decision analysis. This method may be discussed in terms of its purpose, 
value conflict, utility measurement, validity, reliability, rationality, and 
risk. The purpose of decision analysis is systematic evaluation of options as 
a basis for choice among them, considering another party's choices as part 
of an uncertain environment. It attempts to decompose the logical glue 
used to paste together choice and its consequences (Raiffa, 1968:271). 
Decision analysis can be shown in the form of a decision tree or a diagram 
to display the anatomy of a problem. The diagram provides immediate 
actions, uncertain events, and assumed effects of such events on future 
choice (Schlaiffer, 1969:37). Decision analysis relies on numerical 
probabilities that represent judgments about uncertain future events and 
quantitative estimates that express values of relevant choosers. The 
probabilities are for logically possible outcomes given each action. Finally, 
there is a designation of a single alternative to be preferred under model 
assumptions (Brown, Kahr, Peterson, 1974:vii). 
A distinctive feature of decision analysis is its ability to handle subjective 
uncertainties and utilities of decisionmakers. Unlijce operations research, 
decision analysis provides a normative framework for dealing with 
perceptions. One important type of perception concerns value conflict 
within a decisional unit. In this regard, decision analysis is an approach to 
prescribing choice when policymakers emphasize the competition within 
their own national environment rather than vis a vis another state's 
decisionmakers. Game theory, on the other hand, focuses on competition 
between two actors: the outcome of decisions by one actor is dependent on 
choices by the other party. Unlike game theory, decision analysis can be 
used to evaluate choice when the process is not interdependent. 
Decisionmakers may face, for example, a competition between minimizing 
economic costs and maximizing national security. They may try to achieve 
such goals but are constrained by the necessity to make trade-offs (cf. 
Churchman et al., 1957:517ff.). For such a situation, decision analysis is an 
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appropriate procedure. Indeed, benefits of decision analysis are in the 
identification and communication of value conflicts. Sensitivity analysis, 
moreover, might demonstrate that value conflicts are not as important as 
they appear at first glance, since choice may be insensitive to such 
alterations in the values that reflect value conflicts among decisionmakers 
(Fischer, 1975). 
The decision analysis approach to value trade-offs is via multiattribute 
utility measurement (Edwards et al., 1977:20; Fischer, Edwards, and Kelly 
1978:61; Fischer, 1977:9). A basic idea ofthe multiattribute technique is the 
partitioning of preference into dimensions of value and the rank ordering 
of outcomes along each dimension. Since each option may not be better 
than all others along every dimension, value trade-offs may need to be 
calculated. By obtaining relative comparisons for pairs of outcomes on 
each dimension, one is able to convert rank orders into quantitative 
magnitudes of utility (cf. Wagner, 1974). 
The resulting utility estimates are tentative pending validation. For 
example, one approach to multiattribute validity is to assess the degree to 
which there is convergence of utilities inferred from different methods, i.e., 
convergent validation (Edwards, John, and Stillwell, 1977:12).2 The 
approach of the current study, however, is to ascertain the extent to which 
different coders derive approximately the same utility magnitudes using the 
same coding rules. That is, this inquiry discovers the reliability of its scaling 
procedures rather than the validity of the underlying utility concepts (cf. 
Fischer, 1977:11). 
Implicit in the above discussion of value conflict, utility, and validation is 
the idea of rationality. A rational process ensures that a conclusion is 
logically consistent with personal judgmental inputs, utility measurement, 
and probability theory (cf. Brown et al., 1975:ii). The descriptive validity of 
rationality as a criterion for choice is subject to widespread debate. 
Decision analysis is of two minds regarding rationality. On the one hand, 
decision analysts assume that individuals are capable of stating their beliefs 
as numerical probabilities and are able to make complex value trade-off 
calculations. On the other hand, analysts acknowledge that individuals are 
incapable of choosing rationally and therefore need decision aids to 
facilitate a rational choice process. A key to resolving the decision analysis 
paradox (Fischer, 1977:7) is the word "capable." Unaided intuitive 
judgment is incapable of generating probabilities, facing trade-offs, and 
adhering to normative principles of rational choice (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1972, 1973, 1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, 1978; Slovic, 
1972; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1977). On the other hand, this 
2. For a further explication of the issue of subjective preferences for complex outcomes 
and conflicting values, see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky, 1971. 
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same literature concludes that aided human judgment is capable of 
producing numerical probabilities, making trade-off calculations, and 
following rational choice criteria. 
One reason that decision aids facilitate rational information-processing 
lies in their emphasis upon decomposition. By decomposing complex 
choices into more manageable components, decision analysis takes into 
account human incapacity to make unaided judgments in a rational 
fashion. As decision-making increases in complexity, there are discrepan­
cies between rational expectations and actual behavior. Intuitive inference 
deviates from probability theory prescriptions. People ignore relevant 
variables in order to simplify a problem to a scale consistent with their 
computational limits. Humans rely upon heuristic decision rules that 
violate rational choice criteria. As a result, policymakers need assistance if 
they are to choose rationally in complex decision situations (cf. Fischer, 
1977:6-7). Without such assistance, decisionmakers would follow their 
natural tendencies to avoid both uncertainty and value conflict and rely 
upon combinations of cybernetic and cognitive mechanisms as suggested in 
Chapter 2. 
With respect to the current inquiry, the use of decision analysis takes into 
account the "constrained rationality" of Israel's leaders during 1967 The 
study approaches value conflict and utility measurement from the 
perspective of explicating a technology that could have been of great use in 
enhancing the quality of choice during the 1967 crisis (cf. Zlotnick, 1968) 
and that is of immediate relevance for evaluating decision-making in 1967 
after the fact. In addition to value conflict, utility measurement, validity, 
reliability, as well as rationality, afinal aspect of decision analysis concerns 
risk. 
In contrast to game theory, decision analysis is applicable to evaluation 
of risky choice. A decision is risky if outcomes are determined jointly by 
choice and some specified random process, e.g., a gamble.3 Where game 
3. Formal concepts of uncertainty and risk apply to the estimation of the likelihood of loss 
for given alternatives. Decision-making under certainty occurs when the probabilities of the 
consequences of options are either 0.00 or 1.00; these consequences are "known." Such 
certainty is rare, and decision-making under risk is much more common. In a risky choice, the 
probability distribution of a consequence is known even though its occurrence is not. A 
decision to toss a coin, for example, is risky since the probability of heads or tails is known. In 
an uncertain environment, by contrast, even this distribution of probabilities is unknown, and 
no a priori estimates can be made. Such a use of uncertainty approximates a concept of 
decision-making under ignorance: policymakers cannot draw on logical baseline information 
to make their judgments but may be able to use empirically-based relative frequency data. 
This formal classification does not capture the nuances of the environment, however, in which 
most public policymakers work. One category in the typology assumes objective and 
"knowable" probability distributions. Aside from very restricted and narrowly-defined 
problems, generally of little interest to central decisionmakers, such a priori probabilities are 
not available. Moreover, one may question the validity of such a concept of probability: the 
phenomenological interpretation of this inquiry suggests that all probability distributions are 
the property of the perceiver rather than the object and are subjective. Once decisionmakers 
estimate the probability of the consequence of an option—regardless of the information they 
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theory deemphasizes probability or treats it as a function of payoffs 
(Ellsberg, 1961), decision analysis can devote equal emphasis to likelihood 
and value as separate considerations. An expected value model may be 
incomplete, however, unless it considers such cognitive concerns as 
decisionmakers' attitudes toward risk.4 When risk is taken into account, 
one provides differential weights to probability and value components. 
The explanation of Israel's choice to mobilize (Chapter 5) pays 
particular attention to four cognitive dimensions: probability of deterring 
an Arab attack; benefit of deterrence; probability of failure to deter; and 
the cost of failure to deter. These last two dimensions constitute defense 
considerations. To explain and evaluate the choices of Israel's decision-
makers, their processing and integration of these four risk dimensions 
should be understood. In other words, the relative importance of 
probabilities and payoffs of Israel's risk-taking ought to be estimated (cf., 
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). To determine the relative importance of 
probability and value dimensions, consider the importance of cognitive 
beliefs in influencing policymakers' predispositions and the mode of 
information integration. 
Individuals may be predisposed to pay more attention to some risk 
dimensions than to others. Differential attention to risk dimensions can be 
explained by a person's belief that certain dimensions are the most 
important for a particular choice. Decisionmakers of a state with very little 
territory and great fear of losing it may adopt a defensive position. They 
may stress the amount of land to lose and base a mobilization choice almost 
exclusively on this dimension. They thus might discount other information 
such as the amount of territory to be won, the probability of winning, and 
the likelihood of losing. 
The examination of strategic concepts in Chapter 4 suggests that Israel's 
decisionmakers emphasized their country's narrow margin of security, 
given a lack of geographic depth and constant Arab hostility. In the 
absence of strategic depth and consequent vulnerability of population 
centers, only a transferral of fighting beyond Israel's frontiers offers 
protection to the heartland. By an examination of doctrinal concepts 
alone, Israel's leaders would emphasize the risk dimension—defense or 
amount to lose—and deemphasize amount to win, probability of winning, 
and likelihood of losing. 
use and whether or not they are confident of their estimate—their choice must be classified as 
one of risk. This study works with subjective probability estimates that are consistent with the 
central assumption of subjectivity as the basis of choice. All national security decisions, then, 
become risky rather than uncertain choices. Also cf. Alpert, 1976; Milburn and Billings, 1976; 
and Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968. 
4. In connection with risky choice, Kahneman and Tversky (1977) state that probabilistic 
gains and losses will be undervalued in comparison with sure gains and sure losses. 
Nevertheless, one often trades a certain gain or loss, e.g., military advantage, for probabilistic 
gains or losses, e.g., an increase or decrease in the likelihood of war. 
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Information-processing also is relevant to the examination of risk 
dimensions. Despite certain predispositions about the relative importance 
of risk dimensions, the capacity to use these beliefs when making choices 
may be very limited. For example, a decisionmaker acting under stress may 
neglect some dimensions of risk, perhaps depending on some cybernetic 
priority framework for reducing information overload. The evidence 
suggests, however, that in their decision to launch a preemptive strike 
Israel's policymakers considered the two dimensions of amount to lose and 
likelihood of winning. Since probabilities of losing and winning are 
inversely related, Israel's decisionmakers may be said to have given 
approximately equal weight to at least three dimensions: amount to lose, 
probability of losing, and likelihood of winning. 
The psychological literature on the relative importance of probabilities 
and payoffs in risky choice suggests that value (loss and gain) is more 
important than likelihood (of loss and gain) in determining a gamble's 
attractiveness. Second, when decisionmakers confront unattractive bets, 
loss exerts more influence than gain (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968:9-16). 
In 1967, Israel's leaders paid attention to loss and gain but did not neglect 
probability. As anticipated by the second proposition, Israel's decision-
makers do appear to have devoted more attention to loss than to gain. The 
effect on choice of risk predispositions can be assessed by discussing the 
impact of relative change among value preferences across time as is done 
in the sensitivity analysis below. Sensitivity analysis permits the evaluation 
not only of the impact of changes in values on choices, but also of the effect 
that changes in estimates of probability have on decision. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
How can one assess the impact of relative change among the value 
preferences of decisionmakers? Sensitivity analysis is one approach. If 
decisionmakers are risk-averse regarding preferences, for example, the 
impact of risk on choice can be evaluated. If choice is indeed responsive to 
risk preference, sensitivity analysis of the decision would demonstrate the 
impact of cognitive predispositions on selection among options. In 
addition, policymakers may consider multiple values like military security, 
international support, and economic values. Calculating expected value, 
for example, with and without security considerations would demonstrate 
the responsiveness of a mobilization choice to security considerations. 
In addition to evaluating the impact of changes in value preferences, 
sensitivity analysis also can assess the effect of new information and 
different inputs from the environment. If policymakers anticipated more 
than one consequence, for example, an analyst can explore the 
responsiveness of choice to each consequence. Israel's decision to preempt 
in 1967 depends upon Arab attack, Soviet threat to intervene, and 
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American support. The relative sensitivity of choice to each of these inputs 
from the environment can be evaluated. Is Israel's choice of a preemptive 
strike more responsive to a Soviet threat to intervene than to an American 
warning of a withdrawal of support? Is Moscow's deterrent threat stronger 
than Washington's attempt to induce Israel to comply? Answers to such 
queries in Chapter 9 illustrate the use of sensitivity analysis for exercising a 
model, i.e., for model implementation (Brown, Kahr, and Peterson, 
1974:85). 
Sensitivity analysis also can be used to explore interdependence among 
multiple consequences. For example, in considering an option to preempt 
in 1967, did Israel's decisionmakers consider American support con­
ditional on Soviet intervention? If the probability of U.S. support is higher 
when Soviet intervention is more rather than less likely, then Washington's 
support for Israel is conditional on the likelihood that Moscow would 
intervene against Israel. Sensitivity analysis can assess both the conditional 
relations among consequences themselves and their joint impact on choice. 
Sensitivity analysis provides a static approach to the evaluation of the 
impact of information on choice, while Bayes offers a dynamic tool for 
analysis. 
Bayesian Inference 
Bayesian analysis may be discussed in terms of: 1) its relation to a wider 
body of scholarship; 2) decisional tasks and aids; 3) processing biases and 
explanations for deviation from optimal inference; and 4) an illustrative 
application. Bayesian analysis is a part of a predecisional rather than a 
decisional process per se. Where decision analysis concerns prescription or 
evaluation of static choice, Bayesian inference involves dynamic revision of 
opinion about likelihood estimates of uncertain consequences for choice. 
Indeed, Bayesian information-processing can be a link between dynamic 
process and static choice. As used here, Bayes evaluates the extent to which 
intuitive revision meets optimal criteria, i.e., Bayesian standards. 
Information is processed, using Bayes Theorem, in order to update 
likelihood estimates for eventual combination with value or utility to create 
expected value or expected utility. Bayes Theorem is an optimal rule for 
revision of probabilities in view of new evidence. 
Prior to explicating Bayes Theorem, it may be useful to nest Bayesian 
analysis within the context of a wider body of scholarship in the social 
sciences. During the 1930s, experimental psychology focused upon 
stimulus-response explanations of learning. In the 1970s, the S-R focus has 
yielded to work on information-processing in psychology. The stimulus-
response approach in political science was manifest in foreign policy 
decision-making studies during the 1960s. As in psychology, there has been 
a shift to information-processing types of scholarship, as illustrated by 
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Simon (1957) and the present inquiry among others. Information-
processing studies in political science, moreover, are now considered core 
concerns of the discipline as they are in psychology. In both fields, one finds 
a tendency toward research that seeks to close the gap between descriptive 
and normative types of decision-making. The empirical works are designed 
to describe beliefs and values of decisionmakers, including explanations of 
the manner in which people incorporate beliefs and values into decisions. 
Descriptive scholarship has made outstanding progress in areas like 
probabilistic judgment, inference, and choice. Normative inquiry 
prescribes courses of action that are in accord with decisionmakers' beliefs 
and values. Given findings from descriptive studies about the limits of 
human information-processing capabilities, normative scholarship has 
created technological aids that facilitate decision-making. In this regard, 
there is an increasing perception of a need to effect a synthesis between 
natural ways humans make inferences and normative logic of probability 
theory, as illustrated by Bayesian analysis. 
The attempt to synthesize descriptive and normative scholarship has 
been accompanied by a new approach to the role of information in 
decision-making. During the decade of the 1960s, great advances in 
computer technology tended to drive theorizing, leading some to suspect 
that lack of information was the principal barrier to effective decision-
making. Computerized management information systems greatly 
facilitated solutions to technical problems inherent in acquisition, display, 
storage, and retrieval of data. Since lack of information was not the main 
barrier to high quality decision-making, management information systems 
had little impact on policy-making. In light of the limited capabilities of 
humans as information processors, computer systems were used in­
frequently in decision-making. It is within the setting of fallible human 
processors and large-scale computer systems of little use that Bayesian 
analysis enters the picture. 
Four decisional tasks of relevance to Bayes are diagnosis, estimation, 
revision, and evaluation. Prior to performing a Bayesian analysis, it is 
important to decompose and diagnose the situation. Problem recognition 
or alerting is an important aspect of decomposition. In this respect, Bayes 
assists in diagnosing the environment and thereby reduces the complexity 
of the inference problem. Once the initial problem is decomposed into 
manageable elements, Bayes forces the analyst to inquire about the 
diagnostic meaning of each item of information, given the validity of one or 
more hypotheses. While the psychological literature is relatively weak 
regarding problem recognition, it is much stronger on probability 
estimation and opinion revision. The political science field of national 
security studies, on the other hand, abounds with scholarship concerning 
threat perception and early warning as the key issues in problem 
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recognition yet is relatively silent on estimation and revision. In national 
security decision-making, threat and warning drive the system. The 
definition of the situation is more problematic in psychology in contrast to 
the security studies field of inquiry. 
In connection with the second decisional task of estimation, Bayes assists 
in the process of elicitation of numerical magnitudes concerning likelihood 
of occurrence for some uncertain event. Probability elicitation is of two 
types—direct and indirect. Bayes is an indirect elicitation technique. A 
direct procedure is simply to ask decisionmakers to encode their beliefs as a 
subjective likelihood. Bayes is a formula for inferring after-the-fact 
probabilities (posteriors) from initial beliefs (priors) and the occurrence of 
some event. Considering subjective probability as a degree of belief, Bayes 
helps analysts to summarize states of information about future uncertain­
ties (Schweitzer, 1978). Bayes allows decisionmakers to formalize their 
verbal uncertainties as numerical expressions. Since Bayes is a formal 
language of uncertainty, one is able to display narrative scenarios of the 
future as likelihoods and perform deductions about future states of the 
environment via probability theory Inasmuch as Bayes requires numerical 
expression of beliefs, it encourages a precise statement of relative 
uncertainty. As a result, analysts have created scales for coding words into 
numbers, an illustration of which is the Sherman Kent scale, a type of 
content analysis coding scheme. 
Scales for translating words into numbers are a spin-off from an era 
when analysts were grappling for ways to handle uncertainty. Combined 
with related techniques, such scales may be considered as aids for opinion 
revision—a third decisional task. Bayes Theorem itself is a method that 
provides assistance in the evaluation of prior inference, in the conduct of 
information-processing, and in the forecasting of alternative futures. The 
present study employs Bayes as a benchmark in the evaluation of prior 
processes of inference—the fourth decisional task. Bayes provides optimal 
criteria with which to compare human intuition. The current inquiry, 
indeed, compares the unaided intuitive threat revision of Israel's leadership 
with updates that derive from Bayesian normative expectations. As a 
decision aid, Bayes facilitates the conduct of diagnosis, estimation, 
revision, and evaluation. These four decisional tasks are very difficult for 
humans to perform, given the human tendency to succumb to information-
processing biases. 
A processing bias lessened through the use of Bayes is conservatism. 
Conservative revision concerns the human tendency to update more slowly 
than Bayes demands.5 Individuals tend to be suboptimal information 
5. In addition to conservatism, another information-processing bias of concern here is 
uncertainty-management. As discussed in Chapter 2, a cybernetic approach to uncertainty is 
to eliminate it by focused selection on a few indicators with an emphasis on obtaining short­
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processors who revise in the right direction but not with the proper 
magnitude. In other words, humans extract less certainty from data than 
Bayes requires. Unaided human intuition is not as efficient as Bayes and 
thus is wasteful in the conduct of opinion revision. Why does conservatism 
occur? One hypothesis of direct relevance to Bayes concerns misaggrega­
tion.6 People are unable to aggregate information across multiple 
indicators (Edwards, 1968). As a result of misaggregation, there is a failure 
to extract as much diagnosticity from data as would be derived if Bayes 
were used. Considered a decision aid, Bayesian inference provides a formal 
means of aggregating information, thereby minimizing conservatism and 
maximizing the ability to extract meaning from evidence. 
One means for clarifying conservative inference is to distinguish between 
strategic assumptions on the one hand and current tactical indications on 
the other. Analysts of information-processing are not agreed as to the 
weight that should be attached to prior strategic assumptions relative to 
current tactical indications. Bayes weights current indications more heavily 
than original strategic assumptions. As a result, relative to intuitive 
estimation, Bayesian estimates move up or down more quickly in an 
attempt to correct for the conservative bias of intuitive judgment. 
Considering strategic assumptions as cognitive beliefs, information-
processing could be determined largely by such assumptions in the absence 
of a Bayesian approach. By weighting current indications more heavily 
than strategic assumptions, Bayes quickly revises initial estimates derived 
from beliefs. 
There is a difference of opinion regarding the validity of deemphasizing 
the role of strategic assumptions relative to current indications. For 
example, George (1979) considers weighting current indications more 
than strategic assumptions to be a serious defect of the Bayesian approach. 
Heuer (1978), moreover, reports that intelligence analysts tend to reject 
Bayes because it moves their opinions faster than unaided intuitive pro­
cedures. In contrast to George and Heuer, Ben Zvi (1976) takes the oppo­
site position: current indications should receive more weight than strategic 
assumptions in order to modify opinion quickly. 
One approach to a resolution of this debate among analysts is to assess 
the risks of rapid and conservative revision. If the danger of quick change in 
attitude outweighs the risk of slow alteration of opinion, then Bayes may 
not be an appropriate tool. Conversely, if the threat posed by failure to shift 
is greater than the risk of rapid adjustment, then Bayes appears to be 
term feedback from them. Moreover, a cognitive approach to uncertainty is to avoid, deny, or 
manage it by making categorical judgments. Bayes and the accompanying scales for 
translating words into numbers facilitate the estimation of numerical probabilities, helping to 
overcome natural tendencies. 
6. A complementary hypothesis explaining conservatism is misperception (Lichtenstein 
and Feeney, 1968). 
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appropriate. For example, in a situation where a nation may be attacked 
and destroyed, the risk of failure to revise is higher than the danger of too 
rapid alteration of views. Israel's decisionmakers during the 1967 crisis 
found themselves in a situation where a rapid shift of opinion was 
necessary, given their perception of a narrow margin of security based 
upon lack of strategic depth. In other words, the risk-aversity of Israel's 
leaders resulted in a tendency to favor a sudden modification of their 
attitudes. On the other hand, leaders of superpowers may be more risk-
acceptant concerning alteration of opinion toward each other's intentions. 
In order to avoid unintended escalation, each side tends to tolerate high 
indications of threat with little revision of attitudes regarding the 
likelihood that the opponent is moving toward a first-strike strategy. Risk­
aversity among small states in the Middle East sub-system contrasts 
sharply with risk-acceptance among superpowers in the global arena. 
In addition to the debate among analysts on weighting strategic 
assumptions and tactical indications, there is the empirical issue of how 
people actually process information. Chapter 2 reviews this debate: 
evidence that individuals pay too little attention to prior judgment and fail 
to consider background information (Bar-Hillel, 1977) contrasts with 
evidence of inertia effects and conservative biases in opinion revision 
(Edwards, 1968). One possible explanation for the apparent discrepancy in 
research findings is that individuals appear to attach weight to information 
in proportion to whether they consider it relevant (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1972). Generally, they judge prior estimates more relevant; when 
tactical indicators are specific, however, they may consider this informa­
tion to be of greater relevance than strategic assumptions. 
In estimating political intent to attack, the problem of conservative bias 
through strong commitment to strategic assumptions is likely to 
characterize inference. Bayes then provides a useful corrective to earlier 
estimates though not to the strategic assumptions per se. One should 
distinguish between enhancing military capabilities to attack and po­
litical intent to launch an attack. In changing opinion about military 
capabilities, current indications concerning such things as troop 
movements may be perceived as directly relevant. In altering attitudes 
about political intent, strategic assumptions like the predisposition of the 
attacker to issue an ultimatum prior to attack may be perceived as directly 
relevant (Whaley, 1973). Hence, revision of estimates of political intent 
may proceed more slowly than assessment of military capabilities. For 
purposes of this study then, Bayesian inference is an appropriate strategy 
for revising the probability of such political events as the likelihood of an 
Arab attack.7 
7. Acknowledgments to Richards J. Heuer for insights regarding differences in intuitive 
vs. Bayesian procedures. 
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The preceding discussion places Bayes within the context of a broad area 
of related scholarship, provides an overview of decisional tasks and aids, 
and then presents one information-processing bias—conservatism. Given 
this discussion, an illustrative application of Bayes is now in order. 
Consider the situation facing Israel's intelligence in mid-May 1967. On 
15 May, one Egyptian division, mostly armor, moved through Cairo to 
Sinai while Egyptian planes landed at forward bases in the desert. How 
should Military Intelligence revise its estimate of the likelihood of Arab 
attack? 
According to Bayes Theorem, Israel's analysts should perform the 
following steps. First, estimate probability of an attack before the 
Egyptians move; second, assess how likely it would be for the Egyptians to 
move troops to the Sinai if Egypt were going to attack over how likely it 
would be for Egypt to move troops if Egypt were not going to attack; third, 
multiply prior probability times the likelihood ratio to create posterior 
probability; fourth, use posteriors and new priors for processing the next 
element of information. 
Bayes Theorem incorporates three types of probabilities. The first, a 
prior or unconditional likelihood of a hypothesis, H, is the probability one 
assigns before obtaining any information P(H). The second, a conditional 
likelihood of a datum is one assigned in light of information about a 
hypothesis H, and is expressed as P(D/H). The third, a joint probability, is 
the likelihood of two events occurring together—the probability that His 
true and that one observes a given datum P(D&H). 
In the illustration of Israel's Military Intelligence reaction to Egyptian 
movement of forces into Sinai, assume the prior probability of Arab attack 
as about (. 10); the conditional probability of Egypt strengthening its Sinai 
forces, if it were to attack, is about (.88); the joint probability of the 
occurrence of a move to the Sinai and an attack, however, is only (.088). 
The posterior probability to be estimated is the new likelihood of an attack, 
given Egypt's moving troops into the Sinai, i.e., P(H/D). 
The following equations permit calculation of the posterior probability 
of Arab attack, conditional on an Egyptian deployment of forces to Sinai. 
P(D/H)=I(jL§M (8,) 
is the definition of a conditional probability of an event D occurring 
(Egyptian movement of forces into Sinai), given hypothesis H is true: 
(8.2) 
is the reverse case of the posterior probability of the attack hypothesis 
being true, given the datum D, Egyptians to Sinai. 
By substitution one derives the basic form of Bayes Theorem, 
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P(HID) = WW™ (8.3) 
For example, the revised or posterior probability of Egyptian attack, given 
Egypt's sending troops to Sinai P(H/D), is equal to: probability of Egypt's 
sending troops, given that Egypt plans to attack P(D/H) times the original 
likelihood of attack P(H), divided by the probability of Egypt's sending 
troops P(D). 
For two hypotheses, H\ and Hi, one can write Bayes Theorem twice. 
(8.4, 
P(H2/D) = KD/HgW (g5) 
Dividing one equation by the other, the P(D)s in the denominators 
cancel, leaving, 
P(Hi/D) P(D/HQ P(HQ
 ( 8 6 ) 
P(H2ID) P(D/H2) P(H2) 
The right-hand ratio of equation (8.6) is 
Prior Probability = 
The ratio to the immediate right of the equal sign of equation (8.6) is 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) = p^/ff{j (8.8) 
The ratio to the left of the equal sign of equation (8.6) is the posterior 
probability in favor of H\ over Hi, after observing the datum, 
Posterior Probability = 
In summary, 
RATIO OF POSTERIOR PROBABILITY = LIKELIHOOD RATIO X RATIO OF

PRIOR PROBABILITY (cf. Decisions and Designs, 1977: Appendix).

For the 1967 case, consider the following hypothetical data, expressed in

terms of odds rather than probabilities. That is,

NEW ODDS OF ATTACK = MODIFICATION FACTOR X OLD ODDS OF ATTACK 
The prior odds of Arab attack are about one to nine (1:9). Israel's

intelligence then estimates that it is eight times as likely for Egyptians to
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move into Sinai if they were going to attack than not going to attack (8:1 ).8 
Thus, prior odds (1:9) times likelihood ratio (8:1) = posterior odds (8:9). As 
can be seen, there is a dramatic increase in the odds of attack from (1:9) to 
(8:9). To translate odds to probabilities (De Francesco, 1975:317) use: 
Probability =
 o d^s + l (8-10) 
8/9

~ 8/9 + 9/9

_ 8 
= .47 or 47% 
The prior odds of (1:9) translate into a probability of 10%; likelihood ratio 
odds of (8:1) translate into 88% probability; posterior odds of (8:9) convert 
to 47% probability. 
In summary, Israel's intelligence would update the likelihood of Arab 
attack from some 10% to about 47%, in light of the information concerning 
Egyptian reinforcement of troops in Sinai. The posterior probability could 
then be used as a prior probability for a new piece of information. For 
example, Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran on 23 May 1967 could be 
used to create a new likelihood ratio for combining with prior odds; then 
one could reestimate a new posterior probability of Arab attack in light of 
the closure of the Straits. 
The use of Bayesian inference as an iterative method of updating opinion 
allows one to assess the impact of each item of new information on choice. 
In this way, one can establish the sensitivity of choice to each item of 
information. Bayesian analysis also requires that an analyst state explicitly 
assumed cause and effect relations. In the illustration about Egyptian 
troops to Sinai, P(DjH) implies that sending troops (£>) depends upon (is 
caused by) a certain disposition to attack (H).9 In other words, the use of 
Bayes requires an analyst to combine assumptions and events into 
hypotheses. For example, the assumption about what Egypt would do if it 
were going to attack is combined with the actual movement of troops into 
Sinai. 
In short, the application of Bayesian inference to the ex post facto 
8. Confining oneself to only two hypotheses—attack or not attack—may be unrealistic. 
On the other hand, evidence discussed in Chapters 5-7 suggests that these are the two principal 
hypotheses considered by Israel's leaders during the 1967 crisis. 
9. A strict constructionist view holds that Bayes is only applicable when there is the 
expectation that //causes D. If the datum is not considered a consequence of the hypothesis, 
then Bayesian inference would be inappropriate. For example, assume the Egyptian troop 
movements are caused by something other than the hypotheses of attack or not attack; Bayes 
is applicable if one includes as hypotheses the other causes of the troop movements. That is, 
Bayes can be used with any number of hypotheses. 
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revision of the probability of an attack by Egypt does not assume that 
Israel's decisionmakers followed such procedures. Rather, Bayes serves as 
a useful evaluative tool since it demonstrates the way decisionmakers 
should have combined prior information with current indications to revise 
their opinion. As decision analysis evaluates the efficiency of choice and as 
sensitivity analysis examines the responsiveness of decisions to probability 
and value dimensions, so Bayes can update information and assess its 
impact on choice. It remains only to describe the strategies of data 
acquisition used in conjunction with these methods of analysis. 
Data Acquisition 
Data on estimates of probability and value are acquired both through 
content analysis and, where necessary, the use of surrogates for 
decisionmakers, i.e., individuals trained to simulate the estimates of a 
leader. As a first step, all primary sources were searched to locate 
statements of probability and value. Verbal estimates were translated into 
numbers through the Sherman Kent scale, which provides a procedure for 
coding words into numbers.10 At first glance, the validity of the scale for 
coding words into numbers may be questioned on the basis of the method 
by which it was constructed. Because there has been considerable variation 
in the response of intelligence analysts when they were asked to translate 
words into probability estimates, Sherman Kent, then director of national 
estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, suggested a range of 
probabilities for given verbal descriptors. The validity of the assigned 
range, however, has not been ascertained as far as is known from available 
documentation. One could infer that the variation in the estimates reduces 
their usefulness. On the contrary, the numerical range for each verbal 
descriptor provides an opportunity to conduct sensitivity analysis on 
minimum and maximum magnitudes for a given word. The word 
"unlikely," for example, varies between .15 and 45 on the Kent Scale. In a 
sensitivity analysis, one could discover if choice is responsive to the 
uncertainty indicated by such a range. In addition, it may be advisable to 
use a scale based on the judgments of Israel's analysts, rather than to 
employ an American scale. In the absence of such a scale during the time 
the present research was conducted, the Kent Scale provides a useful 
approximation for translating words into numbers—a form of content 
analysis. The resultant estimates were assessed for reliability by conducting 
interviews with participants in Israel's 1967 decision process during 1977, 
ten years after the crisis studied here.11 
10. See Decisions and Designs (1977) for a copy of the Sherman Kent Scale. 
11. The procedure was as follows. Phrases used to infer probabilities were presented to ten 
senior-level officials in Israel's Foreign M inistry during March 1977 Using the Kent Scale, the 
range of their coding is approximately ±5% of the estimates used in the present analysis. In 
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Although a search of primary documents produced verbal estimates of 
probability and value, statements that estimated the relative weights 
among dimensions of value were much less frequent. Two individuals 
trained to act in place of actual decisionmakers estimated the relative 
distance between pairs of outcomes as a means of approximating an 
interval scale of measurement for each dimension of value.12 
In summary, the design consists of procedures for measuring value and 
likelihood as a preliminary to the evaluation of the mobilization and war 
choices made in 1967 Decision analysis is an appropriate procedure for 
evaluation given evidence of some analytic component in the process of 
choice among competing goals. Despite a propensity to risk-aversity, 
Israel's decisionmakers emphasized both probability and value dimensions 
in their processing of choice. An expected value model, modified to 
account for risk propensity, can be used to assess the approximate 
rationality of choice. The model is specified through reference to the 
relevant beliefs and strategic assumptions of decisionmakers. The 
sensitivity of choice to variation in estimates of probability and value is to 
be assessed, and the rationality of inference will be evaluated through 
Bayesian analysis. The quantitative analysis in the following chapter is 
offered as a first step in the evaluation of choice: the estimates themselves 
are tentative approximations rather than precise magnitudes. In this 
respect, the stress is upon relative proportions instead of absolute figures. 
Although numerical estimates appear, the main product is a set of decision 
aids relevant to the evaluation of inference and of choice. 
addition, these officials took part in the creation of a Hebrew version of the Kent Scale—the 
Ben Yehuda Scale named after Hemda Ben Yehuda, who was assisted by Sarah Vertzberger. 
Both were participants in Raymond Tanter's Advanced Research Methodology Workshop in 
the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University during 1977. 
12. Co-author Raymond Tanter and research assistant Robert Olender independently 
coded relative distances between pairs of outcomes and reached a consensus for the final 
estimates. See the Appendix for a guide to the methodology of scale construction. Assessment 
of the value scale proceeded in a similar fashion as regards the probability estimates. Ten 
officials of Israel's Foreign Ministry participated in an experiment during March 1977. They 
estimated the relative distance between pairs of outcomes on the decision trees in Figures 9.4 
and 9.8. The average deviation between the estimates used here and the officials'judgments is 
in the ±10% range. That is, this study's scale could be off by as much as 10% in either direction. 
In order to discover whether such variation affected the results, re-analyses were conducted 
using the Foreign Ministry estimates: the results remained the same indicating that the 10% 
deviation is unimportant. 
chapter jf 
The Evaluation of Revision and Choice 
Given the decision model specified by doctrine, it is possible to display the 
anatomy of choices faced by Israel during the 1967 crisis. This chapter 
considers the following decisions: 19 May choice of mobilization; 23 May 
decision to delay; 28 May decision to delay; and 4 June choice to strike. The 
analysis for each decision presents an overview of the selection, the 
structure of choice represented as a decision tree, dimensions of value 
underlying the expected outcomes on the tree, probabilities of conse­
quences for options, and revision of the probabilities. The Bayesian ideal is 
used as a benchmark for evaluating the unaided opinion revision of Israel's 
leadership. Impact of information, sensitivity analysis, and cognitive 
attitudes toward risk are discussed at the end of the chapter. 
19 May: The Choice to Mobilize 
The general mobilization decision discussed at the conclusion of Chapter 
5 is an example of a choice that follows a cognitive-analytic path (Table 
5.3). Between 16 and 19 May, Prime Minister Eshkol and Chief of Staff 
Rabin confronted a situation for which they identified an option of general 
mobilization. The principal input for such a choice was the risk of an Arab 
attack. Defining risk as the probability of loss, principal dimensions of 
risk for the 19 May choice are likelihood of deterrence failure and cost to 
defense if deterrence fails (Table 5.4). An Arab attack constitutes deter­
rence failure. An indicator of attack is increased concentration of Egyptian 
forces in the Sinai. Figure 9.1 contains the structure of choice on 19 May 
1967 Moving from left to right, the "act fork" in the square designates 
what is under the actor's control, i.e., to mobilize or not. The "event forks" 
in the two circles in the middle represent consequences to be influenced or 
inputs for mobilization choice. The circles on the far right display expected 
outcomes of choice. For example, outcome A is to be read as follows: 
"Israel mobilizes and there is an Arab attack." 
Outcomes A-D may be ordered on the two dimensions of value 
decisionmakers took into account—economic cost and military security. 
Since mobilization costs money, an obvious dimension of value is an 
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OUTCOMES 
Arab Attack e 
Mobilization 
No Arab Attack 
Arab Attack 
No Mobilization 
No Arab Attack 
Fig. 9.1. 19 May 1967 mobilization choices 
economic scale.1 In addition, a main purpose of mobilization is to reduce 
losses in case of an Arab attack, which implies a military security 
dimension of value. 
To estimate the mobilization cost indirectly, one can employ the 
following procedure.2 According to the chairman of the Supreme 
Emergency Commission in Israel, the economy operated at seventy percent 
capacity during the period of mobilization. Industrial production in June 
1967 was twenty per cent below the level of May, which was slightly higher 
than the level prevailing in the previous four months. (Monthly statistics 
reflect production levels of the previous month.) In July, industrial 
production returned to its prewar level, indicating a reduction in industrial 
output of about $45 million. The loss of production in the economy as a 
whole from mobilization is thus about 1.5 percent of the GNP for 1967, 
roughly $60,000,0003—the cost of the status quo if Israel were to remain 
mobilized. $ 10,000,000 is added to the $60,000,000 to allow for a correction 
1. The 19 May 1967 general mobilization withdrew about 250,000 persons from the labor 
force, bringing the economy of Israel almost to a standstill (Brecher, 1975:325-326). See also 
Ch. 5, and Table 5.4. 
2. Acknowledgments to Judith Shribman for assistance in estimating the economic costs 
of mobilization and war choices. 
3. Israel's GNP for 1967 was about $4,000,000,000 (Brecher, 1972:103). 
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factor for the approximate costs of mobilizing personnel and equipment. 
Thus, the economic cost of B is about $70 million or the sum of the 
production and mobilization costs. 
The cost of the war itself is about $567 million, a figure provided by a 
Government of Israel Finance Ministry announcement published in the 
Israel Economist immediately after the war (Kanovsky, 1970:42). 
According to this publication, the war costs were IL. 1,700 million 
($567,000,000). 
The $60,000,000 opportunity cost for loss of production is subtracted to 
avoid duplication, and thus the net cost for outcome A is $507,000,000. It is 
interesting to note that the $567,000,000 figure is very close to the estimate 
presented in the U.S. Armed Forces Journal (1973) which indicated the 
cost of the war to be $100,000,000 a day. Subtract the $60 million 
production costs and $10 million mobilization costs to obtain a figure of 
$497 million for additional losses due to war. It must be remembered that 
this war-cost figure applies to a situation where Israel strikes first. Outcome 
A, on the contrary, defines a situation where Israel mobilizes and Arab 
armies attack. Assuming it would take twice as long for Israel to win a war 
which begins with an Arab first strike, the estimate for economic loss in 
outcome A is $1,064,000,000. This figure represents the mobilization and 
production costs added to double the direct war costs. The greatest 
economic cost to Israel occurs in outcome C, where Israel is attacked 
without its forces mobilized. Assuming that it would take Israel about one-
third longer to win a war under these circumstances, the loss in outcome C 
is $ 1,395,000,000. This total is obtained by adding some 30% of the doubled 
war cost to the economic cost estimate for outcome A. The first column of 
Figure 9.2 presents the outcomes with their approximate economic costs. 
In contrast to economic costs, it is not possible to translate the military-
security dimension directly into monetary units. For Israel, military 
security means a great deal more than just personnel and equipment. The 
value of life is greater than the actual cost one would derive in a standard 
cost-benefit analysis. Israel's acute manpower shortage and intangible 
emotional value attached to life are extremely difficult to measure in terms 
of monetary units. In other words, the utility of not losing a soldier is 
perceived by Israel's decisionmakers as greater than the dollar "replace­
ment" cost of a soldier. 
Taking into account the difficulty involved in translating military 
security into quantitative units, it nevertheless may be done since the results 
are used in combination with other evidence rather than in isolation. For 
example, military security is weighted according to the leaders' perceptions 
of the relative importance of value dimensions and then translated into 
equivalent dollars; rather than using such estimates in isolation, the 
magnitudes for military security are combined with an economic scale to 
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create an overall indicator of value. Irrespective of the initial validity of the 
military security measure, its validity should be enhanced when one takes 
into account both dimensions. In short, interpret the quantitative estimates 
of military security, international support, and domestic politics as 
tentative approximations of relative magnitudes rather than as absolute 
figures. 
With the above caveats in mind, consider a definition of military security 
based upon the discussion of Israel's strategic doctrine in Chapter 4. 
Military security emphasizes defense and deterrence. Military security is 
the capability to defend Israel should deterrence fail, so that there are 
minimum casualties among Israel's soldiers. Given this definition, military 
security may be transformed into numerical estimates on an interval scale 
of measurement. A first step is to rank the outcomes along the dimension 
and then to estimate approximate relative distances between pairs of 
outcomes. Two coders independently estimated the most desired outcome 
to be B, that of mobilizing and no attack. Consistent with the definition 
above, outcome B enhances the defensive aspect of military security while 
reducing the expected number of casualties should deterrence fail and war 
occur. Outcome D is next—not mobilizing and no Arab attack. Following 
D is A, mobilization and an Arab attack, then C, no mobilization and an 
Arab attack; outcome C assumes that it would have been more damaging 
to military security for Israel to fight a war without prior mobilization. In 
summary, the rank order on the military security dimension of value is B, 
mobilization and no Arab attack; D, no mobilization, no Arab attack; A, 
mobilization and Arab attack; followed by C, no mobilization and Arab 
attack. See Table 9.1 for military security relative distance estimates 
concerning the mobilization choice. 
It may be useful to compare across the dimensions of value in Figure 9.2. 
The most preferred outcome on the economic scale (D) is the second most 
desirable outcome on the military security scale. The total worth for a given 
outcome can be estimated by summing its value on each dimension. By 
summing across dimensions, one simplifies complexity, i.e., one creates an 
overall measure of value. Such an arithmetical operation accords with the 
definition of complexity provided in Chapter 2. The overall worth of 
outcome A, mobilization and Arab attack, after combining the economic 
value with the military security estimate, is about $4600 million "equivalent 
dollars": Israel's decisionmakers would pay approximately that sum to 
avoid outcome A, mobilization and Arab attack.4 
4. An alternative assumption could have guided the analysis. If one assumes that 
destruction of Arab armies enhances Israel's security, then one would have Arab attack
outcomes that arc less costly to Israel. Rather than costing $1300 equivalent million, for
example, outcome A might be less negative in magnitude. If one codes positive value to 
Israel's security from destruction of Arab armies, the results reported below nevertheless 
remain the same. 
TABLE 9.1 
Relative Distance Calculations—Military Security—Mobilization 
Military Security Ranking 
B

D

A

C

Relative Distances 
BD = 1/15 DA 
DA = 3AC 
Relative Distance in Terms of X 
BD = X 
D A = 15 X 
AC = 5X 
21 X = 100 
X = 4.76 
B  = 100 
D = 100-X 
= 100-4.76 = 95.34

A = 95.34-15 X

= 95.34-71.43 = 23.91

C = 23.91-5 X

= 23.91-23.91 =  0

Utility Scale 
B = 100 
D = 95.34 
A = 23.91 
C = 0 
Neutral Value = 95.34 
B = 100-95.34 = 4.76 
D = 95.34-95.34 = 0 
A = 23.91-95.34 = -71.43 
C = 0-95.34 = -95.34 
Utility Times Weighting Factor" 
B = 4.76X3.3 = 15.7

D = 0 X 3.3 = 0

A = -71.43X3.3 = -235.7

C = -95.34X3.3 = -314.6

Economic Costs 
D = 0 
B = -70,000,000 
A = -1,064,000,000 
C = -1,395,000,000 
Total Value (Economic Plus Military 
Security'') 
A = -4600 
B = 166 
C = -6114 
D = 0 
Equivalent $15 million
b
 Equivalent $10 million
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With respect to relative weights among dimensions, the procedure is to 
use the data from a content analysis produced for an earlier study 
of Israel's foreign policy.5 A seven-point Advocacy Statement Scale is 
employed for the purpose of coding statements of Israel's leaders during 
the May-June 1967 crisis.6 Table 9.2 contains the scale, frequency of coded 
statements, and a categorization of each item according to the respective 
TABLE 9.2 
ADVOCACY STATEMENT SCALE" 
Frequency of 
Statements Scale Item Value Dimension 
90 The survival of Israel is in jeopardy in light of Military 
Egypt's massing of troops in the Sinai; Security 
we must take action immediately. 
39 We must prevent at all costs the closing of the Military Security 
Straits of Tiran. and Economic 
85 The Western Powers will do nothing; we have no International 
one to rely on but ourselves.6 Politics 
5 Morale is sagging; we must restore national Domestic 
self-confidence. Politics 
10 We should wait another week to give the maritime International 
states time to organize a flotilla. Politics 
47 We will lose the sympathy of the world if we act International 
before all efforts at peaceful settlement have Politics 
been exhausted. 
1 We must not strike first. We need international International 
support if we have to act alone. Politics 
"Stein (Brecher, 1975:351-352) counted statements of Israel's leaders and coded them 
according to the particular scale item. The authors of this study categorized by consensus the 
items into value dimensions, and they used Stein's data for estimating the relative importance 
among dimensions. 
' The third item is the opposite of what one usually means by international support, i.e., 
it is an isolationist position. Nevertheless, the present inquiry aggregates such a "go it alone" 
posture with an attitude which expresses a need for support because both address an overall 
international political concern in contrast to military security. 
5. Stein constructed the seven-point advocacy scale as follows. All foreign policy speeches 
in English and in Hebrew were collected. An advocacy statement was defined as one that urges 
a course of action or policy for Israel. Such a statement usually contained the verb "must" or 
"should." Two judges extracted advocacy statements from the speeches. Reliability in 
extraction was verified at 81 percent. The scale included seven items, initially developed on 
the basis of Stein's area expertise and subsequently, checked for face validity by Michael 
Brecher. The validity of the scale was assessed by four judges using the pair-comparison 
method. The rank-ordering indicated high validity as manifest in the concurrence of three out 
ol lour judges across seven categories. All statements were placed on separate cards; the 
names of countries, places, and leaders were masked. The statements were ranked on the scale, 
and inter-coder agreement was calculated as 84 percent. For further details, see Brecher, 
1975:351-352. 
6. Advocacy statements are uniquely appropriate for inferring actors' judgments 
concerning value dimensions: to the degree that one advocates something, to this extent is that 
phenomenon important. All cabinet members are considered equally important and as having 
similar opportunities to make coded statements. Sequence of statements and in­
terrelationships of the positions are not taken into account. 
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dimension of value the item taps. The scale contains four dimensions of 
value: military security, economics, domestic politics, and international 
politics. Since the scale applies to the entire 1967 crisis (e.g., 16 May­
4 June), it contains more dimensions than the two used for the mobilization 
choice, which covers only the 16-19 May period. There are 129 statements 
concerning military security and 39 involving economic value; hence, the 
relative importance may be estimated by dividing 129 by 39, which equals 
3.3. This figure is used to weight the equivalent dollar value of military 
security in Table 9.1. 
The use of content analysis to weight values may seem dubious to some. 
What are the alternatives? Failure to weight is one option, but it assumes 
that all dimensions are of equal weight. Part Two of this study presents 
overwhelming evidence that military security is more highly regarded than 
economic value among Israel's decision-making elite. Since the weights 
from the content analysis conform with the authors' own area specialist 
knowledge of Israel, the content analysis may yield valid results. 
Nevertheless, a main point of contention remains: is it possible to infer the 
importance leaders attach to values by discovery of the relative frequency 
with which they mention these values in public discourse? According to ten 
officials in Israel's Foreign Ministry in March 1977, the answer is yes. 
That is, there are few differences between the public statements and private 
views of Israel's leadership. One reason for the convergence is because 
private opinions regularly appear in public newspapers in Israel's open 
society. In addition, the ten officials agreed with the weightings used here. 
The issue of whether content analysis can be used to estimate relative 
importance among values raises the question of the general validity of 
content analysis as a tool for making inferences: to the extent that one is 
able to make causal connections between underlying concepts and 
observables, content analysis may be an appropriate procedure. Indepen­
dent verification as practiced here is one method for assessing the validity 
of the rankings derived from the content analysis. 
Now that value has been approximated, consideration can be given to 
the estimation and revision of probability. Chapter 5 considers that the 
phrase "almost no chance" best fits the description of the premobilization 
perceptions of the likelihood of Arab attack. This estimate is supported by 
evidence drawn from ex post facto reconstructions by the principal 
decisionmakers themselves. For example, the chief of staff during the 1967 
crisis, Yitzhak Rabin, said after the war that: 
In May 1967 there was no atmosphere of cooperation in the Arab world and it 
was impossible to suppose that in this setting the Arabs would strike against us 
(1972). 
In an interview four months after the war, Prime Minister Eshkol echoed 
Rabin's view, remarking that: 
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The calculation of all the great luminaries as well as of the lesser military lights 
were—Nasser will not fight before 1970, maybe not even during the first years 
after 1970 (1967b).7 
On the Sherman Kent scale of assigned probabilities, perceptions of Israel's 
leaders prior to the Egyptian mobilization would be coded under "almost 
no chance," or a probability between two percent and ten percent (.02-. 10). 
The higher figure is used to reflect Israel's leaders' tendencies to act on the 
basis of the worst possible contingency, a tendency toward risk-aversity 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
In the revision of opinion between 16 and 19 May, three important 
events constitute data for changing Israel's leaders' estimates of the 
probability of Arab attack: Datum (Di), Egypt demanded the withdrawal 
of UNEF on 16 May, a UN spokesman agreed on the eighteenth, and 
Egypt forced UNEF out of key positions; (D2), Egyptian aircraft 
overflew Israel's nuclear installation at Dimona in the Negev Desert on 17 
May; (D3), Egypt redeployed troops (one infantry brigade and two 
armored battalions) from Yemen on 19 May. Bayesian analysis procedures 
may be used to revise the initial probability of attack in light of these three 
events. 
In Bayesian analysis, a ratio of prior or initial probabilities is updated by 
a likelihood ratio to create a set of new posterior or after-the-fact 
probabilities. The posteriors then can be used as new priors to combine 
with the next likelihood ratio. The posteriors themselves may be 
considered as the odds or chances of one hypothesis (Hi) being true in 
contrast to the opposite hypothesis (H2) being true.8 Although Bayes is not 
confined to two hypotheses, the present analysis employs only two since 
these were the only ones of immediate concern to Israel's leadership during 
the 1967 crisis. 
Table 9.3 contains the Bayesian revision of probability of Arab attack 
for the mobilization decision from 16 to 19 May 1967 The prior likelihood 
of Arab attack is about .10. Thefirst datum, (D1), concerns the set of events 
surrounding the Egyptian demand for the United Nations' Emergency 
Force removal, Egyptian takeover of former UN posts such as Sharm el-
Shaykh, and the UN secretary-general's statement promising complete 
withdrawal of UNEF Israel's strategic concepts are relatively silent on the 
impact of the withdrawal of UNEF on chances of attack. There is, 
nevertheless, "diagnosticity" in the entire set of events, i.e., the probability 
of attack increased dramatically after these events occurred.9 
7. Statements like those of Rabin and Eshkol represent strategic assumptions or cognitive 
beliefs that serve as a point of departure for estimating prior probabilities. 
8. The posteriors arc normalized by summing the numerator and denominator, dividing 
the numerator by the total, and subtracting the result from 1.0 to create the new denominator, 
which becomes a probability rather than odds of occurrence. See Appendix for transforming 
odds to probabilities and vice versa. 
9. Diagnosticity refers to the impact of data on the truth of hypotheses. As with the 
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TABLE 9.3 
PROBABILITY OF ATTACK UPDATES: 16-19 MAY 1967 
Event 
Di Egypt Demands UNEF Withdrawal—16 May 
Priors Likelihood Posteriors Normalized 
Ratio 
Update: 
Hi .10
 x .70 = .07 = .13 
H2 .90 .50 .45 .87 
H i = Arab Attack 
H2 = No Arab Attack 
D2 Egyptian Overflight of Dimona—17 May 
Update: .13
 x .55 _ -0715 .15 
.87 45 .39 .85 
D3 Redeployment of Troops from Yemen—19 May 
Update: .15 85 .1275 .25 x ­
.85 .45 .3825 .75 
The surrogate coders estimate that the probability of observing the 
datum Di if Hi is true (Arab attack) is about 70. The probability of 
observing Di if H2 is correct, however, is approximately .50. The priors of 
.10/.90 times the likelihood ratio of .70/.50 yield an unnormalized set of 
posteriors of .07/.45 and a normalized ratio of .13/.87. That is, the prior 
probability of Arab attack moves from 10% to 13%, given the Egyptian 
demand and events surrounding UNEF's removal (Di). The Egyptian 
overflight of Dimona (D2) causes even less revision of opinion than the 
UNEF events. On the other hand, the redeployment of troops from Yemen 
(D3), results in a dramatic shift, i.e., about a 92% increase in the probability 
of attack (from 13% to 25%).10 
Figure 9.3 displays the mobilization revision on "log-odds" paper, which 
estimation of value, it is not possible to get direct judgments by the decisionmakers 
themselves. Thus, research assistant Olender initially coded statements or inferred from the 
relevant literature probabilities for hypotheses and likelihood ratios. Co-author Tanter 
independently coded the same statements, and the mean estimate is used when the two coders 
disagreed. The coding rules regarding statements come from the Sherman Kent scale. In the 
absence of statements, the coders used the following procedure: (1) if it is equally likely that an 
event would occur given the truth of an hypothesis, code the datum as .50; (2) if it is more 
likely to observe an event, given the truth of an hypothesis, code the datum as greater than .50; 
(3) if it is less likely to observe an event, given the truth of an hypothesis, code the datum as less 
than .50; (4) if no information is available to justify a coding greater or less than .50, code the 
datum at the .50 magnitude. Since virtually all of the codings are based in part upon some 
empirical statements, the validity of the coding based upon the Kent Scale is better than the 
case would be in the absence of such firm grounding. Tables 9.3-9.6 contain empirical 
statements for each of seven events as they impact on the probability of Arab attack. 
10. The absolute magnitude of the difference is only 12%, but the relative change is 92%. 
Relative change equals (t2-ti)/ti, where t = time. 
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16 May 19 May 
Prior Likelihood „ Likelihood
 v Likelihood _ Posterior Normalized 
Probability " Ratio D, Ratio D2 Ratio D3 Probability Value 
H, 0.10 0.70 0.55 .. 0.85 0.1275 0.25 
H2 0.90 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.3825 0.75 
H, = Arab Attack 
H2= No Arab Attack 
D, = Withdrawal of UNEF Request.etc.: 16 May 
D2 = Overflight of Dimona by Egyptian Aircraft: 17 May 
D3= Egyptian Troops Recalled from Yemen-19 May 
Fig. 9.3. Plot of probability of attack updates: 16 19 May 1967 
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has the effect of reducing the tendency for conservative revision. The 
probability of attack is on the left-hand side, the ratio of Hi (attack) to H2 
(no attack) is on the right-hand side, and time is on the horizontal axis.11 In 
summary, the probability of Arab attack shifts from 10% to 25%, given the 
UNEF events, the overflight of Dimona, and the redeployment of 
Egyptian troops from Yemen. In other words, there is an increase in the 
probability of attack of 150%; the odds of attack shifted from about 1:9 to 
1:3, from one chance in ten to one chance in four. Using content analysis as 
a principal tool for the reconstruction and revision of probability and 
value, one is able to make an assessment of the degree to which choice is 
expected-value maximizing.12 
Figure 9.4 evaluates the rationality of the decision to mobilize (cf. Table 
5.3). The actual choice is efficient in that Israel's decisionmakers acted to 
Arab Attack 
Mobilization 
No Arab Attack 
Arab Attack 
No Mobilization 
No Arab Attack 
Fig. 9.4. 19 May 1967 decision to mobilize 
11. To present the probabilities in terms of logarithmic relations assumes that changes at 
the lower and upper end of the scale are of more significance than changes at the middle. For 
example, a shift from 10% to 20% has more impact on changes in odds than a shift from 50% 
to 60%. In both cases, there is an absolute change of 10%; the first has a relative change in the 
odds of 5 to 1, while there is less than a 1:1 change in the second case. 
12. To validate further the estimates of probability and value, sensitivity analysis may be 
employed: vary likelihood and value estimates to see if choice is responsive to such changes. 
Sensitivity analysis, in fact, is used to check the conclusions for the two delay decisions but not 
for the mobilization or war choices. Since the mobilization and war decisions are 
overwhelmingly expected-value maximizing, sensitivity analysis would not change the 
conclusions for these two choices. 
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maximize expected-value.13 The expected loss of not mobilizing is about 
50% more than that of mobilizing, as is shown in Figure 9.5.14 For both 
alternatives, Israel's decisionmakers were choosing between two negatively 
valued options. This is consistent with mobilization as a defensive response 
to reduce costs should deterrence fail and with the study's definition of 
military security and its focus on defense: Israel's decisionmakers 
considered mobilization in terms of expected loss (defense) rather than 
expected gain.15 The 19 May mobilization created two new options for 
Israel's decisionmakers—to strike first or to wait for a diplomatic solution. 
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Fig. 9.5. Graph of mobilization option: 19 May 1967 
13. To calculate expected-value, multiply probability of a consequence by its value and 
combine with the product of probability times value for the other consequence(s) of the same 
option. Repeat the process for the other alternative(s). 
14. A focus on the relative rather than absolute magnitudes is in accordance with the
notion that the absolute numbers may not be precise while relative proportions are more
valid. 
15. The most important exceptions occur when decisionmakers choose mobilization as a 
part of coercive diplomacy or in preparation for preventive war or preemption. A decision tree 
for Israel's 1956 mobilization choice would probably show a positive expected-value for 
mobilizing as a preliminary to launching preventive war against Egypt. 
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23 May: The Choice to Delay 
The first delay choice, as Chapter 6 concludes, is an example of a deci­
sion that follows a cognitive-analytic path (Table 6.1). Between 19 and 
23 May, the cabinet confronted a situation for which it identified two 
options—to wait for diplomacy or to launch a first strike. Figure 9.6 con­
tains the structure of the decision problem facing Israel's leaders on 
23 May. Just as strategic doctrine listed Arab attack probability as a con­
sequence of a mobilization choice, doctrine continues to pinpoint attack 
as a central input to a delay decision. In addition, strategic concepts 
specify major-power support in order to deter great-power intervention 
on the part of an adversary. Arab attack, Soviet intervention, and U.S. 
support are three consequences of choice (Table 6.2). These three conse­
quences combine with two options—delay and strike—to produce the six 
outcomes of Figure 9.6. 
The outcomes of Figure 9.6 are labeled A, B, C, D, G, and H. Outcomes 
E and F are omitted because they refer to the flotilla consequence that 
comes into play after 23 May. One of the six outcomes, A, states that Israel 
attacks with U.S. support, and there is Soviet intervention. Outcome H, on 
the other hand, states that Israel delays military action and there is no Arab 
Soviet Intervention 0U.S. Support 
No 
Soviet Intervention 
_ Soviet Intervent 
No U.S. Support -0 
No 
Soviet Intervention 
Arab Attack 
No Arab Attack 
Fig. 9.6. 23 May 1967 delay choice 
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attack. The dimensions of value underlying these six outcomes consist of 
an economic dimension, military security, international support, and 
domestic politics. On the basis of the content analysis, military security 
would be about 3.3 times the economic scale; international support some 
1.5 times the economic dimension; and domestic politics approximately .13 
times economic value.16 The content analysis, however, is for the entire 
crisis period. On the other hand, the results reported in Chapter 6 imply 
that international support should be weighted about twice as important as 
military security for the 23 May choice. The weights used for the analysis of 
the 23 May decision, therefore, are as follows: international support is 6.6 
economics; military security is 3.3 economics; and domestic politics is 1.1 
economics.17 In short, the results from the content analysis for the entire 
case are not sensitive to the changes that occurred as the crisis evolved. 
Nevertheless, these data are used as a point of departure to create weights 
for the 23 May choice.18 
The economic scale uses $497 million for the cost of war as developed in 
the discussion of mobilization. The $497 million cost is lowered $5 million 
for outcomes A and B to reflect the monetary benefits of continued U.S. 
support (economic assistance). For outcomes C and D, the same logic 
applies to raise the economic cost of war to $502 million because American 
aid could be discontinued in the contingency of a cessation in U.S. support. 
There should be some adjustment in the values for A and C since Soviet 
intervention would undoubtedly increase Israel's economic losses. 
However, it is difficult to estimate the added cost perceived by Israel's 
decisionmakers: there is no evidence that they considered the economic 
cost of Soviet intervention. Despite their analytic processing of informa­
tion throughout most of the crisis, Israel's decisionmakers failed to 
generate retrievable traces of cost estimates for Soviet military interven­
tion. Thus, the economic cost assigned for outcomes A and C are not 
affected by Soviet intervention. An estimate of $994 million is used for G 
under the assumption that costs would double if Arab armies struck first. 
Economic loss, for the wait outcome, which does not result in Arab attack, 
is set at zero.19 
16. The relative frequency of statements is as follows: 129/39 is the ratio of military 
security to economics; 58/39 is the ratio of international support to economics; and 5/ 39 is the 
ratio for domestic politics. See Table 9.2 above for additional details. 
17. In further support of these weights, Brecher (1975:355) states that military security 
and international support components are of "overwhelming importance," while the 
economic and domestic political dimensions became dominant over time. After Dayan joined 
the cabinet, however, the domestic political component became less important, and hence it is 
dropped from the 4 June decision analysis. 
18. Sec Table 6.2 for evidence that international support should receive a higher weight 
than what would be expected from the content analysis data alone. 
19. Some might interpret the actual mobilization cost and the subsequent loss of 
production as continuing costs applicable to later decisions. In this regard, outcome H would 
be rated non-zero on the economics dimension. On the other hand, an assumption here is that 
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Using the estimates that translate the economic dimension into dollars as 
a point of departure, outcomes now may be ranked along the three non­
monetary dimensions.20 Recall the definition of military security as the 
enhancement of Israel's capabilities in the event of deterrence failure and 
reduction in expected casualties. Since Egypt began troop concentrations 
in Sinai, one element of Israel's deterrence had failed; hence, a goal of the 
leadership was to act in such a way as to minimize the losses should war 
occur. A preemptive strike would be an instance of taking the offense for 
defensive purposes. In this regard, outcome B, that of attack accompanied 
by American support and no Soviet intervention, ranks highest. Outcome 
A comes next since U.S. support for Israel's attack could neutralize the 
effects of the USSR intervention. Although such Soviet intervention is 
defined as military, A is ranked higher than the next outcome D, because 
the absence of U.S. support is more important than the presence of Soviet 
intervention. Outcome H, delay with no Arab attack, follows next. Since 
the army was not fully deployed on 23 May, H ranks higher than outcome 
C. It is preferable to wait the few extra days necessary to prepare Tzahal 
than to attack without U.S. support and risk defeat due to Soviet 
intervention. Although outcome H does not involve war, it is not the 
preferred outcome because the concentration of Egyptian forces in Sinai 
would continue to threaten Israel's security. Finally, G is the worst possible 
outcome; Israel waits and absorbs an Arab attack. 
As for the international support dimension, the rankings are based upon 
the assumption that, if the Arab states attack in G, the United States and its 
allies would support Israel and the USSR would not intervene. Within this 
context, outcome G—Israel waits and there is an Arab attack—ranks 
highest. Outcome H is next because delay is considered much more 
desirable by the international community than attack. B follows because 
American support and no Soviet intervention are the best consequences of 
an attack in terms of international support. Outcome A is next because, 
although the Soviet Union intervenes, Israel has U.S. support. D follows, 
since the Soviet Union does not intervene despite the absence of American 
support. The least desirable outcome is C, where Israel attacks with no U.S. 
the wait decision does not involve additional economic cost, e.g., other than that already 
taken into account in the mobilization choice. 
20. With respect to reliability, the two coders rank-ordered outcomes along the three non­
monetary dimensions twice without any differences in results. In addition, an official of 
Israel's Foreign Ministry rank-ordered the outcomes during March 1977. There is 85% 
agreement on military support, 70% for international support, and 60% for domestic politics. 
The procedure was to compare the rankings of the study with the average ranking of the 
official. Although the percentages of agreement suggest some doubt for particular 
dimensions, creation of an overall scale should be more valid than each. In addition, the 
variability makes little difference with respect to the study's conclusions. For example, using 
the Foreign Ministry official's rank-ordering does not alter the main inferences that 
mobilization and strike options were expected-value maximizing. No sensitivity analysis 
using different ranks was conducted on the two delay choices. 
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support and the Soviet Union intervenes. Although there appears to be 
some overlap between rankings for military security and international 
support, there are no ranks in agreement. For example, outcome G is the 
least preferable on military security and the most preferable on 
international support. 
The last dimension of value in the 23 May decision is domestic politics, 
the least reliable and the least important factor.21 On the twenty-third of the 
month, there was no strong consensus among the public or among relevant 
civil servants on the appropriate course of action. Under these 
circumstances, the best outcome on the domestic political level is the one 
with the fewest negative consequences. B is ranked first on the dimension of 
domestic politics because of Israel's desire to take the initiative in solving 
the crisis and because of American support unaccompanied by Soviet 
intervention. Outcome H, where Israel waits and there is no Arab attack, 
follows: although there are few positive gains apparent to the public, there 
are no immediate negative repercussions. (There is, however, widespread 
disagreement on the ranking for H.) The remaining outcomes A, C, D, and 
G all involve significant costs and are ranked according to their relative 
disadvantages. A follows H, since, although there is American support, 
there is also Soviet intervention. Outcome D comes next because of Israel's 
unwillingness to attack without the support of at least one major power. 
Outcome C combines the disadvantages of A and D, since there is no U.S. 
support and there is Soviet intervention. In Outcome G, the worst, Israel 
absorbs an Arab first strike.22 
With respect to likelihood, the estimate of prior probability of Arab 
attack after the mobilization is approximately 25%. Between 19 and 23 
May, the major event which alarmed Israel's decisionmakers was the 22 
May blockade of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt. Since doctrine highlighted 
closure of the Straits as a casus belli, it had a significant impact upon the 
probability of Arab attack. The same two coders used in the mobilization 
update estimated that it was twice as likely for Nasser to close the Straits if 
he planned to attack rather than not to attack. Table 9.4 contains the 
Bayesian calculations for revision of probability of attack in light of the 
closure of the Straits. There is a 75% absolute change, but a 60% relative 
increase as the probability of attack goes from .25 to .40. In terms of odds, 
there is a movement from 1:3 chance of attack to odds of 1.1.5, as indicated 
in Figure 9.7. 
The decision tree for the 23 May choice to delay military action appears 
21. Given problems with replicating the domestic politics dimension and its small weight, 
it should be dropped from future analyses. 
22. Thanks to Hemda Ben Yehuda and Sarah Vert/berger, graduate students at the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for help in verifying the calculations. David Wiechert 
provided valuable assistance in ranking the outcomes along dimensions of value. 
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TABLE 9.4

PROBABILITY OF ATTACK UPDATES: 20-23 MAY 1967

Event 
D4 Closure of Straits—22 May 1967 
Priors Likelihood Posteriors Normalized 
Ratio Value 
Update: 
H, .25 .80 .20 40 
H2 .75 .40 .30 .60 
H, = Arab Attack 
H2 = No Arab Attack 
in Figure 9.8. With respect to U.S. support and Soviet intervention, there is 
evidence for assigning probabilities of occurrence of about 30% and 15% 
respectively. For example, Foreign Minister Abba Eban suggested that the 
likelihood of American assistance in supplying arms and deterring Soviet 
intervention would increase if Israel chose to delay; furthermore, should 
Israel act without consulting the U.S., it was unlikely that support would be 
forthcoming (Eban, 1977:334-335). The perception of U.S. support as 
unlikely has a probability range of between .15 and ,45, according to the 
Sherman Kent scale. Ben Gurion also feared taking action without 
American support. Moshe Carmel recalls that Ben Gurion emphasized 
that, as long as Israel did not have any of the powers on its side, any action 
taken would be a "dangerous adventure." U.S. support is estimated to be at 
the mid-point of the range, i.e., a .30 probability of U.S. support. 
Israel's government also was concerned about the potential for Soviet 
intervention. Without Washington's support of Israel, Moscow could be 
tempted to intervene on the side of the Arab states. In the absence of 
information, Eban was unable to estimate the likelihood of Soviet 
intervention with any precision; therefore, further acquisition of 
information was necessary before alternatives could be evaluated. In an 
interview during 1968, Eban stated that the possibility of Soviet 
intervention had to be explored. In the face of constant Soviet warnings 
that Israel would pay a heavy price if it acted, a countervailing influence 
(e.g., U.S. support) had to be secured. In contrast to Eban's apprehension 
over Soviet intervention, Yigal Allon concluded that Soviet intervention 
was a virtual impossibility: 
First, it was too risky—it could have meant confrontation with the United 
States. Secondly, they were too weak in the Middle East militarily to go to war 
with Israel; it would have meant a military build-up equal to the size of the 
American build-up in Vietnam. Thirdly, based on history I concluded they are 
not inclined to intervene, and finally, I counted on a short war, one not long 
enough to give the Russians time to intervene (1968).23 
23. As stated in Chapter 6, Alton's remarks are ex post facto and are the statements of 
6 Ma y 9 May 23 Mejy 
Prior x Likelihood Posterior 
Probability Ratio D4 Probability 
H, 0.25 x 0 8 ° 0.20 
H2 0.75 0.40 0.30

H, = Arab Attack

H2= No Arab Attack

D4 = Blockade of the Straits: 22 May 
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Fig. 9.7. Plot of probability of attack updates: 16-23 May 1967 
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No Arab Attack 
Fig. 9.8. 23 May 1967 decision to delay 
Taking into account such statements as those of Eban and Allon, the 
coders assessed the probability of Soviet intervention as only 15% if Israel 
had U.S. support but 25% in the case of no American support. The 23 May 
1967 decision tree shows that it was rational for Israel to delay at that time. 
For example, Israel stood to gain aboutfifteen times more from delay than 
it stood to lose from attack. This result is consistent with the historical 
record. 
28 May: The Choice to Delay 
As Chapter 6 concludes, the second delay choice is an illustration of a 
decision that follows a cognitive-analytic path (Table 6.3). Between 23 and 
28 May, the cabinet confronted a situation for which it identified two 
options—delay or strike first. Again, particular attention was paid to the 
risk of losing international support (Table 6.4). 
Figure 9.9 contains the structure of the decision problem facing Israel's 
leaders on 28 May. With the introduction of an international flotilla as a 
possibility after the 23 May choice to delay military action, the tree now 
contains eight outcomes. The two new outcomes on the decision tree are E 
someone who was not a central decisionmaker during the early part of the 1967 crisis, a time 
when he was out of the country. On his return, however, he became a principal participant in 
the decisional process. See also Eban, 1977:404-405. 
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Fig. 9.9. 28 May 1967 delay choice 
and F In E, Israel waits, there is a flotilla and an Arab attack, while in F, 
Israel waits, there is aflotilla but no Arab attack. The relative weights of the 
dimensions are the same as those on 23 May except for domestic politics 
which is increased to 2.2 times the value of the economic dimension. Such 
an increase reflects the additional pressure from public opinion increasing­
ly concerned with the problem of the concentration of Egyptian troops in 
Sinai. 
The presence of additional outcomes on the 28 May tree, as well as 
changes in attitude on the part of the decisionmakers, requires revision in 
the ranking of the outcomes across all four dimensions. On the economic 
scale, outcomes A, B, C, D, G, and H are assigned the 23 May values. The 
new outcomes E and F would represent the same economic cost as G and H 
respectively, except that one of the consequences of E and F is an 
international flotilla. If the flotilla succeeds in opening the Straits, there is 
some economic benefit to Israel. To calculate the dollar value, it is 
necessary to estimate the amount of imports lost to Israel through the 
closure of the Straits. The Statistical Yearbook of Israel (1968) lists the 
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total 1967 imports as $747,456,000. The monthly average is $62,288,000. 
Experts consider that about 5% of Israel's imports in 1967 came through 
the Straits (Geist, 1974:603). Thus the monthly loss to Israel in 1967 
because of closure of the Straits is approximately $3,000,000. Outcome 
E is assigned an economic cost of $991,000,000 which is $3 million less than 
the cost of an Arab attack without aflotilla.F is given a positive value of $3 
million because Israel recovers $3 million in imports through Eilat by the 
opening of the Straits. 
From the standpoint of military security and the reduction in expected 
casualties, the attack outcomes are now considered the best by Israel's 
leaders. By 28 May, the Israel Defense Forces are fully prepared, and 
military leaders are pressing the cabinet to act. Thus, outcome B, attack 
with U.S. support and no U.S.S.R. intervention, ranks highest. Outcome A 
is next because of the negative impact of Soviet intervention. American 
support, nevertheless, makes outcome A preferable to that of D, which 
includes neither U.S. support nor Soviet intervention. C is the worst attack 
outcome, because the Soviet Union intervenes and there is no counter­
vailing American support. Among the wait outcomes, F is best because the 
flotilla might reopen the Straits and Arab armies do not attack. Finally, the 
lowest ranked outcomes are H, E, and G, in that order. If H occurs, the 
situation remains static. Despite the flotilla in E, an Arab attack prolongs 
the war and makes it much more costly for Israel. G is the worst outcome 
since there is an Arab attack and no help from an international flotilla. 
The new outcomes, E and F, are ranked at the top of the international 
support dimension. In both cases, there is aflotilla that provides a concrete 
display of international support. E is ranked higher than F because of the 
assumption that an Arab attack would bring additional world support. The 
ordering of the other outcomes is similar to that of the 23 May choice. For 
international support, the ranking of the remaining outcomes from highest 
to lowest is G, H, B, A, D, and C. 
The last dimension of value for the 28 May decision is domestic politics. 
Because of the increased public pressure exerted on the Eshkol government 
between 23 and 28 May, all four outcomes on the attack branch are ranked 
as more desirable than those on the wait branch. By 28 May, as Chapter 6 
reports, military officers were joined by the press and influential opposition 
leaders in their demand for military action. Simultaneously, pressure for a 
national coalition was growing. What is best for military security is best for 
domestic politics. Thus, the outcomes for domestic politics are ranked in 
the same order as the outcomes for the military security dimension: B, A, 
D, C, F, H, E, and G.24 
24. With respect to reliability, there is agreement between the study's coding for domestic 
politics and the judgments of one of Israel's Foreign Ministry officials during March 1977: 
national security and domestic politics converge for the 28 May decision. In terms of 
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In connection with likelihood, the estimate of prior probability of attack 
after the delay decision of 23 May is 40%. Table 9.5 and Figure 9.10 contain 
evidence relevant to revision of opinion about probability of attack 
between 24 and 28 May. On 25 May, the Fourth Egyptian Armored 
Division was deployed in the Sinai. The positioning of this division was 
noted by Chief of Staff Rabin as an important factor in the calculation of 
TABLE 9.5 
PROBABILITY OF ATTACK UPDATES: 24-28 MAY 1967 
Event 
D5 4th Armored Division to Sinai—25 May 
Priors Likelihood Pcisteriors Normalized 
Ratio Values 
Update: 
H, .40
 y .80 _ .32 .57 
H2 .60 .40 .24 .43 
H, = Arab Attack 
H2 = No Arab Attack 
D6 Nasser Statement—26 May 
Al-Ahram article—26 May 
Update: .57 65 .37 .66 x - = 
.43 .45 .19 .34 
Egypt's capabilities. On 23 May, Rabin considered that the Egyptian build­
up was not yet offensive; the famed 4th Armored Divison was still on the 
western side of the Canal. When the 4th Division was deployed, Israel's 
calculations of Arab capability for attack greatly increased. Because of the 
salience of troop concentration for Israel's decisionmakers, the coders 
assessed the likelihood of the datum given Hi as .80; given H2, they coded 
the probability of the 4th Division's moving to the Sinai as .40. That is, 
it is about twice as likely that Egypt would move the 4th Division to the 
Sinai (D5) if they were going to attack (Hi) than if Egypt were not going to 
attack (H2). The revised probability of attack, given the deployment of 
the 4th, is about 57%. For the first time in the crisis, the chances of war are 
greater than fifty-fifty, as indicated by Figure 9.10. 
methodology, however, the multiattribute utility measurement procedure employed here 
assumes independence among dimensions of value. Two dimensions are independent if 
preferences for one holding the other dimensions constant do not depend upon the specific 
magnitudes in which the other dimensions are controlled. For example, Israel's preferences 
for combinations of military security and economic utility should be independent of the level 
of international or domestic politics. The effect of non-independence among dimensions on 
the results is unclear. By summing magnitudes from non-independent scales, such 
measurement error should not overturn the main results of this study. 
X 
97 30:1 
91 10 :1 
83 5: I 
75 3: I 
50 I I 
25 I :3 
17 I :5 
9 I 10 
16 May 19 May 23 May 28 May 
Prior Likelihood Likelihood Posterior _ Normalized 
Probability Ratio D5 Ratio D6 Probability Value 
H, 0.40 0.80 0.37 0.66 
0.40 0.45 0. 19 0.34 
H, = Arab Attack 
D5 = Deployment of Fourth Armored Division to Sinai : 25 May 
D6 - Nasser Statement and Al-Ahram Article- 26 May 
Fig. 9.10. Plot of probability of attack updates: 16 28 May 1967 
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On 26 May, an article appeared in Al-Ahram, Egypt's semi-official 
newspaper, stating that war was inevitable because Israel had no choice but 
to attack. In addition, Nasser stated in a speech to an Arab workers 
conference that the closure of the Straits meant total war with Israel; the 
war's goal was the complete destruction of Israel; and Egyptian as well as 
other Arab forces were prepared to win the war. During this speech, Nasser 
also opened a channel for Jordanian cooperation, which was to be a very 
important input to the 4 June choice. The coders' estimate of the likelihood 
of attack after the Nasser speech and the newspaper article was .65 given Hi 
and .45 given H2. They reasoned that, although Israel's leaders often 
considered Nasser's statements as rhetorical, within the context of an 
escalating crisis the leaders were less likely to do so. The revised probability 
of attack, given the newspaper article and Nasser's speech, is now 
approximately 66%. In other words, there is almost a 2:1 perceived chance 
of attack, as indicated by Figure 9.10. 
In addition to probability of attack, Israel's leaders updated the 
likelihood of American support and Soviet intervention. The Bayesian 
analysis, however, is used only for the probability of attack. The coders 
estimated that the likelihood of U.S. support decreased by 50% between 23 
and 28 May, i.e., from about .30 to .15. The likelihood of Soviet 
intervention, given American support, decreased by 29%, from ap­
proximately .35 to .25. Evidence for these revisions is more difficult to 
discover than for Arab attack. Nevertheless, there is some evidence for the 
revisions of the probabilities of U.S. support and Soviet intervention. 
The coders rated as low the likelihood of U.S. support if Israel attacked. 
Since the U.S. was planning a flotilla, it is reasonable that American 
support would be less likely should Israel attack. President Johnson's letter 
of 28 May to Prime Minister Eshkol suggested that the United States 
would not come to Israel's aid if it chose to attack at that time. Chapter 6 
reports that almost all decisionmakers—Eban and Allon, for example— 
agreed that the likelihood of American support if Israel acted now was 
lower than if it had acted on 23 May. Thus by the morning of 28 May, the 
likelihood of both an Arab attack and the flotilla had increased if Israel 
chose to wait, while the likelihood of American support had decreased if it 
chose to act (Table 6.4). The coders estimated the probability of American 
support should Israel opt for attack at 25%. 
Israel's decisionmakers did receive indirect information of Soviet 
attitudes. In a note from Johnson to Eshkol on 28 May, the President wrote 
that the Soviet Union had communicated to him that Israel was preparing 
to attack. The President's warning that "The Soviets state that if Israel 
starts military action, the Soviet Union will extend help to the attacked 
states" is reported in Chapter 6. The coders used evidence like the 
Johnson letter to estimate probabilities of 25% and 35% for Soviet 
intervention, depending on U.S. support. 
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With respect to the likelihood of the flotilla, Eban estimated that the 
flotilla was "probable." On the basis of new information, the probability of 
an international naval patrol was now significantly higher as the twenty-
eighth approached. In this respect, the coders estimated the probability of a 
flotilla at 45%.25 
Figure 9.11 contains the decision tree for the 28 May choice to delay 
military action. Israel stood to gain about $1,400 million equivalent dollars 
more from delay than from attack. The optimal choice of delay accords 
with the historical decision and, thus, Israel's decisionmakers chose 
rationally on 28 May. 
4 June: The Choice to Attack 
As Chapter 7 concludes, the war decision illustrates a choice that 
follows a cognitive-analytic path (Table 7.1). Between 28 May and 4 June, 
Soviet Intervention 
U.S. Support 
No 
Soviet intervention 
Soviet intervention 
No U.S. Support 
No 
Soviet Intervention 
Arab Attack 
Flotilla 
0.39* N o A r o b A f t o c k (4034) F 
A r a b A t t q c k 
No Flotilla 
No Arab Attack 
Fig. 9.11. 28 May 1967 decision to delay 
25. The range for "probably" on the Sherman Kent scale is from .55 to .85; nevertheless, 
.45 was selected to reflect the idea that Eban's estimate may have been "wishful thinking" on 
his part that was not shared by other cabinet members. Eban's military colleagues, for 
example, were more skeptical than he was that a flotilla would set sail. 
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the cabinet confronted a situation for which it identified two options-
delay or strike first. In contrast to the two delay choices, however, the 
period leading up to the war decision finds the leadership discounting 
international support and focusing on the risk of Arab attack. For 
example, the cost to military security was thought to be escalating because 
of the multiplicative cost of an expected three-front war (Table 7.2). 
The structure of the decision problem facing Israel's leaders on 4 June 
1967 is the same as that for 28 May (Figure 9.9). As in the decision to delay 
military action, the 4 June tree has eight outcomes. The ranking of 
outcomes on the four dimensions of value also remains the same between 
28 May and 4 June, but the relative weight of each dimension changes 
significantly. By 4 June, military security is about 6.6 economics, 
international support is 1.5 economics, and domestic politics is nearly 
irrelevant at. 13 economics. These weights correspond with the qualitative 
findings of Chapter 7 and the quantitative evidence of the content analysis. 
With respect to likelihood, the estimate of prior probability of attack 
after the delay decision of 28 May is 66%. Table 9.6 and Figure 9.12 contain 
evidence relevant to revision of opinion about probability of attack 
between 29 May and 4 June. On 30 May, Jordan and Egypt signed a mutual 
defense pact. This pact was similar to the Syrian-Egyptian agreement in 
that Article 7 stipulated that, should military action be undertaken, the 
chief of staff of the United Arab Republic shall assume command of the 
operations of both states. On 30 May, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt were all 
under a unified command. The pact also stipulated that foreign troops were 
to be placed on Jordanian soil, thus violating one of Israel's declared casus 
belli. The pact resulted in a major update of calculations of Arab attack. 
The coders estimated the probability of the pact given Hi (attack) as .85, 
and the probability of the pact given H2 (no attack) as .30. That is, it is 
almost three times as likely that the pact would be signed if Egypt planned 
to attack than if it did not plan to attack. 
The likelihood of a Jordanian-Egyptian pact was considered low under 
TABLE 9.6 
PROBABILITY OF ATTACK UPDATES: 29 MAY-4 JUNE 1967 
Event 
D7 Jordan-Egypt Pact- 30 May 
Priors Likelihood Posteriors Normalized 
Ratio Value 
Update: 
H, .66 x ­85 ­ .56 .85 
H2 .34 .30 .10 .15 
H, = Arab Attack 
H2 = No Arab Attack 
x"
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Fig. 9.12. Plot of probability of attack updates: 16 May 4 June 1967 
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an assumption of no Arab attack. Egypt and Jordan had been engaged in 
name-calling indicative of strained relations. Thus, it is reasonable for 
Israel's leaders to have estimated a low likelihood of military collaboration 
if no attack were planned (H2). The revised probability of attack, given the 
pact, is about 85%, or "almost certainly," on the Kent scale. The absolute 
change from 28 May to 4 June is 19 percentage points. Since the 
probabilities are approaching unity, the relative change is 29%. The odds 
shift from 2:1 in favor of attack to almost 6:1 for attack. 
In addition to probability of attack, Israel's leaders updated the 
likelihood of U.S. support, Soviet intervention, and the international 
flotilla. As discussed in Chapter 7, the probability of U.S. support 
increased after the long delay and the decrease in the likelihood of the 
flotilla; also, the probability of USSR military intervention declined (Table 
7.2). 
Empirical evidence for an increased probability of U.S. support is a 
cessation in the constant American warnings to Israel against unilateral 
military action. On 3 June, a day before the decision to strike, at a meeting 
in Eshkol's home, leaders expected that, if they took the initiative to break 
the encirclement of Arab armies, the U.S. would not take an unfriendly 
view. Eban stated that, if Israel were successful in ending the siege and the 
blockade, the United States would not be hostile to its actions (1977:395). 
In other words, decisionmakers assessed the likelihood of American 
support as high. Using the Sherman Kent Scale, the coders estimated the 
probability of American support at 80%. 
Quantitative estimates concerning the international flotilla are based on 
such specific evidence as the American secretary of state's reported 
assertion that the United States was not at the present time planning any 
separate military activity in the Middle East, e.g., aflotilla. Secretary Rusk 
also stated that he did not think it was the business of the U.S. to restrain 
anyone. These statements, along with private conversations with American 
officials, led Israel to view the flotilla as unlikely. For example, Meir Amit, 
then head of one of Israel's intelligence services, reported on 31 May that, 
from hints and scattered facts, he received the impression that the maritime 
force project was running into deeper water every hour. Therefore, the 
coders rated the possibility of a flotilla at about 10%. 
With respect to probability of Soviet intervention, Ambassador to 
Washington Avraham Harman and Meir Amit independently assessed the 
likelihood of Soviet intervention as low based upon U.S. deterrence. Thus, 
the coders rated the probability of Soviet intervention as 10% if Israel had 
U.S. support. 
In the shift in opinion from 28 May to 4 June, U.S. support increases by 
66%; USSR intervention given U.S. support decreases by 60%; and the 
likelihood of the flotilla decreases by 73%. As stated previously, the 
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Bayesian revision suggests a 29% increase in the probability of attack in the 
absence of a flotilla. Under the assumption of the importance of 
proportionate changes in decision-making, these dramatic shifts in 
likelihoods may have been important inputs to Israel's decision to attack. 
In addition to these major changes, the near-certainty of Arab attack seems 
to be equal or of even more importance, as suggested in Chapter 7 
Expected value calculations appear in Figure 9.13. This decision tree 
suggests that Israel would net almost $6 billion equivalent dollars if it 
attacks rather than delays. The optimal choice of attack accords with the 
historical decision; therefore, Israel's decisionmakers chose rationally on 4 
June in favor of an attack the following day. Figures 9.14 and 9.15 
summarize the results of the decision analysis. On 23 May, the positive 
expected value for delay exceeds the negative value for attack. By 28 May, 
the positive value of delay is about twenty-four times the positive value of 
attack and, on 4 June, the positive value of attack is about three-fifths times 
the negative value of delay. 
Q ^ S o v i e t Intervention^ | Q |  ? } A 
U.S. Support 
No 
Soviet Interventio 
Soviet Intervention 
No U.S. Support 
No 
Soviet Intervention 
Arab Attack 
Flotilla 
No Arab Attack 
Arab Attack f.A2l\ G 
No Flotilla 
No Arab Attack 
Fig. 9.13. 4 June 1967 decision to attack 
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Fig. 9.14. Graph of delay options over time: 23 May-4 June 1967 
Decision analysis is a means for inferring approximate rationality of the 
mobilization, delay, and attack options. It is a tool for evaluating the 
rationality of choice. A procedure for assessing the rationality of estimates 
is Bayesian analysis. Figure 9.16 contains a comparison of unaided revision 
with Bayesian change. Individual differences among decisionmakers are 
compared with optimal Bayesian revision. In the earlier stages, both the 
military and the civilian estimates are more conservative than Bayes while, 
in the later stages, Eban's revision was more conservative and Allon and the 
General Staff revised more rapidly than Bayes would recommend. 
Impact of Information on Choice 
Revision of opinion regarding likelihood of consequences of choice 
implies that information is relevant to selection of one option over another. 
Other aspects of the impact of information are threshold probability and 
sensitivity analysis. A threshold is a probability where choice should shift 
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Fig. 9.15. Graph of attack options over time: 23 May-4 June 1967 
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Fig. 9.16. Bayesian and intuitive revision of the likelihood of Egyptian attack 
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from one alternative to another in order to continue maximization of 
expected value or minimization of expected loss. That is to say, below the 
threshold, one option has the highest expected value; above the threshold, 
another alternative has the highest expected value; and at the threshold, 
one is indifferent because the expected values are equal. Sensitivity 
analysis, moreover, assesses the impact of different value estimates on 
choice. Figures 9.17 and 9.18 contain the plots for estimating threshold 
probabilities graphically for U.S. support. 
4000 
3342 3044 
0.50 1.00 
Probability of U.S. Support 
Fig. 9.17. Threshold probability plot for U.S. support 23 May 1967 delay and attack 
choices 
The expected value of each option is plotted assuming zero probability 
and certainty of the respective event forks for a consequence of an option. 
Should the lines for each option cross, the point at which the lines cross is 
the threshold probability. In order to maximize expected value, one should 
shift from one option to the other(s), depending on which alternative has 
the highest expected value. 
Both the 23 May and the 28 May 1967 decisions contain threshold 
probabilities. For example, the threshold for the likelihood of U.S. support 
is about .94 for the 23 May choice. If the probability of American support is 
greater than 94%, then attack is preferable to delay When the probability is 
below 94%, then delay is better than attack. In other words, the expected 
value of attack equals the expected value of delay at about .94 probability 
as of 23 May. 
3600 
3425 
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Fig. 9.18. Threshold probability plot for U.S. support 28 May 1967 delay and attack 
choices 
The threshold for U.S. support by 28 May is about .51. If the probability 
of support increased above 51% on the 28th, then attack by Israel is better 
than delay. The fact that there is a high threshold on 23 May, a significantly 
lower threshold on 28 May, and no threshold on 4 June can be explained by 
Israel's decisionmakers' perceptions of changing circumstances during the 
crisis. U.S. support was most important on 23 May because Israel's forces 
were not fully prepared. As the army reached a state of readiness on 28 May 
and the probability of Arab attack increased, the need for American 
support decreased. By 4 June, the threat of an Arab attack on three fronts 
reduced the salience of American support for some decisionmakers. 
Although there is a threshold for American support, there is none for 
Soviet intervention, Arab attack, and the international flotilla. Failure to 
find thresholds for the uncertainties surrounding the Soviet, Arab states, 
and the flotilla inputs suggests that these consequences are of less 
importance in a decision to switch from one option to another. It is possible 
that Israel's decisionmakers considered that the likelihood of American 
support itself was more sensitive to their choices than the other principal 
consequences. Search activity was designed not only to provide a better 
informational base to estimate the probability of U.S. support but also to 
increase its likelihood. This may explain the allocation of scarce 
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informational resources to permit more accurate estimates of the 
likelihood of American support. Such an allocation is consistent with the 
historical record and the sensitivity of Israel's decisionmakers to this 
consequence of their choice. 
Evidence drawn from the examination of decisionmaking in Chapters 6 
and 7 underlines the considerable effort Israel's leaders made to determine 
the likelihood of American support. Foreign Minister Eban, for example, 
insisted on acquiring additional information on the likelihood that the 
United States would "neutralize a Russian menace" before deciding on 
delay or military action on 23 May (1977:334). Before choosing delay again 
five days later, Israel's cabinet sent Eban to Washington to explore the 
likelihood of U.S. support should they choose a preemptive strike to reduce 
the costs of an expected war and to restore Israel's deterrent credibility. Not 
only was there a major effort to assess the likelihood of U.S. support, there 
was also a parallel attempt to increase its probability. The prime minister, 
as Chapter 6 reports, cabled Eban in Washington requesting that President 
Johnson issue a deterrent threat to discourage an anticipated Arab attack. 
Unlike Soviet intervention, Arab attack, and the international flotilla, 
the likelihood of American support was considered by Israel's decision-
makers to be subject to Israel's influence. That is, Soviet intervention, Arab 
attack, and the naval patrol were considered beyond the range of Israel's 
short-term efforts. Not unexpectedly, American support is the variable 
with a threshold in Figures 9.17 and 9.18. Israel's choices on 23 and 28 May 
were sensitive to the likelihood of American support both as a constraint 
and as an objective. Washington's inducements were considered more 
important than Moscow's threats. The analysis suggests that those 
consequences which decisionmakers consider manipulable may yield 
thresholds where choice should shift from one alternative to another. 
Those consequences that are considered less manipulable may not yield a 
threshold point where choice should change. Sensitivity analysis can be of 
some use, then, in assessing the relative effect of different environmental 
factors on choice. 
The impact of information on decisionmakers' choices can be assessed 
by locating thresholds. A related approach is sensitivity analysis through 
modification of value estimates. The decision to delay military action on 28 
May, for example, assumes the following weights among dimensions of 
value: international support = 6.6 economics; military security = 3.3 
economics; and domestic politics = 2.2 economics. One reason for the 
responsiveness of choice to American support on 23 and 28 May is the 
estimation of the international support dimension as twice as important as 
the military security dimension. When the international support dimension 
is reduced on 4 June, so is the impact of U.S. support. Sensitivity analysis 
can vary the weights to see how the optimal choice may change. 
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To examine the responsiveness of choice to changes in value estimates, 
consider an alternative set of weights. M ilitary security was estimated as 10 
(times) economics, international support as 6 economics, and domestic 
politics as 2 economics. The revised expected values for 28 May indicate 
that attack is now preferable to delay, a reversal of the results when 
international support was considered twice as important as military 
security. The decision on 28 May is the only one that is sensitive to 
reasonable changes in value estimates. The evidence cited in Chapter 6 
supports the original weights, however, where support is almost twice as 
important as security on 28 May. 
Relative changes among value dimensions also permit different 
assumptions about the risk propensities of decisionmakers. By making 
international support twice as important as military security for the two 
delay decisions, Israel's leaders are considered risk-averse on support 
relative to security. From 23 to 28 May, they were more afraid to take a 
chance on losing American support than they were of losing the benefit 
from a first strike.26 By 4 June, however, military security is approximately 
six times more important than international support: they were more 
afraid of losing the benefit of a first strike than they were of losing the 
benefits of delay; or, perhaps Israel's decisionmakers were more afraid of 
the potential loss from an Arab first strike than of the loss of the advantages 
of American support. Since risk includes the probability as well as the 
amount of loss and since the probability of American support was much 
higher by 4 June, the last choice was easier. 
Implications and Conclusion 
Two main conclusions follow from the above analysis. First, with respect 
to information-processing, Israel's leaders were not optimal in the scope of 
their opinion revision. Second, with respect to choice, they chose in an 
optimal fashion. These conclusions raise the following implication for 
policy-making: whether decisionmakers would benefit from the use of 
systematic procedures for revision and choice. 
Especially in a crisis, systematic procedures might assist decisionmakers' 
avoidance of failure to revise, premature closure, and other characteristics 
of crisis-induced stress (Tanter, 1978). On the other hand, one should 
recognize how unlikely it is that leaders would turn to systematic 
procedures during a crisis. Nevertheless, such methods of information-
processing should be developed in order to provide for the contingency of 
their use. 
With respect to Israel's leaders, the question arises as to whether they 
would have benefited from the use of decision aids. For decisionmakers 
26. A person who is risk-averse is more fearful of losing than desirous of gaining the same 
amount, while risk-acceptant individuals wish to win more than they fear loss. 
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who are risk-averse concerning military security, it may be advisable to 
revise estimates of the probability of attack according to Bayesian 
procedures. If they are risk-acceptant about security, then intuitive revision 
may be appropriate. Since Israel's leaders were operating within a narrow 
margin of security in 1967, however, Bayesian inference is suitable as a 
procedure for opinion revision. In other words, the risk-propensities of 
decisionmakers affect the weight they attach to strategic assumptions and 
tactical indications and could determine whether a Bayesian mode of 
information-processing is appropriate. 
The practice of rational choice should not argue against its being 
institutionalized; rather, the fact that choice approximated a rational ideal 
suggests that analytic procedures be systematically incorporated into the 
decision-making process. Without such institutionalization, one is left with 
the vagaries of personality and the happenstance of who is present at a 
given time. For example, perhaps the leadership during the 1967 crisis 
followed a style of open decision-making because of a sense of inadequate 
expertise; on the other hand, leaders who are too confident may follow a 
closed style and fail to revise and to choose in a rational fashion. It is clear 
that persons who are too confident to think rationally need to be reminded 
of the fruits of a rational process: expected-value maximizing options on 
the average. 
To evaluate the rationality of choice, this chapter draws on the analysis 
of doctrine in Chapter 4 to specify decision models. The chapter concludes 
that the decisions to mobilize on 19 May 1967, to delay military action on 
23 and 28 May, and to attack on 4 June are expected-value maximizing or 
rational choices. Confidence in these results is strengthened because the 
decisions are relatively insensitive to changes in value or probability. If 
weights among dimensions of value are changed, only the choice to delay 
on 28 May should be different. Both choices to wait on 23 and 28 May 
should differ with changes in estimates of probability. The mobilization 
and war choices, however, are relatively invariant to reasonable changes in 
values and to changes in probabilities. 
These findings converge with the evidence provided by the historical 
record. There is little doubt about the rationality of mobilization on 19 
May and attack on 4 June. Similarly, there was little doubt in the behavior 
of the decisionmakers themselves concerning these two choices. On the 
other hand, there is some question about the efficiency of the two decisions 
for delay, and this lack of confidence also appears in the protracted cabinet 
discussions leading up to these choices. That decisionmakers recognize 
complexity and are uncertain about some of their choices is testimony to 
their rationality. 

part three 
Conclusion 

10 chapter 
The Explanation and Evaluation of Decisions 
Introduction 
This explanation and evaluation of choice strongly challenges the widely-
accepted view of Israel's decision-making in 1967 The success of the 
preemptive strike on the morning of the fifth of June undoubtedly 
obscured, at least in part, failures in deterrence and in decision-making. 
Examination of the evidence uncovered important and unexpectedflaws in 
rationality which distorted the process of choice. First, decisions can be 
explained best by processes of constrained rationality. These processes 
were not uniform, moreover, as leaders followed different paths to choice 
during the three-week period. Second, and more surprising, the constraints 
to rationality were not rooted principally in limited capacity to calculate 
but in the logic of the arguments leaders used. Using criteria of efficient 
choice, optimal estimation, and logical argument, this evaluation of Israel's 
decisions in 1967 provides only mild encouragement to optimists but 
considerable support for pessimists. Those optimists who cling to the 
legacy of the Enlightenment will point to the capacity to make rational 
choices, but those who argue the limits of pure reason will emphasize 
flawed estimation and critical gaps in logical thinking. 
Before interpreting the significance of the evidence and joining the 
debate between optimists and pessimists, the validity of these research 
results must be assessed. The criteria of a valid explanation are demanding 
and difficult to meet. An explanation which is valid is one which can be 
rejected in the light of evidence yet provide a coherent and parsimonious 
interpretation of more than one case. Here the analyst of decision-making 
must acknowledge the trade-off: the more general an explanation, the less 
nuanced it is in the examination of the processes of any one individual or 
group. 
This investigation of Israel's leaders is animated by a subjectivist 
interpretation of human conduct, and its bias favors intensive rather than 
extensive investigation. This may limit an attempt to generalize to other 
decisionmakers in other contexts. Nevertheless, analysts of a single case 
can turn their rich and detailed evidence to advantage. By tracing the 
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process of decision, they can document the use of one rather than another 
path to choice. Drawing on the evidence leaders offer, analysts can 
establish the procedures they used with some confidence. The explanation 
can be validated further by examining the fit of the evidence with 
competing paths to choice. If the evidence is compatible only with the 
process that is traced and no other, analysts can be more confident of the 
explanation they have offered. 
The contribution of other factors to a broader explanation of choice also 
must be considered. If the process explains the choice, what explains the 
process? And do the factors that explain the process also explain the 
choice? Is the process necessary in an explanation of decisions? Analysts of 
a single case can provide some preliminary answers to these questions. By 
examining the fit between the expectations of complementary and 
competing explanations and the evidence they have found, analysts can 
assess the necessity and sufficiency of factors that produce the decision. If 
they cannot judge precisely how important a particular factor is, or 
measure its exact contribution, they can decide whether it is important at 
all. At the very least, analysts can validate their explanation by elimination. 
A brief recapitulation of the central arguments that guided this 
investigation of decision-making is probably useful before the evidence is 
summarized and evaluated. An important component in any explanation 
of decision, this study argues, is the process leaders use. This process can 
best be explained by drawing on complementary elements from among 
available explanations to construct multiple paths to choice. These more 
complicated paths, built on the five basic decision-making tasks, may 
provide a better reconstruction of the processes leaders use to make 
difficult choices in an uncertain world. Insofar as they trace the complex 
processes decisionmakers follow, these paths to choice can provide a more 
valid explanation of a decision. 
A closely related argument suggests that decisionmakers are not likely to 
use one process at all times under all circumstances. Six of the seven paths 
to choice represent different forms of constrained rationality, and a central 
explanatory issue is not "which process" but "which process when and 
why." The strong interest in the quality of decisions and, therefore, in the 
rationality of the process raises the particular issue of whether, when, and 
why decisionmakers use any variant of an analytic process. While the study 
recognizes the constraints, it underlines the importance of rationality in 
decision-making. 
Completeness in the content and coherence in the structure of strategic 
arguments can provide at least a partial explanation, it is argued, of why 
decisionmakers approximate any variant of an analytic process. When 
issues of national security are up for decision, prevailing strategic concepts 
provide a useful summary of the beliefs leaders shape and share. These 
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beliefs are a necessary, if not sufficient, component in any explanation of 
decision: the central theoretical linkage of the study is that between 
doctrine, process, and choice. 
Other investigations of decision-making suggest that group procedures 
and norms and perceptions of threat and pressure of time may contribute 
to variation in the quality of the processes leaders use. At least three 
different explanations of the impact of a group on the choices of its 
members have received widespread attention: concurrence-seeking as an 
effort to promote and preserve group solidarity; coalition-building to 
assure majority support for an option; and the exchange of argument and 
evidence through group discussion to increase support for one alternative. 
In all these explanations, the decision process of individual members is an 
essential intervening variable in an explanation of the choice the group 
makes. Finally, analysts suggest that crisis-induced stress also may affect 
the decision by affecting the processes leaders use. 
To determine the validity of the link between doctrine, process, and 
choice, the strength of these competing explanations must be investigated. 
If the evidence fits their expectations, then the validity of the relationship 
between doctrine, process, and choice is open to question. If the evidence is 
inconsistent with competing explanations, if competing explanations can 
be eliminated, then an explanation of strategic doctrine through process to 
choice is strengthened. 
The first task in assessing the validity of the linkage between doctrine, 
process, and choice is to establish valid paths to decision, and the evidence 
from "process tracing" is relevant here. More particularly, the issue of 
whether decisionmakers used any variant of an analytic process must be 
settled first. If the evidence is convincing, if it is inconsistent with other 
paths to choice, the analyst can then evaluate how closely decisionmakers 
approximated rationality and the severity of the constraints. The chapter 
begins, therefore, with a summary of the explanation of the processes and 
an evaluation of rationality in 1967 In so doing, it can shed some light on 
the hotly debated issues of the efficiency of choice, the optimality of 
information-processing, and the logic of argument. Once the validity of the 
explanation of choice through process has been established and rationality 
evaluated, then the chapter considers competing and complementary 
explanations of processes of decision over time. 
The Efficiency of Choice 
Evidence drawn from the explanation and evaluation of this set of 
decisions is encouraging. With few exceptions, Israel's leaders showed 
considerable capacity to estimate the cost and benefit of the principal 
consequences of policy options and to face up to unpleasant and difficult 
value conflict. Contrary to expectation, as stress increased and complexity 
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became more intense, decisionmakers became more rather than less 
conscientious in their evaluation of options. The first decison to delay 
military action on 23 May, for example, was not a difficult one and, 
consequently, not an exacting test of the capacity of decisionmakers to 
perform demanding tasks. Five days later, however, value conflict was 
intense and choice was difficult, yet a core group of cabinet members 
acknowledged the complexity of their problem and considered and 
reconsidered their estimates of value. 
Their examination of cost and benefit factors was often impressive. 
Although most members of the cabinet tended to pay a great deal of 
attention to military security—a factor strongly emphasized by prevailing 
strategic beliefs—they did not ignore economic, international, or human 
factors. Even the chief of staff, for example, referred to the cost in casualties 
of a retaliatory strike against the Egyptian army. In the range of values they 
considered, they bore little resemblance to single-minded decisionmakers 
who exclude all but the most important value. Policymakers frequently 
choose to wear blinkers because the inclusion of multiple values is too 
difficult or too unpleasant, yet members of Israel's cabinet did consider 
several values simultaneously in their evaluation of the consequences of 
available options. 
They also made generally reasonable estimates of cost and benefit. There 
was occasional resort to gross evaluations of "catastrophe" by military 
decisionmakers frustrated and alarmed by delay Civilian cabinet members 
challenged these exaggerated estimates, however, even in areas where they 
were not expert. At one point in the long debate that preceded the second 
decision to delay, Allon argued that there was no benefit whatsoever from 
international support, but he did not convince a majority of his colleagues. 
Generally, although the four orfive principal members of the cabinet who 
were most active in debate offered few quantitative estimates, they did 
make qualitative comparisons between alternatives. 
A central core in the cabinet also saw and acknowledged the unpleasant 
conflict in values. Performance was not uniform across decisions or 
members of the cabinet. At least two key ministers—Allon and Eban—at 
times claimed dominance for their preferred option. The foreign minister, 
however, was not consistently constrained in his rationality: in some of his 
presentations to the cabinet he was analytic while at other times he denied 
value complexity. During the long meeting on 27 May, for example, Eban 
explicitly formulated the necessity to trade immediate security for 
diplomatic support while, in other discussions with members of Knesset, he 
saw no gain and only loss if Israel chose to preempt. The prime minister, 
however, focused on the conflict between military security and diplomatic 
support and openly admitted the difficulty of the decision he had to make. 
Eshkol and some of his cabinet colleagues demonstrated considerable 
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capacity to assess, compare, and trade off and they did it under both 
favorable and unfavorable conditions. 
A careful tracing of the process shows little evidence that members of the 
cabinet resorted to single-value or satisficing strategies to make their 
choices. Only once, in the very early stages, did the prime minister, acting 
on the advice of his chief of staff, choose the first satisfactory option. The 
evidence of routine and circumscribed choice on 16 May is consistent with 
a cognitive-cybernetic path to decision. Throughout the rest of the three-
week period, however, choice is best explained by combinations of cog­
nitive and analytic processes. Members of the cabinet did eliminate some 
options out of hand; no important decisionmaker, for example, was pre­
pared to accept a blockaded Straits of Tiran. Elimination stopped short, 
however, of single-value or single-option problem definition, and decision-
makers had to compare the two options that remained on the table. 
Members of the cabinet did not formally calculate expected value to 
make their choice. There is no evidence to suggest that decisionmakers 
systematically considered probability and value across the consequences of 
both options in conformity with rigorous analytic standards. On the other 
hand, members of the cabinet did not simplify their problem by arranging 
their values in some rough order and choosing the first option which 
discriminated among them; the evidence is not consistent with any variant 
of lexicographic calculation. To make their decision, Eshkol, Eban at 
times, Dayan, and Rabin engaged in rough qualitative comparison of the 
likelihood, advantages, and disadvantages of the obvious consequences of 
the two alternatives. Estimates were crude rather than precise and the 
prime minister and his colleagues used no systematic procedures to 
combine likelihood and value, but they did explicitly consider probabilities 
and compare relative cost and benefit. The only explanation which fits the 
evidence of some direct comparison is a cognitive-analytic path to choice. 
Once they had eliminated unacceptable alternatives, Israel's leaders loosely 
approximated analytic processes in their selection between the options that 
remained. 
The critical test of even an approximation to analytic processes lies in the 
capacity to produce rational decisions. To evaluate the rationality of 
choice, decision models were developed to assess the four choices that were 
the product of processes with any analytic component. A decision model 
specifies the environment of the decisionmaker, including the in­
terdependencies among the consequences of choice, the procedures for 
revision of likelihood and worth, and the decisionmaker's value and risk 
preferences.1 Evaluation of the four historical choices finds that all four 
were efficient. Israel's leaders consistently chose that option which 
I. The requirements of a formal decision model are described in greater detail in Chap­
ter 8. 
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promised them the highest expected gain, or where no gain was possible, 
the option which would produce the lowest anticipated loss. 
Despite the fact that members of the cabinet did not explicitly calculate 
expected value, their crude, rough, and intuitive processes of evaluation 
produced what were efficient choices. Such complete convergence between 
their decisions and the optimal choice is not likely to be the product of 
chance. Although there were only four trials, in all four their choice 
corresponded to the rational decision determined through much more 
rigorous and demanding procedures. It is encouraging that failure to 
perform a probability-value calculus was not a major constraint to rational 
choice in this case.2 Despite the fact that leaders did not replicate formal 
procedures, their gross approximations did produce the best decision 
under the circumstances. Through mechanisms not yet fully understood, 
members of the cabinet found the sense and wits to choose the value-
maximizing option. 
If rationality refers to the capacity to choose the option which promises 
the highest expected gain, then Israel's leaders in 1967 were rational. 
Within the limits of their estimates of probability and value, they were 
proficient. Psychological obstacles to proficiency were somewhat less than 
anticipated and neurological capacity somehow greater than is presently 
understood. Evidence from explanation and evaluation suggests some 
validity for a link between approximate analytic procedures and efficient 
choice. 
But rationality encompasses much more than efficiency. At a minimum, 
rational decisionmakers must show a capacity to learn from their 
environment. If they remain closed to new and challenging information, 
even if they are expert at combining static estimates of probability and 
value, decisionmakers could not be considered rational. In evaluating 
rationality, a second important criterion is the quality of information-
processing and estimation. 
The Rationality of Estimation and Revision 
Evaluation of the rationality of estimation and opinion revision is 
conceptually more troublesome and practically more difficult than 
2. The failure of decisionmakers to explicitly perform a probability-utility calculus is 
considered a major obstacle to rational choice (Snyder, 1978 and Jervis, 1979). The 
convergence between the product of intuitive and formal procedures suggests that this need 
not necessarily be the case. 
Closely related is the concern that errors in estimates of probability and value can severely 
distort calculation of the best possible choice. In this case, Chapter 9 demonstrates only 
limited sensitivity to changes in the estimate of the probability of American diplomatic 
support and its relative value. Only on 28 May would changes in estimates of the probability 
and relative worth of American support change the expected value-maximizing option. The 
insensitivity of choice is consistent with the convergence between intuitive and formal 
procedures of calculation. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1973) demonstrate that 
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assessment of the efficiency of choice. In evaluating efficiency, the analyst 
works with the estimates of the decisionmakers as given and considers the 
impact of their interaction on the selection of an option. To determine 
whether decisionmakers are rational in estimation and revision, however, 
their estimates must be assessed against some external criterion; the 
evaluative process must go outside the world of the policymaker. 
Appropriate criteria are neither obvious nor agreed-upon. What is 
centrally at issue, however, is the capacity of leaders to handle large 
amounts of often inconsistent information and to revise their estimates 
in response to important changes in the environment. Beyond this very 
general statement, however, the processes, scope, and direction of rational 
estimation and revision are a matter of considerable debate.3 
Examination of information-processing by Israel's leaders in this case 
documents a high-quality performance. Indeed, procedures were their 
strongest suit—among the five decision-making tasks, members of the 
cabinet were best in their handling of new information. For example, 
leaders frequently fail to search for clearly available evidence which is 
important as a basis for estimation of the likelihood of different 
consequences. This was not generally the case in 1967. Most of the 
important decisionmakers, other than Allon, considered the attitudes of 
the United States to be central to their problem and undertook extensive 
search for additional information on likely American behavior. In 
estimating the likely American response, Eshkol and Eban were especially 
careful and painstaking in their procedures. They used multiple sources of 
evidence, both in the United States and in Israel, and carefully considered 
the reliability and validity of the evidence they had. When members of the 
cabinet considered their information inadequate on the night of 26 May, 
they actively sought new information and refused to finalize their estimates 
until all the available evidence was in. They frequently faced contradictory 
information about American intentions, but scrupulously considered 
inconsistent and ambiguous evidence in formulating estimates about likely 
American behavior. 
In their management of information, civilian and military leaders not 
only followed generally good procedures but also showed a considerable 
capacity to learn. After an initial, routine processing of information, Esh­
kol and Rabin demonstratedflexibility in revising prior estimates, rejecting 
inaccuracies in probability and utility estimates do not lead to suboptimal decisions when 
options are continuous. However, Lichtenstein, Fischoff, and Phillips (1977) find that a 
moderate error in probability estimation can produce a substantial decrease in expected 
utility when options are discrete. 
3. Criteria to evaluate estimation and revision are discussed in detail in Chapter 1 while 
Chapter 2 summarizes the psychological debate on biases in the scope and direction of 
revision. Chapter 8 returns to this debate when it considers normative models of information-
processing. 
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hypotheses they no longer considered valid, and acknowledging past 
miscalculation. It is certainly true that at times they were helped both by the 
unambiguous actions of their adversary and by a set of strongly diagnostic 
indicators deduced from prevailing strategic concepts. Nevertheless, in an 
environment of uncertainty and complexity, they demonstrated openness 
to new evidence and sensitivity to ambiguity and contradiction. Estimating 
the likelihood of an Egyptian attack is a case in point. 
As is usual, decisionmakers approached their tasks with a well-
developed set of cognitive assumptions to organize the interpretation of 
incoming information. The estimate of Egyptian intentions, particularly 
among the General Staff, was that an attack was unlikely in the near future; 
the problem was one of general rather than immediate deterrence. 
Nevertheless, within a period of less than three weeks, military officers 
rejected almost all their organizing hypotheses and drastically revised their 
estimates of the likelihood of an Egyptian attack. Military Intelligence 
quickly abandoned the argument, for example, that President Nasser's 
involvement in Yemen or fragmentation among front-line Arab states 
constrained Egypt's capacity to attack. Civilian as well as military leaders 
modified their earlier optimism about their capacity to deter despite their 
continued confidence in the superiority of their military capability. As 
Eban acknowledged, even though they "knew" that the favorable balance 
of capabilities should have deterred a challenge, Egyptian troop 
deployments and statements challenged this assumption. Confronted by 
the discrepancy, members of the cabinet and their advisers gave greater 
weight to the behavior of their adversary than to their own knowledge and 
revised their estimates; tactical indicators were considered more important 
than strategic beliefs. 
It is also interesting to note that Israel's leaders were discriminating in 
their reading of history and in their use of analogy. Generally, historical 
analogies are a source of misinterpretation, but this does not seem to be so 
in this case.4 When the problem first arose, military leaders in particular 
interpreted Egyptian behavior through analogy to an earlier experience in 
1960. They assumed that not only they but also their counterparts were 
drawing the same lessons from history. Even though they understood the 
lesson and signaled the success of Egypt's deterrent strategy, Egypt's 
4. In their comparative investigation of crisis-bargaining and decision-making, Snyder 
and Diesingfind historical analogies to be a constant source of error (1977:313,371). Evidence 
drawn from this case suggests the contrary. First, decisionmakers quickly rejected an analogy 
to 1960 when its inapplicability became apparent. Even more important, Rabin, Eban, and 
Eshkol used analogies to sharpen their analysis of the problem for definition. The chief of 
staff, for example, drew an analogy to 1956 to underline the differences between past and 
present consequences of the same option. Eban and Eshkol drew an analogy to 1957 to 
support their heavy emphasis on the importance of American support. This was neither an 
unreasonable inference to draw from their earlier experience, nor was it an inappropriate 
application to their dilemma in 1967. Because analogy was used to highlight structural 
differences and similarities, estimation of the likelihood and worth of the consequences of the 
two options was more precise. 
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president apparently did not read history the same way: the pace of troop 
deployment in Sinai increased rather than decreased. Having learned the 
lesson history taught, military officers as well as the prime minister rejected 
its relevance less than one week later and acknowledged the partial failure 
of their own deterrent strategy; apparently, the lessons of history were not 
at all obvious. In order to reject the analogy and revise their estimates, 
civilian and military leaders had to admit past errors of inference. To 
acknowledge miscalculation is a painful process, but a capacity to admit 
past error is an important component of rational information-processing 
and revision. Learning often begins in response to failure. 
To revise their estimates and reconsider the likelihood of an Egyptian 
attack, civilian and military decisionmakers worked with multiple 
indicators simultaneously and cumulatively throughout the processing of 
choice. Often, decisionmakers experience considerable difficulty in 
working with several indicators at once, but this did not prove to be a 
serious constraint in estimating the probability of an Egyptian attack. This 
is perhaps so because leaders generally are more experienced in working 
with at least the two broad categories of capability and intent in their 
consideration of a likely attack. Decisionmakers in this case also got some 
help from strategic concepts which specified a series of indicators through 
the enumeration of casus belli; availability of this set of valid indicators 
made it easier to work with several indicators simultaneously and more 
difficult to resist revision of central assumptions. When a blockade 
followed deployment of Egyptian troops across the Canal, no member of 
the cabinet argued that Israel's capacity to deter was unimpaired. Leaders 
nevertheless had to go beyond strategic concepts to revise their estimates of 
likelihood. If strategic arguments were of some use in identifying relevant 
indicators, they were much less helpful in their interpretation and 
weighting. Particularly when capability and intent indicators diverged, 
strategic concepts were inadequate as a guide to revision. 
Members of the cabinet combined these indicators differently to develop 
different estimates. In the last week of May in particular, when there was 
some divergence between capability and intent, those who weighed intent 
more heavily estimated a lower probability of attack than those who gave 
greater importance to capability. Neither weighting was inherently 
implausible; on the contrary, the fact that both were plausible explains the 
disagreement among cabinet members. The difference in weighting 
reflected the use of different paradigms to define the problem for decision. 
Allon, for example, principally monitored capability indicators and 
defined the problem largely as one of defense. Eban argued that the 
immediate issue was the blockade while the longer-run challenge was to 
Israel's capacity to deter. Allon consequently inferred a much higher 
probability of attack than did Eban. 
At the time of their disagreement, available evidence on capability and 
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intent was sufficiently ambiguous to permit both estimates. It is precisely 
under these kinds of circumstances that the direction and scope of revision 
become a matter of controversy. As information continued to arrive, 
however, Allon paid much less attention to discrepant evidence than did 
Eban. The minister of labor gave little weight to President Nasser's 
statement that he planned no military attack in the immediate future and 
concentrated almost exclusively on tactical indications of changing 
capabilities. Eban, on the other hand, after learning of the Egyptian-
Jordanian defense pact on 30 May and reading a copy of President Nasser's 
speech, found the information sufficiently discrepant to reject the premise 
which had organized his thinking. He no longer adjusted, modified, or 
amended his analysis to accommodate ambiguous evidence, but revised his 
estimate and accepted Allon's interpretation which could accommodate 
the new and disturbing information. Allon was highly unlikely to change 
the direction of his estimate and reduce the probability of an attack while 
Eban demonstrated considerable capacity for revision of his estimates. 
Although Eban was the one to change his opinion—and in the direction 
initially suggested by Allon—the foreign minister was more rational in his 
handling of information than was the minister of labor. Whether Eban 
required too much discrepant evidence to revise his estimates is not 
immediately obvious. It is not obvious precisely because the scope of 
rational revision is fairly wide and the criteria permissive rather than 
explicit. 
A more precise criterion of optimal revision can be extrapolated from 
the standards provided by Bayesian analysis. Bayes works within the 
assumptions of decisionmakers but corrects for conservative biases in 
estimation and revision. The evaluation of opinion revision in 1967 begins 
with the subjective estimates of Israel's leaders and provides criteria for 
updating these prior estimates in the light of new evidence. Bayesian 
techniques explicitly require an assessment of the likely validity of 
competing assumptions as new information is received. 
The results of the analysis suggest that, although leaders may have been 
analytic in their procedures, they were less than optimal in the scope of 
their revision. At best they approximated the estimates generated through 
Bayesian analysis, but the intuitive and unaided procedures used by Israel's 
policymakers produced estimates considerably less precise and more 
variable than optimal Bayesian revision. The hypothesis of many cognitive 
psychologists who study processes of judgment is partly confirmed; 
although revision was consistently in the right direction, change by some 
was too little and by others too great. The estimates of members of the 
cabinet were flawed. 
Civilian and military leaders experienced greatest difficulty when 
uncertainty was greatest. Their early estimates—that there was "little 
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chance of attack," that the Egyptian troop deployment was deterrent-
were the verbal equivalent of the low Bayesian estimate of a 25% 
probability. As the Bayesian probability began to increase, however, and 
approach uncertainty, divergence from intuitive estimates grew (Figure 
9.16). 
When Bayes estimated a 40% probability of attack on 23 May, Military 
Intelligence presented a "restrained" assessment of the likelihood of 
Egyptian action to the cabinet; unaided revision was more conservative 
than Bayes would recommend. After the Fourth Armored Division crossed 
into Sinai on 25 May, the Bayesian estimate reached the point of greatest 
uncertainty when it increased from 40% to 50%. During this period, there is 
no evidence that members of the cabinet or senior military officers 
estimated an even chance of an Egyptian attack; on the contrary, they were 
either too conservative or too radical in their judgments. Eban argued that 
Nasser was not likely to attack; the president wanted a diplomatic victory. 
The foreign minister gave greater weight to his prior assumptions than to 
current indicators, and his estimate, therefore, was more conservative. 
Allon and members of the General Staff, on the other hand, paid more 
attention to tactical indications than even Bayes would recommend and 
inferred a higher probability of attack from the redeployment of the 
armored division. 
By 30 May, however, after the Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact, the 
intuitive estimates by civilian and military leaders corresponded to those 
recommended by Bayes. All three revised the probability of attack to "near 
certainty" or 85%. Errors in the scope of revision were most pronounced 
at points of greatest uncertainty; when multiple indicators converged 
and uncertainty was reduced, however, those who were conservative and 
those who were radical approximated the Bayesian norm. 
This explanation and evaluation of the processes, direction, and scope of 
opinion revision by Israel's leaders produces a rather mixed record. The 
central finding is rather pessimistic: although procedures were analytic, 
estimates were not optimal. An explanation of analytic procedures is 
strongly supported by the evidence, and there is little fit with the 
expectations of variants of cybernetic or cognitive explanations. With rare 
exceptions, civilian and military leaders did consider probabilities rather 
than certainties or impossibilities. Allon did dismiss the flotilla as 
impossible in an effort to persuade his cabinet colleagues to choose 
preemption, but this is an isolated instance of the kind of categorical 
language anticipated by cognitive explanations. Nor is there much 
evidence of inconsistency-management through denial. On the contrary, 
leaders used few of the expected shortcuts: they deliberately sought 
information from several sources; they conscientiously attempted to 
validate the evidence they had; and they worked with multiple rather than 
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single indicators to improve the quality of their estimates. They were good 
intuitive scientists. 
Good intuitive science was not good enough. Although the management 
of evidence was thorough and generally careful, estimates were flawed. 
Unaided, the procedures leaders used to calculate produced biased 
estimates. The biases, however, were not in one direction; some estimates 
were too radical while others were too conservative. At least three factors 
may explain overestimation by one and underestimation by another 
decisionmaker when both are confronted by the same evidence under the 
same circumstances in the same group. 
Evidence from other examinations of crisis decision-making suggests 
that personal bias or predispositions toward "hard-line" or "soft-line" 
interpretations may influence the revision of opinion (Snyder and Diesing, 
1977:359). Such predispositions would explain both conservative and 
radical revision. A second and complementary explanation would suggest 
that the risk-propensities of decisionmakers could explain differences in 
the rate and scope of revision. Allon was risk-averse with respect to military 
security; he was not prepared to risk the loss of military security to gain 
international support. A decisionmaker with this risk-propensity would be 
expected to update radically an estimate of a probable attack. Eban, on the 
other hand, was risk-averse with respect to international support; he was 
reluctant to risk the immediate loss of American support in order to solve 
the security problem. The foreign minister would be more conservative, 
therefore, in his revision of the likelihood of an Egyptian attack. Personal 
bias and risk-propensity could explain the divergence in the scope and rate 
of revision among Israel's leaders in this case. 
A third explanation of the divergence in estimates looks to the 
arguments leaders use. In 1967, those who considered military capability 
the strongest determinant of Egyptian action paid close attention to 
tactical changes and erred on the side of radicalism. Similarly, those who 
estimated likely Egyptian behavior from assumptions about President 
Nasser's intentions were the conservatives in opinion revision. If this third 
explanation is plausible, the flawed estimates may result not only from 
unaided and intuitive procedures but also from the paradigms naive 
scientists accept. If this is indeed the case, the logic of the arguments leaders 
use becomes even more important to the quality of the estimates they make 
and the options they choose. 
The rather modest achievement of good intuitive procedures is 
somewhat sobering. While the link between analytic processes of 
evaluation and decision and rational choice appears strong, the 
relationship between analytic processing of information and rational 
revision is considerably less robust. A great deal more work must be done, 
with evidence drawn from decision-making on international issues, to 
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explain the weakness and to improve unaided procedures. The results of 
this investigation, however, are not entirely discouraging. Even if revision 
was not optimal, civilian and military leaders were not rigid; they did 
change their opinions. That they displayed so few of the expected 
pathologies may be in part because they observed generally accepted rules 
of evidence. Evidence of some capacity to learn when procedures are good 
must provide at least mild encouragement for the optimists. 
The learning that did take place was limited, of course, to the 
consequences leaders identified for consideration. While estimation and 
revision are centrally important tasks, they are performed within the larger 
context of problem diagnosis and definition. If leaders fail to identify 
obvious options and ignore significant consequences of the alternatives 
they do consider, then their rationality is constrained. Diagnosis of a 
problem, identification of options, and specification of their consequences 
provide the structure for all subsequent estimation and evaluation. The 
causal thinking which structures uncertainty is a critical component of a 
comprehensive concept of rationality and, in 1967. there were significant 
errors in causal thinking. 
The errors were largely those of omission. At an early stage in the 
decision-making process, for example, when the prime minister and the 
chief of staff considered an option of large-scale mobilization, they ignored 
some of its obvious consequences. Because they did not identify deterrence 
or escalation as possible consequences of mobilization, they could not and 
did not estimate their likelihood; these estimates were excluded from 
subsequent calculations. In this failure to identify obvious consequences 
and consider their likelihood, leaders were limited in their rationality. 
As the process continued, however, civilian and military leaders had less 
difficulty in pinpointing crucial cause-effect sequences. When they 
examined preemption, they considered the consequences of American 
support and Soviet intervention, and delay was related to an Arab attack 
and to international action to reopen the blockaded Straits. Individual 
members of the cabinet identified these obvious cause-effect relationships 
and were sensitive to the interdependencies among consequences of the 
alternatives under consideration. In his examination of the cognitive maps 
of policymakers in widely different contexts, Axelrod finds similar 
evidence of causal thinking in the consideration of options.5 
Evidence of a capacity to structure uncertainty is encouraging. If leaders 
intuitively do attribute consequence to option as one of many cause-effect 
5. Axelrod (1976:221-248) emphasizes, however, that policymakers limit their causal 
thinking to one-way causation. They have few cycles or feedback loops within their belief 
systems and conceptualize causation as flowing outward and not turning back to affect some 
other variable that is regarded as causally prior. Axelrod suggests that decisionmakers are 
able to avoid such cognitive strategies as selective attention to goals or satisficing precisely 
because they simplify their causal networks. 
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sequences they construct, then the criteria of rationality may be somewhat 
less onerous than research on constrained rationality suggests. If 
policymakers naturally are causal thinkers who build complicated 
relationships, then structural uncertainty in the international strategic 
environment may not be an insuperable obstacle to rationality. This 
judgment, however, is somewhat premature and overhasty. First, it ignores 
considerable errors of omission during the three-week period of decision-
making. Second, on closer investigation, Israel's leaders in 1967 were 
successful in structuring uncertainty when they could draw on strategic 
concepts which explicitly connected consequence to cause, while their 
errors of omission can be traced to flawed strategic arguments. Strategic 
doctrine, for example, did not treat deterrence and escalation as 
consequences of mobilization. The capacity of decisionmakers to avoid 
egregious errors of omission can be explained, at least in part, by the 
quality of strategic logic as well as by their innate capacity for analysis. The 
capacity of Israel's leaders to think causally was constant—and static 
during this short three-week period—while their performance varied 
within and across decisions. While a capacity for causal thinking is a 
necessary condition of rationality, it cannot by itself explain variation in 
the performance of decisionmakers. Evaluation of rationality must be 
extended to include the quality of strategic logic. 
Insofar as leaders draw on strategic concepts to diagnose their problem 
and structure subsequent estimation and evaluation of the consequences of 
options, the logic of these arguments is directly relevant. Israel's leaders in 
1967 referred to these concepts, moreover, not only to itemize the 
consequences of options but also to identify the alternatives. In all five 
decisions, they considered only those options highlighted by strategic 
concepts and, indeed, never identified more than two or three alternatives: 
problems were almost always dichotomous. Throughout the sequence of 
decisions, there is no evidence, for example, of a deliberate attempt to 
expand the search for options. Israel's leaders never tried consciously to be 
logically exhaustive or comprehensive but stopped searching once they 
identified the few options made salient by prevailing strategic concepts. 
Their path to choice can be explained only by a hybrid strategy of cognitive 
and analytic components and, in the early stages of the processing of each 
choice, cognitive elements dominated decisional activity. 
Performance of these initial tasks is critical. Choice was efficient and 
procedures of information-management were rational even though the 
scope of revision was less than optimal, but leaders considered, estimated, 
and costed only those consequences and options they identified. If the 
rationality of choice and estimation were constrained by the conceptual 
framework established by standing strategic arguments, then the quality of 
strategic logic is critical. 
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The Logic of Argument 
Any evaluation of the logic of argument must be particular and context-
specific, since the concepts leaders draw upon vary with different problems 
and among decisionmakers. Throughout these three intense weeks of May 
and June in 1967, Israel's leaders frequently used and abused the two 
concepts of deterrence and defense. The four most important members of 
the cabinet—the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister 
of labor, and the minister of defense—as well as the chief of staff all spoke 
frequently of Israel's deterrent posture and reputation and of the 
imperatives of defense. Two of the five, Allon and Dayan, had played a 
major part in formulating these concepts while Rabin was responsible for 
translating strategy into tactics. An evaluation of the quality of their logic 
must include both an assessment of the completeness and coherence of 
strategic argument and its use by participating decisionmakers. 
To be judged complete, strategic concepts of deterrence and defense 
must examine at least five factors: the valuation of interests at stake; the 
action to be deterred; the calculus and options of an opponent; the 
credibility of commitment to respond; and defense, that is, responses to the 
failure of deterrence. To be considered coherent, strategic arguments must 
order and interrelate these five factors in a set of propositions that are 
consistent in their specification of cause and consequence. Finally, not only 
the concepts but also their application must be assessed. Did leaders 
understand the concepts they used? Did they use them correctly? Were they 
aware of any logical weaknesses in the concepts they worked with? Or, if 
arguments wereflawed, did they replicate these errors when they diagnosed 
their problem and organized their decisional activity? Both pure and 
applied logic are part of a comprehensive concept of rationality. 
While the logic of the arguments leaders use affects their performance 
of all the decision-making tasks, three of the five factors in a strategic 
argument—valuation of interests, specification of the object of deterrence, 
and a credible commitment to respond—impinge directly on the crucial 
initial task of problem diagnosis. At the core of a deterrence argument is an 
assessment of the worth of the interests at stake in comparison with the cost 
of their protection. Indeed, it is usually only after interests are weighed, 
defined as objects of deterrence, and then challenged that leaders diagnose 
a problem. Earlier examination of casus belli found weaknesses in the 
consideration of at least two important challenges—concentration of 
troops and a naval blockade.6 Although loss from economic blockade and 
danger from troop concentrations were discussed, the point at which either 
became so costly that resort to force became rational was not specified. 
Leaders struggled with precisely these two challenges in the critical early 
6. Chapter 4 considers flaws in the logic of strategic argument in greater detail. 
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stages of the three-week period as incomplete strategic concepts created 
confusion in problem diagnosis and definition. 
When Egyptian troops were redeployed in the Sinai and the Straits of 
Tiran blockaded, Israel's leaders disagreed in their diagnosis of the 
problem. Ambiguity in specifying an unacceptable level of troop 
concentrations permitted differing definitions of the challenge in the first 
few days. But leaders had an even more difficult time after the blockade was 
announced. Eban concentrated on the intrinsic interest at issue and defined 
the blockade as the problem, while Allon and Rabin considered Israel's 
deterrent reputation to be the interest at stake. On the face of it, Eban's 
definition of the problem does not seem rational: the decision analysis 
which evaluated the rationality of choice estimated the cost of military 
action in retaliation to a blockade as approximately $497 million, while the 
monthly losses from the closure of the Straits were assessed at $3 million.7 
Even if these estimates are treated as approximations, there appears to be 
little symmetry between fulfilling the commitment once deterrence is 
challenged and the worth of the interests at stake. 
The asymmetry in cost does not in and of itself indicate a flawed 
definition of the problem. It is possible that Eban was fully aware of the 
enormous gap between the cost of protection and the worth of the interests 
at stake. Nevertheless, if he and his colleagues considered the interests 
sufficiently important, they could have threatened a course of action they 
would otherwise not have chosen unless they were committed to do so. A 
strategy of the "rationality of irrationality" would be appropriate if they 
had seen no other way to prevent a challenge to the interests at issue. This 
explanation, however, is not convincing in this case. There is no evidence to 
suggest that civilian or military leaders, either in 1957 or 1967, recognized 
the asymmetry but nevertheless decided to try to deter. It seems rather that 
they expected deterrence to succeed and never seriously considered the 
consequences of deterrence failure; "irrationality" was not calculated. 
If focus on the blockade as an intrinsic interest does not seem rational, a 
diagnosis of the problem as the preservation of a credible deterrent 
reputation was plausible once leaders incorporated the collateral damage 
to other interconnected interests. Allon, Rabin, and the rest of the General 
Staff worked with this definition and, indeed, diagnosed the problem as the 
credibility of deterrence. The closure of the Straits was important insofar as 
a failure to lift the blockade would jeopardize all the other interests 
grouped under the umbrella of casus belli. By emphasizing the loss of 
deterrent credibility, members of the cabinet formalized the transforma­
tion of deterrence from strategy to value and submerged a specific 
7. See Chapter 9 for a discussion of the cost of an attack option and an estimate of the 
economic losses of a blockade. 
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commitment within an undifferentiated concept of deterrence. No one 
except a few junior officers asked whether the blockade alone justified 
preemptive retaliation; the question was beside the point. Indeed, not once 
during these three weeks did Israel's leaders entertain the option of 
permitting deterrence to fail. 
The reaction of the majority of Israel's cabinet is not atypical, 
apparently, in an international crisis. A comparative investigation of 
decision-making finds that such supergame considerations were prominent 
and persistent in the calculations of crisis bargainers (Snyder and Diesing, 
1977:182). When decisionmakers are uncertain both of a challenger's intent 
and of the challenger's estimate of their intent, they assume that their 
adversary will infer their intent from their behavior rather than from the 
issues at stake.8 Consequently, they pay a great deal of attention to their 
reputation for resolve, particularly when a conflict is ongoing. Insofar as 
they value their reputation, commitments become interdependent and 
deterrent credibility becomes an interest independent of the interests it 
protects. 
Such a definition of the problem is logically plausible and empirically not 
uncommon precisely because initial commitments transform subsequent 
consideration of challenges. By 1967, interdependent commitments had 
built in a dynamic of escalation even if the challenge to deterrence were 
partial rather than total. The occurrence of any one of the casus belli 
required retaliation if deterrence were to remain credible for the others. 
Once an adversary chooses to challenge, a defender who has tried to deter 
can no longer exercise freedom of choice; diagnosis of the problem is 
constrained by the original commitment. When he closed the Straits, 
President Nasser challenged deterrence at its weakest link, and Israel's 
leaders confronted that challenge equipped with incomplete arguments. 
Strategic concepts were flawed by two critically important omissions: a 
failure to weigh carefully the interests threatened by a blockade in 
comparison with the cost of its defeat and, even more important, a lack of 
attention to the interrelatedness among interests. Incomplete valuation of 
interests and their interrelationships is especially damaging when a partial 
challenge to deterrence is possible. In 1967, poor logic was not without 
consequence; deterrence was inadequately delimited and possibly over­
extended when the challenge occurred. The ensuing debate among leaders 
about the appropriate diagnosis of their problem was not surprising. 
Flawed strategic arguments affected not only problem diagnosis but also 
the processing of information. Three of the five factors are particularly 
8. Snyder and Diesing (1977:187) find little evidence that leaders infer resolve from an 
adversary's past behavior, but they uncover substantial evidence that decisionmakers think 
such inferences are made. Through the regress of expectations, supergame calculations 
become pervasive in crisis bargaining. 
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relevant to estimation and revision: specification of the action to be 
deterred, designing a credible commitment to respond, and examination of 
the calculus and options of an adversary. If adversaries are to be persuaded 
to refrain from action that threatens vital interests, they must know the 
broad limits of unacceptable action. Through repeated demarcation of the 
unacceptable as casus belli, Israel's leaders attempted to influence the 
calculus of their opponent. In so doing, they simultaneously made 
estimation of their adversary's intent easier. Between 19 and 22 May, for 
example, Eshkol and Eban relied on the regress of expectations implicit in 
deterrence and expected that Egypt knew that Israel considered a blockade 
an act of war; consequently, should Egypt nevertheless proceed to 
blockade the Straits, there would be little uncertainty about President 
Nasser's intention to challenge deterrence. Once the boundaries of 
unacceptable action were established, occurrence of a casus belli could 
serve as a valid indicator to estimate the intentions of an adversary. 
The logic of this proposition depends on the definition and communica­
tion of the limits of unacceptable action. If the scope of the unacceptable is 
undefined, the logic is flawed: leaders cannot be expected deliberately to 
refrain from doing what they do not know is unacceptable. And if a 
defender is unaware that a challenger does not know the limits, 
miscalculation by both becomes more likely as each finds it difficult to 
estimate the significance of actions as indicators of the intentions of the 
other. In the middle of May, Egypt and Israel ran the risk of miscalculation 
in part because the limits of the unacceptable were poorly defined. Israel 
had declared that a concentration of troops along its borders would 
constitute provocation to war, but it was unclear either to Israel's or to 
Egypt's leaders that the forces which had crossed the Canal by 17 May 
constituted a "concentration." This was the point of greatest uncertainty 
for President Nasser; he estimated that the concentration of Egyptian 
forces increased the chances of war tofifty-fifty.9 Prime Minister Eshkol 
and Chief of Staff Rabin were less radical in their revised estimates of 
President Nasser's intentions; they considered the troop movements as 
diversionary. Although an incomplete concept complicated estimation of 
their adversary's intentions, Israel's leaders refrained from a worst-case 
interpretation which could have fueled miscalculation. When the blockade 
was imposed a few days later, the significance of an action that was 
precisely defined was much clearer both to President Nasser and to 
members of Israel's cabinet. 
While narrowly and precisely defined commitments make estimation 
and revision easier, they do not necessarily increase credibility and the 
9. President Anwar el-Sadat reports this estimate by Nasser at a meeting of the Supreme 
Executive Committee. See Sadat, 1977:172. 
The Explanation and Evaluation of Decisions / 327 
likelihood of deterrent success. Comparative investigations of conven­
tional deterrence and crisis-bargaining have paid a great deal of attention 
to the design and communication of credible commitments, a necessary 
and important condition of the success of deterrence. The obstacles to 
credibility are serious, and the impact of broadly or narrowly delimited 
commitments, ambiguously or precisely defined, has been the subject of 
considerable controversy.10 In this case of deterrence failure, however, the 
credibility of commitments was not at issue. President Nasser had no doubt 
whatsoever about the credibility of Israel's commitment to retaliate should 
he blockade the Straits. He told Field-Marshall Amer, the commander in 
chief of the Egyptian armed forces, that "if we closed the Straits, war would 
be a one hundred per cent certainty."11 Commitments must have been 
believable to produce such a categorical estimate; challenge was not the 
result of miscalculation. 
It is striking that commitments were credible even when the worth of the 
intrinsic interest at stake was not obvious. President Nasser and his 
advisers considered the commitment to retaliate believable largely because 
of the attention they paid to reputation for resolve and a credible 
deterrence posture. Mohammed Heikal, writing in Al-Ahram, estimated 
that Israel would have no choice but to retaliate to protect its reputation for 
resolve. The issue at stake, he argued, was not "the Gulf of Aqaba, 
but something bigger. It is the whole philosophy of Israeli security" 
(1967). The leaders of Egypt and Israel were in agreement: at issue was the 
credibility of Israel's deterrent reputation. 
The logic of Israel's strategic argument was not bedeviled by an inability 
to formulate, design, and communicate a credible commitment. Rather, 
the flaw in the logic arose from the failure to consider the range of 
alternatives and resources available to a challenger. Consideration of the 
options at the disposal of an opponent is closely related to estimation and 
revision of the likelihood of challenge: once they have identified the 
possibilities, decisionmakers can begin to estimate the probabilities, but 
what they never consider as possible they cannot estimate as probable. In 
this sense, examination of the calculus and options of an adversary sets the 
boundaries for subsequent information-processing. In 1967, strategic 
arguments were incomplete and oversimplified in their consideration of 
Egyptian alternatives. Most important, they paid no attention either to the 
likelihood or the consequences of a partial and gradual challenge to 
deterrence. 
10. See George and Smoke (1974:550-567), Lockhart (1978), and Snyder and Diesing
(1977:245-254). Chapter 4 treats this controversy only briefly since it is not directly relevant to 
this case. 
11. See Sadat (1977:172) for a report of the meeting at which President Nasser offered this
estimate. 
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In specifying a series of casus belli, strategic concepts treated challenge as 
a distinct, well-demarcated occurrence. This was appropriate if Egypt 
chose an all-out military assault, but concentration of forces and 
redeployment of armies could take place gradually over time; demarcating 
the precise threshold of a challenge to deterrence would then become 
extremely difficult. Second, no distinctions were drawn among the multiple 
casus belli, nor were they ordered in importance. No distinctions were 
drawn in part because challenges were treated as either-or contingencies 
with immediate implications for deterrence. And finally, strategic doctrine 
made no provision for a series of orchestrated actions designed to provoke 
retaliation. This omission was especially striking given the linkage among 
deterrent commitments; even a less-than-total challenge would have wide-
ranging consequences. And a partial challenge was very much an option 
available to President Nasser. 
Generally, when a challenge is less than total, it is designed to explore 
and clarify the intentions of the defender.12 This was not the case in 1967, 
since President Nasser was certain of Israel's commitment to retaliate. Or, a 
challenger designs around the defender's commitment through controlled 
pressure to erode that commitment. Again, this was not the case in 1967 
On the contrary, after 22 May President Nasser engaged in controlled 
pressure to provoke Israel to honor its deterrent commitments and, in so 
doing, he deliberately transferred to Israel's leaders the difficult and 
expensive decisions of whether, when, where, and how to resort to the use 
of force.13 
Eban, in discussion with his colleagues at the end of May, offered this 
analysis of Egyptian options and estimate of President Nasser's intentions. 
He did so, however, not to redefine the problem Israel confronted and 
explore the best possible response to a strategy of provocation, but only to 
argue that a delay in the use of force would not impose serious military 
costs. His estimate of Egyptian intentions was sharply disputed by Allon 
12. George and Smoke (1974:534-548) distinguish three types of challenge: the fait 
accompli, the limited probe, and controlled pressure. They also examine the gradual failure of 
deterrence in stages (1974:101-103). 
13. President Nasser simultaneously attempted to forestall American involvement— 
which he considered a likely consequence of an Egyptian first strike—and to increase 
international support. Evidence of his deliberate attempt to provoke retaliation is abundant. 
In his autobiography, President Sadat recalls the meetings among Egypt's leaders in the 
closing days of May and early June: "With the Tiran Strait closed, war became a certainty. We 
held daily meetings at Army Command Headquarters with all commanders of the armed 
forces. . On Friday, June 2, 1967, Nasser endorsed the defensive War Plan in his capacity 
as President. . On that day, 1 remember Nasser told Air Force Commander Sidqi 
M ahmoud that the air force would be dealt the first blow. . On the same day, Nasser said 
that Israel would attack us on Saturday or Sunday or, at the latest, on Monday, June 5,1967" 
(1977:173, 174). Heikal confirms this interpretation of Egyptian strategy. In his column 
published in Al-Ahram on 26 May he argued that " . the logic of the confron­
tation . . . between Egypt . and Israel . . dictates that Egypt after all it has now 
succeeded in achieving, must wait, even though it has to wait for a blow. Let Israel begin; let 
our second blow then be ready" (1967). 
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and members of the General Staff who had increased their estimate of the 
likelihood of an Egyptian attack. Only months later, when they read the 
testimony given by Egypt's minister of war, Shams Badran, at the trials of 
military officers in Cairo, did some members of the General Staff 
reconsider their estimate.M During the three-week period, however, Israel's 
leaders paid only cursory attention to an Egyptian option of deliberate 
provocation. 
It seems hardly coincidental that the flaws in strategic arguments were 
replicated by members of the cabinet and the General Staff in their 
discussions. Strategic concepts drew no distinctions among challenges, 
made no provision for a strategy of gradual challenge, and included no 
consideration of the credibility of deterrence as the principal imperative to 
retaliation. All these omissions flowed from an incomplete examination of 
the options and resources at the disposal of a challenger. And where 
arguments were incomplete, Israel's leaders disagreed sharply among 
themselves. First, members of the cabinet engaged in a prolonged, 
acrimonious, and confused debate as to whether the troop concentrations 
or the blockade were the more important challenge. Second, differing 
emphasis on the value of a deterrent reputation led to differences in 
estimation and revision; a heavy emphasis on the importance of reputation 
reflected a conservative resolution of uncertainty. Allon consequently 
estimated a higher probability of Egyptian attack than did Eban who 
placed greater emphasis on the intrinsic interest at stake. Estimation and 
revision were at least partly related to concepts of deterrence. And these 
concepts made no provision for the option Egypt's president chose. 
Completeness and coherence in the canvass of the calculus and options 
of a challenger impinge on more than problem diagnosis and information-
processing. Examination of this factor along with two others—deterrent 
commitments and responses to deterrence failure—affect the identification 
and evaluation #f alternatives by the defender. Once the options of a 
challenger have been identified, a complete and coherent concept of 
defense relates different kinds of challenges to available policy responses 
and assesses the effectiveness of differing options under varying 
circumstances. It also includes an analysis of the appropriateness of 
various responses to different indications that deterrence may fail; different 
options may be suited to a growing warning of the likelihood of challenge. 
A logical argument links warning to response and challenge to defense 
under different conditions. Although the logic of Israel's concept of defense 
14. 1 n an interview six years later, General Bar-Lev attested to this revision in the estimate 
of President Nasser's intentions: "At the time it seemed to the General Staff that the Egyptians 
might attack. Today it looks as if they wanted to provoke us to attack them and they hoped to 
be able to defeat our attack" (1973c). In his assessment, Eban drew on the estimates of the 
Pentagon and the CIA, communicated to him during his visit to Washington. This assessment 
was consistent with the report of U Thant on his return from Cairo. 
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was of higher quality than that of deterrence, here too there were important 
flaws. 
Strategic doctrine was unambiguous in its prescription of mobilization 
as an immediate response to imminent deterrence failure. The logic was 
flawed, however, by the failure to distinguish partial from large-scale 
mobilization and relate each to different degrees of warning or to different 
kinds of challenges. Partial mobilization may be sufficient, for example, 
when warning of deterrence failure is ambiguous while large-scale call-ups 
may be appropriate only if a challenge is imminent and massive. In 
discussion of the reserve system, there is little systematic consideration of 
the relationship of mobilization to warning and challenge nor is much said 
about the use of limited or large-scale mobilization to reinforce a 
weakening deterrent posture. Mobilization was not calibrated to the scope 
or imminence of challenge. 
The prime minister and the chief of staff did not rectify the error in their 
evaluation of options. When they chose large-scale mobilization on 19 
May, they concentrated heavily on defense and ignored the workings of the 
international security dilemma; they paid little attention to the escalation 
which could result from an increase in Israel's capacity to attack which 
simultaneously accompanied an increase in its capacity to defend. Working 
within the constraints of limited manpower and a civilian army, they 
limited their capacity to sustain a prolonged period of crisis management. 
The prime minister made his decision to mobilize large numbers of reserve 
forces, moreover, when warning was ambiguous and challenge was limited; 
he and his advisers were still highly uncertain of Egyptian intentions. When 
concepts were incomplete, Eshkol, with the concurrence of his chief of 
staff, chose a conservative resolution of uncertainty. Had he done so after a 
more complete consideration of the consequences, his choice might not 
have been different. It is impossible to know, however, since flawed 
strategic logic was reflected and perpetuated in the evaluation of 
alternatives and, consequently, in choice. 
The logical quality of the examination of the defensive options which 
follow mobilization is considerably tighter. Even then, while the argument 
for preemption is strong, responses to deterrence failure are not sufficiently 
differentiated. Strategic concepts examine the relevant environmental 
constraints and recommend an option of preemption if attack seems 
imminent. By highlighting the importance of great-power support, 
strategic concepts also introduce valuable complexity into the considera­
tion of the response to deterrence failure. Awareness of complexity was 
reflected in the prolonged debate among important members of the 
cabinet, who disagreed both on the appropriate means to meet their 
commitment and on the level of risk that was acceptable to do so.15 Allon 
15. George and Smoke (1974:557) anticipate such differences in the interpretation of 
deterrence by decisionmakers. 
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was willing to risk the loss of American support, but most of his colleagues 
in the cabinet were not. While they were agreed that deterrence had been 
challenged, they disagreed on acceptable criteria for choosing defense or 
inaction. They could not agree in part because of the complexity of their 
problem but also because they differed in their estimate of the scope of the 
challenge. Here they could get little help from strategic arguments which 
did not differentiate a series of responses and relate them to challenges of 
varying scope. While an anticipatory counterattack may be appropriate if 
an attack were imminent or the West Bank were militarized, concentration 
of forces or a blockade might require a different kind of response. Just as 
strategic arguments did not distinguish and link levels of mobilization to 
different degrees of warning, so they were silent on the relationship between 
different kinds of challenges and the appropriate form of retaliation. 
Of equal consequence was the incomplete examination of the options of 
the challenger. Because Israel's decisionmakers devoted relatively little 
attention to the possibility of an Egyptian strategy of controlled provo­
cation, they did not define their problem as the selection of an appropriate 
response to a piecemeal and gradual challenge. Again, it is impossible to 
assess whether preemption was the best possible response to deliberate 
provocation; it might well have been. What is critical is the inadequate 
exploration of alternative Egyptian strategies and the consequent omission 
from consideration of a graduated response to a gradual challenge to 
deterrence. In their discussions, members of the cabinet could draw on no 
contingent predictions other than the undifferentiated treatment of 
preemption. Once again, analyses in Cairo and Jerusalem converged: 
members of Israel's cabinet chose precisely the option that President 
Nasser provoked and expected. 
The successful defense which followed the preemptive attack on 5 June 
should not obscure the flaws in logic and their consequences for decision-
making. Preemption succeeded because President Nasser miscalculated 
relative capabilities when he chose to provoke a first strike by Israel. But 
success does not imply rationality on the part of those responsible for the 
decision. On the contrary, this examination of the logic of the arguments 
Israel's leaders developed and used demonstrates the constraints imposed 
by faulty logic on the choices that were made. Organizing concepts were 
indeed as important as cognitive psychologists assert but not precisely in 
the way they expect. Problem diagnosis, search, estimation, revision, and 
evaluation took place within the limits imposed by concepts that were 
neither complete nor coherent. Leaders showed a surprising capacity to 
"shift toward rationality" in their estimates of the contingencies and in their 
evaluation of the options they identified; they could revise their opinions 
and change their minds. But throughout a good part of the three-week 
period, they discussed only part of the problem and considered only some 
of the options and consequences. And in part because they worked with a 
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flawed concept of deterrence, some members of the cabinet misunderstood 
its meaning, others simplified it, and still others misused it.16 It is not 
surprising that the identification and evaluation of options were sometimes 
confused and unrelated to the challenge Israel faced. Events intervened— 
through the action of President Nasser and King Hussein and the inaction 
of the international maritime states—to reduce the consequences of 
logically flawed strategic arguments which constrained rationality. 
Doctrine, Process, and Choice 
This study began by arguing that decisionmakers use complicated and 
hybrid processes to make a single choice or a series of choices over time. 
Evidence drawn from this case suggests that more complicated paths to 
decision may indeed provide a valid reconstruction of the processes leaders 
use. In 1967, members of Israel's cabinet neither used any one process to 
make any single decision nor did they follow one path to decision 
throughout the three-week period. A tracing of their processes showed that 
Eshkol and his advisers first approached their problem through a 
combination of cognitive and cybernetic processes. Their emphasis on the 
routine and programmed consideration of information is consistent with 
no other reconstruction of a decision-making process. Available programs 
permitted the prime minister to make a choice quickly and with almost no 
effort, and only when this first choice proved inadequate did he shift to a 
more demanding process. 
Throughout the rest of the three-week period, leaders used an amalgam 
of cognitive and analytic procedures to make their choices. In three of the 
four decisions, the cabinet rather than the prime minister made the choice 
as members aggregated their preferences through formal voting to select 
among options. The cognitive component was prominent in their 
processes; the evidence shows considerable congruence between strategic 
concepts, problem diagnosis, and identification of options and conse­
quences. Working within these boundaries, some members of the cabinet 
then approximated analytic procedures more closely than others when they 
estimated, evaluated, and chose. Although individual cabinet ministers at 
times simplified and distorted, once the constraints of organizing concepts 
16. Eban, for example, consistently misused the concept. He made several references to 
deterring a blockade which had already been imposed and did not distinguish between 
national deterrent capacity and international coercive diplomacy to lift the blockade. He 
argued repeatedly that the blockade was the core of the problem Israel faced and defined 
freedom of shipping through the Straits as a vital national interest. Simultaneously, however, 
he spoke of the threat to Israel's deterrent reputation and honor; he saw no difference between 
intrinsic and strategic interest. And even while he referred to the credibility of deterrence, he 
actively sought fulfillment of international commitments to freedom of navigation in the 
Straits. The two were logically contradictory: a strategy of deterrence precluded all options 
but retaliation while the demand for maritime action precluded precisely that option of 
retaliation through preemption. Here the flaws were not principally in the logic but in the 
application. 
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are accommodated, the evidence of careful processing of information, 
direct comparison of alternatives, and recognition of difficult trade-offs is 
most consistent with an analytic explanation of the performance of these 
decision tasks. Indeed, the evidence cannot be accommodated by any of the 
alternative paths to decision. 
If evidence of partial approximation to analytic processing is strong, 
evidence of rationality is much weaker. Evaluation of the four decisions 
suggests a strong relationship between analytic procedures and rational 
choice but a considerably weaker link to rational revision. The strongest 
constraints to rationality arose, however, from the absence of an analytic 
component in the performance of the critical tasks of problem diagnosis 
and search for options. Evidence of some approximation to analytic 
procedures, even within the constraints established by organizing concepts, 
must therefore be encouraging. This is more than is expected by many who 
observe and bemoan the quality of much of contemporary policy-making. 
Indeed, it can be argued that more work must be done not only on the poor 
but also on the good performances, so that the reasons why leaders 
approximate analytic procedures, when they do, are as well understood as 
the reasons why they do not. It may be possible to learn as much by 
examining what decisionmakers do well as by focusing on what they do 
poorly.17 
An explanation of this approximation to analytic performance of some 
of the decision tasks by Israel's leaders can be no more than tentative. 
Although this one case does include five decisions, evidence from 
comparative cases would strengthen any explanation of this "shift toward 
rationality." An examination of the same set of leaders in the same 
environment but working on a different problem would provide the most 
useful basis of comparison. Personality, cultural, and environmental 
factors could then be held constant while the impact of different belief 
systems, varying perceptions of threat and time, and different group 
dynamics were assessed. Such a project is now under way.18 Even without 
comparable case evidence, however, these factors can be varied through 
"mental experiments" to permit a preliminary assessment of their impact 
on process and choice. 
The central theoretical linkage of this study is that among doctrine, 
17. In an analogous research strategy, psychologists who study early childhood 
development are now beginning to examine the child who successfully survives hardship and
deprivation rather than the child who is traumatized. They suspect that understanding the
dynamics of survival may be more helpful to therapists than explanation of the causes of 
trauma. 
18. Three of the four principal decisionmakers Allon, Eban, and Dayan—were among
the five who made the critical decisions in the weeks preceding the October War in 1973. A 
detailed examination of this decision-making process is now virtually complete, and its results
should permit a more valid assessment of the impact of differences in strategic concepts,
perceptions of threat and time, and group dynamics within the same cultural and political
milieu. 
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process, and choice. The structure and content of strategic concepts are 
expected to be important components in an explanation of the processes 
leaders use and therefore of the choices they make.19 This linkage receives 
strong support from this case; evidence drawn from tracing the process 
suggests that strategic concepts were a necessary and important, if 
insufficient, component in the explanation of process and choice. First, the 
evidence that most decision-making activity took place within the 
boundaries established by these concepts testifies to their strong 
contribution to explanation. Areas of incompleteness within strategic 
arguments were reflected in problem diagnosis and definition, in 
identification of options, in specification of their consequences, and in 
preliminary evaluation of alternatives. Indeed, there appears to be a 
relationship between flawed logic and constrained processing of choice. 
Strategic doctrine impinged on process and choice not only by what it 
excluded but also by what it included. Its structure and content may have 
facilitated the shift from a cognitive-cybernetic path to a process with some 
analytic component. Through the enumeration of casus belli, a series of 
indicators was established which made discounting of discrepant 
information more difficult. Although Israel's leaders began by assuming 
successful deterrence, they had a series of indicators which they could and 
did use to test and falsify their assumptions. Strategic concepts also 
contributed to analytic evaluation through their elaboration of multiple 
consequences. Their emphasis on cost made value considerations more 
salient and decreased the temptation to avoid value trade-offs. 
The impact of strategic concepts on choice was mediated, however, by 
the process. Only in their first choice did leaders move reflexively from 
strategic prescription to selection of an option. This first decision could 
have been anticipated by knowledge of prevailing strategic concepts but, 
after 16 May, the options leaders chose cannot be explained by referring 
only to strategic concepts. Doctrine was permissive rather than deter­
mining. Indeed, because it included the constraints as well as inducements 
to action, extrapolation directly from concept to choice was not possible. 
When process is included as an intervening variable, however, the 
relationship between doctrine, process, and choice appears robust and 
worthy of further investigation. 
The impact of doctrine on process and choice can be validated further by 
examining the fit of alternative explanations with the evidence. Other 
investigations of decision-making suggest that group dynamics may 
explain the processes that are used and the choices that are made. In 
reconstructing the three group decisions of 23 May, 28 May, and 4 June, 
19. See Chapter 3 and Figure 3.1 fora restatement of the central explanatory argument of 
the study. The chapter examines competing explanations as well in an effort to strengthen the 
validity of the explanation of process and choice. 
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three different explanations of the impact of group membership on 
collective choice were explored. First, in none of the cabinet decisions was 
there evidence of concurrence-seeking to promote group solidarity. In this 
case, moreover, evidence of concurrence-seeking would contradict that of 
analytic performance of critical decision tasks by members of the cabinet. 
A second explanation, coalition-building by leaders within the group, 
was somewhat more difficult to assess. Coalition politics had considerable 
indirect impact by changing the composition of the cabinet and the relative 
influence of members within it. On 4 June, this newly reconstituted cabinet 
reversed the decision of its predecessor. More directly, Dayan, one of the 
new ministers, could be considered "essential" to any majority coalition; 
his opposition to further delay would explain the choice of preemption. 
Only in this one instance, however, does coalition-building provide a 
partially satisfactory explanation of the group choice. Even then, it does 
not adequately explain the changed preferences of the majority of the 
members of the cabinet. If bargaining can refer only to debate and 
discussion as techniques of influence, coalition-building does provide a 
plausible interpretation of the cabinet decision. Such a loose interpretation 
of bargaining, however, would permit the explanation of any group 
decision as a "bargain." There is little evidence of modification of strategies 
or side-payments which rigorous explanations of coalition-building 
anticipate. In this case, coalition construction does not provide a powerful 
explanation of the three-group decisions. 
A third explanation suggests that exchange of information and 
participation in argument and discussion explain shifts in collective 
decisions. Changes in group decision result from reconsideration by 
members who are exposed to new and persuasive argumentation. This 
explanation of changes in the preferences of group members is consistent 
with that provided by analytic explanations of individual choice; indeed, 
the two explanations are complementary rather than competitive. In this 
case, evidence of an analytic component in the process of choice would also 
be consistent with an explanation of persuasive argumentation in a group 
context. Members of Israel's cabinet worked with a prime minister 
committed to extensive debate, discussion, and free, wide-ranging, and 
open expression of opinion. Members listened to new and unfamiliar 
arguments, heard presentations by "experts," examined new information, 
at times on an hourly basis, and challenged each other's arguments and 
estimates.20 Collective consultation, broad participation, and access to 
better information improved the quality of estimation and evaluation and 
encouraged members to reconsider and recalculate. The society of others 
20. By accident rather than design, the procedures followed by Israel's cabinet mirrored 
many of the components of "multiple advocacy," a system of policy management designed to 
improve the rationality of decisions within a presidential system. See (ieorge, 1972. 
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appeared to make it easier for individual members to approximate 
analytic procedures. While this explanation of the impact of the group on 
individual process and choice is the strongest of the three, there is some 
overlap with analytic explanations of individual choice. And second, it is 
not nor can it be a sufficient explanation of the decisions the cabinet made; 
the content of information and argument worked through the processes 
leaders used to affect the choices they made. 
Finally, studies of crisis suggest that stress which results from threat and 
time pressure affects decisions indirectly through the processes of choice. 
Evidence from this case suggests no relationship between crisis-induced 
stress and processes of decision. A low level of threat and no urgency were 
characteristic of the first routine process of decision. As perceptions of 
threat and pressure of time increased to moderate levels, leaders did switch 
to cognitive-analytic processes, but even when the crisis became intense, 
they continued to use the same processes of decision. This weakness of 
crisis-induced stress as an explanation is somewhat surprising. While there 
is considerable controversy about the impact of different levels of stress on 
performance, leaders working under high stress are not expected to 
approach analytic procedures in any of the five decision tasks. Yet Israel's 
leaders did approximate analytic performance of some of the tasks, even 
after the crisis became severe on 30 May. Several interpretations of the 
weak explanatory power of crisis-induced stress in 1967 are plausible. 
First, intense perception of threat and time pressure may have had so 
little impact because of the context in which choices were made. In 
particular, group norms of extended debate and discussion within the 
cabinet may have curbed the tendency to engage in rapid closure and 
simplification. Closely related is the cumulative impact of shared 
experience; members of the cabinet may have developed confidence in their 
colleagues as they became experienced in making difficult decisions. The 
earlier decisions, those that were made when perceptions of crisis were less 
intense, may have provided a reference point when pressure increased. 
Once options had been identified, consequences itemized, and conflicts 
recognized, the problem for decision became more manageable and easier 
to work with. Because surprise did not co-vary with perceptions of crisis, 
the stress that comes from the uncertainty and complexity of difficult 
problems as well as crisis-induced stress may have been less than usual. 
And third, strategic concepts may have contributed, directly and indirectly, 
to reducing stress and its consequences. By facilitating "early" diagnosis of 
a problem, strategic concepts diminished the co-variance of surprise with 
crisis and consequently the severity of stress. More directly, insofar as 
strategic arguments helped in the identification of options and their 
consequences, the stress of uncertainty and complexity in crisis was less. 
While each of these factors separately may explain the weak impact of 
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crisis-induced stress, it is more likely that the interaction of contextual 
factors with affective and cognitive variables—group norms, experience 
when pressure was less rather than surprise when pressure was intense, and 
strategic arguments—together reduced stress or its impact on processes of 
choice. Until further evidence becomes available from other cases of 
national security decision-making, the contribution of each of these factors 
alone or together cannot be determined with precision. And, of course, it is 
possible that crisis-induced stress is not an important component in an 
explanation of process and choice. 
This review of complementary and competing explanations of process 
and choice in 1967 suggests considerable difference in their relative strength 
and importance. The central theoretical relationship among doctrine, 
process, and choice was strong, and strategic arguments were a necessary if 
not sufficient component in the explanation of the options Israel's leaders 
chose. While the procedures and content of group discussion were also 
important in explaining changes in preferences, inclusion of this factor as a 
necessary component in an explanation is somewhat problematic because 
of the strong overlap with process explanations of individual choice. In 
contrast, crisis-induped stress, concurrence-seeking within a group, and 
coalition-building, the major alternative explanations, were of little 
relevance to this case and can be eliminated. Finally, individual decision-
making processes were a necessary intervening variable in an explanation 
of these decisions. Neither strategic concepts nor the procedures and 
content of group discussion were sufficient to explain the choices Israel's 
leaders made. A tracing of the process in 1967, as well as an examination of 
the congruence of other complementary and competitive factors with the 
evidence, suggests a strong relationship between strategic concepts and 
information exchange and debate within the group, through the process, to 
the choices members made. Doctrine and discussion, mediated by process, 
explain both rationality and its constraints in decision. 
If process is a critical component of choice, then the current debate about 
the merits of analytic decision-making is particularly important. Strategies 
of comprehensive decision-making have been the object of considerable 
criticism, but the criticism is not directed only at its obvious failures. It is 
not the relatively weak link, for example, between analytic procedures of 
information-processing and optimal revision that is the primary focus of 
concern. On the contrary, critics suggest that an analytic process may be 
positively harmful. 
Disappointed by the record of past performance and skeptical of future 
improvement, scholars point to the strong evidence of constrained 
rationality among decisionmakers. These constraints to rationality are of 
particular concern in national security decision-making. Given the 
diffusion of sophisticated technology, disaster avoidance is of the essence if 
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the international system is to survive. Reliance on leaders whose rationality 
is constrained to manage dangerous technology and complicated problems 
requires a leap of faith unjustified by the evidence; indeed, constrained 
rationality precludes a comprehensive decision strategy. Especially in 
national security policy, the priority must be the avoidance of error. 
The alternative to comprehensive decision-making is a strategy of 
sensible satisficing or incrementalism (Morgan, 1977:101-125). As a 
criticism of analytic procedures, satisficing at times becomes an umbrella 
term with a number of distinct if related meanings. When rigorously 
defined by the cybernetic explanation, it refers to the choice of the first 
satisfactory option. Generally, this is not a recommended strategy, but 
some of its proponents do argue that satisficing is easier for those who use it 
(Thompson, 1971). It is "efficient" because the expenditure of resources is 
much less. It requires less effort and removes the burden of enormous 
responsibility which the attempt to be comprehensive imposes. A 
constrained capacity for rationality dictates satisficing as a rational 
strategy. 
More often, satisficing or incrementalism refers to the choice of modest 
rather than ambitious objectives. Limited objectives are well-suited to the 
complexities of the contemporary international strategic environment and 
to a limited capacity to understand these complexities. When errors occur, 
they are less likely to be disastrous if objectives are modest; excesses are 
bred by the urge to control rather than to manage. If the priority is disaster 
avoidance, limited objectives are appropriate in a dangerous environment. 
A third interpretation of sensible incrementalism suggests modesty not 
in the scope but in the approach to objectives. Modesty in approach may 
not only avoid serious error, it may also improve the quality of 
international political life. When an objective is approached incrementally 
through a series of small steps, accommodation and cooperation become 
less risky and therefore more likely. If goals are approached by degree, 
cooperation is less dangerous for those who try it. If the worst occurs and 
an adversary betrays, the loss is manageable if not small at early stages of 
the process. Because the risk is less and the loss is small, cooperation 
becomes more likely if it is pursued incrementally (Schelling, 1960:134-135 
and Jervis, 1978:181).21 A slow and gradual pace also reduces the 
consequences of error since policymakers can benefit from feedback to 
correct mistakes. Of course, incrementalism can be chosen carefully, after 
comprehensive consideration of the alternatives.22 It is, however, a defining 
21. Schelling and Jervis discuss the propensity of a series of small transactions to reduce 
conflict and promote cooperation. Cooperation is easier not only because risk is less when 
steps are gradual, but also because the benefit of cheating is less if progress has been 
incremental and limited. 
22. Kissinger's application of step-by-step diplomacy to the reduction of conflict between 
Egypt and Israel probably is better explained by comprehensive consideration of alternative 
approaches than by a routine search for the first acceptable strategy. 
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characteristic of a sensible satisficer; the preferred policy fits easily with the 
decision-making strategy. 
Fourth, critics of "the best and the brightest" extend modesty beyond 
scope and approach to objectives to include the confidence with which a 
leader chooses. A modest assessment of the reliability and validity of 
estimates is appropriate given the pervasive uncertainties of the 
international strategic environment; indeed, a healthy respect for 
uncertainty is the distinguishing characteristic of a sensible decisionmaker 
(Morgan, 1977:120). Skepticism prevents overconfidence in spurious 
estimates and avoids the fallacy of misplaced concreteness which is so often 
characteristic of an analytic decisionmaker. A sober assessment of human 
capacity is a better approach to a dangerous, capricious, and intractable 
environment. 
Those who are more hopeful about human capacity to be rational defend 
a comprehensive decision strategy with empirical and normative argument. 
First, the criterion of efficiency as ease is dismissed out of hand as logically 
inconsistent and ethically unacceptable. A claim that satisficing is efficient 
logically implies some criterion of optimizing; the optimal point is 
determined not by the decisionmaker, however, who never sees the total 
picture, but by the policy analyst who observes the uncertainties and 
complexities and applauds the reduction of effort made possible by the 
selection of the first satisfactory alternative. That choice is easier and less 
expensive in time and effort is not an adequate ethical basis for 
recommending a satisficing strategy. 
The thesis that modesty in scope and approach to objectives is 
characteristic only of sensible satisficing is also open to question. Limited 
objectives and incremental progress promise prudence and an opportunity 
for feedback and correction. But caution also may result from analytic 
processes. In 1967, for example, Israel's leaders found it rational to be 
prudent: when uncertainty was highest and complexity greatest, between 
23 and 28 May, they chose not to use force but to delay. They were prudent 
not through incrementalism but through analytic examination of the cost, 
benefit, and likelihood of the consequences of alternative solutions to a 
difficult and dangerous problem. And if prudence is not characteristic of 
incremental processes only, incrementalism may also produce imprudent 
decisions. A process that excludes longer-range consequences and a 
comprehensive overview to concentrate on immediate effects may create 
unintended commitments that overextend rather than limit expenditure of 
resources. Some historians of American policy in Vietnam, for example, 
contend that, because policymakers proceeded incrementally through a 
series of small decisions, they never considered or understood the broader 
consequences of the choices they made and the result was quagmire 
(Schlesinger, 1968:47).n Through a series of marginal steps, errors are 
23. Policy analysts, no less than policymakers, frequently find what they are looking for 
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compounded rather than corrected, and in a chain of decisions one poor 
judgment contaminates all the others. When leaders miss the forest for the 
trees, disaster is not less likely but simply less dramatic. 
The argument that feedback in an incremental process reduces error is 
no more convincing. On the contrary, cumulative error is particularly 
likely if leaders use incremental strategies to manage international 
problems. Such a strategy is successful only in a decentralized, pluralistic 
environment where sustained feedback permits self-correction and 
adjustment. Decision-making on issues of national security is usually 
centralized, hierarchical, and secret. Far from being appropriate to the 
complexity of security problems, a satisfying strategy is unsuited to the 
political and organizational context of national security decision-making 
even in the most open societies. Its requirements generally are violated by 
the organization of national security decision-making. 
If disaster-avoidance and reduced error are neither necessary nor likely 
outcomes of incremental processes, the case for sensible incrementalism 
rests ultimately on two grounds: the need for modesty and humility on the 
part of those responsible for decision and a fundamental skepticism of 
human capacity for rationality. Modesty and humility are sensible 
attributes in an uncertain and complex world. But they are not necessarily 
restricted to incrementalists. A distinguishing characteristic of analytic 
decisionmakers is their recognition of the uncertainties in their environ­
ment, their rejection of categorical estimates, and their acknowledgment of 
the difficulty of the choices they face. Though misplaced concreteness may 
create false certainty, great confidence in judgment and choice is neither 
expected nor characteristic of analytic decisionmakers. If modesty and 
humility are the issue, a stronger case can be made for sensible and modest 
optimizing than for sensible incrementalism. 
It is emphasis on constrained rationality which fuels the opposition to 
analytic decision strategies. At least three issues are relevant here. First, 
available evidence suggests variable performance by decisionmakers; while 
Cartesians cannot ignore the findings of cognitive psychologists, skeptics 
cannot dismiss the evidence of rationality on the part of some 
when they read history. Those who urge a strategy of sensible satisficing point to systems 
analysis and programmed and planned budgeting within the Pentagon as the source of the 
disaster in Vietnam (Halberstam, 1969). Leaders fell victims to the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness and their overwhelming desire to control rather than to manage: Vietnam 
becomes the sin of pride and precision. Those who defend a comprehensive strategy argue 
that, precisely because decision-making was incremental, leaders arrived at a monumental 
disaster without ever stopping to consider what they were doing and why. More, not less, 
analysis would have avoided the imperceptible commitment that grew out of control. Ellsberg 
(1971) and Gelb (1971) dispute the interpretation that decision-making was incremental and 
argue rather that each president quite carefully considered the costs and consequences of his 
options but chose to achieve stalemate and avoid loss rather than achieve gain. It was not the 
decision process, they argue, but the decision rule that produced catastrophe. The lessons of 
history, it appears, are far from obvious. 
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decisionmakers some of the time under some circumstances. Although the 
neurological and psychological obstacles to rational decision-making are 
considerable, they are not determining.24 That rationality is constrained is 
established, but it is debatable whether the emphasis is better placed on the 
constraints or on the rationality. 
Second, for those who share the perspective of the phenomenologist, the 
arguments of leaders themselves cannot be irrelevant to this debate. 
Generally activist by nature, those responsible for decisions and their 
consequences do not share the pessimism of some of those who watch. 
They expect that they can and must choose the best possible rather than the 
first adequate option. To manage international and national security 
problems, they usually emphasize the rationality rather than the 
constraints in decision. If leaders considered themselves or their 
counterparts to be severely constrained, an attempt to persuade, bargain, 
or negotiate would be wasteful if not dangerous. Yet leaders routinely 
bargain and persuade across a wide variety of strategic issues as they do in 
many other policy environments. When they choose such classic 
techniques as threats and promises to manage conflict with their 
adversaries, decisionmakers seek to alter estimates of probability and value 
of future events. If leaders considered their counterparts to be incapable of 
logical thinking, rational judgment, and efficient choice, then all such 
activity would be an exercise in futility. 
To impose order on their complex and uncertain environment, leaders 
attribute rationality both to themselves and to their adversaries. They build 
in contingency plans for error, miscalculation, even irrationality, but their 
pessimism is constrained by the reality principle.25 They want to be and 
consider that they are rational in argument, process, and choice. The 
alternative to an assumption of rationality is paralysis, and those charged 
with responsibility tend to consider paralysis irrational. They see little 
alternative to rationality. 
Finally, if leaders see few practical alternatives to rationality as a basis 
for choice, scholars find few acceptable alternatives to rationality as a 
24. While cognitive psychologists emphasize the sub-optimal performance of com­
plicated tasks of judgment by "human computers," neurophysiologists argue that 
understanding of the brain and its functions has been vastly oversimplified. Analogies to a 
computer are misleadingly simple; the brain is infinitely more complicated than any man-
made machine, and its operations are so sophisticated that any technological metaphor is 
inappropriate. 
25. Because military planners are skeptical of their adversary's capacity to be rational, 
they hedge and design contingency plans for the irrational. One consequence of such 
skepticism is stockpiled nuclear and conventional weapons to reduce uncertainty for both 
parties. A heavy emphasis on constrained rationality in the international strategic 
environment leads to insurance through overkill, an overkill which is never quite sufficient to 
reduce the likelihood of error by a limited adversary. The practical consequences of an 
assumption of a limited capacity for rationality are as dangerous as the consequences of 
policies which tax and extend the limits of human capacity (cf. Steinbruner, 1976). 
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standard of evaluation. This is particularly so on issues of national security 
where the consequences of constrained rationality may be beyond the 
capacity of a civilized society to absorb or comprehend. If leaders cannot 
be rational, they cannot be held responsible. In its extreme form, 
acceptance of arationality must preclude judgments of responsibility in the 
face of history. In this reductionist argument, if what leaders choose is 
determined rather than decided, they are excused from errors of omission 
and commission on their path to choice. Only if some norm of rationality 
informs the analysis of decision can leaders be held accountable for their 
choices. To judge decisionmakers irresponsible, they must be free to be 
rational. 
If an analytic decision strategy is preferred for ethical reasons, the 
concept of rationality must extend beyond proficiency if it is to be useful as 
a normative standard. Technical proficiency within the framework of 
poorly conceived or poorly articulated concepts and arguments will not 
provide the quality of decision which both participants and observers seek. 
In 1967, for example, the principal constraints to rationality were rooted 
not in an inability to perform complicated calculations but rather in the 
inadequate logic of the arguments which structured the process of choice. 
The logic wasflawed in critically important areas: incomplete valuation of 
interests and their interrelationships; inadequate delimitation of the scope 
of deterrence; and only partial examination of relationships between 
warning and response and challenge and defense. Flawed logic constrained 
the choices Israel's leaders made, and an evaluation of their decisions 
cannot be divorced either from the substance of the issues they confronted 
or from the arguments that organized their discussion. All decisionmakers 
begin a process of choice with a set of beliefs or concepts, and the crucial 
question is what kind and of what quality. Leaders, moreover, are rarely 
original in the concepts they use; in almost all policy arenas, they generally 
draw from an available body of analysis and argument. If the evaluation of 
decisions and the processes used to make them is not to be ahistorical, the 
substance of these arguments must be read back into the evaluation of 
process and choice. 
The current generation of leaders, when faced with decisions about 
national security, especially when the use of force is possible, continue to 
draw on the concept of deterrence. The continuing relevance of the concept 
raises three quite distinct issues among those who evaluate its use: poor 
quality in the development and application of the concept in any particular 
case; inherent obstacles to logic which may be built into the concept of 
deterrence; and the consequences whichflow from the logic of a deterrence 
argument when it is well-developed and consistently applied. 
The first issue seems to be the most easily dealt with. If a concept was 
flawed in its development or its application—as it was in both in 1967—the 
flaws may have been specific to one group of leaders and, consequently, 
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remediable—either by changing the leaders or improving the argument. 
Remediation may not be possible, however, if deterrence is weak in theory 
as well as in practice. Here, a number of considerations are relevant. 
First, a complete and coherent concept may not be possible given the 
multiplicity of possible contingencies, the variety of options generally 
available to challenge, and the differentiated capabilities at the conven­
tional level; the requirements of a logical argument of deterrence may 
simply be too demanding.26 Second, in part because the logic of deterrence 
is so heavily dependent on context, appropriate strategies for success 
generally cannot be detailed independently of the issues and the parties. 
Even then, it is difficult to specify whether ambiguous or precise 
commitments promote credibility or whether narrowly or broadly 
delimited strategies provoke challenge. Both flexibility and commitment 
offer advantages, and the particular context is an important determinant of 
the appropriateness of different responses.27 Because deterrence is 
underdetermined as an argument and offers few contingent hypotheses and 
conditional predictions, it is frail as a policy guideline; it says too little. 
The weakness in argument is particularly serious given the demanding 
conditions for the success of deterrence and the severe consequences of 
failure. If the concept of deterrence says too little, the strategy may require 
too much. If deterrence is to succeed, at the very least a rational adversary 
must consider a commitment credible and the costs and risks of a challenge 
incalculable and uncontrollable.28 Even then, certainty about substantive 
interests may dominate uncertainty about the consequences of action.29 
26. George and Smoke (1974:54) question whether a logical concept of deterrence at the 
conventional level is possible. Given the large scope of contingent possibilities, a single 
concept may be unable to meet minimal criteria of completeness and coherence. 
27 George and Smoke (1974:65) examine the consequences of broad and narrow 
delimitation of deterrence strategies. While a stringent delimitation of the scope of deterrence 
reduces linkage among interests, it may promote challenge by encouraging an adversary to 
"design around" the narrow commitment. George and Smoke (1974:550-567), Snyder and 
Diesing (1977:214, 243), Morgan, 1977. and Lockhart, 1978 discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of flexibility and commitment under different circumstances. In particular, 
Snyder and Diesing find in their investigation of crisis-bargaining that decisionmakers 
generally choose to preserve their options by retaining ambiguity in their verbal declarations. 
Crisis bargainers were at least as concerned with avoiding escalation through mutual 
commitments, keeping their options open, and minimizing risks as they were with maximizing 
coercive gains. Paradoxically, even while decisionmakers tend to resolve uncertainty through 
conservative arguments of deterrent credibility, they resolve complexity by trying to reduce 
costs rather than maximize gains. Since an emphasis on deterrent credibility inflates cost, the 
two strategies are not fully consistent. 
28. George and Smoke (1974:526-527) examine the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
deterrence success in a number of cases and find these to be the two major conditions. There 
are a series of minor conditions the challenger's perceptions of the defender's military 
capability, the challenger's perception of the defender's motivation, the challenger's 
perception that only force can effect change, and the challenger's willingness to accept 
compensation elsewhere which are neither necessary nor sufficient. 
29. Snyder and Diesing (1977:502-503) make this argument about a defender, but the 
argument can be extended to the challenger as well. They suggest that, while the certainty of 
interests may be calculated, the uncertain consequences of action are not calculated or 
controlled but gambled. 
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Should a challenger consider that present injury outweighs anticipated 
cost, or calculate cost on a basis not understood by the defender, or simply 
miscalculate, deterrence is likely to fail. 
Yet trying and failing to deter is worse than not trying at all. Once an 
adversary chooses to challenge, a defender who has tried to deter exercises 
less freedom in choosing an appropriate response; choice is constrained by 
the original commitment. Even if a challenge is partial rather than general, 
as it was in 1967, fully rational leaders find a non-violent option at best 
costly and at worst prohibitive when they consider alternative responses. If 
commitments are interdependent—and they are often difficult to separate 
in an ongoing relationship—even a partial challenge becomes generalized, 
and options that exclude the use of force are devalued. Because leaders 
have attempted to prevent the unwanted through a threat of force, a resort 
to force becomes the obvious choice when their attempt fails. Or so the 
logic of deterrence dictates. It is when the argument is logical that the cost 
of alternatives to force in response to challenge is inflated. The limits to 
rational choice lie not only in the constrained processes of decisionmakers 
but also in the logic of the arguments they use. When the experiment is 
very expensive, heavy reliance on a strategy of conflict management which 
is overdemanding and underspecified appears foolhardy at worst and 
problematic at best. 
Finally, deterrence is not a strategy of conflict reduction. At best, it is a 
mangement technique. It does not address the fundamental incom­
patibilities between the parties which fuel a conflict relationship, and it 
contains rather than confronts grievances which motivate challengers to 
risk the use of force. The underlying premise of deterrence is one of 
continuing hostility in an adversarial relationship which requires 
containment rather than compromise and responds to the threat of 
punishment rather than the promise of reward. Insofar as deterrence 
discourages experimentation with strategies of conflict reduction, its logic 
is at least partly self-fulfilling and, insofar as it diverts attention from the 
issues at stake, deterrence is even more expensive than a cost-benefit 
analysis would suggest. Once the logic of deterrence is understood, its 
opportunity costs must be included in any assessment of its ap­
propriateness as a strategy of conflict management. 
If deterrence is weak in theory, it is even poorer in practice in the Middle 
East. In 1967, deterrence failed not because President Nasser misread 
signals or found commitments incredible, but because he miscalculated 
relative capabilities. Prime Minister Eshkol and his colleagues chose and 
used force in large part to restore the credibility of deterrence, but the sense 
of injury whichflowed from that use of force made deterrence more difficult 
and more expensive after 1967 than it had been before. By 1973, when the 
alleged asymmetry in relative capabilities was even greater than it had been 
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in 1967 and Israel's intention to retaliate if attacked no less clear, President 
Sadat carefully calculated the advantages and disadvantages of a challenge 
and deliberately chose to do so. This dismal record of deterrence as a 
strategy of conflict management should make it highly suspect to Israel's 
policymakers. Especially as Israel enters a new and unprecedented 
relationship with its most important neighbor, the premises and 
consequences of a strategy of deterrence—even a strategy based on an 
inclusive and coherent concept—must be reconsidered and reassessed. 
First, Israel's leaders must examine the appropriateness of deterrence as 
a strategy of conflict management in a changed relationship with Egypt. 
Deterrence presumes permanent hostility and aggressive intent and designs 
strategy and tactics accordingly; this basic premise needs reexamination.30 
Although important incompatibilities remain between Egypt and Israel, a 
peace treaty has been signed, relationships have been normalized, and there 
is now significant compatibility as well as incompatibility of interest 
between the two. Particularly important is the increasingly salient goal of 
war-avoidance in an era of unsurpassed destructive capability even if 
technology is conventional rather than nuclear. When avoiding the use of 
force is a constraint for both parties, it becomes a shared goal.31 Although 
the appropriate mix of accommodation and coercion is a central dilemma 
in international political life, an emphasis on common as well as 
competitive interests and use of inducement rather than threat is more 
likely to reduce rather than simply manage a conflict.32 Deterrence must 
become one among a panoply of techniques rather than a principal 
component of a concept of national security, and security must include not 
only the deterrence of challenge but the reduction of grievance. 
Second, even if deterrence is reduced to one of many rather than the 
major strategy of conflict management, its scope must be delimited. If 
Israel's leaders are to construct viable security arrangements, not only with 
Egypt but with other parties to the conflict, they must distinguish the 
essential from the desirable and decide what is critical to deter. Before once 
again making commitments which constrain, they must examine the cost of 
failing to fulfill these commitments. Before leaders draw "red lines" which 
must not be crossed, the value of the interests which underlie such casus 
belli must be assessed and reassessed. Are these interests enduring, or do 
they respond to a particular environment at a specific moment in time? Are 
30. In an examination of the arguments of spiral and deterrence as competitive 
explanations of conflict escalation and prescriptions for conflict management, Jervis 
(1976:58-113) underlines the critical role of the estimate of an adversary's intentions. 
31. Snyder and Diesing (1977:280) find that, even during a crisis, decisionmakers pay 
more attention to avoiding war than to the benefits the use of force may provide. 
32. George, Hall, and Simons(1971),Georgeand Smoke(1974:588-613),and Snyderand 
Diesing (1977:207-281) examine the difficulties of designing the appropriate mix of 
inducement and threat. In a related investigation, Jervis (1978) details the rigorous conditions 
which are necessary for inducement to succeed. 
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commitments likely to ossify while underlying interests evolve and change? 
How can commitments be made flexible enough so that they reflect rather 
than determine the issues at stake? And even if agreed-upon commitments 
do reflect stable and intrinsic interests, when, where, and how much 
constitutes an unacceptable challenge? Is it an infraction of numbers of 
forces permitted in a demilitarized zone? Is it the forward movement of a 
new system of "defensive" equipment? Is it the purchase and deployment of 
sophisticated offensive weaponry? How much and how many threaten 
deterrence? When? Are a series of small steps as challenging as a single 
major initiative? Only through contingent analysis are leaders likely to 
delimit deterrence and reduce the consequences of its logic. Finally, leaders 
must decide which actions cannot be deterred at all. They must consider 
not only where deterrence is appropriate but, far more important, where it 
is inappropriate. 
If conflict is to be reduced rather than managed, the constraining logic of 
deterrence must be fully understood and appreciated. The case for a 
comprehensive decision strategy rests in no small part on a comprehensive 
concept of rationality, and rationality encompasses not only the efficiency 
of choice or the quality of judgment, but also the logic of argument. 
Contrary to the dominant interpretation, evidence drawn from this 
examination of decision-making on deterrence and defense in 1967 
suggests a number of flaws in the logic of argument. The evidence also 
shows that members of the cabinet did learn; they did change their minds. 
Although the lessons of history are neither simple nor obvious, a sober look 
at the repeated failure of deterrence may induce Israel's leaders to seek 
other strategies to structure security and reduce conflict. If leaders do learn 
principally from failure, the logic of deterrence may be less seductive. 
Appendix: Steps for Performing Decision Analysis 
1) Examine process of decision making to discover if it is sufficiently 
rational (analytic) to justify applying decision analysis. Unless 
choosers generate verbal or numerical cost, benefit, and likelihood 
estimates, it is not possible to use decision analysis in an ex post facto 
manner. 
2) Determine if decision process is mainly interdependent or indepen­
dent. An interdependent process involves at least two choosers and is 
a process where one side's "best choice" is calculated based on its 
expectation of the other side's choice. Each side needs to have 
knowledge of the utilities or values of each other. An independent 
process generally involves only one actor, who seeks to maximize its 
own expected value without taking into account the value of another 
party. 
3) For a single actor, structure perceived options as mutually exclusive 
action forks on a decision tree; action forks are alternatives under the 
control of the chooser, i.e., that which is being decided may be 
considered as actions to be taken. 
4) Specify consequences of alternatives as mutually exclusive, logically 
exhaustive event forks on the tree; event forks are consequences of 
options—branches on the tree not under control of the chooser. 
5) Estimate likelihood of occurrence for each event fork. Code verbal 
statements (about what may occur as a result of one option's being 
selected) into numerical estimates. The Sherman Kent Scale is one 
tool for translating words into probabilities. 
6) Determine expected outcomes—combinations of forks—for each 
option. Outcomes are logical derivatives of options and conse­
quences; hence, it is possible to deduce all outcomes, given 
assumptions about expected consequences as stated by decision-
makers. 
7) Discover dimensions of value underlying each consequence, and 
determine relative weight among dimensions, e.g., via interviews and 
content analysis of documents, speeches, etc. 
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8) Find a dimension of value with a well-defined scale, e.g., money, 
casualties, barrels of oil, etc., and determine the benefits and costs for 
each outcome along this dimension. 
9) For dimensions with an unknown scale, here is one procedure to 
develop a metric for combination with probabilities via multiplica­
tion: 
a) Rank outcomes on the dimension from least preferred at 
bottom to most preferred at top. 
b) Estimate relative distances between pairs of overlapping or 
adjoining pairs of distances. 
c) Set some pair of outcomes equal to X, translate all other 
relative distances between pairs of outcomes in terms of 
proportions of X, then solve for X. 
d) Set the most preferred outcome equal to 100 and the least 
preferred to zero on a utility scale. 
e) Derive the utility of each outcome between 100 and zero by 
subtracting X and proportions of X from 100 and then from 
correspondingly smaller points on the scale. 
f) Summarize utility estimates for each outcome on scale from 
100 to zero. 
g) Set the neutral or status quo outcome equal to a new zero 
value, e.g., the outcome to which the decision maker is 
relatively indifferent. 
h) Estimate distance between each outcome by subtracting each 
utility from the adjoining one, under the constraint that the 
neutral outcome is now zero; thus, there are positive values 
above the neutral outcome and negative values below the zero 
valued outcome. 
i) Estimate relative importance of each dimension to obtain a 
weighting factor; for example, if a military security dimension 
is three times as important as an economic scale, simply 
multiply the utility of each outcome by three, to derive the 
"equivalent dollar value" for each outcome on the military 
security scale. 
j) Create a table showing all dimensions of value relevant to a 
particular choice. 
10) Sum each outcome across all the dimensions to create multi­
dimensional value; in the situations where an outcome is positive on 
one dimension and negative on another, this step is equivalent to 
subtracting costs from benefits to obtain multi-dimensional value. In 
other words, (benefit - cost) = value. 
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11) Place the sum for each outcome in the circle for that particular 
outcome on the right hand portion of the tree. 
12) Multiply the likelihood of an event fork times the value of the 
outcome, and add the result to the product of likelihood times value 
for the other outcome(s) on that particular node, to calculate 
"expected value." 
13) Repeat the process of calculating expected value for each remaining 
empty circle in the tree, moving from right to left, until the circle 
representing the options themselves is reached. 
14) Compare the expected values for each option; if all numbers are 
negative, select the option with the smallest expected value; if the 
numbers are all positive, select the option with the largest expected 
value; if the numbers are both negative and positive, select the option 
with the largest positive expected value. These options selected would 
be the rational or "expected-value maximizing" choices. 
15) To conduct sensitivity analysis on value dimensions, re-calculate 
expected values under different weightings of the dimensions, or by 
excluding some dimensions and retaining others. 
16) Determine if choice is sensitive to information via graphic or 
algebraic methods. A graphic procedure involves the following two 
steps. First, plot the expected value of two options, assuming zero 
probability and certainty of consequences for which choice may be 
sensitive. Second, ascertain if the two lines for the options intersect. 
The point at which the lines cross indicates a threshold probability, 
i.e., where choice should change from one option to another in order 
to minimize expected loss or maximize expected gain. An algebraic 
procedure may be illustrated by the following formula. 
Set EV, = EV2

P(A) + (1 - P) = P(C) + (1 - P)D

P(A) + B - P(B) = P(C) + D - P(D)

P(A) - P(B) - P(C) + P(D) = (D - B)

P(A) ( B C + D) = (D - B)

_ D - B , the threshold probability 
A - B - C + D 
The graphic and algebraic methods should yield approximately the 
same results. 
17) Conduct Bayesian analysis to revise opinions about probabilities, 
especially if choice is sensitive to information. 
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18) Conduct Bayesian Analysis: 
a) Determine if Bayes is applicable to the predecision process. 
1) Is there a need to update prior opinion in light of new 
information? 
2) Are there alternative hypotheses for which new informa­
tion is relevant? 
3) Is there documentary evidence from which to derive 
quantitative estimates of the impact of a new datum on 
hypothesis validity? 
b) Given the need to update prior opinion, three ratios should be 
created: 
1) Ratio of Prior Likelihoods (PL) 
2) Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
3) Ratio of Posterior Probabilities (PP) 
c) Assess Prior Likelihoods (PL) of alternative hypotheses (e.g., 
Hi and H2 as mutually exclusive likelihoods of some event 
occurring). 
1) Convert documentary evidence for each hypothesis into 
numerical estimates using Sherman Kent Scale or some 
other means for translating words into numerical es­
timates. 
2) Create ratio of Prior Likelihoods:  P ( H '  ) 
P (H2) 
d) Create Likelihood Ratio (LR): 
Likelihood of observing new datum (D) if first hypothesis 
(Hi) is true, to probability of observing that same datum 
(D) if second hypothesis (H2) is true. 
P(D/Hi) 
P(D/H2) 
e) Determine Posterior Probabilities (PP): 
1) Multiply (LR) X (PL). 
2) Multiply numerators of (LR) and (PL), then multiply 
denominators of (LR) and (PL).*

^ P(H,/D) P(D/Hi) P(Hi)

}
 P(H2/D) P(D/H2) P(H2)

(PP) (LR) (PL)

* Do not divide ratios before multiplication. 
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 Normalize Posterior Probability Ratio 
1) Sum numerator and denominator of (PP). 
2) Divide numerator by sum of numerator and denominator 
(new Hi). 
3) Subtract dividend (new Hi) from 1.0 to obtain new H2. 
g) Compare (PP) to (PL) to assess impact of information on 
Hypothesis. For example, calculate relative change and 
absolute difference. 
h) Since probabilities have a ceiling of 100%, one may wish to 
convert likelihoods to odds, which do not have a ceiling/?er se. 
To convert probabilities to odds, 
1) Let P(Hi) = .375; thus P(H2) = 1 - P(Hi) = .625. 
2) Convert .375 to odds; then convert .625 to odds. 
3) Create ratio of Prior Likelihoods 
P(Hi)
 = J75_ 
P(H2) .625 
4) Sum numerator and denominator to get new denominator 
(1.0), with prior numerator (.375). 
.375 
1.000 
5)	 Reduce ratio by dividing numerator and denominator by 
Least Common Denominator (e.g., 125) 
-^21 = i  . , the odds of P(Hi) or .375 
1.000 8 
6)	 Repeat steps 4 and 5 for P(H2) = .625, i.e.,

.625
 = _5

1.000 8 
7) Note that odds of P(H,) plus odds for P(H2) equal unity: 
Thus 
8) I odds P(Hi) = odds P(H2) as 1 P(H,)=P(H 2 ) 
9) Finally, to obtain odds ZiHii , divide odds P(H 1) by odds 
P(H2) P ( H 2 ) 
I 
odds P(Hi) 8 2
 x £ = i or 3-5 
odds P(H2) 5 8 5	 5 
8 
10) In short, the original probabilities of .375 and .625 convert 
to 3:5 odds, to be read "three to five odds," or "three 
chances in eight." 
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i) Odds are difficult to work with in sensitivity analysis and in 
estimating the impact of information on choice; hence one 
may wish to convert odds to probabilities, which are easier to 
manipulate. Here are two methods: 
Method /** 
Odds •{• Probability = 
Example: 
Odds = \ probability ^ .60 
Probability =-j^— = -J- = J -j = .375 
Method 2** 
Odds £ Probability = ^—r-
Example: 
Odds =•% Probability ^ .60 
Probability =
 3 I 5 =j= -375 
j) Since any Likelihood Ratio (LR) results in more movement of 
the odds when the prior odds are high, Bayes Theorem can be 
written in logarithmic form. Logs give greater weight to lower 
odds and probabilities than to higher ones. 
log  P ( H ' / D ) - l o ggl 0  P ( p / H ' ) ++  l o gg1Og  l 0P (H/D) ~ log P(D/H2) + log 
P (H2/D) ~ l 0  g P(D/H2) + l 0  g P(H2) 
Note that the logarithmic expression of Bayes sums rather 
than multiplies. 
For further information on probabilities and odds see De Francesco 
(1975). 
** Note: Both methods are used to find the probability of an event occurring(p(a)). To find 
the probability of an event not occurring use the following: 1 — p(a) = p(b). 
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